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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis examines the role of Leo Amery as a military commentator and his decision to 
create the Army League in 1937. The League went on to argue for the introduction of 
conscription prior to the outbreak of the Second World War. In 1948 Leo Amery decided to 
resurrect the Army League and use it publicise defence issues at the beginning of the Cold 
War. Leo and Julian Amery attempted to shape defence policy in the late 1940s and early 
1950s by using the Army League as a pressure group to influence Government policy and 
public opinion. It focuses particularly on the League’s report, The Army in the Nuclear Age, 
the culmination of several years of work by a small study group which included a 
considerable contribution from Basil Liddell Hart. The League published its report in 
November 1955 seeking to ‘educate’ the public on the key defence issues of the day including 
the impact of nuclear weapons on strategic planning and the need for a reorganisation of the 
Army. At a time when Britain was involved in two major counterinsurgency operations in 
Kenya and Malaya and a third was beginning in Cyprus the report also attempted to make a 
strategic case for retaining the remaining colonies and overseas bases at least until the end of 
the Cold War. However, on the contentious question of the continuing validity of National 
Service the League was ambiguous, proffering a solution based on utilising colonial 
manpower to make up any shortfall in recruitment and a reorganisation of the existing army 
manpower back into a small professional force with a limited conscript element. The report 
arrived as the Government was discussing the future of conscription and commencing a long-
term defence review which meant that the League’s proposals were studied in detail by the 
War Office and Ministry of Defence at the behest of defence ministers. Therefore the report 
and the Government’s response to it add to our understanding both of the formation of 
defence policy immediately prior to the Suez crisis and of an alternative policy based on an 
aggressive response to further decolonization and anti-colonialism based on national security 
concerns.  
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Introduction  
 
 
In 1937 Leo Amery Member of Parliament (MP) formed The Army, Home and Empire 
League (Army League) to campaign for rearmament and the introduction of conscription. Leo 
Amery a former Cabinet minister and journalist had spent many years campaigning for Army 
reform and the introduction of national service before the First World War. He was veteran 
pressure group campaigner with many years of experience publicising military and imperial 
issues to the public and the government. The creation of the Army League in 1937 was his 
response to appeasement and what he considered to be mismanagement of the defence effort. 
The League’s activities in the late 1930s included the publication of A Policy For the Army in 
1937. In 1938 the Army League became the Citizens Service League and campaigned for the 
introduction of conscription prior to the start of the Second World War. The pre-war League 
had an active membership of several thousand. The League in the 1930s produced a monthly 
pamphlet and held meetings and a national rally. The activities of the Citizens Service League 
were suspended in 1939 at the start of the Second World War. In 1948 Leo Amery decided to 
restart the League to campaign for better conditions of service for the Regular Army. In 1950 
a study group was formed under the leadership of Leo Amery to write a report to highlight 
post-war defence issues and the impact of nuclear weapons on Army. The study group 
included Julian Amery and Basil Liddell Hart, who is considered to be one of greatest 
military thinkers and historians of his generation, both of whom were its most active 
contributors. In November 1955 the Army League published the Army in the Nuclear Age: An 
Report by the Army Study Group.
1
  
 
Both reports were designed to inform the public and influence Government opinion 
concerning the Army and defence issues. The League’s 1937 report was intended to promote 
the Army to the general public. The 1955 report attempted to articulate a British Army 
strategy for the nascent ‘nuclear age’. The report also attempted set out a plan for a 
reorganisation of the Army to reflect the ‘modern conditions’ of the mid 1950s. However, the 
report did not influence Government policy and must be viewed as a failure. This thesis seeks 
to explore Leo Amerys association with the Army League and the preparation and publication 
of the 1937 and 1955 report’s. The League was comprised of a group of distinguished ex-
Army officers, serving Members of Parliament from both sides of the political spectrum, 
including several ex-Cabinet Ministers and contemporary experts on military affairs. They 
represented a substantial amount of expertise on military and strategic matters spanning many 
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decades of public service. In the 1930s members included, Field Marshal Lord Milne, the 
former CIGS 1926 -1933, Lt-General Sir Ronald Charles who had been Director of Military 
Operations and Intelligence at the War Office (WO) 1931-34; The Marquess of Willingdon 
the former Viceroy of India 1931-36, Sir Edward Grigg, Conservative MP for Altrincham, 
later Lord Altrincham and Field Marshal Sir Philip Chetwode, the former Commander-in-
Chief in India 1930-1936. In the early and mid 1950s members included Lieutenant General 
Sir Fredrick Morgan, Major General JFC Fuller, Lieutenant General Sir Wilfred Lindsell and 
the Labour MP Reginald Paget.  
 
The 1937 report was launched nationally and widely distributed by the members of the 
League. The 1955 report was widely disseminated at home and abroad and well received by 
military experts and the press in America. It also received television and coverage in the UK. 
The most significant, and active, members during this period were Leo Amery, the chairman 
of the League, and his son Julian Amery, who was its secretary. The both of the reports was 
prepared by a small study group which was drawn from among its most eminent members 
Although there was a strong element of Conservative imperial opinion represented within the 
League, the Report did strive to be objective and was more or less successful in this regard; 
the influence of Liddell Hart is clearly discernible in the 1955 report when it comes to its 
remarks on Army reorganisation and greater use of mobility based on highly mobile armoured 
forces and the use of air mobility to deal with colonial or regional emergencies. However, the 
overwhelming strategic conceptual influence is that of Leo Amery in the 1930s and of Julian 
Amery in the 1950s. 
 
The League’s methodology was simple: produce a well researched and factually accurate 
report which contained alternative policy recommendations that would be accessible to the 
general public and noticed by the press which could then be used to influence or assist 
Government policy. The League also used personal and social connections to advance its 
ideas in Parliament Defence pressure groups can be divided into three main categories: 
associational, atomic and institutional. There are three standard approaches taken by defence 
lobby groups; firstly, to create favourable public opinion which the Government could not 
ignore; secondly, to lobby Ministers and MPs directly within Parliament; thirdly, to lobby 
officials within Government departments. The Army League, the Navy League and the Air 
League are associational groups. This is because they exist to promote the interests of their 
respective services. Institutional groups include the services themselves or the Chiefs of Staff 
(COS). Atomic groups are spontaneous organisations which temporarily lobby on a issue; the 
most notable in the 1950s was the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND); however, in 
the 1920s and 1930s the Peace Pledge Union and the No Conscription Fellowship lobbied for 
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peace and were mass movements; similarly, the National Service League (NSL) was a 
spontaneous movement which by 1913 claimed to have several hundred thousand members. 
Snyder argued that the Army League and the other associational groups could not offer the 
Government ‘neither expert assistance nor control of membership, they have nothing to 
bargain with’.2 He concluded that these groups had very little influence over policy. This 
assumption is borne out by the research in this thesis which shows that the Army League was 
not ignored but could not directly influence Government policy.  
 
Compared to the activities of the Navy and Air League’s the Army League was a smaller 
more elitist organisation. The Navy League was formed in 1894 to promote awareness of 
naval affairs with the public and ensure that ‘party politics’ did not interfere with naval 
policy; it also set about educating the public and young people through publications and 
lectures about naval issues. The Naval League received considerable assistance from the 
Admiralty and its more prominent members lobbied the Government and MPs assiduously 
about naval policy. In 1908 it orchestrated a national publicity campaign to force the 
Government to construct eight new battleships. By 1914 the Navy League reached its zenith 
and had a membership of 100,000. After 1918 the League’s political influence began to wane 
and it concentrated on promoting its youth movement (Sea Cadet Corps) and educating the 
public through its publications. During the 1950s the Navy League was still active but had 
lost its earlier political significance. The Air League was formed in 1908 to promote civil, 
commercial and military use of air power. It was supported by many distinguished figures 
from the Royal Air Force in the 1920s and 1930s. During this period the Air League was 
active in lobbying the Government and industry on the merits of aviation. Like the Navy 
League the Air League developed a series of publications to promote and educate the public 
on aeronautical issues. In 1938 it formed the Air Defence Cadet Corps which was its youth 
movement. In the 1930s the Air League publicised the merits of air defence. Like the Navy 
League it was given official recognition from the RAF for its activities. In the 1940s and 
1950s the Air League continued its promotion of civil and military aviation.  
 
In contrast the Army League was never given official recognition from the WO. The Army 
League did produce a monthly pamphlet in the late 1930s called Rising Strength and 
produced a report in 1937 but not on the same scale as the Navy and Air League. The 1955 
report was the first publication issued by the League since 1939 when it ceased its activities. 
The Navy and Air Leagues were still active in the Second World War. In this respect the 
Army League behaved more like a spontaneous movement. The Army League in the 1930s 
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was formed to agitate for improvements to defence measures which were introduced in 1939. 
The Army League from its conception sought to confront Government policy in one particular 
area. In this respect the League had more in common with the NSL than other associational 
groups. Leo Amery had been an influential member of the NSL and was intimately involved 
in the production of its written material. The Army League attempted use it’s reports to gain 
public and press creditability which could then be transferred into political influence. In this 
respect the contribution of Leo Amery and later of Julian Amery is significant. Leo Amery 
spent over thirty years in public service as a backbencher and a Cabinet Minister and was well 
aware of how the system of government worked. If that is the case why did he waste his time 
with the League to gain very little political influence?  
 
Synder argued that associational groups could offer no expert assistance to Government. 
However, a non-official group of political and military experts could pose a tangible threat to 
the presentation of Government policy, especially in challenging international and economic 
conditions. In the late 1930s it appeared that Britain was on the verge of war with Germany 
and in the late 1940s with the Soviet Union. The League in late 1930s was responding to 
international tension and what it viewed as a lack preparation for the possibility of war. Leo 
Amery was also concerned that the public was not sufficiently aware of the dire state of the 
Army and its preparedness for a major war which he thought was eminent. Leo Amery was a 
vociferous critic of appeasement. His activities with the League enhanced his anti-
appeasement stance and improved his political creditability. In the 1950s the League was 
attempting to make the case for retaining conventional forces while Government policy 
seemed to indicate that Britain was becoming over reliant on nuclear weapons and the 
concept of massive retaliation. However, Julian Amery was agitating against withdraw from 
the Middle East and Suez Canal Base by being publically associated with the League his 
perceptions on strategic policy and his standing as a military expert was improved. In both 
cases the Leo and Julian Amery benefited from being associated with the League.   
 
Equally, the League’s perceptions in the 1950s can be located within the debate concerning 
the direction of defence and strategic policy which is based on a declinist or ‘orthodox’ view 
of British security policy after 1945.
3
 The orthodox analysis argues that British policy makers 
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were dictated to by economic and financial anxieties which compelled them to make 
intractable cuts to defence policy in a haphazard fashion. The declinist analysis of defence is 
pervasive and undeniable but Greenwood has stated that it does not provide an adequate 
explanation of the process.
4
 What links many of these studies is the assumption that the 
ending of conscription contributed to the increasing pace of decolonization after 1959 and left 
the Army overstretched.
 
Most studies link the reduction in manpower numbers after the 1957 
White Defence Paper with the ‘possible’ inability of the British to carry out or contemplate 
large-scale counter-insurgency operations in the 1960s.
5
 However, is this cogent statement 
because contemporary military analysts like the League, most of whom were committed 
imperialists, argued that regular forces, rather than short service conscripts were more suited 
to the task of internal security (IS)? They also argued that the existing large hybrid Army of 
regulars and conscripts was wasteful in manpower terms and therefore inefficient and in need 
of reorganisation to make it more flexible. The League argued that the quality of the Army 
and its equipment was being diluted by an over emphasis on quantity. The League recognised 
the valuable contribution made by conscripts but questioned the continued need for a hybrid 
army in the nuclear age.  
 
Conversely, the League’s study group thought that the army was being used ‘far too much’ 
for internal security duties because of overall failings in colonial security arrangements. This 
perception was widespread within Whitehall in the early 1950s, because most departments 
blamed the Colonial Office (CO), which was responsible for the Colonial Police and internal 
security, for the inability of Colonial Governments to effectively maintain order or anticipate 
trouble before it got to the point where the army was needed to restore order. In the early 
1950s the Government began discussing what was wrong with the existing colonial security 
arrangements and what could be done to rectify the situation. In response, a Cabinet 
Committee on Colonial Security was convened in 1952 which had representatives from all the 
interested government departments. This Committee subsequently completed, in April 1955, a 
Report on Colonial Security which was written by the then General Sir Gerald Templer. The 
Report argued that the training, housing, pay and conditions of service of the colonial police 
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and military forces and intelligence-gathering services (especially the police) in the colonies 
had to be improved urgently if security was to be maintained in the colonies.
6
  
 
Templer also wanted more opportunities for rapid promotion and more comprehensive 
training of indigenous officers and the rank and file to create truly representative and efficient 
security forces in the colonies prior to ‘self-determination’. This debate was taking place in 
conjunction with plans to transfer the administration and financial responsibility for colonial 
forces from the War Office (WO) back to the CO because the former had taken them over in 
1939 at the start of the Second World War. The League’s Report arrived at a point when 
many of the questions which they posed regarding colonial security and the future of colonial 
forces were being debated within Government. The League leaned toward maintaining the 
status quo by increasing the number of British-led colonial forces. Whilst Templer and the 
Colonial Security Committee, which more or less fully endorsed his Report, were arguing for 
greater indigenous participation at command level and the modernisation of, and the 
allocation of more resources to, the security forces.  
 
The defence and decolonization debates were fundamentally about analysing management of 
what by the late 1950s were becoming intractable policy problems. The League’s 
observations ruminate with dire warnings concerning the future economic and strategic 
validity of the British state if an injudicious withdrawal from its imperial commitments were 
undertaken based on short-term political and economic expediency. Conversely, the League 
did not present a strategy based on absolute reliance on the existing defence arrangements or 
give overt endorsement of the Government’s strategic policy which at the time was based on 
universal conscription and multiple conventional capabilities. The League thought that the 
Army needed modernising, reorganizing and re-equipping urgently. But the basis for the 
strategic policy was the Edwardian geo-political concept that ‘colonies and overseas bases 
equal power’. Similarly, the League argued that leadership of the Commonwealth was a 
fundamental policy consideration which required significant military and economic effort to 
sustain British status as a great power. The League’s unequivocal strategic stance can now 
appear dogmatic, especially since it was made a year before the Suez Crisis, but much of the 
Report is undeniably pragmatic, if placed within the international context of the first decade 
of the Cold War.  Selwyn Lloyd, Minister of Defence, 1955-1957 considered the Report 
significant enough to have it closely scrutinised by officials at War Office (WO) and the 
Ministry of Defence (MOD) after its publication. Chapters five and four will discuss the WO 
and MOD appraisal of the Report and its recommendations about the League. The League 
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mattered because of its high profile members and the fact that defence policy and colonial 
policy had reached a cross roads. Conversely, the League attempted to become a semi-official 
arm of the WO and Army Council in the late 1940s and early 1950s. However, these 
advances were blocked by successive Labour and Conservative governments. His post-war 
re-launch gathered steam in 1950 when the Korean War commenced and the government 
announced an extensive rearmament programme.  
 
The Army League’s perceptions in the 1950s can also be placed within linear observations 
that the process of decolonization from 1918 until the retreat from East of Suez in the late 
1960s and early 1970s was an inevitable consequence of Britain’s economic, political and 
military ‘decline’ from a great to a medium power (European Power) in the latter half of the 
twentieth century.
7
 Similarly, the League’s Report argued that the Government should and 
could better manage the over-stretched and underequipped Army by undertaking a major re-
organisation and modernisation which would reduce manpower constraints and increase 
efficiency. The four main theories that have been advanced to explain the end of Empire can 
be broadly divided up as follows; the collapse of morale and the will to rule by the 
metropolitan centre; anti-colonial pressure from indigenous peoples, including the use of 
violence or the threat of it to overthrow the colonial state; international pressure from the 
United Nations (UN), Soviet Union and United States (US); economic vulnerability and 
imperial overstretch.
8
  
 
The basis of this research on the Army League is the Leo and Julian Amerys’ MSS at 
Churchill College Archive. Most of the material on the Army League only became available 
for scrutiny incrementally after 2003. Additionally many of Julian Amery’s official papers 
from his tenure as Under-Secretary of War, Colonial Office (CO) and Minister of Air have 
now become available, although there are some restrictions on sensitive government 
documents. At the National Archive various Cabinet, Colonial Office, War Office and 
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Ministry of Defence files were consulted on defence issues in the 1940s and 1950s. There are 
two WO files pertaining to the activities of the Army League between 1937 and 1956 at the 
National Archive both of which were consulted. The League was very closely linked to the 
Conservative Party Research Department through the participation of Brigadier John Faviell, 
defence advisor to the Conservative Party in the 1950s. The Conservative Party Archive at the 
Bodleian Library Oxford contains material concerning the activities of the Army League and 
compilation of the 1955 report. This archive also has many of the files of the Conservative 
Parliamentary Committee Army Sub Committee in the 1950s which Julian Amery was a 
member. Further information regarding the Conservative Party perceptions of defence and 
colonial issues were consulted at the Butler MSS Trinity College Cambridge - Butler was 
Chancellor of Exchequer from 1951 until December 1955. Another source on the League’s 
activities in early 1950s is the Liddell Hart MSS at Kings College London Liddell Hart Centre 
for Military Archives. Other papers consulted at Kings College included the Lindsell MSS, 
Julian Amery MSS, Dimoline MSS and the Pyman MSS. These papers contain considerable 
number of reports and papers generated by Liddell Hart which were used by the League to 
produce its 1955 report. The MSS’s of former defence and war ministers Selwyn Lloyd, 
Hore-Belisha and Duncan Sandys at Churchill College Archive were also consulted.  
 
Chapter one describes contribution of Leo Amery to the defence debate from the Boer War to 
the First World War and his period in Government in the 1920s. Leo Amery was active in the 
Army reform debate. Amery first made a name as a military commentator with his editorship 
of the various volumes of The Times History of the War in South Africa. Working on the six 
volumes would consume Amery for ten years. He subsequently used his position editorial 
post at The Times to argue for army reform. In 1903 he published Army Reform which sought 
‘modernise’ the army after its deficient performance during the war in South Africa. Amery 
was closely involved with the ill fated ministry of Arnold Forster who was Minister of War 
1903-1905. In 1905 Amery joined the NSL becoming one of its most strident supporters. 
Amery worked closely with Lord Roberts the NSL President for over decade. During the First 
World War Amery was at the centre of the War Cabinet working as a secretary under the 
direction of Maurice Hankey, later Lord Hankey. After the war Amery served as a junior 
minister and then Cabinet minister. In that capacity he was closely involved in the direction of 
military and strategic policy as First Sea Lord and later as Secretary of State for Colonies. In 
the 1930s he returned to the back benches in the House of Commons. It was from here that he 
became a critic of the League of Nations and the Government’s policy of appeasement and 
disarmament.    
Chapter two charts the creation of the League in 1937, its membership and their aims and 
methods and the role of Leo Amery. The League was formed at a point when it appeared that 
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Britain was unprepared for another major war.
9
 Leo Amery decision to form the League was 
based on his personal conviction that Germany and Italy could only be stopped by the threat 
or use of force. Leo Amery had been a vocal opponent of appeasement for many years. He 
also thought that the League Nations was incapable of regulating the international system 
which by 1936 was collapsing. His negative views on the preparedness of the Army to fight 
another European War were shared by many of his fellow Conservative MPs by the late 
1930s. However, Amery was primarily concerned in 1937 was that the Army was incapable 
of defending the Empire from external threats and internal disturbances. The first League 
which formed in 1937 was concerned primarily with findings ways of inducing more 
recruitment to the regular army. As the international situation deteriorated in 1938 after 
Munich the scope and direction of the League was expanded to include the introduction of 
conscription in peacetime which was contrary to Government policy. This reflected Leo 
Amery’s long held belief that Britain should have a form of compulsory military service for 
its citizens in peacetime.    
 
The first League was a larger organisation than the one which emerged in the Cold War. 
However, the pre-war League did not produce as many authoritative reports but produced a 
monthly magazine. The League became a vehicle to attack the sluggish rearmament 
programme of the Government and the defence policy of Neville Chamberlain, the Prime 
Minister. Without doubt Leo Amery used the League as a public platform to articulate his 
concerns about the direction of Government defence and foreign policies. Although, the 
League attempted not to antagonise the WO it was by 1938 actively at odds with the 
Government. This is borne out by attempts by the Conservative Central Office to demand that 
the League scale down its activities and not ‘discus’s strategic policy or the issue of 
conscription. Politically the League was a Conservative organisation both in ethos and the 
political allegiance of its members. Similarly, the social back ground of its membership was 
narrow and representative of what was later termed the ‘establishment’. In many ways the 
League in the 1930s reflected a strand of imperialist militarism which had been active in the 
Edwardian period. The League in the 1930s was very different to the one that emerged after 
the Second World War.  
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Chapter three looks at how the league was reformed in the late 1940s and how it evolved into 
what amounted to an elite study group. In 1950 the League’s study group began working on a 
report about the problems facing the Army in the 1950s. The study group greatly benefited 
from the input of Basil Liddell Hart who supplied much of the material which was used in the 
final report which was published in 1955. The study group made several attempts to gain 
official backing and recognition for its work. Chapter four looks at how the study group 
finalised work on the report and the disagreements and problems which went into completion 
between 1951 and 1955. Leo and Julian Amery were very much on control of this process and 
the final report reflected their post war vision. Leo and Julian Amery can be rightly described 
as being diehard chauvinistic imperialists, especially because of Julian’s central role in the 
Suez Group, but within the dynamics of mid-1950s Cold War geo-politics their entrenched 
perceptions regarding the continuing legitimacy of a strategic policy based on an Edwardian 
imperial security nexus of overseas bases, colonies and indirect rule is more complex than at 
first glance.  
 
Chapter five analyses the League’s 1955 The Army in the Nuclear Age A Report by the Army 
League Sub-Committee and WO assessment of the report. The report argued that considerable 
savings in manpower could be achieved by restructuring the Army organisation. The report 
discussed the impact of nuclear weapons on the Army and its wider implications for strategic 
policy. However, the report was ambiguous about the national service and still considered 
African colonies a viable source of manpower and resources for many years to come. The 
report claimed that Britain could remain a major international power by consolidating and 
entrenching within its existing (remaining) imperial structure and by emphasising the close 
relationship with the Commonwealth. The report argued that the Commonwealth should be 
more active in providing forces for ‘imperial defence’ and advocated more collective 
responsibility in the defence sphere, especially in the Middle East and Far East. However, 
since the turn of the century Britain had never achieved in peacetime a binding collective 
security agreement with Commonwealth countries or functioning military alliance based on 
mutual participation beyond the planning and staff level.  
 
Conversely, in 1954 Britain had joined the American South East Asia Treaty Organization 
(SEATO) which included Australia, New Zealand and Pakistan. The importance of creating 
regional strategic reserves which Commonwealth forces could contribute to was a central 
consideration of the League’s planning. Both were analogous policy concerns which, 
according to the League, had to be rationalised by stressing the threat posed by the Soviet 
Union and China. Similarly, the management of independence for the remaining colonies was 
enshrined within strategic necessity. Although, the League recognised the importance of the 
 14 
American alliance with Britain they were ambiguous about the true extent of the relationship 
between the two powers and of Britain’s influence within it.  Strategic policy in the early 
1950s was overshadowed and dominated by the detonation of the hydrogen bomb which 
rendered large bases obsolete during a Hot War; however, Soviet willingness to intervene 
within the Third World or resort to the use of limited war via proxy states to extend its sphere 
of influence perpetuated the importance of overseas bases in the Cold War. Both of these 
issues the Report attempted to reconcile within the context of traditional security policy. 
Winston Churchill was a vociferous critic of Ernest Bevin’s, the Foreign Secretary 1945-
1951, policy of negotiation with the Egyptian Government regarding Britain’s continuing 
tenure of the Suez Canal Base which he uncompromisingly described as ‘scuttle’ in 
opposition, but later when dealing with the problem in Government in the 1950s conceded 
that the hydrogen bomb had rendered the base obsolete.
10
 The report viewed the remaining 
bases and colonies as vital to British and Western interests in the Cold War; equally they 
argued that the bases were a deterrent against more limited conflicts or regional disputes 
between the smaller powers which of course refuted many of the doubts concerning the 
vulnerability to nuclear attack.  
 
The informal Empire of the Middle East was still regarded as a strategic glacis from which 
the Soviet Union and her allies could be attacked or confronted by conventional or covert 
means. Similarly, the colonies of the Far East, Malaya, Hong Kong and the remaining Pacific 
islands were perceived to be in the frontline of a tide of Chinese Communism which was 
surging through South East Asia and the Pacific rim. Ensuring the security of Malaya because 
of the high dollar-earning potential of its raw materials and its key strategic position was 
given the highest priority by successive British Governments and the League. The African 
colonies, which were in a state of constitutional and economic development, were expected to 
be many years away from self-government. However, the control of the Middle East, 
specifically Egypt, was linked to the unimpeded management of ‘development’ and 
constitutional reform in Africa. A Soviet presence in Egypt, backing Nasser’s brand of anti-
Western nationalism, was perceived to be a threat to the ‘development’ of the African 
colonies. However, the East African colonies contained considerable numbers of white 
settlers who would create significant political problems for successive British Governments in 
the 1950s and 1960s as they contemplated constitutional and political change. The League 
supported the greater involvement of British military personnel in East African forces. West 
Africa was already firmly on a path toward self-determination by the time the League 
published its Report but the League thought it wise that the military potential of the remaining 
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African colonies should be fully utilised by the British during the Cold War. Therefore, the 
League believed that British interests were best served by preserving a global military, 
political and economic presence.  
 
The report argued that any more reductions in overseas commitments and military capabilities 
would have ‘momentous and incalculable’ economic repercussions for the British economy, 
leaving the UK only able to ‘concentrate power in Europe and Africa’. The League 
considered the problem to be one of financial management based on a desire to make political 
decisions based on transient convenience. A corollary of this argument was that reductions in 
defence estimates and overseas spending on security might lead to a long-term and 
irreversible diminution of trade and investment potential. Leo Amery argued in 1948 that 
‘imperial preference is a foundation for our whole economic life’.11 Much of the 
historiographical material on economic decolonization states that the early 1950s was a key 
period when economic liberalisation was put into practice by successive British governments 
because the Empire and the economic systems created to oversee and protect trade imperial 
had ceased to be of critical importance to the British economy and were in fact acting as a 
break on growth and modernisation.
12
 However, recent studies have argued that the Sterling 
Area rather than being a drag on the economy was in fact still a useful trade and finance 
mechanism utilised by the British state and companies in the 1950s and early 1960s.
13
 It is 
widely stated that the excessive amount of GDP dedicated to defence also had an adverse 
effect on the British economy.
14
 However, the League equated defence spending with 
economic control and protection of British overseas assets, to the League it was a price worth 
paying for continuity and therefore power and influence.    
 
If British military power was the custodian of a Commonwealth bloc, then economic 
interdependence was its fundamental foundation and unifying purpose. The League argued 
that a Commonwealth bloc was necessary for the security and prosperity of all its constituent 
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parts, and not merely a self-serving device for the UK. The League’s justification and 
motivation for this policy was the threat posed by the Soviet Union and China to the 
international system and the West and, by inference nationalism and economic liberalism. 
The League contended that because of the Cold War Britain would be fully engaged as a 
‘major’ global power for decades to come in the struggle against the Soviet Union and China. 
Optimistically the League emphasized that Britain’s post-war economic and geo-political 
decline was ‘temporary’ but would become terminal if injudicious withdrawal from the 
leadership of the Commonwealth and control of the colonies was hastily contemplated for 
reasons of economic expediency or through exogenous pressure from another power.  
 
However, the League’s Report is full of ambivalences and contradictions concerning the 
longevity and direction of the imperial project and its continuing relevance to the West’s 
effort in the Cold War. The League assumed that European imperialism in some shape or 
form would continue because it was self-evident that it was in the West’s and American 
interests for it to do so, at least during the Cold War. Conversely, the League recognised that 
the colonies would move toward ‘self-determination’ but on a prescribed path guided by the 
metropolitan centre; the intention being to preserve British hegemony or influence after 
independence. Incongruously, the League believed British cultural assimilation and robust 
democratic constitutional structures would leave a positive legacy there by disseminating pro-
British sentiment among the leaders and population of former colonies. Butler has noted that 
British officials in Africa on the eve of withdrawal in the 1950s showed ‘astonishing 
confidence in their own ability to shape the long-term development of the colonial 
territories’.15 The League argued that in the security sphere former colonies (including India) 
would naturally gravitate to the West because of British influence and a legacy of ‘shared 
values’. However, the League’s Report was published the same year as the Bandung 
conference which brought together Third World countries from across the globe. The 
conference set out a political agenda declaring that the participating states had a non-aligned 
status within the dynamics of the Cold War. The 1955 League report allows a closer 
examination of how pressure group analysis of defence policy was driven by personality and 
political expediency.  
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Chapter One: Leo Amery Military Expert.  
 
 
Most of the historiography on Leo Amery focuses on his ardent support of imperialism or his 
indefatigable support for imperial preference for over 55 years or his political life.
16
 However, 
his contribution to the national defence debate from the Boer war onwards is largely 
neglected as a separate study. A notable exception is a study by Grayson which is a 
comparative analysis of Leo Amery and the three Chamberlains (Joseph, Neville and Austen) 
differing opinions on the direction of imperial defence and foreign policy within the 
imperialist wing of the Conservative party between 1903-1939.
17
 However, Grayson neglects 
the Army League, army reform and Leo Amery’s work in the National Service League (NSL) 
to focus on the implications of imperialist philosophy on the direction of Conservative Party 
foreign policy. The main sources of information on his life and political career are the three 
volumes of memoirs which Leo Amery wrote in the 1950s and his two volumes of diaries 
edited by Barnes and Nicholson in the 1980s.
18
 Amery began writing and recording his diaries 
after 1910. The diaries are an invaluable source of information which detail his political life 
up to 1945. Each volume contains editorial commentaries which cover aspects of his political 
life. The most detailed being his disagreement with Government in the late 1930s over 
German colonial concessions Amery also appears in studies on Appeasement and his role in 
bringing down the premiership of Neville Chamberlain.
19
 This chapter analyses what shaped 
his fascination with and latter expertise concerning military and strategic matters before the 
First World War. It also looks at his contribution to national security in the 1920s as a 
member of the several Conservative Governments. However, the public opening of Leo 
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Amery’s archive in 2006 and a detailed ongoing cataloguing of its contents allow a more 
systematic approach to understanding Leo Amery’s military activities.   
 
In 1896 the Harrow and Balliol College Oxford educated Leo Amery gained a history 
fellowship at All Souls College (Oxford). Amery intended to pursue an academic career. 
However, in 1897 he was offered a post as a part-time foreign correspondent for the The 
Times while undertaking an academic tour of the Balkans. The following year Amery decided 
to take the Bar Exam with the intention of becoming a lawyer. Conversely, in 1899 he was 
offered a permanent position as an assistant foreign editor at The Times and subsequently 
decided to pursue a career as a journalist. At the age of twenty-five the virtually 
inexperienced Amery was sent to South Africa to manage The Times coverage of the War. 
Once arriving in South Africa Amery rapidly developed personal and professional contacts 
with senior British Army officers and politicians and their staffs. He also developed close 
working relationships with his fellow correspondents which included Rudyard Kipling, who 
became a close friend of Amery. Significantly, Amery became closely associated with Lord 
Milner, High Commissioner for South Africa and Governor of Cape Colony, and members of 
the latter’s ‘Kindergarten’ of officials; Milner, who had also been at Balliol, offered Amery a 
post in his administration as his personal secretary, but Amery declined because he was 
embarking on his first major political project The Times History of the War in South Africa.
20
  
 
In 1899 The Times was in financial difficulties, and Amery and the considerable pool of 
correspondents that The Times had dispatched to South Africa quickly began running up a 
considerable expenses bill; also Amery initiated a complicated ciphered dispatch system 
utilising the telegraph to rapidly send classified information to London; however, this turned 
out to be a costly failure due to technical difficulties.
21
 Amery was primarily based in Cape 
Town during the war and was living very comfortably at one of the best hotels where he dined 
and socialised on a lavish scale with government officials and senior Army officers and their 
staff. By the end of December 1899 an increasingly exasperated Moberley Bell the editor of 
The Times began putting pressure on Amery to economise. Half jokingly Amery suggested to 
Bell that he would write a series of books about the war; Bell, who had already published 
profitable series of books, could see the commercial potential of the venture and gave his 
consent.
22
 However, Amery quickly perceived that a series of books could be used means of 
establishing himself as a serious writer and commentator on contemporary political and 
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military issues and not solely as a means of generating revenue. Retrospectively Amery 
would write, ‘my time in Berlin in 1899 had convinced me that Germany meant mischief, and  
what I saw in South Africa convinced me no less that our Army needed complete 
reorganisation to meet the danger. It was from this point of view that I took my writing of the 
South African war so seriously. For I felt that my criticisms of our generals and of our whole 
Army system would only go home if my facts were unchallengeable- as indeed they were’.23 
However, at the time the historian H.A.L Fisher described The Times History of the War in 
South Africa as a, ‘history with a mission’ calculated to, ‘defend Imperialism in the past, to 
make Imperialism in the present, and, by displaying not only the virtues but also the faults of 
the British organization, to strengthen the Empire against the perils of the future’.24 Clearly 
Amery was in the right place at the right time for someone wanting to make a name for him-
self, because the unfolding crisis in South Africa and its aftermath presented Amery with an 
opportunity to display his undoubted abilities as a writer, theorist and propagandist.  
 
In the spring of 1900, when it appeared the war would shortly be over,  Amery spent time 
travelling around South Africa adding to material he had collected since arriving in 1899; this 
included speaking to defeated Boer commanders and ‘assessing’ the performance of British 
senior officers, troops and officials. He set sail for home in August 1900 when the first phase 
of the conflict was over. On his return he immediately began working on the first volume. 
Amery would work directly on the first two and contribute, and edit, the next four volumes 
over nine years. It took Amery six months to write and edit the first volume; however, Amery 
increasingly insisted on being excessively precise and inclusive, which meant that the 
production of the subsequent volumes was slow and they became comprehensive and 
fastidious record of the war. The later volumes were edited by Erskine Childers and Basil 
Williams and many of The Times South African war correspondents contributed, including 
the pioneering and iconic Lionel James, The Times chief war correspondent, assisted Amery 
editing the early volumes.
25
 The war produced a plethora of published memoirs, periodicals, 
illustrated histories and books from distinguished military writers and journalists.
26
 However, 
the various volumes of The Times History of the War in South Africa were for many years 
considered to be the definitive work on the subject. Throughout the process of assembling the 
various volumes Amery was assiduously assisted by Field Marshall the Lord Roberts of 
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Kandahar and Lord Milner and their respective staffs. Both Roberts and Milner used Amery 
to propagate a positive portrayal of their roles in the conflict. Amery would work with both 
men over the next decade on the issue of Army reform and the campaign to introduce a form 
of compulsory national service.  
 
The first volume of The Times History of the War in South Africa set-out the historical and 
political back ground of the conflict. It is a detailed and wide ranging appraisal, but 
steadfastly depicts the British motives and actions as being morally and politically justified. 
Significantly the first page of the first volume has a photograph of Joseph Chamberlain, the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, whom Amery describes as the ‘ablest of English 
politicians’.27 Amery rapidly attached himself politically and socially to Milner during the 
war, and then to Chamberlain. Leo Amery’s relationship with the two men shaped his future 
political career and his life-long commitment to imperialism and protectionism. Amery had 
been an admirer of Chamberlain since his time at Oxford and supported Chamberlain’s break 
with the Liberal Party on the issue of Irish Home Rule. Julian Amery would later contribute to 
several biographical volumes about Chamberlain’s life and political career.28 However, 
Chamberlain was a divisive figure known for his radical views both on domestic and imperial 
policy within the Liberal party and later as a cabinet member of Lord Salisbury’s, the Prime 
Minister and Foreign Secretary, Conservative Unionist Government. Chamberlain and 
Milner, were profoundly influenced by J.R. Seeley’s influential work of 1883 The Expansion 
of England which argued for the creation of a ‘Greater Britain’ to counter the rise of the great 
continental powers of America and Russia.
29
 Seeley noted that British imperialism had been 
conducted in an ‘absent minded’ manner, and advocated a planned methodical approach by 
the state to the question imperial governance which would utilise modern technology such as 
the steamship, telegraph, and railway to cement the ‘bonds’ of Empire.30 This approach to the 
‘problem of empire’ was enthusiastically endorsed by Chamberlain. By the 1890s 
Chamberlain had devised a policy of ‘constructive imperialism’ which sought to redress the 
apparent political and economic drift of the white settler colonies away from the mother 
country, while instigating a centrally planned and administered development and economic 
policy for new and existing colonies. Chamberlain envisaged the creation of an imperial 
federation which would gather all the ‘different branches of the Anglo-Saxon races’ into a 
mutually beneficial collective.  
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In June 1895 Chamberlain became Secretary of State for the Colonies. Chamberlain had 
asked for the Colonial Office (CO), which at the time was considered to be a ‘political 
backwater’,  because he wanted to initiate his vision for politically unified British Empire.31 
Amery argued in the first volume of the Times History of the South Africa War that 
Chamberlain, since becoming Colonial Secretary, had created a ‘sense of imperial unity and 
mutual understanding between England and the colonies’.32 Unity became the watch word of 
Amery and his fellow imperialists for the next fifty years when discussing imperial economic 
and defence issues. Conversely, Chamberlain’s ‘constructive imperialism’ was increasingly 
implemented through the use or threat of force and was overtly militaristic. Critics of this new 
imperialism like J. A. Hobson, who reported on the War in South Africa for the Manchester 
Guardian, argued that it was economically rapacious and distinctly militaristic both in tone 
and application.
33
 However, even critics like Hobson maintained that the Government needed 
to adopt a more systematic approach to imperial problems and governance.
34
 Chamberlain 
maintained that British race was predestined to rule, and that ‘means justified the ends’ which 
in case of South Africa meant war with the Transvaal and Orange Free State republics over 
the rights of Uitlanders (outsiders). In 1886 discovery of the massive Witwatersrand gold 
field in the Transvaal radically changed the social and political situation in the republic and 
central South Africa.  The resultant gold rush was accompanied by an influx of predominantly 
British miners and speculators into the gold-field. The Uitlanders brought technical expertise 
and overseas investment and rapidly developed the area around Johannesburg (the centre of 
the Witwatersand) to point where it rivalled and then surpassed the Afrikaner capital of 
Pretoria as the principle economic and population centre in the Transvaal. However, there 
were a considerable number of German nationals who arrived to participate in the gold rush.  
The arrival of German nationals and investment was seen as direct threat to British interests in 
the region. Paul Kruger, the president of the Transvaal Republic, adroitly forged diplomatic 
and economic links with Germany and accentuated the strong cultural links between 
Afrikaner and German society.
35
 The Boers diplomatic and economic position was 
significantly strengthened by the discovery of the Witwatersrand gold field, but by drawing in 
Germany and the other great powers into the affairs of the Transvaal Kruger was playing a 
dangerous diplomatic game which further antagonised the British government who claimed 
suzerainty over the Transvaal. Amery dismissively described the Boers as ‘20,000 families of 
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squatters’ who had not developed Transvaal since they had arrived there in the 1830s.36 Boer 
society was essentially agrarian and consisted of dispersed farms interspersed with a few 
small towns.  
 
However, a combination of living in a hostile environment and continuous war with 
indigenous peoples developed a highly interdependent society based on strict observance to 
Calvinism and adherence to the principles of collective responsibility. All Boer males were 
liable for military service between the ages of sixteen and sixty and served in a commando. 
The Boers developed a highly efficient mobilization system which required all men to muster 
with their own horse, weapon, ammunition and food for eight days in the field. The Boers had 
no permanent military administrative organization but had a network of locally elected 
commandants who commanded each commando. Decisions in the field were made 
collectively by a vote, but once a strategy was adopted there was no deviation from the plan.  
The Boers adapted their tactics to suit the conditions on the veldt and preferred to ambush and 
fight on prepared or familiar ground.
37
 The Transvaal and Orange Free State remained 
independent until they were annexed by the British in 1877. In 1879 After the British defeated 
the Zulu kingdom it was expected that the Boers would see the advantages of being part of 
British dominated South African confederation and accept the geo-political realities of the 
situation and submit to British hegemony. However, on 15 December 1880 the Boers rebelled 
against what they saw as the levying of excessive taxation, the imposition of British judicial 
and political institutions and fired on British troops in Pretoria- the capital of the Transvaal. 
The Boers rapidly mobilized about 8,000 men the British had about 1,500 deployed in small 
garrisons across the Transvaal. On 27 February 1881 at the battle of Majuba Hill a force of 
500 troops and a naval detachment commanded by General Sir George Pomeroy Colley, 
considered to be one of the most intelligent and talented  senior officers in the Army, was 
defeated by a comparable force of Boer irregulars. Colley was killed along with 93 of his 
men, 133 were wounded and 58 taken prisoner, however, the Boers lost one man and five 
wounded (one of whom died later). Majuba was a humiliating defeat for the British because 
Colley had been comprehensively defeated when in possession of seemingly impregnable 
defensive position. In response to these set-backs and in line with his policy of not pursuing  
further imperial entanglements William Gladstone, the Prime Minister, sued for peace and 
granted the Boers limited independence, but ambiguously retained suzerainty over the 
Transvaal. The Boers annually celebrated Majuba day as the defining moment in their 
struggle for self-determination. The Boers subsequently created the Afrikaner National 
League which it used to promote the possibility of a union of Natal and Cape Afrikaners.  
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Amery considered the Boers victory at Majuba a ‘splendid feat of arms’ and an example of 
their tactical mastery of utilising broken terrain both in defence and attack and testimony of 
their ability with small arms.
38
 
 
Amery argued that Majuba had emboldened Boer nationalism and created a sense of 
Afrikaner national unity, but he also noted that the Boers hubristically thought they had 
crushed the British.  Amery asserted that Gladstone’s lack of ‘decisiveness’ and his 
subsequent back down rather than the defeat of British military power had been the primary 
foundation of Boer nationalism. This assumption is probably accurate given that the Boers 
out- numbered the British garrison by eight to one. Also there were questions over the morale 
and composition of the British garrison; prior to the war there had been desertions from the 
garrison which was widely dispersed in small units; many of Colley’s men were ‘green’ and 
he had no cavalry or mounted infantry.
39
  The Boers had shown that they were masters of 
mobile infantry warfare; intrepid both in defence and attack, and that they were expert 
marksmen. In comparison the British effort had been desultory and based on the hubristic 
assumption that the Boers were merely itinerant farmers who could be easily defeated with 
the available forces present in the colony. However, Amery argued that if Gladstone had 
permitted the Army to respond to Majuba and send a properly constituted expeditionary force, 
then the outcome of the First South African War might have been very different. Troops 
embarking at Southampton in 1899 for South Africa was greeted with calls of avenge Majuba 
by the crowd. 
 
In 1897 Chamberlain appointed Alfred Milner to the post of High Commissioner for South 
Africa and Governor of the Cape Colony. Milner, like Amery, trained as a barrister and 
journalist. During the general election of 1885 Milner stood as the prospective Liberal 
candidate for Harrow but failed to win the seat; ironically while campaigning he defended 
Gladstone’s decision to negotiate with the Boers. However, like Chamberlain he became a 
Liberal Unionist and broke ranks with the Gladstone and the Liberal party over Irish home 
rule. Milner served under Lord Cromer in Egypt as a financial secretary in the British 
administration before returning to the UK and becoming Chairmen of the Broad of the Inland 
Revenue. Milner shared Chamberlains views on the future direction of imperial policy and 
was a self confessed ‘British race patriot’. Amery described Milner as having ‘courage and 
ability’ and praised his efforts in attempting to negotiate with President Kruger of the 
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Transvaal.
40
 However, after his arrival in South Africa Milner skilfully manipulated the 
political impasse over the rights of Uitlanders and set the British on path which would lead to 
war with the Boers. He granted greater autonomy to Cecil Rhodes British, and the South 
African Company in Rhodesia which further antagonised Boer sentiments and strengthened 
Rhodes control of region. This was particularly significant because Chamberlain had been 
forced to defend in the House of Commons the British South African company’s and the 
involvement of British troops in the brutal suppression of a native uprising in Mashona and 
Matabeleland in 1896.
41
  Rhodes was lauded by Amery as a patriot and a master exponent of 
‘modern’ imperialism. Subsequently, Milner and Amery served as board members of the 
Rhodes Trust and were instrumental in forming the Round Table movement for the 
advancement of closer union between the Britain and the self-governing colonies both of 
which were funded by large bequests from Rhodes will. Milner steadfastly rejected offers of 
international mediation between Uitlanders and the Boers and made inflammatory speeches 
which made thinly veiled threats to use military force to resolve the political impasse.  
 
In June 1899 Milner informed Kruger at a conference at Bloemfontein, in the Orange Free 
State, that the Uitlanders must be given full political rights, knowing that the Boers would 
never agree to such a proposal. Amery wrote to Sir Valentine Chirol, The Times Foreign 
Editor, that Milner had told him in September 1899 ‘that war is the only satisfactory solution’, 
followed by ‘annexation’.42 Although, he saw the trap Kruger only offered limited 
concessions to the Uitlanders which of course were rejected and it was only a matter of time 
before the war started. Milner and Chamberlain then began military preparations for the 
‘defence’ of Natal and the Cape, and began reinforcing the British garrison. In October 1899 
the Transvaal and Orange Free State issued an ultimatum calling for the removal of British 
troops on their respective borders. However, Amery argued in the first volume of the The 
Times history of the War that Milner had attempted to negotiate a compromise, but Kruger 
was unwilling to concede because he was attempting to destabilise the Natal and Cape 
colonies through the Afrikaner National League by asserting Boer nationalist sentiment 
among the wider Afrikaner society in the Cape and Natal.
43
 When the British did not comply 
the Boers attacked the Natal and Cape colonies before more British reinforcements could 
arrive. Amery considered this to be a ‘blessing’, because it handed the diplomatic initiative to 
the British since they were technically responding to an act of aggression and not invading a 
smaller state.
44
 Over 10,000 Cape and Natal Afrikaners did fight for the Transvaal and Orange 
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Free state, but there was no general uprising against British rule in the Cape and Natal 
colonies. As Amery remarked to Chirol in January 1900 the ‘Dutch rising which was so much 
feared has not developed’.45  
 
Amery observations of the political and diplomatic events surrounding the start of the war 
were mainly supplied by Milner and his staff an obviously shed a favourable light on the 
actions of Chamberlain and Milner. In Leo Amery’s version of events the war was fought for 
the rights of Uitlanders and the removal of unrestrained Afrikaner nationalism as a political 
force and not the seizure of the gold field. Amery also went to great lengths to emphasize the 
emergent military and political threat that the Transvaal republic posed to British interests in 
South and Central Africa. This duplicated Milner and Chamberlain views on the Boer threat 
to British hegemony. Chamberlain presented the war in South Africa to the rest of the Cabinet 
as a test of British resolve and influence within the Empire and a demonstration of strength to 
the other Great Powers.
46
 Gollin described Leo Amery’s twenty five year relationship with 
Milner, as that of ‘the devoted disciple’.47 Unsurprisingly then, that Amery portrayed Milner 
and Chamberlain as the political heroes of the diplomatic war who had defended the rights of 
the Uitlanders against the nationalistic intransience of the Boers led by the obdurate 
intransigent nationalist Kruger. However, both sides were indulging in irreconcilable 
bombastic brinkmanship. Similarly, cultural and strategic imperatives prevented a diplomatic 
solution. Amery gained considerable political and personal influence from his close 
relationship with Milner and Chamberlain which was cemented by his work on Volume 1 of 
The Times History of the War. 
 
Military History or Selective Version of War  
 
 
Amery edited and predominantly wrote the next two volumes of the Times History of the 
South African War which were appraisals of the early military operations and the end of the 
first phase of the war in 1900; the second was published in 1902 and the third in 1904. Amery 
was given considerable assistance by General the Lord Roberts of Kandahar, who was known 
affectionately as ‘Bobs’ by the public. Amery would work closely with Roberts and members 
of his staff for the next decade on various topics related to the army and the issue of 
compulsory military service. At the start of the South African War in September 1899 
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General Sir Redvers Buller was given command of British forces in South Africa. Buller had 
been reluctant to take the command in the first place, because he was concerned by the lack of 
military preparations being made by the Government and he doubted his own suitability for 
the task. However, he was persuaded by Lord Lansdowne, Minister of War, Arthur Balfour 
and Lord Salisbury, the Prime Minister, to take the command. The war started on 9 October 
1899; however, Buller only arrived in South Africa on 30 October with reinforcements from 
the UK. Buller had initially planned to build up his forces (there were reinforcements being 
dispatched from a number of imperial garrisons) and then invade Boer territory. This was a 
sound strategy, because it would take time to concentrate and integrate his forces and build up 
supplies and logistic arrangements. However, the Boers struck first and invaded British 
territory at four different points aiming to cut the railway lines which linked the coast with the 
interior, which at a stroke took the strategic initiative away from the British who were heavily 
reliant on the railway system for movement and resupply.
48
 The British forces, some of whom 
had only recently arrived from India and other imperial garrisons, on the border were forced 
back and then surrounded at Ladysmith, Mafeking and Kimberly; the Boers then made a 
limited advance toward Port Elizabeth and Cape Town but concentrated on laying siege to the 
trapped British forces. The Boers strategy was twofold; firstly, they had no intention of letting 
the British gain an overwhelming numerical advantage; secondly, the Boers thought that they 
could conjure up another Majuba and undermine British resolve and force a favourable 
negotiation and peace-terms. The Boers also thought that a string of early victories and 
invasion of British territory would act as a catalyst for a general uprising among Afrikaners in 
the Cape and Natal against British rule.    
 
As a consequence Buller was forced to move his newly arrived army corps from Cape Town 
to Durban by sea, and moved in early December toward Ladysmith from Natal. Two other 
columns of British troops moved toward Kimberley and Mafeking from the Cape Colony; 
however, these forces were defeated at Stormberg and Magersfontein losing over 1,500 men 
in the process. On 15 December Buller and his 20,000 men moving toward Ladysmith were 
defeated at Colenso by 8,000 Boers and lost 1,100 men dead, wounded or missing after a 
frontal assault; Buller immediately retreated but was not pursued by the victorious Boers. 
Boers took a considerable number of prisoners, which were then paraded before the 
international press adding to the national sense of humiliation and bewilderment. The press 
dubbed this series of defeats ‘black week’. On 16 December 1899 Roberts replaced General 
Sir Redvers Buller as the commander in chief of British forces in South Africa with General 
Sir Herbert Kitchener as his chief of staff. Amery would later state that the decisive decision 
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to rapidly appoint Roberts had been a triumph for Lord Lansdowne, Minister of War, and 
Lord Salisbury, the Prime Minister, because they had not consulted Field Marshal Wolseley 
the Commander-in-Chief or the military ‘establishment’ at the WO before making the 
appointment. Amery also described, with the benefit of hindsight, the politicians as being 
‘stronger men’ than the soldiers.49 However, it had been the same politicians who had talked 
the reluctant Buller into going to South Africa in the first place and had waited before 
allowing a build up of troops in South Africa.  
 
Buller was widely criticised in the press for his handling of the attempted relief of Ladysmith 
and his alleged signal to General Sir George White, the besieged commander of British forces 
in Ladysmith, telling him to surrender when he was defeated at Colenso. Buller was also 
vilified for leaving a battery of guns to the enemy after retreating from Colenso. Roberts only 
son was killed while attempting to retrieve the guns.  After his arrival in South Africa Roberts 
reorganised the forces in the Cape, by increasing the number of mounted troops; he also 
issued new tactical guide lines which included the use of more diligent reconnaissance, 
avoidance of massed frontal assaults, continuous artillery bombardment of enemy positions 
rather than desultory or periodic ones, awareness of the use of available cover for infantry and 
artillery and more flexible employment of cavalry and mounted infantry. Roberts devised a 
strategic plan based on a rapid advance utilising his increased mobility and a carefully 
designed flanking manoeuvre toward Kimberly by mounted troops covered infantry. Roberts 
ordered Buller and his 40,000 men to hold and menace the Boers in the vicinity of Ladysmith, 
and remain within Natal; However, Buller began moving forward on the 10 January 1900. On 
24 January his force was defeated at Spionkop losing 1,200 men dead, wounded and missing; 
this resulted in images of a mass grave of British dead on Spionkop being published around 
the world which caused further out-cry in the UK. On 5 February at Vaalkranz his forces were 
repulsed again and then forced to retreat. Amery described the British effort at the battle of 
Vaalkranz as the ‘one of the feeblest performances in the history of war’, and laid the 
responsibility solely on Buller.
50
  
 
Roberts attacked on the 11 February with 37,000 men; the cavalry and mounted infantry 
successfully outflanked the Boers and managed to cross the Reit River and moved toward the 
Modder river (the only natural obstacle on the route to Kimberly) and Kimberly, while the 
infantry moved up behind. The 4,000 Boers holding a line at Reit River retreated back to 
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Modder and on the 18 February they were cornered against the river at Parrdeberg. After a 
suicidal frontal assault commanded by Kitchener was repulsed with heavy loss the Boers were 
surrounded and bombarded into submission on the 27 February. Roberts advance gained 
momentum and the outnumbered Boers, who for the first time were displaying tactical 
ineptitude, were forced to retreat back toward their own territory. Roberts’s use of increased 
mobility and superior numbers was ultimately to prove decisive during the ensuing campaign; 
however, Buller had reached the same conclusions regarding the need for more mounted 
troops after Colenso, but this was subsequently ignored by Amery who credited Roberts with 
devising the strategy and tactics which ultimately won the second phase of the war.
51
 In 
March Roberts invaded the Orange Free State taking Bloemfontein and then moved into the 
Transvaal in May. However, the advance was hampered by increasing fatigue among the 
troops and animals and there were supply problems. Conversely, Buller did learn from his 
earlier mistakes and using similar flanking tactics to Roberts moved forward as the Boers 
retreated back into their own territory. Buller linked up with Roberts on the 24 July, and then 
defeated the Boers at Bergendal and then occupied Lydenburg.  
 
The war appeared to be over and the Boers defeated. Buller requested to be sent home and On 
9 November Buller returned to the UK and was welcomed home by euphoric crowds; he was 
offered in January 1901 the Aldershot Command and the new First Army corps. He was 
awarded the Grand Cross of St Michael and St George (GCMG). On 11 December Roberts, 
after handing over command to Kitchener, also returned home and was met with a wave of 
public affection and adulation on his arrival. Roberts was made Commander-in-Chief of the 
Army, given the Order of the Carter, an earldom and a grant of £100,000. However, the war 
then entered a new phase when Boers refused to surrender and the protracted guerrilla war 
began. Before leaving South Africa Roberts had authorised the use of pacification techniques 
designed to isolate the remaining Boer commandos from the local population who were 
supporting them. British troops also made reprisal raids for attacks on railways and outposts 
by Boer commandos; this involved the destruction of farms, villages, livestock and crops. The 
British also began the construction of block houses at strategic points and made sweeps by 
mounted forces to contain and destroy the remaining Boer commandos. He also gave 
instructions that the families evicted and dispersed by the destruction of farms be settled in 
concentration camps for their protection and to stop their contact with the Boer commandos.
52
 
Amery predominantly wrote Robert’s and his staff’s version of the war. Amery closely edited 
the first three volumes of The Times History and was general editor for the subsequent 
volumes. However, Erskine Childers edited the volumes which dealt with the controversial 
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concentration camp policy, the guerrilla phase of the war and the period of political settlement 
and reconstruction.
53
 Amery specifically noted in his political memoirs that the volumes that 
dealt with the subjects of concentration camps, the destruction of crops, the shooting of 
livestock and farm burning were the work of Childers and not his.
54
 However, Amery was the 
editor in chief and had the final say in what was contained in the various volumes. Amery 
concurred with Childers observations, and wrote that the ‘concentration camp system caused 
far less misery and loss than would have been suffered had the families remained on the 
veldt’.55 However, he did partially blame the Boers for the conditions in the camps, because 
of their ignorance of modern sanitary conditions and intransigent nature.  
 
Arguably, Kitchener and Roberts emerged from The Times history of the war with their 
military reputations enhanced, if not protected; their mistakes which included a muddled 
reorganisation of the Army transport system, failure to deal with the poor performance of the 
Royal Army Medical Corps, and Kitchener’s frontal assault at Paardeberg were glossed over 
by Amery. Similarly, Kitchener’s direction of the guerrilla war was also judged to be a 
success, and accusations of prisoner executions and the rape of Boer women perpetrated by 
British soldiers were not commented on by Amery. However, Amery did launch a public and 
persistent attack on the reputation of Buller and other generals. On 28 September 1901 in 
response to the fact that peacetime and wartime command of the First Army corps was to be 
harmonised, which meant that in theory Buller would lead the corps in a future war, Amery 
using the pseudonym ‘Reformer’ in The Times editorial column launched an attack on 
Buller’s professional competence and the alleged surrender telegram to General White at 
Ladysmith.
56
 On 10 October 1901 Buller responded at a luncheon at the Queen’s Hall 
Westminster and attempted to defend himself from the mounting criticism. However, William 
St John Broderick, Secretary of State for War 1900-1903, deemed that Buller had breached 
Kings Regulations and he was dismissed on 21 October, but was retained on the active list; 
however, he was never given another command. There has been some speculation by Powell 
that Buller was a scapegoat for the systemic failings of the army during the war.
57
 He is also 
is critical of Roberts’s performance in South Africa and his connivance in Buller’s dismissal. 
Amery benefited from attacking Buller because it allied him with Roberts and his staff, and it 
increased his apparent credentials as a military expert and political commentator. Leo  
Amery’s condemnation of Buller was based on what he considered to be the undisputed 
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‘facts’, but his persistent pursuit of Buller smacks of a vindictive witch hunt on the most 
conspicuous scapegoat for the failings of a disjointed and transitional military system which 
reflected years of ambiguous imperial security policy direction and failure to deal with 
inadequate administrative management of the army. Arguably, Buller was very vulnerable 
because of his abhorrence of the press which made him an easy target for Amery and The 
Times, and his obvious unsuitability for a large independent field command which had been 
exposed during the major peacetime manoeuvres of 1898.
58
 Buller at first rejected the offer of 
command in South Africa. However, after being asked by Lansdowne and Salisbury, who 
brushed aside Buller’s objections and doubts about his own suitability, Buller felt obliged to 
accept. The reluctant and ponderous Buller should never have been given the South African 
command in the first place. Amery viewed Buller’s replacement by Roberts as a political 
success but he was less inclined to criticise his appointment which was made by the same 
politicians. Amery went to great lengths to exonerate the politicians (especially the desultory 
reinforcement of the South African garrison prior to the war starting which Buller had 
complained about before accepting the appointment) from responsibility for the failure of 
diplomacy and ineffectual preparations for war.  Lieutenant-General Sir William Butler, who 
was Commander of British forces in South Africa prior to the war, had warned Milner that 
any conflict with the Boers would be a ‘calamity’.59 Milner forced Butler to resign his 
command and ignored his warnings. Amery glossed over the fact that Milner and 
Chamberlain had seriously underestimated the military potential of the Boers and their 
willingness to use force to protect their interests. Similarly, Amery ignored the fact that 
British forces at the start of the war were numerically inferior to the well armed and 
motivated Boers. Amery shifted the blame on to Buller and other senior officers for the 
disaster of black week and not on the politicians who engineered the crisis by not allowing 
adequate reinforcements to be sent to South Africa during the period of negotiation. His co-
ordinated press campaign against Buller pushed the latter to the point of dismissal.  
 
During the rest of 1901 and early 1902 Amery worked on completing volume two and 
preparing for volume three. While Amery was in South Africa James remained in London 
managing the sub-editors and interviewing returning officers and officials. Amery returned to 
South Africa at the start of 1902 to gather more information and was present when the 
guerrilla war ended on 31 May 1902. Amery worked closely with Lawrence James on the first 
two volumes and was involved in preparing the third when the war ended. But, it was the 
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second volume which caused the biggest stir, because it was highly critical of the Army and 
Buller and because Amery stated that he had used official sources to gather information. In 
fact Leo Amery’s correspondence with Lawrence James shows that Amery and James had to 
provide payment for some of the information, and he utilised gossip from government 
officials and Army officers. James told Amery that he had to pay ‘General Porter’ £15 for 
information concerning the ‘Rhodes Kekewich eimbrogilo’.60 Porter had commanded one of 
General French’s cavalry brigades and had been one of the first units to arrive in Kimberly 
after its relief. Lieutenant-Colonel Kekewich had commanded the besieged garrison and a 
force of civilians (most of whom were employees of Rhodes), but he had had difficulty 
dealing with the volatile and domineering Cecil Rhodes who was trapped in Kimberly. 
Rhodes thought that Kekewich was incompetent and insisted on countermanding orders and 
in one instance took a swipe at him. Once the town was relieved Rhodes pressurized General 
French into removing Kekewich from his command; however, Roberts and Kitchener both 
later publically acknowledged Kekewich’s skilful and professional handing of the defence, 
and he later commanded a mobile column and was promoted to the rank of major general in 
1902. However, a lot of officials and serving Army officers were happy to supply information 
to Amery, because they just wanted to record their side of the story. Although, Roberts 
supplied official information to Amery he was selective about its content and scope.
61
  
 
On 24 May 1902 Amery wrote to James, from South Africa, that he was receiving military 
information from the WO about previous and ongoing operations; however, he was concerned 
that any of the journalists, officials or soldiers submitting material be made aware that their 
‘stuff’ would be subject to ‘revising’ by Amery before it was published.62 Amery noted that 
he was anxious not to give himself ‘more trouble than necessary in revising’. Amery also 
suggested to James the names of people who might possibly give information or would like to 
contribute, such as Colonel Henderson, Robert’s director of Military intelligence, who was 
writing the official history of the war for the WO.
63
 Amery also told James that he had been 
given a ‘circular letter’ from Kitchener, ‘telling people they may help me’ when he arrived 
back in South Africa. This was in stark contrast to Emily Hobhouse, the social campaigner 
and charity activist, who had been the first person to highlight the terrible conditions in the 
concentration camps in the press, who Kitchener had deported on her return to Cape Town, 
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without even letting her set foot off her ship. Roberts also supplied Amery with a letter of 
introduction before he left London. In fact there was a general tightening of press censorship 
when Kitchener took over command in South Africa.
64
 However, this did not appear to effect 
or apply to Amery who was free to gather information from army officers, government 
officials and captured Boer commanders. Amery was given General Sir Bruce Hamilton’s, 
commander of the 21
st
 Brigade, staff diary for the whole campaign.  
 
Another important source of information for Amery was Lieutenant-General Ian Hamilton, 
Kitchener’s chief of staff, who supplied him with despatches and other information.65 At the 
start of the war Hamilton was given a temporary rank of major general and a brigade 
command under General Sir George White. He was involved in the early phases of the war 
before being besieged in Ladysmith with rest of White’s command; he distinguished himself 
during the battle of Elandslaagte and during the defence of Ladysmith. After the relief of 
Ladysmith Roberts promoted Hamilton to the temporary rank of lieutenant-general and gave 
him a division of mounted infantry which he commanded until the end of the war. In 1900 he 
returned with Roberts to the UK before Roberts sent him back to be Kitchener’s Chief of 
Staff during the guerrilla war. Amery suggested to James that the language in the dispatches 
from Hamilton should be ‘altered freely’ and filed under the heading ‘from a correspondent’. 
This became a standard practice for Amery. Colonel Douglas Haig (later Field Marshal the 
Earl Haig) also provided Amery with information on military operations and had long 
discussions with Amery on several occasions about the war and the Army.
66
 Another 
important source of information for Amery on the war was Colonel Henry Wilson, who was a 
member of Roberts’s staff in South Africa and then followed Roberts to the WO in 1900. 
Wilson became a close friend of Amery (Wilson was Julian Amery’s god-father and later 
Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS)) who supplied him information and advice for 
many years on military matters until his assassination in 1922 by Irish republicans. Amery’s 
initial coverage of the war as an editor and then his work on The Times history gave him 
access to many officers who would go on to hold senior positions within the Army over the 
next twenty years. Both at the time and later this would prove highly useful to both Amery 
and his military contacts.    
 
However, James wrote back to Amery that he was having difficulty getting information from 
‘official sources’ because of Amery’s decision to cite in his preface for the first volume that 
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much of his documentation had come from ‘official heads’ which had caused a ‘fuss’.67 James 
also warned Amery that ‘Buller’s friends have turned their backs upon us to a man’, because 
Amery had begun launching attacks on the professional competence of Buller in The Times.
68
 
Amery wrote to James that ‘it certainly is necessary that somebody should point out that the 
work isn’t simply an attack on Buller’.69 However, Amery was forced to write in the preamble 
to the second volume that his attacks on Buller were ‘not personal’, but ‘impartial and 
objective’, and based on ‘facts’.70 Nevertheless, in the second volume Amery was particularly 
scathing of Buller’s performance at Colenso. Whilst Amery was in South Africa he received 
the reviews for the second volume many of which were unfavourable. Amery argued that this 
was because of the influence of ‘Bullerites’.71 However, Hamilton told Amery that Roberts 
considered ‘the chapter on Colenso enough to make a dead man turn in his grave, but the 
worst of it is that it’s all absolutely true’.72 Given that Roberts only son was killed trying to 
recover the guns at Colenso, the phraseology of this statement is revealing and probably 
indicative of Roberts animosity toward Buller. Conversely, Kitchener had advised Amery, 
according to Amery, not to be too ‘severe on officers who had failed through acting on their 
own initiative’; however, Amery asked him whether ‘if had been too severe on Sir R. B. and 
he said ‘Not at All’’.73 This statement is also illuminating, because it shows how Kitchener 
was concerned that Amery might indulge in indiscriminate attacks on the performance 
officers under pressure in the field. Similar fears were raised by Lt Colonel Charles a Court, 
later known as Charles Repington,  who was asked to comment on the drafts of The Times 
History of the War and made the observation that Amery’s assessment of the war  might 
‘arouse dispute and ill feeling’ among his fellow officers.74   
 
Leo Amery’s tour of South Africa in 1902 provided him with more anecdotal evidence from 
senior officers who had commanded troops under Buller. Sarcastically, Amery told James that 
Major General Neville Lyttelton, (Lyttelton had commanded troops at Spion Kop and was a 
close friend of Buller) had accompanied him on a recent trip to Spion Kop where Lyttelton 
had told him that he did not want it to get back to the ‘ears of his dear personal friend Buller’ 
that he had spoken to Amery.
75
 Lyttelton was one of the few senior officers who emerged 
from what Joseph Chamberlain described as the ‘sickening fiasco’ of Spion Kop with his 
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reputation intact. However, Lyttelton became a covert critic of Buller to the press and among 
other senior officers.
76
 Amery built up a considerable amount of information on Buller’s 
‘failures’. Without doubt Amery contributed, if not engineered, to the dismissal of Buller and 
in doing so moved closer to Roberts and his circle. Amery was only too willing to listen to, 
and indulge, senior officers in giving ‘their’ assessment of the war and the performance of 
other officers. However, given the general feeling that the Army and individual officers had 
performed badly, many officers and officials were only too willing to talk to Amery. Whether 
Amery made any attempt to change his preconceived, and often biased, ideas about the 
performance of individual commanders in the field after interviewing witnesses is open to 
debate. Especially, because Amery motives for writing his history of the war were 
increasingly becoming political. Amery sought to capitalise on the perception that the war had 
exposed deep rooted and systemic failings within the Army and by association the imperial 
defence system.  
 
Similarly, imperialists, like Amery, sought to highlight the social, economic, military and 
political weaknesses of British society which they argued needed reinvigorating and 
modernising if it was remain a major imperial power. In 1902 Amery was invited by Beatrice 
and Sidney Webb, the social reformers and diarists, to join a selective dining club known as 
the Coefficients; other members included Lord Haldane, Sir Edward Grey, Bertrand Russell 
and H. G. Wells. The group met eight times a year to dine and discuss political, military, 
social, economic and imperial matters. The Webb’s wanted the group to meet in an 
atmosphere where political allegiances could be put to aside and topical discussion 
undertaken in constructive way among intellectuals from different perspectives. Amery later 
described the group which met until 1910 as ‘brains trust’ or ‘general staff’. His participation 
in this group began a lifelong affinity for being involved or founding small elite discussion 
groups and societies; before the First World War Amery was closely involved in the Empire 
League, the Round Table Movement, the Compatriots, Tariff Reform League, the Empire 
Parliamentary Association and the National Service League (NSL). A.J. P Taylor noted that 
Amery thought that formation of political policy was best achieved ‘by small groups of men, 
meeting in dining-club and working out a policy’.77  
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Army Reform  
 
 
After the publication of the second volume Amery began promoting Army reform and 
national service both of which were endorsed by Roberts. The second volume of The Times 
history contained a considerable amount of comment on the need to reform the organisation 
of the WO and for general improvements to the training and equipment of the army.
78
 Amery 
considered the army’s performance in the Second South African War indicative of an army 
which needed to modernise and embrace continental practices. Amery noted that insufficient 
numbers of trained reserves, unlike the other European powers, was a major strategic 
weakness and that Britain needed urgently to create a general staff on ‘Prussian lines’ to co-
ordinate the strategic objectives of the Army and its development. Amery concluded that 
colonial wars were not ‘easy’ but training and tactics was being adversely affected by the 
preponderance of diverse small wars. Amery noted that fighting numerous colonial wars 
‘might have created an atmosphere of reckless overconfidence’, and the ‘supreme belief in the 
virtues of improvising’; he further stated that there was a general neglect of strategy and 
tactics which had been caused by fighting against ‘inferior foes’ and the ‘supervising of the 
shooting down of ill-armed savages’.79 Amery observed that the existing ‘diversity’ of the 
British military system and inferior home defence arrangements were adversely affecting 
efficiency, and was therefore, according to him, a structural weakness at the heart of the 
Empire. Amery argued that many commentators had ‘not been surprised’ by the mediocre 
performance of the Army in the initial phases of the South African War, because the warning 
signs had been clearly articulated by the findings of the Hartington Commission of 1890 and 
the Wantage Commission of 1892 which had advocated reforms to the WO and the Army 
organization, the introduction of conscription and a increase in the Army establishment.
80
   
 
In October 1900, William St John Brodrick became Secretary of State for War. Between 1886 
and 1892 Brodrick had been financial secretary to the War Office; in 1895 he became Under-
Secretary of State for War, and in 1898 Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs. Therefore, 
Brodrick was well aware of the organisation problems at the WO and was conversant with the 
army reform agenda. Once in office Brodrick sought to carry out radical reorganization of the 
home army by creating six army corps of regular and auxiliary forces which would be funded 
by a 50% increase in the pre-war Army estimate. Each corps would be comprised of 40,000 
men; the first three corps of the new home army would be entirely regular and would form the 
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nucleus of an overseas expeditionary force of 120,000 men. The other three corps would be a 
mixture of regular and auxiliary units. This represented an increase of 45,000 on the existing 
number of regular and reserve forces earmarked for overseas service; however, the South 
African war had shown that the home army had been hard pressed to find 75,000 men fit for 
overseas service. Brodrick wanted to improve terms of service, enlistment and pay in the 
Army to attract more recruits. However, his decision to introduce an initial three year 
enlistment period was unsuccessful, because reenlistment figures were poor; many three year 
men chose to go straight to the reserve on completion of service. Sensing that having 
adequate numbers of manpower was going to be a major issue he argued unsuccessfully in 
Cabinet for the introduction of compulsory service which would mitigate against the vagaries 
of volunteer recruitment and ensure that his home defence scheme was viable. Brodrick was 
convinced that the Army lacked sufficient manpower both in the regular and reserve forces 
which could be solved by introducing a form of conscription. However, Brodrick was a firm 
supporter of the Cardwell system, and he believed that the war in South Africa had not 
highlighted any significant structural weaknesses in the Army organisation or at the WO.
81
 
Brodrick assured Roberts, by then Commander-in-Chief, that his scheme would get backing 
because of the prevailing political atmosphere for grappling with imperial defence issues 
which had been created by public and press demands for action to ‘reform’ the army after its 
disastrous performance in the war.
82
  
 
Although supported by the majority of the Conservative parliamentary party, Brodrick’s 
grandiose reforms were over ambitious and unrealistic. Even The Times, which broadly 
supported Brodrick’s reforms, was sceptical of the scheme because it noted that ‘volunteer’ 
recruitment to the army was inadequate because of poor pay and conditions of service; there 
was a perception that the ‘old happy- go-lucky notion that men of sorts can be always be 
found in an emergency’ was so prevalent among the political classes that any shift in the 
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direction of national defence policy was doubtful, if not impossible.
83
 Amery and other 
imperialists went to great lengths to argue that a fundamental shift in national character was 
required to meet the challenges of the modern world and guarantee imperial defence. 
Campbell-Bannerman, the leader of the Liberal Party, attacked the scheme on the grounds 
that it was too expensive and unsustainable because it could only be implemented by 
introducing conscription.
84
 The massive cost of the Boer war had shattered the Gladstonian 
system of finance which had been designed to keep government expenditure to a minimum; 
therefore, future Government spending was adversely effected by the war. Campbell-
Bannerman also noted that Brodrick was utilising the hysteria surrounding an ‘exceptional’ 
war as a pretext to establish a state based on militarism. Although, the Liberal Party had been 
divided by the war in South Africa, they were united in their hostility to Brodrick’s reforms.  
 
As the guerrilla war in South Africa dragged on and increasingly became more controversial 
the political and public appetite for fundamental changes to the military system waned. 
However, after 1902 a series of committees were appointed to enquire into the Army’s and 
WO performance during the war; the Royal Commission on the War in South Africa chaired 
by Lord Elgin, the Royal Commission on Militia and Volunteers chaired by the Duke of 
Norfolk and the Committee on War Office (Reconstitution) chaired by Lord Esher. Amery 
gave evidence to the Royal Commission on the War in South Africa and in the process greatly 
impressed Lord Esher, who was one of its members, with his knowledge of the war and wider 
military matters.
85
 Roberts initiated a new training programme for officers and men, 
introduced the Lee Enfield rifle, modern quick firing artillery, new drills for the artillery and 
infantry and reorganised the mounted infantry. However, Roberts, like his predecessors, was 
less inclined to carrying out a meaningful reorganization of the WO. Nevertheless, in 
December 1902 the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) was created by the new Prime 
Minister Arthur Balfour which vastly improved the coordination and direction of imperial 
defence policy between politicians and the two services. Also in 1902 Britain signed an 
alliance with Japan signalling the end of ‘splendid isolation’. But it appeared that a 
meaningful a reform of the WO or the creation of a general staff was still elusive as ever. In 
early 1903 Amery published The Problem with the Army which was a polemic about the 
unpreparedness and inefficiency of the Army during the South African War and an appraisal 
of the wider strategic questions which had been posed by the war.
86
 Much of this work was a 
reproduction of his Reformer articles and information received from officers in South Africa. 
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Amery had become highly sceptical of Brodrick’s reforms and used The Problem with the 
Army to attack them as being merely good intentioned ‘modifications’, and not the ‘radical’ 
reorganisation that he thought was essential.
87
 Amery argued that ‘modern conditions’ 
dictated that the formation of coordinated and efficient imperial defence system was now a 
national priority. 
 
Amery wanted a series of major imperial garrisons of regular troops located at key points 
along a ‘strategic front’ from South Africa to Manchuria. This, he concluded, would allow 
Britain to move large bodies of troops rapidly to an emergency in a matter of weeks rather 
than in month or months which had been the case at the start of the Boer War. Amery argued 
that the war in South Africa would have been shorter, or may even have never started, if a 
considerable portion of the regular Army had been concentrated there. In 1901 Brodrick 
announced that he wished to garrison 12,000 troops in South Africa for ‘Indian defence’, but 
the Indian government refused to pay the annual cost of £400,000 required for their upkeep 
and the scheme was dropped. Amery cited this as an example of a disjointed imperial defence 
policy which relied on short sighted economic expediency rather than strategic realities.
88
 
Amery, also, bemoaned the economic and strategic introspection of colonial governments 
which he considered was accentuated by a lack of centralised coordination. In 1902 
Chamberlain lobbied the Cabinet to permanently garrison a division of the regular army in 
South Africa.  Chamberlain solicited Amery for advice on the subject while try to influence 
the Cabinet.
89
 In early 1903 Amery also began privately lobbying Balfour as well.
90
 This was 
done in partnership with Hamilton who also spoke to Balfour about creating a permanent 
garrison in South Africa at social gatherings and weekend parties.
91
 Due to his increasing 
influence as a writer and journalist Amery was given invitations to the social and political 
gatherings of the Edwardian establishment; this gave him ample opportunity to discuss his 
ideas with the political power brokers of the Unionist movement and obtain political 
patronage. 
 
Ironically, Brodrick objected to a garrison in South Africa on the grounds that the prohibitive 
costs, especially the initial expenditure, involved in stationing an additional number of troops 
abroad on a permanent basis made the scheme impracticable. The Cabinet concurred with 
Brodrick and Chamberlain backed down. However, Amery persistently exploited the spectre 
of another ‘South Africa War’ or war in India as justification for peacetime imperial defence 
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schemes which appeared expensive but according to him were a fraction of expenditure 
involved in fighting a major colonial or limited war on the scale and intensity of the Boer 
War. Therefore, Amery wanted new commands located in South Africa, Canada, New 
Zealand, Burma and Australia.
92
 These commands, he claimed, would increase strategic 
mobility and allow Britain to have an overlapping imperial defence scheme which would be 
mutually supportive and allow training in different climates and terrains. It would also allow 
the rapid reinforcement of India in the event of an attack by Russia or a widespread 
insurrection. He also wanted the government to reintroduce long-service enlistments of nine 
years and six with the reserve; because his overseas garrison scheme required keeping the 
bulk of the army in the colonies for long periods. Amery was an advocate of Sir Charles 
Dilke’s dual army system of a long service overseas army and short service home army. 
 
Amery intended the regular army to form the nucleus of an imperial army which would be 
supported by ‘native’ and colonial forces in regional defence schemes. If large numbers of 
British troops were stationed in different regions of the Empire then training and co-operation 
between colonial forces would be easier to achieve. However, he was pragmatic enough to 
note that ‘neither India nor the great self-governing Colonies are in the least likely to submit 
to the direct interference of the War Office in their affairs’.93 This perception presented a 
major obstacle to the aspirations of federal imperialists like Amery who wanted to create a 
supranational system based on shared values and goals. At the 1902 Imperial Conference, 
Chamberlain had contentiously informed the representatives that ‘the weary titan staggers 
under the vast orb of its fate’ in an attempt to persuade the self-governing colonies to increase 
their participation in the administration and defence of the Empire: more succinctly this was 
an appeal for more financial support. There was a partial agreement on the need to increase 
colonial naval forces and a promise to make financial contributions toward British naval 
construction from the colonies, but a military defence arrangement remained an area of 
disagreement; the British government wanted the self-governing colonies to be able to 
provide ‘moderate imperial forces’ for rapid deployment in an emergency which were capable 
of fighting against ‘European troops’ in conjunction with British regular units.94 Brodrick 
used the conference to argue that the war in South Africa had shown that ‘hastily levied 
reinforcements’ could not ‘be pitted against’ European troops without further training and 
better organisation.  However, the British delegation went to great lengths to point out that 
these forces would be used to strike against European forces which were stationed in overseas 
colonies and not for employment on the continent during a European war. The British also 
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wanted a definite obligation from the self-governing colonies to provide forces in an 
emergency, and not assurances which hitherto had been the case. It was noted, at the 
conference that due to the signing of the alliance with the Japanese the British might 
conceivably in the future be involved in a war against Russia and its ally France.  
 
However, most of the self-governing colonies stated that they were willing to increase the 
training of their existing forces, but rejected the British proposals for the creation of imperial 
forces on the grounds that they represented an infraction of their sovereignty. The South 
African War had revealed how the British Empire could mobilize considerable military 
strength in an emergency, but the immediate post-war period revealed how the divergent 
political agendas of the self-governing colonies were still a stumbling block toward a unified 
security policy. Similarly, the defence discussions at the 1902 conference highlighted how 
tenuous a proposition an imperial federation was at this stage. Imperialists like Amery 
considered the creation of an imperial federation as a strategic necessity. Writing in 1911 
journalist and noted Imperialist theorist Richard Jebb argued that the disastrous start of the 
war in South Africa appeared to have been the catalyst for the creation of an imperial 
federation, but by the time of the 1902 conference it was apparent that the war had fostered a 
burgeoning sense of ‘nationalism’ among the self-governing colonies.95 Amery considered, 
with some justification, that there was a vacuum where a unified imperial defence policy 
should exist and that Britain should display more leadership by establishing a forward 
strategy based on new imperial garrisons which would require political cooperation from the 
self-governing colonies. Amery argued that the decision made in the 1860s and 1870s to 
withdraw imperial garrisons from the established colonies had been a mistake because it had 
undermined imperial unity and created resentment.
96
 Amery believed that the creation of a 
General Staff administering a clearly defined imperial defence policy could efficiently 
coordinate the Empire’s defence effort, even if the self-governing colonies were less than 
enthusiastic contributors in peacetime. Amery expected there to be a great expansion of forces 
in time of war and that the government should prepare cadres for dispatch to the colonies in 
an emergency.
97
  However, Amery thought that Brodrick’s reforms reinforced the ‘outdated 
perception’ that half of the regular army should be based in the UK in case of invasion. This 
he concluded destabilised colonial defence because the ‘exigencies of imperial affairs’ and 
modern geo-political conditions required a new approach. However, he acknowledged that the 
costs involved in garrisoning a considerable number of troops aboard appeared prohibitive, 
but he noted that the immense cost of the war in South Africa had shown the futility in not 
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having adequate numbers of men and material at mutually supportive strategic points. His 
underlying argument was that having the bulk of the regular army abroad acted as a deterrent 
and increased strategic mobility and was therefore more cost effective in the long run.  
 
However, Amery unequivocally argued that ‘naval supremacy is the keystone of our whole 
defensive position’.98 He also noted that in a major war with a major European power the 
movement of reinforcements through the Mediterranean and off the western coasts of Europe 
would present the ‘greatest  difficulty and danger’.99 Amery asserted that the Admiralty had 
stated that they could not ‘guarantee’ the safety of troop convoys from the UK or through the 
Mediterranean during a major war. This observation backed his assumption that the regular 
army should be concentrated at strategic points across the Empire. However, Hamilton told 
Amery that there was a considerable amount of ‘objections’ in the WO to his plans because 
the Admiralty could not move troops in a hurry from South Africa to India.
100
 Paradoxically, 
Amery was a pragmatic adherent of the ‘Blue Water’ theory and believed that naval power 
was the cornerstone of British strategic policy. Amery believed that in the event of a major 
war with a European power Britain’s primary military effort would be directed at attacking 
their overseas territories or defending British overseas territories. He also argued that given 
the small size of Britain’s regular army, in comparison to the other European powers, the 
likelihood of British troops being deployed on the continent was negligible at the outset of a 
major war; but significantly he did not dismiss Britain’s participation in major war with 
another European power. Amery’s idea’s appear to conform to the model of the ‘British Way 
in Warfare’ which accentuated the importance of maritime power; during the eighteenth 
century, Britain had used its maritime power to dictate where and when it fought on land; 
naval power had also allowed the British to keep their forces adequately resupplied in period 
when the most efficient form of transport was seaborne traffic. In an era of poor land transport 
links this gave the British a significant strategic advantage. However, the advent of the 
railways meant that the continental powers could rapidly concentrate their forces to counter 
any landing and then supply them without interference from British naval forces. In 1902, 
Russia’s construction of strategic railways toward India, the Far East and the Middle East 
presented the greatest challenge to Edwardian policy makers because it negated British 
maritime power.  
 
Amery was a close associate of Halford Mackinder, the noted geographer, and a fellow Co-
efficient, who argued that command of Eurasia by a single power, or combination of powers, 
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would dominate the world.
101
 Mackinder noted that rapid industrialisation and improvements 
to transport networks in central Europe and Asia would increasingly give Russia access to 
vast mineral and agricultural resources and a protected internal market. Mackinder later 
developed his ‘heartland’ theory which stated that any power which dominated Eurasia would 
render oceanic commerce and naval power less important than had been the case in the past. 
This theory also applied to the United States in the Western Hemisphere which unlike Russia 
had a highly developed internal market, considerable raw materials and a comprehensive, and 
expanding, industrial and transport infrastructure. Similarly, Germany had by 1900 a highly 
developed industrial, agricultural and transport network which gave it considerable strategic 
advantages, but Germany was dependent on imports of raw materials and chemicals.
102
 
France with its overseas empire was like the British dependent on maritime commerce with 
its colonies. However, the logic of the heartland rendered the naval blockade one of Britain’s 
primary strategic weapons ineffectual. Conversely, Britain, like France, was susceptible to 
blockade, because of its heavy reliance on imports of raw materials from its empire. 
Similarly, France and Britain relied on utilising sea power for communication with and 
transportation to their colonies. As Lord Fisher, the First Sea Lord, noted later, ‘It’s not 
invasion we have to fear if our Navy is beaten, it’s starvation’.103Although, having a diverse 
and extended empire gave the British many economic and strategic advantages, the problems 
associated with transporting by sea, material over great distances to the UK in wartime were 
manifold. Arguably, the threat posed by cruisers, gunboats and submarines to British 
merchant shipping was a more significant national security problem than the risk of an 
invasion.  
 
However, as the other great powers, especially Germany, expanded their industrial capacity 
and began building blue water navies, Britain was forced to respond by constructing modern 
ships and restructuring strategic policy to counter these new threats. After 1904 Fisher began 
redeploying the bulk of the navy to defend the British Isles from attack and reduced the 
number of overseas stations and squadrons.
104
 By 1902 British strategic and foreign policy, 
which in theory was dependent on maintaining the European balance of power by remaining 
diplomatically detached from the alliance system was shifting toward entering into military 
pacts to counter the threat posed by Germany.
105
 Splendid isolation had always been 
dependent on the global supremacy of the Royal Navy and a balance of power which did not 
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favour one state or a combination of states. Although, Amery argued that Britain would never 
unilaterally fight a land war against another European power on the continent, because as an 
oceanic power the UK did not have the capacity to have a large army and navy, he did, 
however, advocate the creation of a large reserve since he expected another ‘great war’ in the 
Empire.
106
 Similarly, he argued that if Britain became embroiled in a war with another 
European power, or powers, military operations on the continent would require the ‘whole 
manhood of the country trained in the use of arms’.107 Conversely, Amery stated that British 
military strength lay in its unsurpassed strategic mobility which was afforded by naval power. 
He concluded that Britain’s principal offensive effort in a European war would be naval. 
However, adoption of his imperial defence scheme would have precluded the UK from taking 
part initially in continental operations until a nation in arms had been created, trained and 
equipped, because the bulk of the regular army and its equipment would have been deployed 
overseas protecting the empire or attacking the colonies of other great powers. Clearly, 
Amery’s scheme was designed to counter the threat posed by France and Russia, and to a 
lesser degree Germany, to the Empire. But Mackinder’s theories did begin to gather credence 
as it became apparent that the ‘British way in warfare’ based on maritime supremacy was 
being superseded by rapid industrialisation and the construction of railways on the continent 
and in Asia. The other ingredient of the British way in warfare was a continental ally or allies 
which could supply unlimited land power during a major conflict. By 1900 Britain’s 
economic, industrial and strategic advantages over the other great powers were now at an end 
which increased the desire to realign British foreign policy to reflect the new strategic 
realities. However, Britain still obtained considerable economic advantages from invisible 
earnings such as insurance, overseas investments and maritime commerce. The perception of 
economic decline and isolation increasingly haunted Edwardian security policy considerations 
and increased the likelihood of British involvement in a major European war. The subsequent 
rapprochement with France and Russia removed a twin threat to the British Empire while 
simultaneously acquiring allies with the land forces to nullify Germany’s military strength 
which was primarily directed at the British Isles. 
 
Amery argued that home defence should be firstly the preserve of the Navy and that army 
strength in the UK should reflect the realities countering an invasion, which he stated would 
be limited given the difficulties involved in moving and concentrating sufficient men and 
material by sea on to a hostile coast protected by the Royal Navy, rather than reflecting 
hyperbole and scaremongering which had been the case in the past. He concluded that the 
regular army establishment in Britain could be reduced to a quarter of its strength by the 
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simple expedient of improving the training, facilities and organisation of the auxiliary forces. 
Amery noted that the headquarters of the auxiliary forces had, in his words, ‘practically no 
organization’, and as a consequence did not constitute an efficient army fit to counter a 
regular invasion force or a major raid. However, Amery was very careful not criticise the 
Volunteer movement as an institution but argued that it should be reorganised to make it more 
efficient and thus able to deal with an invasion. He argued that a cadre of regular officers and 
NCOs should permanently seconded to the auxiliary forces to ‘stiffen up’ units and improve 
administration and organisation.
108
 Amery argued that the prohibitive costs involved in being 
an officer, especially a commanding officer, of the volunteer and Yeomanry regiments 
excluded many competent officers of an ‘ordinary professional income’ advancing through 
the rank structure. He also argued that command of auxiliary regiments should be entrusted to 
professional soldiers. Given the dominance of Members of Parliament, the House of Lords 
and the ‘establishment’ in officers’ corps of the Auxiliary forces this statement was probably 
calculated to cause some resentment, if not hostility, from Volunteer officers. Amery thought 
that the government could induce more interest in the Volunteers by paying each member for 
their time on duty.  
  
Amery argued that national apathy was a major impediment to resolving imperial and home 
defence issues; this was, in his opinion, also a reason why recruitment to regular army and the 
militia was so poor. Amery’s solution was that all children (male) in Britain between the ages 
of sixteen and seventeen  should be taught how to use weapons and given rudimentary drill 
and tactical training through a military education system which would foster an ‘underlying 
military spirit in the nation’ and greater civic responsibility.109 Amery also argued that a new 
national militia be formed which would replace the Volunteers and auxiliary forces. The 
compulsory militia ballot had been abolished in 1831 and subsequently the militia had gone 
into decline, but after the invasions scares of the 1850s it was revived as a voluntary force 
along-side the Volunteer movement. By 1900 service in militia comprised of three months 
initial training with the army followed by a requirement for a month’s annual service; 
militiamen were paid for their time on duty but there was no overseas liability. The militia 
often attracted men in need of an additional income or the unemployed. Many decided to 
carry out the initial service period before deciding to join the regulars, which meant that the 
militia became an important source of recruitment for the army. Amery argued that the 
national militia should be based on compulsory universal service to create a ‘nation in arms’. 
However, Amery realised that any compulsory system which was comparable with European 
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model was politically and socially unacceptable, so he argued that there would be no 
‘compulsory residence in barracks’, except for short periods of annual training.110  
 
Amery accentuated the social and medical benefits of his national militia scheme, because the 
state would be able to monitor the health of men whilst carrying out their annual service. 
During the war the poor health of large numbers of recruits had caused a national outcry. 
However, Amery stated in the first volume of The Times history of the war that it had been no 
surprise to those ‘interested in military matters’ that large sections of the of the urban poor 
were in poor health, and therefore not fit for service in the military, because for years large 
numbers of potential recruits were rejected on medical grounds or were unable to be posted 
overseas until their physical condition had been improved after enlistment.
111
 Similarly, he 
thought that universal military training would improve the educational standards of the men 
enlisted. However, Amery noted that there was a lack of adequate training grounds in the UK 
and in the ‘environs of London’, but he argued that there were ‘plenty of them in the 
Empire’.112 Amery also argued that the Army should employ civilians to do many of the 
menial tasks which soldiers were required to perform in UK garrisons which would free them 
up to carryout military training. Amery stated during the war in South Africa that many 
reservists and volunteers had been found to be inadequately trained. This was a major 
problem because many regular units had their establishments brought up to strength with 
reservists prior to their embarkation for South Africa. The throwing together of men from 
different commands to create units for expeditionary forces was universally considered to be 
unsatisfactory. Amery’s imperial system was designed to remove the need to establish 
composite forces in the UK for deployment overseas. However, Amery prophesied that a 
major war in the future would require large numbers of men and it would be a protracted 
attritional conflict which is why Britain needed to create a viable trained reserve. 
113
  
 
Amery was also influenced by writings of Polish banker Jean De Bloch who in 1899 argued 
in The Future of War In Its Technical Economic And Political Relations Is War Now 
Impossible?, that the defensive power of modern weapons had virtually rendered the 
offensive obsolete.
114
 Bloch calculated that entrenched troops armed with magazine rifles, 
smokeless power, high explosive, machine guns and quick firing guns would create a fire 
swept zone which would be difficult if not impossible to cross; he considered that under such 
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circumstances the ratio of attackers to defenders would have to be eight to one. Bloch 
prophesied that the next major war would become an attritional conflict waged by massive 
armies locked into a series of indecisive sieges. Amery thought that Bloch might be right that 
the next war in Europe would create ‘deadlock’. However, Bloch concluded that a major war 
was now unthinkable because nation states would face ‘mutual annihilation or complete 
exhaustion’ and lacked the economic or logistical ability to wage war on the scale required to 
overcome the firepower potential of modern weapons.
115
 At the time many of Bloch’s ideas 
were rejected by the British military establishment because he was perceived as an advocate 
of ‘non-militarism and non-jingoism’, and ‘namby-pamby humanitarianism’.116 Similarly, 
Bloch thought that the war in South Africa had reflected the realities of modern warfare. But 
many commentators argued that the war was unique and had been governed by local 
conditions and had not reflected a manifest inability to tactically respond to technological 
advances in weapons. A school of thought was created around the premise that it would 
always be possible push home an attack by utilising greater discipline and esprit de corps 
among attacking troops who would themselves be backed by artillery and machine guns. 
Amery argued that modern war required an increase in ‘moral quality’ and total adherence to 
discipline to overcome the technological advances which confronted the soldier on the 
battlefield.
117
 He argued that both of these qualities could be better produced through a more 
comprehensive training of officers and men. The South African War had shown that many 
soldiers lacked initiative and independence when under fire or separated from direct 
command. Amery concluded that a more comprehensive training programme would improve 
the ‘intelligence and will power’ of the individual soldier which under ‘modern conditions’ he 
considered essential.  
 
On the question of WO reform Amery argued for greater co-ordination between the different 
branches of the department. He advocated the creation of an Army Council which could 
strengthen the power of the Secretary of State for War and improve administration by 
channelling decisions and ideas through an executive broad presided over by a politician. 
Amery argued that the office of Commander-in-Chief should be abolished and replaced by an 
Inspector General Of Forces who would be directly responsible to the Secretary of State for 
War.
118
 Amery considered a lack of general staff a serious deficiency which needed to be 
urgently remedied. He noted that a general staff could co-ordinate training, planning, 
education, organisation, intelligence gathering, and the distribution of forces both at home and 
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in the Empire. Such a body he argued would constitute a ‘brain of the army’ which would 
‘both acquire knowledge and use that knowledge to guide military policy’.119 Many of the 
ideas contained in the Problem of the Army were drawn from various sources and many of 
Amery’s military contacts such as Hamilton and Wilson who supplied him with advice and 
information. Consequently, Amery quickly established a reputation as an expert on imperial 
defence policy and army reform. Amery also began, in his own words, ‘colloquing’ with a 
group of Unionist members of parliament led by Lord Hugh Cecil and Winston Churchill who 
were opposed to the Brodrick reforms on the grounds that they were too expensive and over 
ambitious. They also believed, as did Amery, Brodrick’s corps scheme was unworkable 
because of the small size of the regular army and its numerous overseas commitments. It was 
often remarked that Brodrick was attempting to imitate the continental military system 
without providing adequate amounts of manpower. The Hughligans, as they became known, 
mounted a sustained attack on Brodrick’s proposals in Parliament. Their attacks slowly 
gained momentum but never really ignited public attention. During this period Churchill 
would often dine with Amery and ask his advice on military matters and army reform.
120
 On 
19 January 1903 Churchill mounted a spirited attack on Brodrick’s reforms at a Primrose 
League
121
 meeting in Oldham in his constituency.
122
 During the speech he essentially 
endorsed Amery’s ideas about imperial defence and his criticism of Brodrick’s reforms. On 
21 January Hamilton wrote to Amery and discussed Churchill’s attacks on Brodrick’s reforms 
and stated that Lord Roberts was inclined to acknowledge that there was a ‘great deal of truth’ 
in what Churchill was saying.
123
 Amery later noted in his memoirs that he had not ‘broadly 
agreed’ with the Hughligans, and had increasingly distanced himself from them, because of 
their lack of meaningful alternative defence programme and their increasing advocacy of 
Winston Churchill’s appeal for retrenchment on defence spending.124  
 
However, by early 1903 Brodrick’s plans were beginning to unravel. Recruitment figures 
were poor and his central plan for a six army corps were derided as a ‘phantom army’ by the 
Hughligans during parliamentary debates.
125
 Ernest Beckett, one of the Hughligans, wrote to 
Amery in June 1903 stating that his ‘powerful and persistent advocacy’ in The Times would 
bring about ‘useful and necessary’ army reorganization.126 The Hughligans also argued that 
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expenditure on the Army should be subordinate to that of the navy which they stated was the 
primary means of ensuring imperial and national defence. Similarly, the high cost of the 
South Africa War had placed a heavy burden on the public spending which further 
complicated Brodrick’s attempts to create his six corps home army because he was under 
pressure from the Treasury to reduce spending. However, the defence debate was soon being 
overshadowed by other political events such as the controversial 1902 Education Act and in 
1903 tariff reform. In May 1903 Chamberlain used a speech in Birmingham, his political 
heartland, to attack free trade and made a powerful case for tariff reform and the introduction 
of inter-imperial preferences to protect British economic interests.
127
 Chamberlain set about 
setting up the Tariff Reform League and in the process split the Unionist government and 
coalition apart. Amery enthusiastically threw himself into the Tariff Reform League which 
subsequently attracted powerful support from politicians, industrialists and most of the 
newspaper proprietors. As a consequence the Tariff Reform League received considerable 
financial and organisational assistance from its powerful backers and launched a national 
propaganda campaign. In contrast the Free Food League which was set up as a counter to the 
Tariff Reform League by fifty-four Unionist MPs was underfunded and unable to mount an 
effective publicity campaign; many of the Hughligans, including Winston Churchill, were 
also members of the Free Food League. Amery recounted in his memoirs how shocked he had 
been to hear the ‘vehemence’ against Chamberlain and his tariff reform policy from members 
of the Hughligans at a private dinner held at Beckett’s rooms in Mayfair.128  
 
On 14 September 1903, Chamberlain resigned from Cabinet and devoted his energy to the 
cause of tariff reform. Balfour reacted by reshuffling his cabinet and Brodrick became 
Secretary of State for India and the Unionist MP Hugh Oakley Arnold-Forster was appointed 
Secretary of State for War. However, Arnold-Forster was not Balfour’s first choice for the 
position of Secretary of State for War but was compromise appointment after five other 
candidates, including Esher, declined his offer of the post. Balfour, who was considered to be 
an expert of defence issues, also setup a small three man committee headed by Lord Esher to 
report on reform of the WO; the other members were Admiral Sir John Fisher, later Lord 
Fisher, and Sir George Clarke, who had been a member of the Dawkins Committee which had 
produced a report in 1901 on the lack of cooperation and preparation between the WO and 
politicians prior to the war in South Africa. Arnold-Forster was a known critic of the 
Cardwell system and avid navalist and he was enthusiastic supporter of Chamberlainite 
polices such as tariff reform and the creation of an imperial federation. Arnold-Forster was 
also advocate of the dual army system. Like Amery he had been a journalist and had written 
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several pamphlets about the army in the late 1890s; in 1900 he published The War Office, the 
Army and the Empire. In 1900 Lord Salisbury appointed Arnold-Forster Parliamentary 
Secretary of the Admiralty. Arnold-Forster was an intellectual and technocrat, but he was 
considered to be austere and inflexible, and like Amery a poor public speaker.
129
 However, 
shortly before taking up his post of Secretary of State for War Arnold-Forster suffered a heart 
attack from which he never fully recovered. Arnold-Forster would be plagued by ill health 
throughout his tenure at the WO.  
 
On accepting the post Arnold-Forster began planning to dismantle what he considered to be 
completely discredited Cardwell system of linked battalions; he also wanted to abandon 
Brodrick’s army corps scheme. He planned to create a dual army of 32 battalions of short 
service men enlisted for two years in a home army, and an overseas army of 112 battalions of 
men on a nine year enlistment for use in imperial garrisons and in a striking force. However, 
Arnold-Forster was under considerable pressure from the Treasury to make substantial 
savings. He decided to reduce the number of volunteers, disband half of the militia and 
restructure the home army. His plan was to improve training and equipment by reducing the 
overall size of the auxiliary forces; he also wanted to improve the organization and 
administration of the entire home army. Therefore, Arnold-Forster decision to reduce the 
volunteers and militia placed him on a collision course with members of the Cabinet and 
Government who were officers in the auxiliary forces. This opposition was replicated in the 
House of Commons were many members were also officers in the volunteers and militia.
130
 
However, Arnold-Forster confided to Amery that he thought ‘that anything will really revive 
the Militia, or make it fit to face an enemy’.131 His other proposals included building modern 
barracks, reorganizing the cavalry and improving the employment prospects for ex-soldiers. It 
was very apparent that Arnold-Forster had already determined prior to taking office what his 
policy would be. However, his inflexible personality and inability to engage in a constructive 
debate with senior officers and other politicians regarding his plans ultimately handicapped 
his ability to effect change.  
 
Amery knew Arnold-Forster socially through Chamberlain and both were committed tariff 
and army reformers and imperialists. Amery wrote to Arnold-Forster at the end of 1903 
stating that their ideas were in ‘parallel’ and offered his assistance which was accepted by 
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Arnold-Forster.
132
 Having Arnold-Forster appointed Secretary of State for War presented 
Amery with a good opportunity to get his ideas officially adopted. On the 9 January 1904 
Amery wrote a memorandum to Arnold-Forster giving him advice on ‘his reorganization 
plans’.133 Amery was concerned that Arnold-Forster should make it clear in his statement to 
the House Commons that the proposed short service army was not solely intended for home 
service and would be used for imperial service if required. Amery was worried that in some 
‘great emergency the Government will dare not send the whole of the short service regular 
army out of the country’ for political reasons.  He also stated that the ‘underlying problems of 
national service’ were not being tackled. Amery also attempted to gain support from Arnold-
Forster for the creation of a South African garrison. On 13 January Arnold-Forster replied that 
he had read Amery’s letter ‘with lively satisfaction, and with almost complete agreement’ and 
that it was ‘interesting how our minds have been working together’.134 Amery sent Arnold-
Forster clippings of Canadian plans for their militia and over the coming month’s further 
letters setting out his ideas on army reform. However, Arnold-Forster was being stalled by the 
Cabinet from publically announcing his plans. Overtime Arnold-Forster’s abrasive 
personality began to alienate senior officers and fellow politicians who had been initially 
prepared to listen to his proposals on WO and militia reform. Amery was well aware of the 
personal and professional animosity toward Arnold-Forster. 
  
On 6 January 1904 Sir Clinton Dawkins, chairman of the 1901 Dawkins committee, and one 
of the founder members of the National Service League (NSL), wrote to Amery that he had 
encountered Arnold-Forster at the Athenaeum Club where he had ‘seized hold of me’ and 
then ‘poured over me in his, nervous rapid way’ and discussed the ideas he ‘hopes’ to put into 
practice at WO.
135
 Dawkins told Amery that Arnold-Forster wanted to meet with him and 
discuss his ideas in more detail, but he admitted that he was ‘rather avoiding him’. Dawkins 
other objective in writing to Amery was because he believed that Amery was the only 
qualified person outside of the WO worth speaking to on the issue of army reform and he 
wished to have a meeting with him so that when he saw Arnold-Forster again he wanted to 
know what ‘particular point’ Amery thought he should ‘press upon him’. Amery sent 
Dawkins a long letter setting out his ideas on army reform. On 13 January Dawkins sent 
Amery a note thanking him for his information and said he was broadly supportive of his 
ideas; specifically he agreed that having short service men in a home army with a overseas 
liability to back the foreign service army was a good suggestion, but that the policy need 
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careful presentation ‘so as to get into the popular mind its intimate connection’.136 However, 
Arnold-Forster’s chief detractor was Lord Esher, who briefed against him within the Cabinet 
and with Balfour. Similarly, Lord Esher began intervening within the WO policy decision 
process which brought him into conflict with Arnold-Forster. However, because Esher was a 
confidant of King Edward VII Arnold-Forster was hard pressed to counter his interference. 
Amery was in close contact with Esher and they were in agreement on many of the issues 
concerning army reform.
137
 Amery in memoirs stated that he had persuaded Esher to employ 
colonel Gerald Ellison, later General Sir Gerald Ellison, as the committee’s secretary; Ellison 
was later credited as having considerable influence over Richard Haldane, Secretary of State 
for War 1905 -1912, and made a significant contribution to reform of the army between 1905-
7. Ellison has also been attributed with being instrumental in preparing the Esher Committees 
recommendations.
138
 Amery considered Ellison to be responsible for ‘laying the foundations 
on which our General Staff system has been built up’.139 In February 1904 Lord Esher’s 
Committee recommended the abolition of the post of commander-in-chief, the formation of a 
general staff, creation of a Chief of the General Staff, a permanent secretariat for the 
Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) and the establishment of an army council of three civil 
and four military members. Balfour and the Cabinet endorsed Esher’s recommendations and 
the changes were set in motion immediately without seeking Parliamentary approval. Arnold-
Forster had not been party to any of the work of the committee after being excluded from it at 
its inception. However, Arnold-Forster was now expected to rapidly implement its findings. 
Arnold-Forster tactlessly wrote to Roberts the day before the new Army Council was due start 
work informing him that the timetable for implementing the Esher Committee proposals had 
been increased and he would be shortly dismissed from his post.
140
 However, Roberts decided 
to resign, but did accept a seat on the CID. Conversely, Lord Esher had no intention of 
relinquishing control of the process, so Arnold-Forster was placed in a difficult, if not 
impossible, position. A frustrated and increasingly impotent Arnold-Forster offered to resign 
on several occasions, but Balfour refused to let him go.  
 
However, Balfour gave Arnold-Forster permission to make his statement on his vision for the 
army during the army estimate debate on 14 July 1904 but he was told not state that it was 
Government policy. However, Arnold-Forster was taken ill at home on 13 July 1904 and 
Amery was asked by Arnold-Forster’s wife, Mary, if he could help prepare the policy 
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statement.
141
 Arnold-Forster gave Amery access to official papers and his office at home to 
work on the statement. Amery asserted that the statement and an accompanying memorandum 
were completely unprepared and that he was forced to work all through the night to complete 
them.
142
 Amery declared in his memoirs that Arnold-Forster’s statement and subsequent 
performance at the dispatch box answering questions was entirely due to his ‘practically 
repeating’ the memorandum. Amery noted that Arnold-Forster reproduced ‘his’ memorandum 
in The Army in 1906.
143
 Arnold-Forster never publicly acknowledged Amery’s authorship of 
the memorandum. However, on 15 July Arnold-Forster wrote a private letter to Amery 
thanking him for the ‘invaluable help you gave me. Very few men in London would have 
been competent to do work at short notice and with such material as I was able to supply’.144 
He further stated, ‘I have your memorandum, which I can send to people, and which will 
explain matters better than my speech’.  On 16 July Amery using his pseudonym reformer 
wrote a glowing endorsement of Arnold-Forster’s statement to the House of Commons and of 
his new policy.
145
 However, Amery recognising which was the most contentious part of the 
statement noted that ‘the Militia was moribund’ and needed to be reformed; he noted that 
auxiliary forces training, equipment was deficient and that the Volunteers establishment was 
short by 100,000. On 20 May 1904 the Norfolk Commission reported that the Volunteers and 
Militia were in an unsatisfactory condition and  the Home Army needed reforming. However, 
the report also observed that without Regular support the Home Army would be unable to 
resist an invasion.
146
 As a consequence the Commission concluded that it would be advisable 
to create a Home Army based on conscription. The controversial statement about introducing 
conscription overshadowed the rest of the report. Arnold-Forster thought that the findings of 
the report were ‘unimportant’ and resolved to press on with his own ideas.  
 
Naively, Arnold-Forster thought that he had not ‘greatly offended any party’, and that ‘I shall 
eventually get my own way with regard to the Militia’.147 However, prior to his making 
statement in the House of Commons someone had leaked details of his plans to make cuts to 
the auxiliary forces to the Daily Express and the Standard.
148
 This of course was calculated to 
stir up feeling against Arnold-Forster in the Commons chamber during the debate. The 
problem for Arnold-Forster was that his plans for the militia and volunteers made him many 
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enemies which then overshadowed his whole programme. Over the coming months Arnold-
Forster became locked into a cycle of confrontation with the newly constituted Army Council 
and senior officers over his reforms. His position with the Army Council was made more 
difficult by the presence of Lord Lansdowne and Brodrick both ex Secretaries of State for 
War, because he was reversing much of their work. After July 1904 Amery began lobbying 
Balfour on the question of army reform.
149
But, Amery was increasingly at odds with Balfour 
over his refusal to fully endorse Chamberlain’s tariff reform programme which increasingly 
limited his ability to wield any influence on behalf of Arnold-Forster’s scheme with the Prime 
Minister.  
 
In April 1904 Sir George Clarke became the first secretary of the CID.
150
 Clarke supported 
some of Arnold-Forster’s proposals but was in favour of retaining the Militia. Clarke, like 
Esher, began conspiring with Balfour against Arnold-Forster and succeeded in January 1905 
in having a sub-committee of the CID convened to consider Arnold-Forster’s proposals on the 
Militia. The committee was chaired by Balfour and included Clarke and Esher, but not 
Arnold-Forster who was excluded from the process. The committee subsequently decided to 
retain the militia. It was now apparent that Arnold-Forster had little authority or any say in the 
formation of army policy. However, Amery was on amicable terms with Clarke. Like Amery, 
Clarke supported the idea of a spilt long service-9 year enlistment- and short service-3 year 
enlistment- regular army; he also favoured compulsory military training in national schools 
and extending the overseas liability to all militia, Yeomanry and reserve forces during an 
overseas emergency. All of which Amery had been advocating for some-time. An overriding 
theme in Amery’s writings on imperial security was the threat posed by the advance of 
Russian strategic railways into Asia. One of the dominant themes during Clarke’s tenure at 
the CID was the Indian defence question. Balfour dominated the CID and the direction of 
strategic policy and his overriding concern was the possibility of a ‘great war on the North 
West Frontier’ which would require the mobilization of 100,000 men to reinforce British 
forces in India.
151
 However, in October 1904 during the Russo-Japanese war Amery made a 
startling proposal to Clarke about how to deal with the Russian question.  
 
On 27 October 1904 Amery wrote a paper to Clarke setting out his ideas on a scheme to assist 
a Finnish uprising against Russian rule. The letter was sent a couple of days after the Dogger 
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Bank incident when the Russian Baltic fleet on route to Port Arthur fired on the Hull fishing 
fleet which resulted in a trawler being sunk and an number of fishermen being killed and 
injured. Historically Finland had a semi-autonomous status within the Russian Empire, 
however, in 1901 the Finnish army was disbanded and a conscription law introduced which 
made all Finnish males liable for service in the Russian Army. The Finns responded by 
carrying out passive resistance, holding demonstrations and refusing  to recognise the 
conscription edict. The Russia government reacted by imposing draconian laws and 
suspending all of the Finns autonomous privileges and individual political rights. By 1904 it 
appeared that the Finns were on the verge of rising up against Russian rule. Sensing an 
opportunity to attack Russia Amery wanted the British government to embark on a sustained 
programme of propaganda to orchestrate a revolution in Finland as a prelude to military 
intervention; he also wanted the British to enter into an alliance with Sweden which would 
encourage the Swedes to invade Finland in defence of Finnish rights.
152
 However, he 
proposed letting the Swedes annex Finland for their assistance after the war was over.  Amery 
argued that the British could send 120,000 regulars and 80,000 Militia, the Swedes could 
supply 250,000-300,000 men and the Finns 100,000; he thought that the Navy could be 
deployed to control the Finnish coast and blockade the Russia ports in the Baltic. Amery also 
noted that with the Russian military distracted by the Manchurian question there was an 
opportunity to strike at St Petersburg the ‘very heart of Russia’ from Finnish soil. He 
concluded that if the scheme worked having a hostile army at the gates of St Petersburg 
would make ‘India safe’. However, Clarke dismissed the scheme on the grounds that if the 
project failed or succeeded ‘we should be held up to the execration of Europe as insidious 
plotters seeking to involve inoffensive peoples in our own difficulties’.153 Nevertheless, he did 
conclude ‘meanwhile, you may be sure that the project is not being lost sight of ’. To all 
intent purposes Amery’s scheme was impractical and dangerous, but it does demonstrate how 
Amery considered himself to be a master strategist and it is indicative of his ability to get his 
‘memorandums’ read by the most influential people within the British defence establishment.  
 
By October 1904 the beleaguered Arnold-Forster was offering to send Amery official 
information to ‘assist him’ with his work.154 With Amery providing favourable comments in 
The Times it was obvious Arnold-Forster needed to keep Amery on side. In October 1904 
Arnold-Forster gained approval from the Cabinet for his long-service enlistments; and in June 
1905 for a trial of his short-service enlistments. For much of 1905 Arnold-Forster attempted 
to bring about changes to the composition and size of the Volunteers. However, like his 
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previous endeavours with the militia Arnold-Forster soon found himself at odds with 
Parliament and other members of the Government.  On the 20 June 1905, an ambiguous 
circular was sent to commands to find out how many men in the Volunteers were fit for 
overseas service. It was leaked to the press, who interpreted it as attempt by the Government 
to impose severe medical requirements to reduce the number of Volunteers. Although, 
Arnold-Forster retracted the circular and issued a new one which attempted to clarify the 
situation he was forced to defend the Governments position in an adjournment debate in the 
House of Commons on 13 July. By September other members of the Government were 
appealing for more recruits to come forward to join the Volunteers. Again Arnold-Forster was 
forced to bow to pressure and seek additional funding for the Volunteers from the Treasury. 
However, by December 1905 Balfour’s government was on the verge of collapse. The issue 
of tariff reform had increasingly divided the Conservative and Unionist Parties. Balfour 
attempted to placate both sides by promoting a policy of retaliation which was designed to 
correspond with the trade restrictions of other states while continuing to abide by the 
principles of free trade.
155
 However, the Conservative and Unionist support for tariff reform 
led to a series of by-election defeats. The Liberal Party accentuated the notion of cheaper food 
being a consequence of free trade and began promoting a new progressive social reform 
agenda. Similarly, a number of free trade Conservative and Unionist MPs were driven out of 
their seats or joined the Liberals’.156 It was becoming apparent by the end of 1905 that 
Chamberlain’s attempt to convince public opinion of the value of tariff reform was not 
succeeding.  
 
At the start of 1905 Amery relinquished the role of military correspondent at The Times to 
Repington. In February 1905 Joseph Chamberlain and his son Austen Chamberlain put 
forward Amery as a prospective Unionist candidate for the seat of Wolverhampton East 
which was a Liberal seat. In April Amery was accepted as the Unionist candidate. In May 
1905 the third volume of The Times history of the War in South Africa was published. This 
provoked some criticism of Amery, because he had again attacked the performance of senior 
officers and the army system, but as Amery noted there was no significant assault on his 
‘facts’.157 Balfour resigned in December 1905 and a general election was called for the 
following January. On 15 January 1906 the Conservative and Unionist Parties were heavily 
defeated in an election dominated by the question of tariff reform, and Amery was 
unsuccessful in his attempt to gain a seat at Wolverhampton East. The new Liberal 
government was formed with a large majority of 130. The problem for Amery was that he 
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was intimately associated with the policy of tariff reform which increasingly left him isolated 
and out of touch with public opinion. In 1906 he published the Fundamental Fallacies of Free 
Trade which set out to make a case for a unified imperial economic policy constructed around 
a Zollverein; Amery argued that the period of free trade was now being superseded by the rise 
of a new international economic system which was dominated by the protectionist powers of 
the United States and Germany. After the election Amery did not have same level of direct 
access to new Secretary of State for War, Richard Haldane, as he had enjoyed with Arnold-
Forster.  
 
However, Amery was still in close contact with Esher, Clarke, Wilson, Hamilton and Ellison. 
Unlike the abrasive Arnold-Forster, the affable Haldane was prepared to consult and listen to 
WO officials and senior officers about their views on the Army reorganization. Haldane was a 
lawyer and came with little experience of military matters, and therefore had no preconceived 
ideas or prejudices when he became minister of state. However, Haldane’s primary focus was 
on cutting expenditure on the Army from £29,813,000 to £28,000,000 which had been an 
election pledge of the Liberals. Haldane envisaged creating a two tier army comprised of a 
striking force of three corps, supported by elements of the Militia, Yeomanry and a new 
Territorial Force fashioned from the Volunteers, and the remainder of the Militia and 
Yeomanry which could be expanded in the event of a major war. Haldane’s striking force was 
to be based in the UK but configured for overseas deployment in the event of a crisis.  The 
striking force was comprised of six large divisions rather than dedicated corps which was 
considered to be ill-suited to the peacetime British army. Haldane decided to reduce overseas 
garrisons and reintroduce the old terms of service of seven or eight years with the colours 
followed by five or four with the reserve. This was a return to the Cardwellian system of 
having roughly equal numbers of units at home and abroad at the same time.
158
 He planned to 
decentralise administration of the auxiliary forces to County Associations under the control of 
the Lord Lieutenants, this was the most controversial idea which Haldane proposed 
concerning the auxiliary forces. Amery later claimed in his memoirs that he ‘might have 
suggested’ the idea of County Associations to Haldane during a discussion on the creation of 
a Territorial force.
159
 However, there is no evidence of a memorandum being written or a 
letter from Amery on the subject to Haldane which was his usual method of indoctrinating a 
government official on one of his ideas.  
 
Gooch states that Haldane, like Arnold-Forster, came under a considerable amount of 
pressure from the Volunteer officer lobby that were opposed to being administered by county 
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associations. However, Haldane received support from Esher which swung the argument in 
his favour.
160
 However, Haldane also gained professional support from a committee of senior 
officers and Clarke, who were convened to look at the scheme and find its weaknesses. The 
most notable problem was that during a major conflict Haldane’s Territorial force would take 
at least six months to expand and train the numbers considered adequate enough to sustain a 
large expeditionary force overseas. The committee made the suggestion that seventy four 
Militia depots be retained as reserve battalion cadres for the regular army. These cadres could 
be then utilised in a national emergency as the basis for a mobilisation scheme which could 
produce draft manpower for the regular army. In other words, the army had the machinery in 
place to massively expand the army in a national crisis. Haldane’s plan for the Territorial 
force was intended to create a ‘nation in arms’ based on voluntary service. Haldane ensured 
that he had full backing from the Army Council and the Cabinet before publically announcing 
his plan on 4 March 1907.  Haldane’s scheme was diametrically the opposite of Amery’s 
imperial defence plan. However, Haldane did complete the task of forming the General Staff 
which Amery had been advocating for many years.  
 
During this period Amery moved away from solely advocating army reform to actively 
campaigning for compulsory military service. In 1905 Amery and Lord Milner became 
members of the National Service League (NSL). Another prominent member was Clarke. The 
NSL was formed in 1902 by the fourth Duke of Wellington and the Conservative politician 
Lord Newton in response to the Boer war and what they considered to the apparent moral and 
physical decline of the nation. In 1904 it formed a women’s branch but at this point was it not 
a mass movement; by 1905 the NSL had membership of 2000. After 1905 Milner and Amery 
were considered to be the driving force behind the NSL. It was Milner who persuaded Lord 
Roberts to become President of the NSL in 1905.
161
 Amery wrote much of the NSL’s public 
material and many of Roberts’s speeches. Roberts had been for sometime publically 
advocating that every male should receive at least four months military training; he also stated 
that the possibility of an invasion or raid by a foreign power on the British Isles made it vital 
that the UK had a large trained reserve. Like Amery, he thought that Britain had insufficient 
trained reserves to respond to an attack on India. However, Roberts and other members of the 
NSL were careful not to publically state that compulsory service would include any sort of 
Foreign Service liability. In November 1905 Roberts resigned from the Imperial Defence 
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Committee (IDC) after being admonished by Edward VII for making public announcements 
in favour of compulsory military service which were counter to Government policy and that 
of the IDC.
162
 Roberts was now fully committed to the NSL and became its public figurehead. 
During 1906 the NSL began to receive financial assistance from sympathetic supporters and a 
favourable press from many of the leading newspapers. Roberts embarked on a national tour 
giving speeches on the merits of compulsory service and the UK’s unpreparedness for war. 
Although, the NSL welcomed Haldane’s national army scheme, Roberts pointed out that once 
the striking force had been dispatched there would be practically no army left in the British 
Isles for six months until the Territorial manpower had been mobilized, trained and 
equipped.
163
 The NSL persistently used Haldane’s admission that it would take six months to 
fully mobilize the Territorial Army as a reason to introduce conscription. The NSL also used 
the findings of the Norfolk Commission to back their case for the introduction of a 
conscripted Home Army. The other was the utilising the fear of invasion.  
 
In 1903 Balfour had chaired a special committee of the CID which had concluded that the 
possibility of invasion was negligible; the committee argued that the maximum number of 
men which could be transported by the available shipping was 70,000 men; it would take 
twenty hours to cross and forty eight hours to disembark.
 164
  Under such circumstances they 
concluded the Royal Navy would be able to disrupt or destroy the bulk of the invasion flotilla 
while still at sea or disembarking. However, the enemy which the committee was considering 
was France.
165
 As Otte notes under Balfour the CID reasserted the navalist orthodoxy about 
Britain’s defence requirements.166 In early 1907 the NSL commissioned a report from Cunard 
Company into harbour depths, port facilities and the size and composition of German 
merchant-marine tonnage. The NSL then produced a detailed memorandum which noted that 
the conclusions of CID’s 1903 report were rapidly being superseded by increases in the naval 
and merchant marine capability of Germany; the NSL argued that Germany had a distinct 
strategic advantage, because the Royal Navy bases were positioned along the English Channel 
facing the old enemy France which left the East coast vulnerable to attack from across the 
North Sea. The Germans, unlike the French, concentrated the bulk of their fleet in home 
waters which meant they could, in theory, protect an invasion force more adequately than the 
French. Therefore, the threat posed by Germany became the principal concern of the NSL and 
in their opinion the reason why compulsory service should be introduced. Roberts noted that 
the pre-emptive attack on the Russian Fleet at Port Arthur by the Japanese in 1904 was a clear 
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indication of what might occur at the start of hostilities with another major power. Roberts 
and Repington lobbied Balfour, now leader of the opposition, to force the Liberal government 
to carry-out a new enquiry. Roberts also began arguing that there were 80,000 trained German 
and Austria soldiers living and working in Britain who would be used to attack transport, 
communication networks, ports, vital factories and disrupt the mobilization of the reserves at 
the beginning of war. Balfour was sympathetic and succeeded in forcing the Cabinet Defence 
Committee to hold a fresh an enquiry into the question of an invasion.
167
 On 27 November 
1907 the NSL were invited to give evidence which was made by Roberts and Repington. 
However, the findings of the Committee, which agreed that the possibility of invasion had 
increased, were kept secret and the NSL demand for the introduction of compulsory service 
was ignored.
168
 In response the NSL continued to make the case for the ‘bolt from the blue’. 
However,  
 
Amery was on the periphery of these events and did not take part in the proceedings at the 
House of Commons. Amery was a committed navalist and had previously played down the 
invasion threat. His motivation for compulsory service had been his conviction that Britain 
needed to prepare for another major colonial war and therefore needed to create a large 
reserve to allow the ‘regular army and the navy to fulfil its imperial strategic role’.169 
However, Amery later concluded that his acceptance of the invasion threat was due to 
German intransigence. After 1900 the German threat was increasingly mythologized in a 
series of books such as Erskine Childers The Riddle of the Sands (1903), William Le Queux’s 
The Invasion of 1910 (1907) and R. W. Cole’s The Death Trap (1907). The Invasion of 1910 
was a graphic account of a German invasion on the East coast which was preceded by attacks 
on shipping and naval bases by spies and saboteurs. The book was commissioned by Lord 
Northcliffe, owner of the Daily Mail; Le Queux received a considerable amount of help from 
Roberts when preparing the manuscript on the military and strategic material; Roberts also 
wrote the forward to the book. The book was serialised in the Daily Mail and became an 
international best seller. Both Le Queux and Northcliffe were members of the NSL and 
contributed to the national campaign.   
 
After 1906 Amery began increasing his public profile by making speeches on behalf of the 
NSL, the Empire League and the Tariff Reform League. In 1906 Chamberlain suffered a 
stroke which effectively ended his political career. As a consequence Amery increasingly 
became the intellectual and spiritual guardian of Tariff Reform. By 1908 Britain and 
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Germany were locked into a naval arms race which increasingly influenced the strategic 
debate and the direction of defence spending in the UK. Similarly, the 1909 Imperial Defence 
Conference was dominated by naval questions; however, the Dominions were concerned 
about the threat posed by the Japanese navy which led to the creation of Australian naval 
squadron and the development of imperial naval forces.
170
 British naval concerns were 
focused on the German fleet across the North Sea. By 1909 the NSL had increased its 
membership to 35,000 and was producing a considerable amount of printed material which 
was widely distributed by its burgeoning network of members and supporters. Local NSL 
branches held meetings and discussions and collected subscriptions. However, the NSL was 
quick to exploit any political crisis which would further their aims. During the early months 
of 1909 the Liberal government came increasing under pressure from the Admiralty to 
increase battleship construction from four to eight to match intelligence reports of a renewed 
German battleship building programme of seven. This presented difficulties for the Liberals 
who had vowed to cut defence expenditure and increase social spending programmes at the 
1906 election and were planning to decrease naval construction even further. The Unionists 
and right wing press attacked the Government over the issue and launched a jingoistic 
campaign demanding that the Government agree to the immediate construction of eight 
battleships at the next naval estimate. The Admiralty used the Navy League to make it case to 
the public and put pressure on the Government. The problem for the Government was that 
Britain, unlike Germany, was totally reliant on naval power for imperial and national security. 
On 29 March 1909 the opposition tabled a vote of censure against the government in the 
House of Commons on the issue; the subsequent debate was dominated by the fact that 
Britain was wholly dependence on sea power which gave the Government virtually no room 
for manoeuvre.
171
 The Liberals were forced to agree to the construction of eight battleships. 
This nearly split the Liberal Cabinet apart because the costs involved in constructing eight 
battleships in a single year were excessive and would require tax increases or reductions in 
spending elsewhere. The chief opponents of the policy in Cabinet were Lloyd George, the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Churchill, President of the Board of Trade who were 
attempting to introduce a raft of social policies which included unemployment insurance and 
a statutory minimum wage in certain industries. Liberals decided to increase taxes for the rich 
and introduce a new land tax.
172
 The NSL used the navy scare to renew their calls for the 
introduction of compulsory service on the grounds of national security.   
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On July 12 1909 Roberts introduced a National Service Bill in the House of Lords. The bill 
was rejected by 23 votes which Roberts and his supporters considered to be a victory. 
Increasingly, the NSL tactics were focused on attacking the government’s lack of preparation 
for a major war. They used the crisis over the navy scare to argue that naval supremacy could 
not be taken for granted. In November 1909 the House of Lords rejected the Liberal budget 
which set in motion a constitutional crisis which rumbled on through-out 1910. The Liberals 
called a general election for 9 February 1910. Amery contested the seat of Wolverhampton 
East, but lost. Shortly after the election Amery married Florence Louise Adeliza (Bryddie) 
Greenwood (1885–1975), the sister of Hamar (later Viscount) Greenwood, a barrister and 
Liberal MP. However, during the campaign in February Amery had been accused by ex-
Sergeant Major Edmondson that The Times History of the South African War constituted a 
‘damnable libel’ against the British Army; Amery responded by publicly claiming that 
Edmondson had been sent home in disgrace from South Africa for cowardice at a public 
election meeting. Another general election was called for 19 December 1910, and Amery was 
again unsuccessful in Wolverhampton East. Edmondson sued for liable and case went to court 
on 26 January 1911. During the trial Lord Roberts gave evidence in Amery’s favour, as did 
officers and sergeants who had served with Edmondson in the Imperial Yeomanry.
173
 The 
trial lasted eight days and Amery won. This did no damage to Amery politically, but he was 
forced to ask the Unionist party for money to help pay his court costs of £500 pounds.
174
 The 
Liberal government had survived both elections but was returned with no overall majority, 
which made them dependent on Labour and Irish Nationalist MPs to get their policy 
programme through the Commons. In early 1911 Amery was asked by the Duke of 
Bedfordshire to contest the seat of Bedford at the next election. This had an added advantage 
because the Duke was willing pay Amery’s election costs.    
 
In December 1910 Haldane and Ian Hamilton published a book entitled Compulsory Service 
which set-out the case against national service.
175
 Hamilton argued that Britain’s voluntary 
professional army was more suited for garrisoning and expanding an empire rather than a 
force based on universal service. Haldane and Hamilton also rejected the notion that navy was 
incapable of defending the UK from invasion and set out the  historical  and constitutional 
case against conscription. To counter this in early 1911 Amery in collaboration with Roberts 
and the historian Professor John Cramb wrote Fallacies and Facts which argued that 
compulsory service was now a national priority because of the much altered international 
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situation and Britain’s increasing imperial responsibilities.176 The book noted that the NSL 
had no plans to radically alter the professional army or its role but wished to create a large 
trained reserve for rapid expansion during a national emergency. Roberts also claimed that 
Haldane had asked Hamilton to write the book because he was the only senior officer at the 
WO who was not in favour of introducing compulsory service.
177
 It was well known that 
many senior officers were sympathetic to the NSL. However, the only senior officer to 
publicly offer his support for the NSL was Wilson, by then a Brigadier General, who was 
commandant of the Staff College. Roberts also attacked Haldane for using his office to 
politicise the military members of the Army Council which was unconstitutional. However, 
the previous March Roberts had stated that he had the support of 105 Conservative MPs and 
inferred support from the Regular Army as well. James states that Roberts felt that Hamilton 
had personally betrayed him because of his collaboration with Haldane on Compulsory 
Service.
178
 Amery merely noted in his memoirs that Hamilton had been ‘persuaded’ by 
Haldane to ‘write against our campaign’.179 In February 1911 Amery formally accepted the 
Duke of Bedford’s offer to contest the seat at Bedford. However, in March Chamberlain 
contacted him and offered him the seat of Birmingham South because the local Unionist MP 
had been elevated to the House of Lords. Amery accepted and on 3 May 1911 and was 
returned unopposed. Amery had now achieved his foremost ambition of gaining a seat in 
Parliament. The following day he was formally introduced into the House of Commons by the 
leader of Liberal Unionists Austen Chamberlain. This afforded Amery the opportunity to 
become the champion of the NSL and tariff reform in the House of Commons. 
  
During his first months in the House of Commons he rarely became involved in defence or 
Army debates. However, he did defend the NSL in the Commons. On one occasion he 
intervened during a question concerning alleged interference by NSL members to restrict 
recruitment for the Territorial Army.
180
 However, after a few months Amery established a 
reputation for being a member of the ‘awkward squad’. In 1912 he became more active in 
Parliament on issues concerning the Army and imperial defence. He became a regular 
contributor to ministerial questions and bombarded ministers for information and clarification 
of their facts.
181
 On 12 March 1912 during the Army Estimate debate Amery made a strong 
case for increasing overseas garrisons and attacked the Governments policy on the Territorial 
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Army and its reserves as being totally inadequate in the event of major war.
182
 Amery pointed 
out that the NSL national service scheme would have created a force of 400,000 men 
available at the outset of a war for mobilization from the first three contingents of men; by 
calling up the fourth and fifth contingents this would increase to 650,000. However, he noted 
the Territorial Army had a nominal strength of 275,000 men which included 150,000 men 
who would need extra training (six months in some cases) to bring them up to the required 
state of efficiency at the start of a war. The NSL argued that the at least three of the 
contingents would be ready for immediate mobilization and the other two within weeks not 
months as was the case with the Territorial scheme. On 25 July 1912 Amery set-out his 
reasons for wanting to impose compulsory service during a debate on the functions of the 
Committee of Imperial defence; he stated, ‘to-day we are utterly unable to command the sea 
anywhere in the world except in the narrow seas round our coasts. We have lost the command 
of the sea all over the world because we are using our tremendous Navy for one purpose only, 
for the continuous passive defence of the shores of this country’; he concluded, ‘what I 
believe to be the only true solution to this problem, and that is to liberate the British Navy for 
its proper function of commanding the seas of the world, whether the narrow seas here or the 
Mediterranean or the Atlantic or even the Pacific, by providing a defence force on land in this 
country which would make invasion a dangerous and difficult task’.183  
 
During 1912 Amery wrote to Roberts on a number of occasions concerning the policy 
direction of the NSL.
184
 Roberts provided Amery with a confidential memorandum which set 
out twenty points of ‘conditions under which a war for home defence would be fought’. At 
the top of this list was a ‘rising in India, following the mutiny of the native army’; secondly, 
was the ability to ‘dispatch of 100,000 men’ at short notice which; thirdly, was ‘trouble in 
Egypt which would require the same number of men’.185 However, the possibility of an attack 
by Germany was given a priority of five, and only then after the bulk of the navy had been 
deployed in the Mediterranean. The real concern of Roberts and Amery was the defence of 
India and the Middle East. But those opposed to the imposition of compulsory service were 
suspicious that the real intent of the scheme was to drag Britain into a European war. On 25 
October 1912 Roberts gave a speech in Manchester which was widely criticised for implying 
that the NSL wished to emulate the German conscription system to allow Britain to purse a 
‘European policy’.186 Both Roberts and Amery were regularly accused of being militarists.187 
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After the 1912 Army Estimate debate Amery discussed with the former Conservative Under 
Secretary of State for War, George Wyndham MP, about making a concerted an attack on the 
Government’s Territorial Army policy.188 Amery subsequently worked in unison with 
Wyndham until the latter’s sudden death in April 1913. However, the Conservative Party now 
under the leadership of Bonar Law, who was a committed tariff reformer, would not endorse 
the imposition of compulsory service because he knew it was unpopular with public. 
Therefore, it appeared that Amery was at odds with his own party over the issue but many in 
the Conservative and Unionist parties were sympathetic to the aims of the NSL. On 15 July 
1912 the Manchester Guardian noted that Leo Amery was not afraid to say ‘out loud’ what 
others in his party only ‘dare to think’.189 By the end of 1913 the NSL was reported to have a 
membership of 100,000. It appeared that the NSL was making progress toward its goal of 
educating the public of the benefits of compulsory service, but the issue of Irish Home Rule 
and the possibility of a continental commitment would increasingly dominate the defence 
debate.  
 
In 1910 Henry Wilson became Director of Military Operations (DMO) at the WO. Gooch 
argues that the appointment of Wilson to the DMO marked a turning point away from a 
wholly imperial strategy to one which encompassed a continental commitment.
190
 Tentative 
staff talks had started with the French in 1906, but nothing binding was agreed. However, 
British strategic assumptions concerning a continental commitment reflected mounting 
concerns about the preservation of Belgium and the Netherlands as independent states. After 
the Agadir crisis in August 1911 Wilson began pressing the Government to begin make 
detailed plans for a continental commitment to come to aid of France in the event of a war 
with Germany. Subsequently, the Government gave Wilson permission to make 
comprehensive arrangements for deploying an expeditionary force in support of the French at 
the start of a conflict; although, in public the Prime Minister, Herbert Asquith, denied the 
existence of any secret arrangement. Given Amery’s close friendship with Wilson it is 
inconceivable that they did not discuss the planning for the continental commitment. Amery 
had persistently argued that Britain’s security interests rested in the Empire, which is where 
he considered defence provisions, should be made. As Strachan has pointed out there were no 
real preparations made for major continental war by the British Government prior to 1914.
191
 
In 1914 Wilson thought that a European war would be over in months and not years. Amery 
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and other military writers had since 1900 been calling for a large reserve but it was always 
based on the assumption that it would be used to defend Britain’s imperial interests at the 
outset of a major war. Conversely, in 1903 Amery had stated that Britain might find it 
necessary to become embroiled in a Great War to maintain the European balance of power 
which would require the mobilization of the whole of British manpower reserves. Amery was 
well aware that this would take months, if not years, to complete given the vast numbers of 
men that required training and equipping on an unprecedented scale. However, a military 
crisis closer to home would focus Amery’s attention between 1912 and 1914. 
 
The Anglo-Irish Wilson and Roberts were supporters of the Ulster Unionists and had become 
embroiled in the Irish Home Rule controversy. Amery was also fervently opposed to Irish 
Home rule as were many Conservative MPs. However, the Liberal Government was in favour 
of granting home rule to the Irish and prepared to pass a Bill through parliament. In 1912 the 
Ulster Unionists responded by forming the Ulster Volunteer Force and prepared to defend the 
Union. Roberts was instrumental in establishing the force. The Nationalists created their own 
force of volunteers to defend their interests. Many Army officers stated that they would not 
use coercion against the Ulster Unionists if the government tried to enforce Home Rule. 
Roberts was also in close contact with dissentient regular army officers. By March 1914 it 
was becoming apparent that Ireland might descend into civil war. At this point  relations 
between the Government and Army officers in Ireland rapidly deteriorated after the general 
officer commanding in Ireland, Sir Arthur Paget, gave all his officers an ultimatum: resign or 
be dismissed if you were not prepared enforce the Government’s policy.  The focus of 
military dissension was the Curragh barracks outside Dublin were nearly all of the officers 
chose dismissal. The commander of the 3
rd
 Cavalry Brigade Brigadier-General Hubert Gough 
and commanding officers of the regiments involved  were summoned to the WO for a 
meeting with Government officials and the CIGS. Wilson had been involved for sometime 
behind the scenes contacting the press and cajoling fellow officers not to implement the 
Government’s policy. On 23 March 1914  Amery was given information from Wilson on 
what was happening at a meeting at the WO between Gough and the Government. Gough 
received written assurances from Field Marshal Sir John French, CIGS, that they would not 
be compelled to use force. However, this was later repudiated by the Cabinet and French 
resigned on the 30 March. Amery relayed the details of the meeting on the 23 March to Bonar 
Law who raised a question with Government over the issue the same afternoon in the House 
of Commons. After this Amery became a conduit through which the Opposition received 
information from Wilson. Amery also became the principle tormentor of the Government 
 66 
within the House of Commons on the issue of Irish Home Rule.
192
 However, the increasingly 
vehement Amery began launching personal attacks against Asquith in Parliament and gained 
a reputation for impertinence and un-parliamentary behaviour. The crisis rumbled on for 
many months and was only placed in abeyance by a greater emergency which was unfolding 
on the continent: the First World War.  
  
The start of the First World War caught Amery by surprise, because, as he later claimed, he 
was consumed by the Irish question.
193
 The NSL immediately suspended its activities and 
Roberts offered his services to the Government. In August 1914 Amery was appointed by 
Kitchener, the new Secretary of State for War, as a recruiting officer for his new volunteer 
army. Amery concentrated his efforts on Birmingham and requisitioned the Town Hall to 
process the large number of volunteers that were coming forward. A week later Kitchener 
promoted Amery to the position of Civilian Director for the Southern Command, with a room 
at the WO. Amery reported to General Sir Henry Rawlinson, the Director of Recruiting. 
During his time in post Amery instigated a cross party Parliamentary Recruiting Committee 
and attempted to convince Kitchener to use the Territorial Army Associations to house, train 
and clothe the massive influx of recruits. However, Amery was abruptly sacked and at the age 
of 41 volunteered to join Rawlinson’s, who had been given a command in Belgium, staff with 
the rank of captain. Amery served in Flanders as a temporary intelligence officer during the 
early battles of the war. On 14 November 1914 Roberts died while visiting troops in France. 
Without doubt Amery had genuine affection for Roberts and over the coming years would 
protect Roberts reputation. In January 1915 Amery was asked by General Callwell, head of 
Intelligence, to write a handbook on Serbia for use by British troops who were being sent to 
Salonika. At the request of Asquith, Amery was refused permission to serve on the staff of 
senior officers in the field. After appealing to Balfour for help Amery was given a permanent 
position with Callwell as a member of the Balkan intelligence section of military 
intelligence.
194
 Amery spent the next few months in the Balkans gathering intelligence and 
acting as liaison between the British military attaches in region and the WO. Before returning 
to London on July 4 1915 Amery witnessed the ‘shambolic’ British landings in the 
Dardanelles. On his return Amery unsuccessfully lobbied the WO and Cabinet for a greater 
effort to be made in the Middle East and Balkans. 
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Whilst Amery was in the Balkans, Asquith formed a coalition government from all the main 
political parties. During the spring of 1915, the Government was placed under increasing 
pressure to introduce conscription after a fall in volunteer recruitment. In August 1915 the 
Government instigated a National Register which was designed to access the UK’s manpower 
resources. The register revealed that 5,012,146 men of military age were still not in the armed 
forces; of this number only 690,138 were employed in the starred occupations such as 
munitions, mining and the railways. The problem for Asquith was that most of the Liberals in 
government were opposed to any form of compulsory service, while the Conservatives were 
in favour. At the suggestion of Callwell, Amery began a campaign in Parliament to introduce 
conscription. In late 1915 Milner and Amery instigated a ginger group of Conservative and 
Unionists politicians against Asquith, whom they blamed for the ‘disastrous’ prosecution of 
the war. Wilson also became involved urging Amery to get rid of Asquith so that ‘if we are to 
win the war’.195 The group met regularly on a Monday night to dine and would continue to do 
so for the rest of war. In October Lord Derby, Director-General of Recruiting, and a pre-war 
advocate of compulsory military service, introduced a recruiting scheme designed to compel 
men aged 18 to 41 to register their willingness to be called up if required. However, the 
scheme was unsuccessful and on 27 January 1916 the Government bowed to pressure and 
introduced a compulsory system for unmarried men.
196
 Asquith insisted that scheme exclude 
married men. Nonetheless, in May the scheme was extended to include married men as well 
due to mounting political pressure to have an equitable universal system of ‘sacrifice’. 
Another reason was the mounting casualty numbers being incurred on the western front. In 
the autumn of 1916 after the battle of the Somme, Asquith came under a considerable 
political pressure to create a small war cabinet to improve the day to day direction of the war 
which was floundering due to lack of clearly defined co-ordination. Asquith managed to 
remain in power but on 6 December 1916 was replaced by Lloyd George, the Secretary of 
State for War. Lloyd George was considered acceptable to the Conservatives and Unionists, 
who subsequently dominated the new coalition government.   
 
Lloyd George decided to create a new five man war cabinet to co-ordinate the British and 
Imperial war effort. Lloyd George asked Milner to join the Cabinet as a Minister without 
portfolio. Milner then had Amery appointed assistant secretary to Maurice Hankey at the 
newly reconstituted War Cabinet Secretariat.  Lloyd George had instructed Hankey to create 
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an entirely new system of cabinet governance to manage the direction of the war.
197
 Hankey’s 
War Cabinet Secretariat controlled the distribution of civil and military memorandum to and 
from the Cabinet, recorded and set the agenda of cabinet meetings, arranged the attendance of 
Ministers outside of the Cabinet and senior officers. Hankey’s control of the War Cabinet 
Secretariat gave him unprecedented power and influence. This placed Amery for the first time 
at the heart of the government in the most powerful bureaucratic department in Whitehall. 
However, Hankey was deeply suspicious of Amery, because he thought he was over 
ambitious, pushy and a conspiratorial intriguer.
198
  Another critic was Lord Derby, the new 
Secretary of State for War, who for sometime blocked Amery’s promotion from captain to 
lieutenant colonel. However, this did not stop Amery becoming more involved in the 
preparation of strategic memorandum for the War Cabinet. Amery produced a considerable 
number of papers on the ‘Empire at War’ and was closely associated with the creation of 
imperial war cabinet.
199
 Between 1917 and 1918 Amery was also responsible for collating and 
distributing Cabinet memorandums on the situation on the Western Front.
200
 Amery was 
present at many of the key Cabinet meetings of the war. He later stated, that he learnt, that if 
the secretary provided a good conclusion to the discussion of a Cabinet or Committee it was 
rarely queried.
201
  
 
On 1 December 1917 Henry Wilson became the British military representative on the newly 
created allied Supreme War Council (SWC). This post gave Wilson unrestricted daily access 
to Lloyd George and the war Cabinet and brought him back into daily contact with Amery. 
Wilson rapidly became a confidant of Lloyd George. However, this brought Wilson into 
conflict with General Sir William Robertson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), who 
resented Wilson’s interference in strategic matters. In January 1918 Wilson asked Amery to 
prepare a draft plan for allied operations for the rest of the year, which was known as 
Resolution 12. Amery argued that the allies should maintain a defensive posture in France and 
Italy but go on the offensive in the Middle East. Wilson approved the plan and submitted it to 
Lloyd George. However, Robertson objected and then conducted a press campaign against 
Lloyd George. On 18 February 1918 Robertson resigned and Lloyd George appointed Wilson 
as CIGS. Over time Amery developed a close working relationship with Lloyd George. 
Amery lobbied Lloyd George for some time to make Milner the Secretary of State for War. In 
April 1918 at the height of the German spring offensive Lloyd George made Milner Secretary 
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of State for War. Amery moved to an office next to Milner at the WO and became the 
secretary of the so called X Committee which was comprised of Wilson, Milner and Lloyd-
George.
202
 For the remaining months of the war Amery worked closely with Milner and 
Wilson. At the end of the war, Amery was involved in preparing armistice terms for the 
various fronts and was on the periphery of the armistice talks in Paris.  
 
In November 1918 Lloyd George and Bonar Law came to an understanding that the wartime 
coalition would be extended into peacetime. Lloyd George had the allegiance of 114 Liberal 
MPs and Bonar Law agreed to give these candidates a free run in the forthcoming election. 
Lloyd George and Bonar Law issued a joint letter of approval to their candidates which 
Asquith dubbed the ‘Coupon’.  Parliament was dissolved on 25 November 1918 and Amery 
was re-elected as a coupon candidate with a massive majority of 12,211 on 28 December. 
Lloyd George appointed Milner as Secretary of State for the Colonies. Amery was appointed 
Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for the Colonies. Amery’s principle achievement 
whilst at the CO was the promotion of Empire migration; Amery helped establish the 
Overseas Settlement Committee which offered free passage to ex-servicemen to the 
Dominions.
203
 He was also concerned with co-ordinating improvements to imperial 
communication and transport networks. He stayed at the CO until Milner resigned as 
Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1921. Amery was then made Parliamentary and 
Financial Secretary to the Admiralty. By 1922 many Conservative backbenchers were arguing 
that the coalition should be dissolved and a general election called. In early 1922 Bonar Law 
was forced to step down due to ill health and Austen Chamberlain became leader of the 
Conservative Party. Chamberlain wished to continue the coalition because he feared an 
electoral shift to the Labour party. However, Lloyd George was pursuing a belligerent Eastern 
policy which gave tacit support to further Greek territorial ambitions in Turkey. The Turks 
under Mustafa Kemal refused to accept the terms of the 1920 treaty of Sevres, which had 
ceded large sections of Asia Minor to the Greeks. In August 1922 the Turks attacked the 
Greeks and quickly drove them back. The British had a small force of troops at Chanak in the 
Dardanelles which formed a neutral zone between the two sides. The Turks quickly closed in 
on the British forces it appeared that Britain might be at war with Turkey. Lloyd George 
requested military assistance and moral support from the Dominion Governments; however, 
the only country to do so was New Zealand. At the same time Lloyd George issued a 
belligerent public communication which threatened the Turks with war if they did not retreat. 
However, there was no public support for a war against Turkey which greatly weakened 
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Lloyd-Georges position. Although, a peaceful resolution to the crisis was achieved the 
Conservatives in the coalition were concerned that Lloyd George had acted irresponsibly. For 
many Conservative backbenchers this was the catalyst for forcing Chamberlain to end the 
coalition and call an election. On 22 June, Henry Wilson, by then the Unionist MP for North 
Down, was assassinated by two Irish republicans as he returned to his house, 36 Eaton Place, 
London, after unveiling a war memorial at Liverpool Street Station. The death of Wilson 
horrified Amery, who reflected in his diary that he had lost, ‘one of my best friends’.204 
Wilson was also godfather to Julian Amery.   
 
On 3 August Amery acting as spokesman for a group of disgruntled junior ministers informed 
Austen Chamberlain, an old friend that they were no longer prepared to serve under Lloyd 
George in a coalition Government. This became known as the ‘revolt of the under 
secretaries’. On 19 October Chamberlain was confronted by a group of Conservative 
backbenchers at a stormy meeting at the Carlton club and was forced to agree to dissolve the 
coalition. The same day Lloyd George resigned and the coalition and government collapsed. 
A general election was set for 15 November. However, Austen Chamberlain considered 
Amery’s intervention a personal insult which ended their friendship. Chamberlain resigned as 
leader and a rejuvenated Bonar Law returned to lead the Conservative party. On 15 November 
1922 the Conservatives won the election with a majority of 87 and Bonar Law became Prime 
Minister. Amery was made First Lord of the Admiralty. During his tenure at the Admiralty 
Amery contributed to the 1924 Cabinet Report of the Sub-Committee of the Committee of 
Imperial Defence on National and Imperial Defence which sought to clarify and improve co-
ordination between the three services in the field of national and imperial defence; and 
provide a framework for the creation of a air defence scheme for the Empire and the UK.
205
 
Amery was also involved in the dispute and subsequent enquiry between the Admiral of the 
Fleet the Earl Beatty, First Sea Lord 1919-1927, and the Air Ministry and Royal Air Force 
over the control of naval aviation; Amery supported Beatty within Cabinet but was forced to 
convince Beatty not to resign and take all of the naval members of the Admiralty with him 
when the decision of the enquiry went against the navy.
206
  
 
Amery had to grapple with the  consequences of the ‘Geddes Cuts’ to public spending in early 
1920s and the imposition of the Ten Year Rule which stunted development and investment in 
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the Armed Forces.
207
 Although, initially Navy was able to escape the worst consequences of 
Geddes recommendations the signing of the Washington Naval Treaty in 1922 annulled any 
pretensions about gaining parity with the other naval powers; in effect Britain was entering a 
phase of disarmament and tonnage restriction. The same year the Anglo-Japanese treaty was 
allowed to lapse. Both of these events were to have long-term consequences for British 
defence and foreign policies in the coming years. In 1923 Amery also cautioned the Cabinet 
against involving Britain in collective security arrangements-outside of the Dominions-and 
European treaties of guarantee and disarmament which he postulated would increase British 
commitments and ‘drag’ Britain into wars ‘which we have no real interest, without in the 
slightest degree promoting either our own peace and security’.208 On the question of 
disarmament Amery noted that prevailing ideological and political argument that the pre-war 
arms race had contributed to the outbreak of the Great War had  missed the point, because it 
was ‘essential to keep in mind that it is not armaments, as such, which bring about wars, but 
the conflict of interests and ambitions’.209 However, Amery did argue that ‘where there is no 
real conflict, where a costly competition of arms has grown up almost accidently, or based on 
vague suspicion, frank explanation and discussion may put an end to such a competition for 
all concerned’. Amery cited the recent Washington naval limitation talks as a recent example 
of how mutual disarmament talks should, and could, proceed. But he warned that where there 
were ‘fundamental differences of policy it is idle to imagine that a reduction of armaments is 
possible, or would, contribute to peace’. Presciently, but increasingly out of step with 
government policy, Amery contended that it only armed strength which preserves the peace in 
Europe. This memorandum exemplifies Amery’s views on disarmament and the relative 
merits of collective security arrangements in the 1920s and 1930s.  
 
Amery was disparaging of the League of Nations, which he compared to the Holy Alliance of 
1814 Covenant, because it had the capacity to involve the UK in disputes and acts of 
aggression which had no strategic influence, or impact, on British interests and imperial 
policy. Amery advocated a partial return to Britain’s Victorian diplomatic status of ‘grand 
isolation’ and argued that ‘danger’ lay in Africa, on the Afghan Frontier, the Middle East and 
the Far East, in other words adjacent or within the Empire. However, Amery’s tenure at the 
Admiralty was cut short by the resignation of Bonar Law in May 1923 due to ill health. In 
October 1923 the new Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin, decided to call a general election and 
fought the campaign with a manifesto commitment to impose tariff reform which he argued 
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would reduce unemployment and protect British industry. Amery had lobbied Baldwin and 
his fellow Cabinet members for the introduction of this policy for a number of months. The 
Labour and Liberal parties fought the campaign on a free trade platform. Amery was now one 
of the preeminent tariff reformers in British politics who whole heartedly endorsed Baldwin’s 
plan. However, the result on 5 December was a comprehensive rejection of protectionism. 
Although, the Conservatives were still the biggest single party in Parliament they had no 
overall majority. Baldwin attempted to govern by appealing to the house but this was voted 
down by the Liberal’s led by Asquith. The Liberal’s then allowed Ramsay MacDonald, leader 
of the Labour party, to form the country’s first Labour Government. However, the Labour 
Government was dependent on Liberal support. This state of affairs lasted for ten months 
until the Liberals voted against the Government and another general election was called for 
the 24 October 1924. The resultant election campaign was fought on anti-socialist platform by 
the Liberals and Conservatives. However, the main beneficiary’s were the Conservatives who 
won the election with a majority of 223. Labour lost nine seats and the Liberals one hundred 
and nineteen. This marked the end of Liberal party as a major political force for rest of the 
century. 
 
On 6 November 1924 Amery was made Secretary of State for the Colonies. Amery had 
coveted this post for some time and saw this as his opportunity to carry-out a radical 
development programme in the colonies. He subsequently set up the Colonial Medical 
Research Council, the Empire Marketing Board and instigated a modest colonial development 
scheme after his more ambitious plans were scaled back by the Treasury and he created a new 
co-ordinated agricultural research service for the colonies. Amery was the first Secretary of 
State for the Colonies to undertake a tour all the Dominions. On 25 May 1925 Milner died 
which left Amery as the Conservative Party’s foremost imperialist.  In 1925 Amery stated in a 
speech that his aim was to utilise ‘the economic possibilities’ of the Empire’s tropical 
territories and unlock its ‘immense natural resources’.210 In 1925 he formed the Dominions 
Office which he thought would foster a sense imperial unity and become a conduit to 
exchange information and theories and resolve policy anomalies. After 1925 he was also 
Secretary of State for Dominions. However, he was less successful at fostering a new spirit of 
collective responsibility between the Dominions and Britain. Although, Amery was advocate 
of Dominion participation in a multilateral collective security arrangement, he found the 
realities of the situation frustrating. This was starkly illustrated by unilateral decision by the 
Canadians to withdraw its forces from Russia in 1918, the rejection of the creation of an 
imperial navy in 1919, and the Chanak Crisis in 1922. The debate was characterised by the 
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unwillingness of the Dominion Government to have their defence and foreign policies 
controlled or influenced by the British Government.
211
 In the 1920s South Africa and Canada 
increasingly pursed amplification of their status within a ‘voluntary’ imperial system, while 
the other Dominions were more measured in their approach. In 1926 the ‘Balfour Definition’ 
set-out a compromise formula which made the members of the Commonwealth ‘autonomous 
communities’ with an ‘allegiance to the crown’.212 This appeased their aspirations for 
independent status and kept them within the British sphere of influence. The intellectual 
driving force behind the compromise had been Amery because he sought to foster a spirit of 
unity.  
  
During the interwar years little progress was made on creating an effective imperial military 
force. In fact, the Dominion’s military forces reverted to being small underequipped militia’s 
with diminutive professional cadre for training purposes. The Dominions also had virtually no 
air force personnel or modern aircraft; the combined strength of the Dominion air force 
personnel in the 1920s and 1930s was 1854 but there were virtually no aircraft.
213
 There were 
no large-scale manoeuvres or exercises with British forces; however, there were some joint 
staff planning meetings, liaison and training of staff officers, but little else. The only the 
Dominion with a sizeable naval forces was Australia. The other great imperial force was the 
Indian Army which was reorganised in 1922 to incorporate the lessons of the Great War and 
recent constitutional developments in India. However, Indian politicians began demanding 
that defence expenditure and the British garrison be reduced. The British had no intention of 
reducing the garrison but did reduce defence expenditure; this had the effect of starving the 
Indian Army of modern equipment. During the 1920s Amery sought to improve imperial 
defence and was involved in the planning for the naval base at Singapore while at the 
Admiralty. However, he was bitterly opposed in the Parliament by the Liberals and was 
depicted by H. G. Wells as a war monger.
214
 When he became Secretary of State for the 
Colonies he sat on the Cabinet sub-committee which finalised the plans for the base.
215
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However, Leo Amery’s original plans were much reduced by reductions in defence 
expenditure. Increasingly, Amery was hampered by a lack of financial support  to implement 
all his schemes when he was Colonial Secretary. Similarly, during his tenure as Colonial 
Secretary Amery made many enemies within Cabinet, because of his habit of talking over 
people or involving himself in other departments business.
216
 With rising unemployment and 
an international financial system in crisis Baldwin called a general election for the 30 May 
1929. 
 
The Conservatives narrowly lost the 1929 election and Amery returned to the backbenches. 
However, when the National government was formed in 1931 Amery was not offered a post 
in the new government. Grayson argues that his persistent support for imperial preference and 
tariff control lead to his not being recalled to the National Government.
217
 Also by then he had 
gained a reputation as an outspoken rightwing imperialist which made him unacceptable to 
the Liberals and Labour members of the Government. Among his fellow Conservatives his 
imperious manner and his capacity for scheming and intrigue left him isolated. Therefore, 
during the 1930s he held no government appointments but was an active backbencher within 
the Conservative parliamentary party and an ardent critic of appeasement.
218
 From the 
backbenches  he focused on the importance of a imperial strategic and economic co-operation 
as it became apparent, to him and others, that Britain and the Empire was inadequately 
prepared to resist the emerging external threats posed by Germany, Italy and Japan. However, 
it must also be noted that in the 1920s and 1930s there was a widespread support for the 
concept of international disarmament and pacifism in Britain because of the psychological 
impact of the Great War. Many people supported appeasement because they loathed and 
feared another major war which many thought would literally destroy the ‘civilised world’. 
The economic problems of the Depression added to the general malaise and undermined 
public confidence in the state and the capitalist system. However, through-out the 1920s and 
into the early 1930s there was no credible threat to the British Empire from another power. 
Therefore, Amery appeared out of touch with the public and to a certain degree with 
mainstream political opinion in the early 1930s.  
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Chapter Two: Creating the Army League  
 
 
Through-out the 1930s Amery opposed the policy of appeasement. However, he also believed 
that Britain should be ‘detached’ from European affairs.219 In 1931 Amery used the naval 
estimate debate to attack what he construed as ‘wilful neglect of national security in the name 
of efficiencies’.220 In the early 1930s Amery persistently argued that Britain was pursuing a 
short-term policy of unilateral disarmament which in the long run would adversely affect 
Britain’s imperial security. However, development of the armed forces was still constrained 
by the limitations of the ten year rule which had imposed in 1919 when Amery was a junior 
minister.  Bond notes that the imposition of a ten year rule was ‘eminently sensible’ after a 
major war, but in the mid 1920s the policy was placed on shifting basis that carried on until 
1932 which was a destabilising factor on the development and rearmament of the Army.
221
 
However, after the First World War British overseas responsibilities increased which placed 
added pressure on an overstretched and underfunded Army. In 1932 the Chiefs of Staff (COS) 
managed to get the ten year rule overturned.
222
 However, by the late 1920s the army was 
equipped with obsolete equipment and had insufficient numbers of munitions to allow for an 
adequate training cycle. During annual manoeuvres flags were used to simulate the position 
of guns and tanks. The Territorial Army was particularly short of equipment. In 1933 the 
Government setup the Defence Requirement Committee (DRC), which was comprised of 
representatives from the COS, Treasury and the Foreign Office (FO), to report on what urgent 
deficiencies three services had. The DRC outlined a five year rearmament programme. The 
WO wanted £40 million which was based on what the available industrial capacity in the 
much depleted armaments industry could realistically produce in the time span. The General 
Staff also wanted to organize a small expeditionary force which would be equipped to fight 
on the Continent. 
 
However, Neville Chamberlain, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, was in favour of giving 
priority to the Royal Air Force and the Navy which he believed constituted a better deterrent 
than the Army. He rejected the notion that the Army should prepare small expeditionary force 
for operational use on the Continent. Chamberlain argued that the Maginot line rendered the 
French frontier impregnable which diminished the need for a British expeditionary force; he 
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concluded that Britain would be able to provide air and naval support to her allies and the 
Army should concentrate its effort on its imperial role and make a greater contribution to the 
air defence of Great Britain (ADGB). As a consequence the Army received £20 million. With 
some justification the Army considered it-self to be the ‘Cinderella Service’. After 1934 in 
response to public fear of air attack the bulk of the Territorial Army was diverted to an air 
defence role. By the mid 1930s Amery’s earlier scepticism concerning the ability of the 
League Nations to maintain the international system and its covenant commitment to promote 
disarmament was replaced by open hostility. In 1935 Amery argued against British support 
for the League of Nations use of sanctions against Italy, which had recently invaded 
Abyssinia, because he thought that it would only alienate Mussolini’s Government and create 
a hostile state along Britain’s imperial route through the Mediterranean to the Far East and 
India.
223
 Amery argued that Italian forces in Libya and Abyssinia posed a threat to British 
interests in the Middle East and Eastern Africa which could not be ignored. In September 
1935 three battalions of troops were dispatched to Malta and a brigade to Egypt from the UK. 
The Japanese occupation of Manchuria and its increasing belligerence toward China had 
destabilised the Far East and posed a threat to British interests in the region. Bond notes that 
the small Army by the early 1930s was incapable of effectively discharging its imperial 
defence role because its equipment, numbers and transport were inadequate.
224
 On 16 March 
Germany announced that it was reintroducing conscription and that it had formed an air-force. 
This marked the end of the military limitations imposed on Germany at Versailles in 1919. 
During 1935 as the international situation continued to deteriorate Amery became convinced 
that Britain should increase the pace of the rearmament programme.
225
  
 
In 1936 Amery began using the Empire Industries Association as a national platform to argue 
for increased imperial unity.
226
 Amery organised a national campaign at which he gave 
speeches and made attended rallies supporting imperial preference and greater economic 
integration between Britain and the Dominions. Amery thought that this campaign was 
essential if British foreign policy was to be unequivocally backed the Dominions. He also 
considered it essential to the industrial development of British and Imperial industries which 
could then be better harnessed for strategic purposes and assist in the rapid mobilization of the 
Empire’s resources in a future war. On 7 March 1936 German troops marched into the 
Rhineland which was seen as a final repudiation of Versailles Treaty. British response was to 
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allow Germany to remedy its ‘justified grievances’ in an attempt to avert a war.227 However, it 
was now apparent that the balance of power in Europe was shifting which had long term 
implications for British foreign and defence policy. In November 1936 Amery was a member 
of a deputation of backbenchers and peers who had a meeting with Baldwin to discuss the 
matter of air rearmament. Amery also began writing letters to The Times stating that the Army 
needed strengthening which he argued could only achieved by improving terms and 
conditions of service to stimulate  recruitment.
228
 But, Amery forcibly argued that Britain 
should not commit ground troops to the continent. However, Amery was an adherent of the 
air retaliation policy which was dependent on the development of a fleet of long range 
bombers.      
 
By mid 1936 the Arab revolt in Palestine was in full swing and the Army was hard pressed to 
find enough manpower to deal with the problem and had been forced to call up Section A 
(most recently released men) of the Army reserve. Amery believed that the WO was being 
placed in an impossible position. The pace of rearmament was slow and in the case of the 
army there were serious delays and problems with programme. On 4 December 1936 the 
General Staff circulated a memorandum to the Cabinet on the present state of the 
organization, armament and equipment of the Army that unequivocally stated that the army 
could only send two divisions abroad which could not be provided with up to date weapons 
and was therefore ‘not fit for war according to modern standards’.229 On 16 December 1936 
Duff Cooper, Secretary of State for War, wrote a memorandum to the Cabinet wanting 
clarification of when the Territorial Army would start receiving new equipment and 
confirmation of whether it would configured for continental service which had a bearing on 
reequipping costs.
230
 Cooper felt strongly enough about the situation to state that unless the 
Territorial Army received new equipment ‘it might as well be abolished’. However, 
Chamberlain was opposed to anything other than a token continental commitment and 
continued to block any increase spending on the Army until a further analysis of the problem 
had been carried out by the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence, Sir Thomas Inskip. In 
other words he kicked the issue into the long grass.  
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Another problem for the WO was a collapse in recruitment to the Army and Territorial Army 
which were both under strength.
231
 The regular army establishment shortfall was 10, 074 and 
the Territorial’s 40,000. The Army had 22 battalions fewer than in 1914 but had more 
imperial responsibilities. Amery estimated that the Army in 1936 had 112,000 fewer men than 
in 1914. In October 1936 Cooper circulated a paper to the Cabinet setting out the extent of the 
problem and his ideas for dealing with; Cooper shrewdly ensured that the paper contained 
recommendations and approval from the Army Council. Cooper wanted to improve 
conditions of service, pay, accommodation, new recreational facilities, free vocational 
training on discharge and improved employment prospects within the state sector for ex-
servicemen. There was nothing new in this approach, however, the eternal problem was the 
cost; an initial outlay of £1,941,000 and then an annual additional cost of £1,898,000. The 
other problem was that the WO had identified a major problem with the garrison facilities in 
India which they concluded was having a detrimental effect on retention and recruitment to 
the regular army. The Government would be forced to ask the Government of India for 
£150,000 followed by an annual amount of £1,139,000. However, Cooper argued that the 
Indian Government ‘should not be allowed to prevent this being put into force’. These were 
recognised to be ‘formidable’ figures but Cooper noted ‘I believe they represent the price of 
the survival of the voluntary service’. Cooper was also wanted the Army begin planning for a 
continental commitment which put him at odds with Chamberlain who was opposed on the 
grounds of economic cost and his psychological aversion for creating the conditions for 
another protracted war of attrition on the Western Front. Danchev contends that Chamberlain 
was increasingly influenced by Liddell Hart’s theories on ‘limited liability’ because it 
justified his aversion for a continental commitment and legitimised his defence policy.
232
  
 
This was the situation facing the army when in early 1937 Edward Beddington-Behrens city 
investor, former soldier and League of Nations official, suggested to Amery that he should 
create a study group which could look at the whole question of ‘Army reform’ and imperial 
defence. Amery agreed and they both set about recruiting distinguished politicians, 
businessmen and retired soldiers to the study group. Amery decided to call the group the 
Army League Committee. Amery was able to convince Field Marshal Lord Milne, the former 
CIGS 1926 -1933, to be a member. Milne was heavily criticised at the time by Fuller, Liddell 
Hart and other military commentators for not pushing through at a faster pace of 
mechanization, motorization and modernisation of the army during tenure as CIGS.
233
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However, Bond argues that the late 1920s and 1930s were a period when rapid technological 
advances in military equipment were rendering orthodox doctrines obsolete and as a 
consequence the lessons of the First World War were far from clear.
234
 Milne was also 
president of the Army Cadet Force Association which was supported by funds from the 
dormant NSL-Amery administered the endowment. Milne famously remarked in 1926 that 
the Great War had been ‘abnormal’, and that the army was most unlikely ever again to be 
required to fight a European War; Sir Harry Hague was managing director of the chemical 
firm Wander Ltd, which made Ovaltine, and Chairman of Blackfriars Skin Hospital; Sir 
Anderson Montague Barlow Bart, Conservative MP, former Minister of Labour, who in 
1920s chaired a Cabinet select committee on soldier’s pensions; Lt-General Sir Ronald 
Charles who had been Director of Military Operations and Intelligence at the WO 1931-34; 
The Marquess of Willingdon the former Viceroy of India 1931-36. Willingdon’s period as 
Viceroy had been very tumultuous because he had to deal with Gandhi’s campaign of civil 
disobedience and implement the Government of India Act; Sir Arnold Wilson, Conservative 
MP, author, a former Anglo-Persian oil executive, soldier and colonial administrator. Wilson 
met Mussolini in 1935 and Hitler several times between 1935 and 1937 and he was admirer of 
General Franco. Wilson wrote in 1935 that Hitler ‘was a great instrument of peace in the 
world’.235All the men had similar social backgrounds and were connected to the Conservative 
or Unionist Party. The only member who had not gone to public school was Sir Harry Hague.  
The first meeting of the Army League Committee took place on 1 February 1937 at the Army 
and Navy Club in London. Beddington-Behrens opened the meeting and said they had 
gathered together to discuss the ‘possibility of formulating a policy for popularising the 
Army’.236 He posed the question, ‘What position would arise if some real military peril 
threatened the country or our Empire overseas’. This of course was a well trodden path for 
Amery, who had been arguing since 1900 for adequate reserves. Beddington-Behrens went on 
to argue that ‘the present deficiency in recruits, both for the regulars and the Territorial’s, was 
such that the present voluntary system was breaking down’. Amery and Beddington-Behrens 
suggested that the Committee would put forward proposals to the government in the form of a 
report. Once they had done this they proposed ‘elaborating’ a policy and starting an 
organisation along the lines of the Navy League which could be used for ‘general 
propaganda’. Beddington-Behrens suggested that the procedures of the National Housing 
Committee might be a useful guide when writing and publishing the report. Beddington-
Behrens was a member of a The National Housing Committee comprised of businessmen, 
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eminent architects and housing reformers which in 1934 produced a private report which 
called for slum clearance, lower rents and a comprehensive programme of house building. 
The Committee attempted to put pressure on the Government by circulating an interim report 
to the Government and then the Press. An interim report being shorter and made up of 
headings received considerably more editorial and public attention than a normal report which 
was longer and more technical. Because of the report Beddington-Behrens secured a meeting 
with Neville Chamberlain to discuss its findings; he noted that Chamberlain listened to him 
patiently and then told him the government had no money for any great house building 
programme.
237
 However, some of the recommendations were later incorporated into 
legislation.  
 
Beddington-Behrens stated the Army League report would be designed to shape public 
opinion. However, he noted that the report ‘must not enter into criticisms of the Government’, 
but was designed to rouse public opinion in the country to ‘help’ the Government agree to 
certain ‘necessary measures’.238 He also thought that the Press would actively support 
constructive proposals put forward by the committee. He concluded that the report should be 
careful not to appear to militaristic because it was bound to attract criticism of this sort.  In 
1935 11.6 million people in the UK signed the Peace ballot (the UK’s first national 
referendum) which argued that Britain should be actively pursuing a multilateral international 
disarmament policy, and be a leading member of the League of Nations.
239
 Sir Harry Hague 
wanted to know if it was possible to get support from the ‘Liberal and Labour’ papers for any 
scheme connected to the Army. After a general discussion it was agreed that the ‘Left Wing’ 
was now beginning to fear the weakness of an ‘unarmed democracy’ in the ‘face of the 
enormous military forces of the Dictatorship Powers’.240 This point is interesting because the 
Labour Party usually voted against the Government’s defence estimates on ideological 
grounds but there was an internal struggle within the Labour Party over the issue of 
rearmament. In June 1937 the Labour party national executive committee rescinded the 
party’s objections to the rearmament policy and at the party conference in October 1937 the 
Labour party voted in favour of endorsing the executive committee’s proposals. Sir Montague 
Barlow said he was attempting to get some representation from the Labour Party on the 
committee. He also thought it essential that they gain support from the Trade Unions, 
especially in the area of employment for ex-soldiers which he considered a vital consideration 
if the committee was to make suggestions for improving recruitment.  
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Lord Milne was ‘anxious’ that the committee would be run by civilians, because he did not 
want it ‘to look as if the soldiers were conspiring together to obtain any special privileges’. 
Milne also thought it more appropriate that the ‘soldiers’ would give their advice as 
‘technicians’. This reflected a perception in British society that soldiers were above politics; 
however, Amery had worked closely on major political campaigns with two of the most 
politicised soldiers in British history Wilson and Roberts. Montague Barlow pointed out that 
the committee conclusions needed to be clearly associated with those of senior officers to 
have credence with public and the Government. Milne wanted that Committee to clearly 
determine for what purpose the Army was required for, what things the country should fight 
for and what armed forces were required to meet these contingencies. This was a reference to 
a continental commitment and asks the question what are the strategic and diplomatic 
absolutes which the British would accept as a condition to go to war. Milne wanted the report 
to be complied slowly so it would have a permanent influence on policy. He confessed that he 
‘feared the general unpreparedness’. Amery agreed that the committee needed to formulate a 
general policy ‘to show the direction and purpose of the Army’. He also wanted ‘concrete’ 
proposals on improving conditions of service which would assist recruitment in the future.
241
 
Amery wanted the group to make its report then wait and see what response it got and then 
form an Army League to promote Army issues to the public and the Government. Rather than 
abstractedly hinting at a continental commitment Amery stated the group had to consider 
whether an Expeditionary Force for intervention on the European Continent was really 
required. Amery was in-favour of the Air Force being the principle offensive weapon against 
another European power. He also pessimistically argued that given the state of recruitment to 
the Army this may have to be the only means providing military assistance to another 
European power. Generally British strategic planning between the wars revolved around an 
antagonism between the needs of imperial defence and the possibility of a continental 
commitment and a lack of resources; however, this obscured the wider implications of 
political and strategic developments on the continent and in the Far East to the detriment of an 
interdependent security policy based on a multilateral approach.
242
  
 
Charles was concerned that Army had a bad reputation with the public which needed 
redressing. He also cautioned that the report should not be rushed and should be delayed until 
after the Army estimates to determine what the Government’s defence policy was. Amery 
argued against, because he thought the Government ‘has never expressed any general view 
upon such policy in the past’ and thought ‘unlikely that would do so in the future’. However, 
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he thought that if the committee made a review of underlying policy it might force the 
government to take note. Sir Arnold Wilson wanted the Army League formed immediately, 
because of the Regular Army’s urgent requirement for 16,000 recruits. He thought conditions 
in the Army were so bad that he would not personally advise anyone to join. However, he 
believed that conscription was the only way to get a satisfactory Army, though he thought that 
Committee ‘should not advocate this policy at this stage’.243 The committee decided not to 
form the League until after it had published a report. Amery told the group that he would ask 
Duff Cooper, Sir Maurice Hankey and Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), Field 
Marshal Sir Cyril Deverell, if they would see them informally to discuss the general policy of 
the Committee. Beddington-Behrens then proposed Amery as Chairman which was carried 
unanimously. Lord Willingdon stated that he was willing to serve but made no real 
contribution to the discussion. At the end of the meeting Beddington Behren was tasked with 
preparing a draft report for the committee to discuss at the next meeting which was set for 
March 17. 
 
On 13 February Amery, Charles and Beddington-Behrens went and saw Cooper at the WO. 
Cooper informed that he welcomed their decision to help the Army and would be grateful of 
any assistance they might give; however, he was more cautious about their idea of forming an 
Army League and said he would have to discuss this with his officials before making a 
statement of his views on the subject.
244
 Cooper minuted his officials that he was favour of a 
League but was concerned that must follow Government policy, rather than advancing one of 
its own which might be opposed to the Government’s position. He was also concerned that if 
the ‘distinguished gentlemen’ of the League were not fully conversant with the position of the 
WO through a lack of information they might inadvertently cause the department 
embarrassment. On 10 March General Sir Reginald May, the Quarter Master General (QMG), 
wrote a memorandum to the Army council stating that he thought it was doubtful if the 
League would be a success.
245
 He thought that the League would struggle to raise funds from 
the public; there would be a public perception that the League would want to ‘further a war on 
the continent; the Trade Unions would oppose it; it would be accused of being militaristic by 
a ‘large number of influential people’. He also stated that when the Navy League was formed 
(189 ‘the majority of the country was only semi-educated and a great number illiterate, who 
were accustomed to believe what they were told. The man in the street does not now believe 
what he told’. Because of this May thought the Army League would find it difficult to 
                                                 
243
 AMEL 1/7/82, Army League Committee Summary of Discussion, 1 February 1937 p4. 
244
 National Archive, War Office File, WO 32/4644, Army League, minute no1, 18 February 1937. 
Hereafter, WO 32/4644.  
245
 WO 32/4644, Loose Minute No3, Memorandum on the Army League by QMG, 10 March 1937.   
 83 
convince the public to support it work. The CIGS was also hostile, because he was concerned 
that the League would begin to ‘lay down policy’. May agreed and noted that the proposed 
membership list would not ‘look on complacently and agree always with the policy of the 
Government’. Both men were concerned that the Army League would become political and 
therefore the WO would have its name ‘associated with politics’. This reflected Milne’s 
concerns about the League. May concluded that the WO should refuse to give official and 
financial assistance to the League. However, on 19 March May minuted that the WO ‘could 
hardy refuse help of this kind’ because it could use the assistance of an ‘influential 
organization which was prepared to back us in our efforts to increase recruitment’.246 He 
thought that the WO could offer recognition which would ‘prevent undesirable activity in the 
sphere of policy’. May was also concerned that the League would become a satellite Army 
Council which would erode the status of the official body. Cooper also wanted to utilise the 
expertise of the ‘strong committee’ but had unspecified reservations about the motives of 
Beddington Behrens.
247
  
 
On 14 March Beddington-Behrens wrote to Amery giving him an update on his progress on 
the report. He also enclosed a memorandum from Charles which set his personal views on the 
role of the army.
248
 Beddington Behren also told Amery that he was having trouble with 
drafting the report which would appeal to the public and the Government simultaneously and 
wanted to get some ‘outside’ assistance. This had been agreed in principle by Montague 
Barlow, who suggested Basil Liddell Hart, at that point The Times defence correspondent. 
Liddell Hart was also surreptitiously advising Duff Cooper on the Army and general military 
matters.
249
 However, Beddington-Behrens stated that Liddell Hart had ‘very fixed views’ 
which would place the committee in a difficult position ‘if the man who drafts the report is 
always trying to get his ideas over’. The ‘very fixed views’ included his rejection of a 
continental commitment and his advocacy of a ‘limited liability’ based on the employment of 
air and sea power supported by two armoured divisions to deal with non imperial military 
commitments. Liddell Hart was also vociferous opponent of conscription. However, Amery 
persistently stated that Britain should concentrate on its imperial role and use its air and sea 
power in support of its European policy which differed little from Liddell Hart’s ideas. 
Conversely, Amery was later considered to be a staunch critic of appeasement, while Liddell 
Hart has been described by Mearsheimer as a serial appeaser who misjudged scope of the 
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threat posed by Hitler after Munich.
250
 Beddington-Behrens comments illustrate the distrust of 
Liddell Hart in military and political circles, because he was perceived as a resolute self-
promoter of his own conceptual ideas, while dismissing the perceptions of others as 
superfluous. However, after the war Liddell Hart would become an important source of 
technical information for the League Committee.
251
 As a consequence Beddington-Behrens 
suggested that he should write the report. Amery concurred and Beddington-Behrens and 
work began on a draft copy of the report. 
  
On 17 March the League held its next meeting. Three new members were also present. Sir 
Edward Grigg, Conservative MP for Altrincham, later Lord Altrincham. Grigg had been 
journalist, soldier, Liberal MP 1922-1926 and then Governor of Kenya 1925-1930. Grigg had 
recently written a book on the subject of national defence The Faith of an Englishman (1936), 
which had made a powerful case for increased spending on defence.
252
 Field Marshal Sir 
Philip Chetwode, the former Commander-in-Chief in India 1930-1936 and deputy CIGS, 
Colonel Geoffrey Codrington, later Sir Geoffrey Codrington, who had served with the 
Leicester Yeomanry during the First World War and in 1933 he published a book on the 
Territorial Army.
253
 In the intervening period since the last meeting Beddington Behrens, who 
was acting secretary, had produced a draft paper entitled the ‘problems of Imperial Defence 
and the role of the British Army’.254 Charles thought that the UK should be ‘ready to meet a 
very strong air attack’, and he considered Home defence to be largely one of maintaining the 
lines of communication with the Empire and the rest of the world. His primary concern was 
that air defence should be concentrated on protecting imports of food and raw materials and 
not dispersed   ‘all around England’. Grigg wanted the report to focus on defining what the 
strategic role of the Army. This theme was taken up by Amery, who observed that the Air 
Force and Navy had ‘special roles’, while the Army was perceived as being of secondary 
importance by the public. He thought the report needed to clearly set out how essential the 
need for land forces still was, and what their role was in relation to the other two services. 
Grigg required the Report to ignore the other two services and concentrate solely on the role 
of the Army and whether it should be configured for operations ‘outside of the Empire’. This 
of course was becoming the fundamental question because it effected the direction of 
rearmament programme and the future configuration, organisation and deployment of the 
Army. The fear was could the security of  British Isles be guaranteed by sea and air power 
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alone if a hostile foreign power was within striking range of British cities and ports. As 
Chetwode pointed out the preserving communication with the UK, which was the main 
imperial base, was vital for the safety of the Empire. However, Amery thought that the report 
should focus solely on the question of ensuring imperial defence first and then consider the 
question of ‘continental engagements’. Chetwode countered that it was possible for three 
divisions to made available for an ‘independent striking’ force. However, Milne was 
concerned that there insufficient troops to reinforce essential garrisons. Amery concurred and 
pointed out that the situation in Palestine which had necessitated the calling out of Section A 
of the reserve had shown the inherent deficiencies of the Army.
255
  Section A being the most 
recently discharged men.  
 
Milne was concerned that the Government had never given any indication of what the 
problems of imperial defence were. He argued that the League should use the report set out 
what these problems were and how they could be solved. Grigg asserted that a clearer 
consideration of the Army’s responsibilities for the internal and external security of the 
Empire was essential because it was impossible to accurately access the strength and future 
organization of the Army without it. This point was also made by Charles who wanted the 
report to examine all the various Imperial liabilities in conjunction with responsibilities 
assumed under the various pacts and treaties which the British Government was obligated to 
honour. Milne stated that the Army was already seriously short of its Empire requirements 
which was the overriding problem facing the country at this point. Grigg pessimistically noted 
that any continental obligations would have to be ‘moral support only’ until such time that 
‘position of our defences was on a sounder footing’. He also thought that British security was 
‘dependent on a policy of diplomacy’ until British military strength could be ‘improved’. 
Chetwode said British policy should be based on the philosophy of the ‘the Empire came 
first’ but he did consider it important that ‘we recognize the necessity of putting something on 
the shores of France in a Continental conflict’. This exchange clearly shows how brittle and 
ill defined British military and security policy had become by the end of the 1930s. The 
members of the League considered that the Army was incapable of carrying out its imperial 
defence obligations or interceding on behalf of Britain’s European allies.  
 
At this point the meeting moved on to questions about Army reform. Amery knew that the 
Government was contemplating radical changes in the Army, and it was the business of the 
committee to indicate the direction in which that reform is going. Amery wanted the 
committee to ‘consider’ the Cardwell system. Amery had for many years considered the 
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Cardwell system ill suited to ‘modern conditions’, because it did not create a big enough 
reserve and there were too many regular units based in the UK in case of mobilization. Amery 
then proceeded to state that Arnold-Forster’s scheme of having two year short service 
enlistments for a Home Service Army had been vindicated by the First World War; Amery 
explained that the war had shown that it was possible to train troops for active service in six 
months which had been one of the criticisms levelled at the scheme originally. Amery then 
argued that the League should promote the two tier army of long service imperial army  and 
short service Home Army. However, Amery did not get backing for his idea. Milne thought 
that the country needed an effective Territorial Army which he thought was ‘merely a 
collection of men with rifles’.256 The minutes of the meeting reflected that the committee 
considered the Territorial Army ‘practically hopeless owning to the lamentable condition of 
its equipment which was obsolete’. Codrington, the expert on the Territorial Army thought 
that the Government’s attitude to the Territorial’s needed closer scrutiny, especially the 
question of them using obsolete weapons. He also referred to a statement made by Cooper in 
the House of Commons the day before during the Army Estimate statement which give the 
impression that unless the Territorial Army received new weapons and equipment it would be 
a waste of time and money to train them.
257
 For several years the Territorial Army had been 
undergoing a transitional period because it was being reconfigured to encompass an anti-
aircraft role which was causing a degree of upheaval.
258
 However, the main problems were a 
lack of modern equipment and sluggish recruitment. Conversely, the Territorial Army had 
lower rearmament priority than the Regular Army which destabilised the home defence 
programme.  
 
At the end of the meeting Montague Barlow again asked if the committee would consider 
allowing a Liberal or Labour representative on the committee, because he thought their 
participation and co-operation would be ‘necessary’.259 However, this was rejected by the 
committee on the grounds that it might be better to nearly complete the report before ‘co-
opting’ new members to join. Barlow also suggested that the military experts of the 
committee Milne, Chetwode and Charles-should jointly prepare a detailed assessment of 
imperial commitments and the role of the Territorial Army both abroad and at home. Barlow 
then suggested that Beddington-Behrens should be made Vice-Chairman which unanimously 
agreed. On 15 April the League held its next meeting at 24, Carlton House Terrace, London, 
which was home of Lord Iliffe. Until January 1937 Iliffe had been the proprietor of Allied 
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Newspapers which owned the Sunday Times and Daily Telegraph and considerable number of 
regional titles. After the breakup of Allied Newspapers in February 1937 he retained a 
number of regional papers in the Midlands, including the Birmingham Telegraph, and had he 
interests in periodicals and a publishing house. He was Chairman of the Guildhall Insurance 
Company, a member of Lloyds and president of Periodical Proprietors' Association from 
1935 to 1938. Iliffe had been Conservative MP for Tamworth between 1923 and 1929. He 
had been a friend of Amery for a many years. Amery shrewdly asked Iliffe if he wanted to 
participate because it gave the League access to his newspapers and a ready source of finance. 
Victor Cazalet, Conservative MP for Chippenham, who was well known Zionist supporter 
and considered an up 
 and coming MP.  
 
Amery began the meeting by asking for general comments on Beddington-Behrens the paper. 
Amery thought that Beddington-Behrens had over emphasised the possibility of invasion 
because the navy and the air force made it impossible for a large force to be dispatched 
against the UK.
260
 This marked a break with the NSL, who used the threat of invasion as one 
of main arguments for the introduction of conscription. However, he did add a caveat that an 
invasion would be possible if the naval and forces of the UK had been ‘knocked out by enemy 
forces’. Chetwode interjected that the diminution of naval and air forces to other fronts could 
provide an enemy with the opportunity to attack. However, Amery believed that Britain 
would always have sufficient naval forces in the North Sea to deter or disrupt an invasion. 
Chetwode noted that a ‘new combination of forces might be arraigned against us in the next 
war. We might have Italy and Japan against us instead of allies’. Although, with hindsight this 
statement seems prescient, by 1937 it was very clear that Italy and Japan had more territorial 
ambitions within their respective spheres of influence which made them potential enemies of 
the British. The committee agreed that any future literature should not emphasise a direct 
invasion threat but note that the possibility should not excluded in the future. Charles wanted 
the paper to stress the importance of air defence, because it was a new form of invasion and 
was now the major danger to the public. Charles thought also that the paper was insufficient 
and lacked detail on the particulars of air defence.
261
  
 
Iliffe argued that the purpose of the paper was to educate the public and should give details. 
However, Milne thought that the paper should receive the blessing of the Secretary of State 
for War and the WO before publishing. He was concerned that if the League went into detail 
it may cause offence to the WO or contradict their policy. Milne wanted the report to be 
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edited by the WO or Secretary of State for War before publication and receive official 
recognition. Amery then told Milne that he had been to see the Secretary of State for War 
with Beddington-Behrens and Charles, and had discussed what they were doing and how they 
could achieve it. However, he thought it was a mistake to be directly connected to the WO 
because it would diminish the impact of the League by making it appear to the public that it 
was not independent; he was further concerned that the Secretary of State for War would be 
placed in a difficult position in the House of Commons if the group was not entirely 
independent.
262
 Chetwode argued that the Army League should emulate the Navy League; by 
saying to the WO we will help you, but if you refuse are assistance we shall act independently 
in matters which the committee considered to be of ‘grave national importance’. Beddington-
Behrens later stated that he conceived of the idea of an Army League because of the activities 
of the Navy League.
263
 The Navy League was formed in 1894 to promote a strong navy and 
ensure that the public were made aware of the need for adequate naval expenditure. The Navy 
League’s most prominent public campaign had been in 1909 during the height of the navy 
scare. By 1914 it had a membership of 100,000 members. It produced books, pamphlets and 
gave lecture tours on naval matters. The Navy League also attempted to ensure that naval 
policy was above party political differences and therefore not subject to ‘damaging’ 
interference. The Navy League wielded considerable political power and in 1919 achieved 
office recognition from the Admiralty. It was also instrumental to the creation of the Sea 
Cadets Corps. However, overtime the Admiralty found it hard to control the League which 
increasingly reflected the personalities and aspirations of its organising committee and 
president.  
 
Iliffe thought the committee should clarify whether the report was to guide Government 
policy or inform public opinion. Amery stated that the League wanted to help the Government 
and that he had told Cooper that they would at some stage show him what they were 
proposing and allow him to make comments and suggestions. But he said they should place a 
caveat on any exchange by saying the League would not categorically ‘accept anything you 
say’. Iliffe said the initial report should make a specific policy recommendation which would 
mean it was aimed at the Government. Amery said it was preferable to raise interest with the 
public first on what the Army was for and after that it would be appropriate to discus 
policy.
264
 He wanted the first report to be a ‘general statement’ and not a detailed policy 
document. Amery then said that they would approach the Government with the attitude ‘we 
are going to publish the memorandum, believing it will help you’. At this point Amery 
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wanted the relationship with the WO to be ‘informal and friendly’. But, he would like the 
committee to agree to certain vital points which the League would press and others which 
they would be ‘willing to be guided on’ when dealing with the WO. Iliffe wanted the League 
to concentrate its efforts on increasing recruitment to the Regular and Territorial Army by 
arguing for increased pay and improved conditions of service. Amery replied that the League 
needed to also improve the public perception of the Army which was prejudicing recruitment; 
however, he conceded that good pay and conditions was important as well. There was general 
agreement on this point but they all thought that the Government needed urgently to create an 
‘organisation which meets our strategical needs’. The Committee also agreed that the 
possibility of seaborne invasion was highly unlikely so long as the navy and air force were 
strong enough to provide a deterrent. But there was concern that the air defence organisation 
was uncoordinated and under strength and should be included within the report as a matter of 
urgency. The spectre of the ‘bomber always getting through’ had been cause of public 
concern for a number of years. This made air defence the primary focus of the Government 
after it decided to commence its rearmament programme in 1934.
265
 Similarly, the committee 
would have to address this fundamental question if it was to get public attention.  
 
Amery thought that it was essential that the report state that it was desirable to have an 
‘Imperial Reserve’ which could be moved without having to ‘resort to a general 
mobilisation’. However, Beddington-Behrens thought that it would be better not to stipulate 
the number of divisions involved. Milne also agreed to this because he thought that without 
sufficient data the committee could not make an accurate assessment of the number divisions 
available for overseas service. Milne was also concerned that stipulating a number would put 
political pressure on the WO to achieve an unrealistic target. However, Amery pointed out 
that the emergency in Palestine could be used as a starting point. But Milne countered that all 
overseas garrisons were constituted on 50% basis which meant that during a period of intense 
international pressure all imperial garrisons would need to be reinforced prior to the 
commencement of hostilities. This of course would limit the amount of men which could be 
spared for an imperial reserve. As Chetwode pointed out the exception was the Indian 
garrison which always nearly at its establishment level. The question of mobilization was 
discussed at great length because Amery wanted the Government make it easier for the 
reserve to employed prior to the commencement of a war without having to order a 
mobilization which in theory required Parliamentary consent.
266
 He also thought that this 
would limit the atmosphere of crisis that a mobilization order created. Beddington-Behrens 
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said that for ‘Imperial interests we do not have enough troops’. Amery thought that 
expeditionary forces would be required in Egypt and Libya rather than in France at the start of 
the next war. The committee thought that imperial requirements diminished the possibility of 
creating a force for a European commitment. Amery also thought that fighting in the next war 
would take place in France and he predicted that Belgium would not be involved.  
 
Grigg also wanted the importance of reinforcing imperial obligations emphasised within the 
report, which he stated should take precedence a European commitment. Grigg also noted that 
Cooper had made it plainly clear in a statement to the House of Commons that if Britain had 
two simultaneous imperial emergencies the Army would be at breaking point. Milne 
speculated that if in 1936 the Italians had launched an attack on Egypt or British possessions 
in East Africa there would have been no reserves either in theatre or in the UK to respond. 
Grigg said that the possibility of having a policy which included an Expeditionary force 
would have to be additional to the Imperial Reserve. There was concurrence on this point it 
was felt that it was impossible to have to these two forces analogous of each other. At the end 
of the meeting it was agreed that a small editorial team comprised of Amery, Beddington 
Behrens, Charles and Grigg would complete the report and that it should be published in the 
summer. This became the standard procedure of the League in the years to come. The 
committee would look at a prepared draft report which was often accompanied by 
memorandum written by individual committee members and Government publications. 
However, the final draft work was always left to a sub-committee which worked 
independently. This was the last recorded meeting before publication of the committee’s first 
report. On 28 May 1937 Chamberlain became Prime Minister the same day he appointed 
Leslie Hore-Belisha the successful Minister of Transport as Secretary of State for War. Hore-
Belisha was considered to be a dynamic and efficient minister who could modernise the WO. 
Hore-Belisha had served in the First World War as a major in the Royal Army Service Corps. 
He entered office believing that Britain should not be contemplating sending large forces to 
the continent again in time of war. He thought that the Army should be planning for a ‘limited 
liability’. Hore-Belisha assumed that the Maginot line was impregnable and the French Army 
was still a formidable military force. Within months of taking office Hore-Belisha forged a 
close relationship with Liddell-Hart who quickly became his unofficial mentor.
267
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On 26 July 1937 the committee published an eight page pamphlet A Policy For the Army. The 
opening section stated that the report was addressed to both public and the Government.
268
 
The published report stated that an imperial reserve with a high degree of mobility should be 
created which would consist of two divisions; this force could either be deployed to deal with 
an imperial emergency or ‘against another power’. This of course was contrary to Milne’s 
argument that it would place the WO in a difficult position if the committee specified the 
number of divisions. The report thought that the imperial (central) reserve should act as a 
spearhead for a larger expeditionary which would be created on mobilization. On the question 
of recruitment the pamphlet stated that improved rates of pay should be introduced for 
imperial service and a ‘long service’ pension which was Iliffe suggestion. The committee also 
stated that the ‘public must realise that exemption from compulsory service in the armed 
forces of the Crown is a privilege that must be paid for’.269 Although, this line appeared 
directed at the public its real target was probably the Government and in particular the new 
Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain. The report also wanted short service enlistments of two 
or three years with a six year period with the reserve introduced for Home, Caribbean and 
Middle Eastern service. The present six year enlistment was to be retained but would used to 
create a long service army to maintain the Indian garrison and stations in the Far East. This of 
course was the two-tier Army which Amery had been advocating for 37 years. The report 
stated that the Territorial Army urgently needed modern equipment to increase its efficiency 
and make it more appealing to potential recruits. The committee also thought that it was 
matter of urgency that a large anti-aircraft organisation be created which to supplement the 
‘insufficient protection afforded by air-defence acting alone’.  
 
On the question of the size of regular Army the report thought that it was important that a 
minimum safety level be set. However, the report falls short of stating that compulsory 
service would be introduced to maintain the level of the regular Army. Committee also argued 
that in recent years imperial security in the Mediterranean had become a concern. This 
adversely effected communication and supply links with rest of the Empire. The report 
considered that reinforcing Mediterranean and Middle Eastern garrisons was the number one 
priority of the Army at the start of a major war. The report thought that air and navy forces 
afforded the best option for home defence which released the Army to concentrate on its 
imperial role. Something which was not mentioned in any of the discussions but was included 
in the report was the creation of a civilian employment corps which could be used to do 
fatigues and therefore release manpower for operational duties. They proposed that the corps 
would be formed out of ex-servicemen which would create a source of employment for them. 
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The final paragraph stated that the committee thought that the present system of voluntary can 
be made to work ‘if the nation is determined that it is of vital importance’. In the press the 
report was presented as being the inspiration of Amery.
270
  The report also tried to deal with 
perceptions that its agenda was purely militaristic by arguing that a strong ‘defensive’ posture 
was now vital because the League of Nations was collapsing and the international situation 
deteriorating. Amery later commented that the report was well received by the Press which is 
why the committee decided to form the Army League.
271
 The report was also widely studied 
at the WO. On 13 July General Sir Harry Knox, the Adjutant General (AG), thought the 
report had made a ‘valuable contribution to the education of the public’ on the subject of the 
size of the Army.
272
 Knox also minuted Hore-Belisha ‘we are sadly in need of support, and 
public opinion must be aroused’. Knox and Hore-Belisha were clashing over the issue of 
recruitment which led to Knox’s dismissal from the Army Council in November.   
   
On 29 July Amery received a letter from General Burnett-Stuart, commander of the Southern 
Command, congratulating him on the report and the creation of the Army League.
273
 Burnett-
Stuart was outspoken advocate of armoured forces and had recently been the commander of 
British forces in Egypt. Burnett-Stuart enclosed a memorandum which he had sent to General 
Sir Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd the CIGS in 1934 setting out his belief that the 
Army should concentrate on its imperial and extra-European functions. Burnett-Stuart also 
thought that the Army should not be ‘imitating the methods and organisation of continental 
mass warfare’. Burrnett-Stuart also told Amery that the CIGS had not been at all pleased by 
the contents of the memorandum. Amery wrote back on the 4 August stating that he 
wholeheartedly agreed with Burnett-Stuart.
274
 He also told him that he thought the League 
report had not gone far enough in stating that the Government should not be considering a 
continental commitment but he feared that the WO was ‘still dreaming of another 1914-18 
with unlimited time to build up a 60 division Army’. Amery was very uncomfortable with the 
prospect of a European commitment. His obvious preference for concentrating on imperial 
defence is clear. Amery now switched his attention to Hore-Belisha in attempt to get his ideas 
put into policy. On 3 November Amery wrote to Hore-Belisha suggesting a scheme were 
older men on long service enlistments be placed in garrison battalions for overseas service 
which would release existing foreign service battalions for service at home and for use in an 
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emergency.
275
 On 7 December Hore-Belisha replied that his experts considered garrison 
battalions in peacetime were prone to deteriorate badly and they were expensive to maintain 
because they required increased inducements.
276
 Amery also wanted to know what Hore-
Belisha thought about his short service Home Army scheme. Hore-Belisha responded that it 
would be difficult to use battalions of short servicemen in overseas emergencies because they 
may last for ‘varying periods’. He also thought that short service battalions would contain a 
disproportionate number of young soldiers who would be leaving and joining units as their 
enlistment came to its end. This he concluded would disrupt the efficiency and cohesion of 
the Army.  This letter ended any chance of Amery’s getting his two tier army scheme 
adopted.  
 
On 20 February 1938 The Army and Home and Empire Defence League was officially 
launched. However, The Times Editorial thought that the title was ‘clumsy’ and that the 
League was ‘exaggerating the nation’s ignorance of the state of defences’.277 The motto of the 
League was ‘In defence of Freedom’. The League stated that it was non-political organisation 
which had been formed to make ‘defence a national issue’.278 The League distributed a 
manifesto which stated that ‘to prepare for defence is merely common-sense pacifism’.279 One 
of the aims of the League was to make all ‘men and women feel that defence is their own 
responsibility, not merely the job of the fighting services’. The manifesto also stated that the 
there was a ‘considerable shortage in the Army reserve’ which should be remedied as soon as 
possible. Willingdon became President of the League and The Earl of Derby Deputy-
President. Beddington-Behrens was Chairman of the Executive Committee. The League also 
had a council which included Amery, who was also a Vice President, Charles, Chetwode, 
Hague, Grigg, Milne, Iliffe and Montague- Barlow. New members included Duncan Sandys 
MP, Captain Bullock MP, Viscount Greenwood, who was  president of the Iron and Steel 
Federation, Sir Malcolm Campbell, holder of the land speed record, J, P. Black, chairmen of 
the Standard Motor Company, Major General Sir John Kennedy, Vice Chairmen of the 
British Red Cross and John Maxwell, owner of Associated British Cinemas (ABC). Although, 
the League was committed to being non political it had no representation from the Labour or 
Liberal party’s on its council.  
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At the launch the League appealed for new members who could form local associations and 
hold meetings and rallies. It was envisaged that local branches would have minimum of fifty 
members. The League intended to distribute books to news-stands, bookstalls and libraries, 
use educational film shows and hold public debates and meetings. The League produced a 
monthly magazine called Rising Strength which was published from February 1938 until 
March 1939. The magazine’s name was changed in March 1939 to Citizen Service but was 
discontinued in September 1939 when the war started. Although, it was called a magazine it 
was usually three pages long, and can be more aptly described as a pamphlet. According to 
Amery by June 1939 it had a circulation of 12,500 a month.
280
 . Amery contributed many of 
the articles in Rising Strength and Citizen Service which covered a wide range of topics from 
Army recruitment to promoting the training of girls in nursing and civil defence. After the 
winter of 1938 Citizen Service was primarily concerned with promoting the introduction of 
national service.
281
 The Leagues ‘propaganda’ methodology was designed to educate the 
public on the problems which ‘defence faced under modern conditions’. The League also 
stated that it was independent of the Government. However, the League privately wanted its 
Executive Committee to maintain a constant liaison with the WO.
282
 As well as promoting 
issues concerning the Army and imperial defence the League embarked on a campaign to 
educate the public on the subject of Air Raid Precautions (ARP) and civil defence. 
Membership of the League cost 10 shillings a year for normal members, £2 for founder 
members, life members were £50 and associate members 1 shilling a year. Although, the 
League had many distinguished members their participation appears to be limited to giving 
financial backing or making endorsements rather than active support. Willingdon and Derby 
had limited contact with the day to day business and were figure heads. Amery often asked 
distinguished people if they would mind having their name associated with the League.
283
 The 
daily management of the League and its strategic direction was carried out Beddington-
Behrens and the Executive Committee which was dominated by Amery. The League rented 
offices Belgravia, London, to co-ordinate its activities and had another in Birmingham. Public 
relations were handled by Richmond Temple, Director of the Savoy Hotel Company, and 
Beddington Behrens. Lord Iliffe gave financial assistance and the use of his staff for 
administrative activities. However, by 1939 the League employed accountants and secretarial 
staff. The League owned a car and office equipment. The League was also subject to income 
tax on its assets. 
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The League was run as a registered company with an incorporated board of governance made 
up of a council of management. In September 1938 the League had 2,500 members and 7,000 
subscribers to Rising strength. However, the League’s accounts for 1943 show that they had 
received £201 in normal member subscriptions prior to the start of the Second World War but 
had been expecting to receive a further £255 before membership was suspended in September 
1939. This would mean an active membership of around 912 members based on a 
subscription of 10 shillings.
284
 Life and council members would put this figure at around 950. 
However, prior to officially launching the League the executive committee had sought to 
contact every retired Army officer which it considered to be ready made membership source. 
In January 1938 Captain Bullock MP the League’s acting secretary had telephoned the WO 
requesting the names and addresses of every retired army officer living in the UK.
285
 Bullock 
said the League wanted the information to circulate their ‘propaganda’ and make appeals. The 
WO officials stated that would not divulge the information but did agree to forward material 
if the League paid the postage costs. However, Hore-Belisha thought that this was setting a 
dangerous precedent which would also give the League a veneer of official approval, so the 
request was denied. This undoubtedly was a setback for the League which needed to attract 
subscribers and members to increase its financial resources. At its launch the League had 
£12,000 (£640,000 in today’s money) which had been donated by its council members.  
However, by September 1939 the League had assets totalling £4140 (£164,151 in today’s 
money) which included covenant loans and donations. Therefore most of the League’s capital 
came from donations from its wealthy members. It was also evident that the League’s 
propaganda campaign between February 1938 and September 1939 had greatly reduced the 
League’s coffers.  
 
In November 1938 Beddington-Behrens told Amery that he was preparing 5000 copies of a 
speech given by Amery for members ‘who could run a circulation close on six figures’.286 The 
Army League did supply other organisations such as the Over-Seas League, the Empire 
League, Colonial Defence League and Air Raid League with its material. The Over-Seas 
League was created by Sir Evelyn Wrench in 1918 to promote imperial unity. Wrench also 
founded in 1929 the All Peoples Association to promote Anglo-German cooperation; 
however, in 1936 he was forced to close it because its aims clashed with those of the Nazi 
Party. For a time Wrench was considered to be pro-Nazi after he published a book in 1940 
entitled I Loved Germany which attempted to distinguish between Germany and the Nazis 
state. However, Wrench had told Beddington-Behrens that the Army League could utilise the 
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68000 members of the Over-Seas League ‘to the fullest extent’ which somewhat dismisses 
any notion that he was pro-Nazi. Similarly, the Army League cultivated close links with Air 
Defence League which was formed in January 1939 by Sir Arthur Salter, the MP for Oxford 
University. Salter had been pressing the Government for a number of years to improve air 
defence precautions and increase stocks of food and raw materials. The Navy League and Air 
League both had large memberships. Lord Lloyd President of the Navy League 1930-1941 
also became a member of the Army League Council in early 1938. Lloyd and Amery also 
worked closely together promoting imperial preference. Many of the pre-war military 
pressure groups had interconnected leaderships, who were also active in Imperial 
associations. The overlapping nature of these contacts is evident in council membership of the 
Army League. The League’s ‘ordinary’ members created local associations which were 
encouraged to give luncheons and meetings which would then be attended by guest speakers 
supplied by the council.  The League was essentially an organisation which was at the heart of 
the establishment and centred in Westminster and Belgravia. 
 
Munich  
 
 
After its inception the League remained inactive for several months but events would soon 
move the organisation in a different direction. On 10 March 1938 Hore-Belisha gave his first 
Army Estimate speech which set out his vision for the Army.
287
 He announced that pay, 
pensions and conditions of service in the Regular Army would be improved; the Territorial 
Army would receive more equipment and additional home defence responsibilities. However, 
Hore-Belisha stated that the Army’s primary role was Home defence followed by imperial 
defence which negated any notions of a continental commitment. He argued that the Army’s 
primary consideration was preparing for the ‘menace of air attack’ and internal security, 
which included post attack recovery. He also set out a plan to create a two division strategic 
reserve which would be used for emergencies. Hore-Belisha announced that key imperial 
garrisons at strategic points would have their establishments increased. Many of the League’s 
proposals were included in speech. When it was Amery’s turn to contribute, he congratulated 
Hore-Belisha on his speech which he thought ‘portended little less than a complete revolution 
in the structure and organisation of the British Army’.288 On 22 March when closing the 
debate Hore-Belisha stated, ‘I was indebted to several hon. and right hon. Members who have 
advanced ideas from time to time, notably my right hon. Friend the Member for Sparkbrook 
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(Mr. Amery). I thought he would be gratified that after so much advocacy he had won a case 
for his main points’.289 However, on the 10 March the Germans annexed Austria. On 14 
March responding to the crisis Amery called on the Government to contemplate creating a 
war cabinet to manage the emergency.
290
 It was apparent that Hitler’s next demand would be 
the Czechoslovakian controlled Sudetenland which contained a large ethnic German 
population. Amery thought that the Czechs would fight and urged the Government to stand 
firm against German aggression. In the spring Amery began calling for the introduction of a 
national register which would be the first step toward preparing the population for military 
and industrial conscription. The WO response to the formation of the League was mixed. On 
1 March the new AG, Major General Clive Liddell, thought that the manifesto was 
innocuous; however, the WO was unhappy with the comments concerning the size of 
reserve.
291
 Liddell said that he had been in touch with Sir John Kennedy and told him that it 
would be advisable in the future that the League ‘find out the facts from the WO’ before 
printing. However, he also said that they would not give the League any material which was 
not publically available which Kennedy had understood. In May a minute was circulated 
which stated that the League should be encouraged to provide paid lecturers throughout the 
country to assist the WO in getting its message across to the public.
292
 However, there was 
some uneasiness at the WO because many of the League’s members were in favour of 
conscription which was contrary to Government policy. This discounted the possibility of 
giving official recognition or assistance to League.  
 
On 1 June deputation of Conservative 1922 Committee, which included Sir Edward Grigg, 
held a meeting with Chamberlain in attempt to force the Government implement a national 
register.
293
 However, Chamberlain was adamant that the international situation did not 
warrant such a drastic step. In the following weeks the crisis intensified and it appeared that 
Britain might go to war with Germany over the Sudetenland. By the middle of the summer 
League began using its network of members and contacts to start agitating for increased 
preparations in the event of war. On 15 June Amery gave a speech in Leeds at a luncheon 
hosted by the League where he warned about how modern warfare involved the ‘paralysing 
the moral of the people by panic’ and the ‘destruction of all that equipment of national life 
which is essential either to the support of arms in the field or to the life of the civilian 
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population itself’.294 He also thought that the state of the Army ‘was a cause of grave 
concern’, because it was ‘totally unprepared and its reserves woefully inadequate to deal with 
a serious crisis’. However, he stated that he was against putting ‘an army of millions on to the 
continent’. He argued that Britain should improve its air defence arrangements and the Army 
because the ‘next few years will be years of the gravest anxiety’. On 15 July Grigg was a 
guest speaker at a public meeting organised by League at the Taylorian Institution in 
Oxford.
295
 Grigg used the meeting to argue that the Government needed to create a national 
register of occupations, skills and previous military service experience; he also wanted a 
national youth training programme established for teenagers which would offer ‘voluntary’ 
military instruction.
296
 The same day Chetwode addressed a meeting of businessmen on 
behalf of the League on the subject of ‘cooperation of industry with defence’ at an event run 
by Firestone tyres; the League proposed the establishment of a liaison committee between the 
League and business to help promote awareness of defence requirements and production 
difficulties. 
 
During the summer Amery increasingly began criticising Government defence and foreign 
policy. On 12 July Amery wrote to The Times about his concerns concerning the amount of 
supplies and food stuffs being stored by the Government to mitigate against the derogation of 
merchant shipping by air and naval attacks; Amery pointed out that the available merchant 
marine tonnage was 3 million tons less than in 1914, and that 7 million tons had been sunk 
between 1914-18 which had caused considerable problems to the war effort.
297
 However, 
Amery’s final break with Chamberlain’s Government occurred at the end of September and 
marked his decision to call for the introduction of national service. In mid-September Amery 
wrote to Anthony Eden the former Foreign Secretary asking him to participate in a revamped 
National Service League.
298
 Eden had resigned from the Cabinet in February after disagreeing 
with the direction in which Chamberlain’s foreign policy was moving. Eden soon became the 
leader for a group of younger Conservative MPs, including Harold Macmillan, who were 
opposed to appeasement.
299
 Cazalet was also on the fringes of the group. The head of the 
Conservative Research Department, Sir Richard Ball, while attempting to undermine their 
influence on Parliamentary Conservative sarcastically described them as the ‘Glamour Boys’. 
However, the name stuck and far from ridiculing them, it increased their resolve and appeal 
among disaffected backbenchers. Ball states that Amery ‘an old enemy’ of the group began 
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attending their meetings after the Munich debate in October.
300
 However, Amery was trying 
to recruit Eden to a new NSL before Munich.  However, Eden declined the offer saying he 
was too busy, but a more likely explanation was that Eden knew that public support for the 
introduction of national service was divided and volatile. The Daily Mail produced a poll of 
its readers in October which showed that they were equally divided on the issue.
301
 On 28 
September Chamberlain flew to Munich and agreed to all of Hitler’s demands. The British 
and French then forced the Czechs to cede the Sudetenland to the Germans. Although war 
appeared to have been averted, Munich marked a turning point for Amery, who became a 
bitter and vociferous critic of Chamberlain for appeasing Hitler over the Sudetenland.  
 
On 5 October Amery abstained during the Munich debate. The following day Amery clashed 
with Chamberlain in the Commons other issue when Chamberlain stated ‘that conscription or 
compulsory national service will not be introduced by this Government in peacetime, and that 
statement still holds good’.302 Amery responded ‘In that case, would it not be desirable to 
have a change of Government, in order to make it possible to introduce this necessary 
Measure?’ On 10 October Amery wrote to Hore-Belisha that he accepted Chamberlain’s 
decision regarding conscription but he told him that he was contemplating using the Army 
League to promote the issue.
303
 He asked Hore-Belisha for an informal and unofficial meeting 
to discuss what kind of national service would be acceptable to the WO and how best to 
promote it. On 12 October Amery wrote to Sir George Shee, a former secretary of the NSL, 
that he was considering creating a ‘new National Service League in order to preach the 
necessity of some form of National Service as the groundwork of all defence’.304 Amery 
wanted Shee to send him as much information on the various policies and campaign strategies 
which the NSL had developed between 1905 and 1914. Also Amery had decided that it was 
preferable to discontinue the activities of the Army league and create a new organisation 
which could promote the creation of a national register and the introduction of national 
service. On 14 October Amery wrote Grigg saying that he intended to utilise the staff and 
funds of the Army League to promote national service and that the other members of the 
council were in agreement with his idea.  
 
Amery had been discussing with Lord Salisbury about making a public appeal for a national 
register to be introduced as a precautionary measure.
305
 Salisbury had been calling for the 
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introduction of conscription since summer. On 1 November Amery and fellow League 
members Milne, Black, Beddington Behrens, Charles, Willingdon, Iliffe and Hague signed a 
manifesto with Lord Salisbury, Admiral Sir William Goodenough, Marshal of the Royal 
Force, Sir John Salmond, Sir Henry Price and the Bishop of London published a manifesto. 
The manifesto called on the Government to establish a Ministry of National Service, compile 
a national register and introduce national service as soon as possible. However, the manifesto 
argued in favour of compulsory service being extended to the Territorial Army not the 
Regular Army. However, on 18 November Sir John Anderson, the Lord Privy Seal, circulated 
a memorandum to the Cabinet on the subject of national service.
306
 Anderson view on the 
subject was clear ‘I have never been able to understand how it can seriously be contended that 
a compulsory National Register has any value, except as a prelude to some form of 
compulsory service’. Anderson preferred making an appeal for volunteers and the issuing of a 
handbook for the guidance of would-be volunteers. In early November Amery produced a 
memorandum for the council on the future of the League. He argued that the League needed 
to concentrate on areas that the public were ‘interested in’ rather than ‘detailed points of 
organisation matters’ which they ‘are not’.307  He thought that concentrating on the issue of 
conscription was of ‘vital importance’ and demanded a detailed and unambiguous campaign. 
The overriding reason he thought it was necessary to act was the fact that ‘the Government is 
hesitating to do what they know they ought to be doing, for fear of public opinion’. Amery 
argued that there was ‘unorganised body of latent public opinion in favour of national service 
that only needed organising to develop into a powerful movement capable of influencing 
Government policy’. He also thought that if the League tapped into this public opinion it 
could attract many new members and in the process more funds from subscriptions. 
  
On 25 November the Army League council decided to suspend its activities and start a new 
organisation called the Citizens Service League which would concentrate on the promotion of 
compulsory military service. It was decided by the council to launch the new organisation in 
January 1939 at the annual general meeting. However, a more pressing problem for the 
League was that it was running out of funds which would severely curtail its future activates. 
On 30 November the Cabinet decided not to introduce a compulsory national register or 
national service on the grounds that it was inappropriate during peacetime.
308
 On 1 December 
Anderson announced that the Government would introduce a voluntary register and a 
voluntary national service scheme in January.
309
 In view of this partial realignment of 
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Government policy in the direction of the League, the League’s council decided to ask the 
Army Council for some kind of recognition of their work over the preceding months and for 
the future. On 22 December Hore-Belisha noted that the League’s request ‘go very far toward 
formal recognition by the Army Council’ which he thought was unwise and the request was 
denied.
310
 Hore-Belisha was particularly worried about the League’s stance on National 
Service and its increasingly ‘political’ message. He believed that the WO should treat the 
League with ‘benevolent neutrality’, while attempting not to ‘antagonise it’. In March 1938 
the WO had been forced to send a letter to the League’s Executive Committee to complain 
about article in Rising Strength written by Beddington-Behrens about the poor conditions in 
the Army which were discouraging recruitment.
311
 The same article claimed that the 
Government had significantly reduced medical standards in an effort to increase recruitment. 
The WO thought that the League was in fact harming the WO recruitment drive and were 
being overtly political. After this, Hore-Belisha was weary of becoming too close to the 
League. By the end of 1938 Amery was openly attacking the Government which compounded 
WO suspicions. 
 
In January 1939 Amery began gathering support for the League’s new campaign. He wrote to 
Lord Beaverbrook who pledged the support of Daily Express.
312
 The League decided that it 
would support the Government’s efforts to popularize service in the Militia and not launch an 
assault on Chamberlain’s policy. After Hore-Belisha’s complaint about the tone of the 
League’s articles in Rising Strength Amery was careful not to use the League against the 
Government because he surmised that its role was to nudge and inform and not alienate the 
WO. Most of the Executive council were in or closely connected to the Conservative Party 
which dominated the National Government. Similarly many of the League’s backers were 
also connected to the Conservative Party. On 31 January 1939 Amery wrote to Beddington-
Behrens stating that the council ‘wanted to make it clear that our permanent policy is not 
intended to interfere with the Government’s efforts to meet the immediate urgency (whatever 
we may think of those efforts in private).
313Similarly, the League’s proposals for compulsory 
service were carefully nuanced to make them more palatable to the public. The League 
accentuated the social and civic benefits of giving teenagers four to six month military or civil 
defence training.
314
 Over the winter Hore-Belisha began arguing in Cabinet for the creation of 
six divisions for rapid dispatch to the continent in the event of an emergency. This marked the 
end of WO advocacy of a limited liability which had been the fundamental policy 
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consideration of Hore-Belisha collaboration with Liddell Hart. Hore-Belisha and Liddell Hart 
had ended their ‘partnership’ in the summer of 1938 after the latter had made many enemies 
among military establishment which made it difficult for the relationship to continue. On 22 
February 1939 the Chancellor, Sir John Simon, reluctantly agreed that the previous financial 
objections were no longer valid given the international situation and the additional funds were 
released for the Army.
315
 On 15 March the Germans occupied the rest of Czechoslovakia 
which effectively dispelled any notion that Hitler could be contained through negotiation or 
that his territorial ambitions were confined to bringing Germans inside the Reich. This 
signalled the end of appeasement as an effective foreign policy consideration. On 7 March the 
Government announced that the TA would be doubled in size and there was large increase in 
the Army Estimate.  
 
On 22 March Amery wrote to Lord Chatfield, Minister for Co-ordination of Defence, asking 
for a meeting to discuss defence issues.
316
 Amery told Chatfield that opinion in the 
Conservative Parliamentary Party was in favour of introducing conscription. However, he told 
Chatfield that he was against putting an army of the size of that which had fought in the Great 
War on the Continent again. But he noted that a voluntary system would not produce enough 
trained manpower which could be placed straight into the field without additional training. 
Amery was convinced that the nation understood that the next war would be a total war and 
‘are absolutely ready’ for a compulsory service, because it was in the national interest. On 24 
March Amery wrote to Lord Cunliffe Lister, the former Secretary of State for Air, asking him 
to join the Citizen Service League or whether he could use his ‘name as member of the 
council’. Amery also remonstrated that the international situation demanded the introduction 
of conscription, because ‘we have got to make this timid government and this factious and 
unreasonable Opposition to do what I believe the nation as a whole is crying out for’. Another 
reason why Amery contacted Cunliffe Lister was because the League needed more funds to 
continue its campaign. Since January the League had made a concerted effort to publicise its 
activities. The culmination of this campaign was to be a large rally at the Queens Hall in 
London on 26 April which was too used as a platform to urge the Government to adopt 
national service. The fact that the League was running out of money is probably indicative of 
not being able raise increase its membership. However, the international situation continued 
to deteriorate which gave added emphasis to the League’s efforts. On 31 March the British 
and French Government’s offered Poland a military guarantee. On 6 April the Italians 
invaded Albania. Amery gave a speech that afternoon in the House of Commons which 
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questioned whether the Government’s defence policy was adequate for the ‘multiple dangers’ 
which were ‘now confronting the country’.317  Amery argued that the Government’s decision 
to give a military guarantee to Poland had created a ‘formidable commitment’ which the 
defence policy needed to address as soon as possible.  
  
On 24 April the League gathered for its rally at which Amery was to give the key note speech 
on the urgent need to introduce conscription. On the same day Chamberlain announced that 
the Government was introducing a compulsory military training bill for men aged 20-21 who 
would be called up for a period of six months in the Militia. Another significant move was to 
call up Territorial and Air Force personnel to reinforce the air defence organisation. Bond 
argues that this transpired after Hore-Belisha ‘performed the bravest action of his political 
career in forcing Chamberlain to accept a measure of compulsory service in peacetime despite 
repeated pledges to the contrary’.318 On 27 April Amery welcomed the Government’s 
decision to introduce conscription but was scornful of the Labour party’s decision to oppose it 
on the grounds that the volunteer system had recently provided a steady flow of recruits.
319
 
This marked the end of the rationale for the existence of the Citizen Service League. 
However, Amery was concerned that the decision to compulsory military training might be 
subject change and thought it best to continue its activities. On 1 May Amery wrote to Hore-
Belisha stating that the Government should try and obtain older voluntary recruits for work on 
anti-aircraft batteries.  On 4 May he was contacted by Sir Douglas Hacking, the Chairman of 
the Conservative Party about the future of the Citizen Service League.
320
 Amery had asked the 
Conservative Party Central Office for assistance with the League. However, Hacking told 
Amery that the Party had received reports from all over the country stating that conscription 
was being ‘accepted quietly’ by the public. Under such circumstances Hacking thought that if 
the League continued its work it ‘might result in stirring up opposition’ to the policy and 
ignite a counter campaign calling for a return to a voluntary system. Predictably Amery 
ignored Hacking and the League continued its work.  
 
Amery decided that the League should agitate for compulsory service to be introduced 
permanently. Amery was convinced that the activities of the League had contributed to the 
introduction of the Militia Act.
321
 During July and August the League set about raising funds 
for its new campaign that would coincide with the general election which was due in early 
1940. On 18 July Chester Beatty, one of the League’s council members, who was also a stock 
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broker managed to secure donations £1000 from sources in the city.
322
 However, on 3 
September 1939 Britain and France declared war on Germany. On 13 September the 
Executive Committee of the League met to discuss the position of the League. They decided 
to suspend the propaganda activities of the League for the duration of the war. It is difficult to 
gage the League’s efforts or its impact. The deteriorating international situation made the 
implementation of their recommendations self evident. Amery would remain on the 
backbenches until May 1940. He will always be remembered for his attack on Chamberlain 
during the Norway debate on 7 May 1940 when he said ‘depart, I say, and let us have done 
with you. In the name of God, go’. The day after Chamberlain resigned and Winston 
Churchill became Prime Minister. On 13 May Amery was offered the post of Secretary of 
State for India which he accepted. However, he was not given a seat in the War Cabinet.  
 
Right from his arrival at the India Office he was involved in the planning and co-ordination of 
India forces at a time of unprecedented crisis. Italy had declared war on Britain which meant 
that the Middle East, East Africa and the Mediterranean were now threatened. France had 
fallen and most the British Army’s equipment and supplies had been lost at Dunkirk. 
Therefore, India and the Indian Army were of significant strategic importance to the British 
war effort. On 25 July he submitted a memorandum on the preparation Indian troops for 
service overseas.
323
 The Indian Army, like the British, had been totally unprepared for a 
modern war. Most of the best equipped units had been sent to Egypt and East Africa in 
August and September 1939. The COS wanted as many India units as it could muster sent to 
the Middle East and East Africa to bolster British forces against the Italian forces in Libya, 
Abyssinia and Somaliland. However, Amery also had to contemplate the possibility of war 
with Japan which required sending Indian troops to Malaya and Burma. Another 
consideration was the possibility of Soviet aggression against Afghanistan which meant 
having sufficient forces in the North West Frontier area for internal security duties and to 
deter invasion.
324
 After the fall of France the rapid mobilisation of Indian forces became a top 
priority. However, the problem for the Indian Government was a lack of equipment and 
supplies which would hamper the expansion of the India Army. Leo Amery’s first weeks in 
office were spent dealing with this problem. Similarly, after the fall of France the WO 
requested the regular units of British garrison be replaced by Territorial units in training in the 
UK as a matter of urgency. Because of Amery’s extensive and detailed knowledge of defence 
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issues and the Army he was able to quickly grasp the problems associated with the 
movement, supply, training and concentration of military forces. 
 
However, Amery also had to deal with the political upheaval which had been a feature of 
Indian politics since the 1920s. When in 1939 the Viceroy Lord Lithgow declared war on 
Germany without consulting the Indian Government he created a political crisis which was 
still raging when Amery took office. For a number of years Amery had been arguing the India 
should be given dominion status. He considered the best way to deal with the political  crisis 
was to promise the Indian people that in exchange for their continued loyalty during the war 
they would be granted post-war Independence.
325
 However, his plan was not acceptable to 
Churchill, who was committed to maintaining British control of India, and the rest of the 
Cabinet. After only several weeks in post he considered resigning. In August Churchill made 
a watered down proposals to Indian Congress Party, the Muslim League other nationalists 
which offered consultation on outstanding political issues and the granting of Dominion status 
after the war. This was rejected. Amery was then forced to impose tight political and civil 
control of India through the Defence of India Act. Many anti-British politicians were arrested 
and imprisoned. By 1941 India had over 200,000 troops serving abroad and by 1942 it was 
expected that India would have a million men under arms.
326
 However, the entry of the 
Japanese into the war on 7 December 1941 would severely test the Indian Army and British 
forces in South East Asia. Hong Kong was captured on Christmas day. On 10 December the 
Japanese invaded Malaya and drove the British imperial forces down the Malay Peninsula. In 
February 1942 the Japanese captured the much vaunted Singapore fortress and 130,000 
British, Indian, Australian and New Zealanders troops went into captivity. This event 
shattered British prestige and mortally weakened European imperialism across Asia. The fall 
of Singapore was a poignant moment for Amery because he had been instrumental in getting 
the great naval base constructed. Another blow was the loss of Burma which brought 
Japanese forces to the border of India.  In March 1942 the British government sent a mission 
led by Sir Stafford Cripps, deputy leader of the Labour Party, to negotiate with Indian 
nationalist politicians in an attempt to gain their support for the duration of the war. Cripps 
essentially offered the 1940 proposals again. 
  
However, in August 1942 Congress the largest nationalist party passed its ‘Quit India’ 
resolution which called on the British to withdraw from India immediately. In reprisal the 
British arrested leading Indian nationalist leaders which led to widespread unrest and riots. 
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This was only contained with some difficulty by the Indian Army and Police which stayed 
loyal. However, the British were able to cultivate the Muslim League which softened its 
stance toward British rule and the war effort in exchange for assures about the possibility of a 
post-war political settlement that might include the creation of a separate Muslim state. 
Amery was instrumental in laying the ground for the possibility of Muslim succession. After 
the Japanese occupation of Burma, Amery had to deal with a rise in pro-Japanese sentiment 
across India and the possibility of sabotage and attacks on British and Indian security forces 
by nationalists.
327
 On 10 May 1943 Amery circulated a paper to the Cabinet stating that there 
were concerted attempts both from inside and outside India to subvert Indian Army forces.
328
 
Amery was concerned that the pro-Japanese Indian National Army (INA) would become the 
focal point of anti-British sentiment and effect morale among Indian troops serving with the 
British. However, his fears proved to be unfounded. By the end of the war two million Indians 
had volunteered for service in the Indian Army. For the first time officers and men were 
drawn from all sections of Indian society and were considered to be highly professional and 
proficient soldiers. By 1945 the Indian Army was equipped with armour, artillery and other 
technical equipment. The Indian economy had been harnessed for the war effort and became 
an important source of war material for the allied war effort in South East Asia. Amery 
between 1940 and 1945 was intimately involved in directing and coordinating this effort 
mammoth effort. However, for much of the war Amery was at odds with Churchill over the 
direction of Indian policy and his usual capacity for involving himself in the affairs of other 
departments made him enemies within the Cabinet. Nevertheless, he was undoubtedly 
successful at dealing with the political and military crisis which engulfed India between 1940 
and 1945. At the time of the General Election in 1945 Amery was attempting to create a 
constitutional plan which would be acceptable to all sides. However, this would be the last 
time Amery would serve as minister because during the election he lost his Sparkbrook after 
33 years and did not return to Parliament. 
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Chapter Three: The Army, Home and Empire Defence League 
1945-1951  
 
 
On 23 October 1945 the Army League held its first meeting after the end of the Second World 
War. There were only nine council members were in attendance; Lord Iliffe, Amery, Lord 
Altrincham, Beddington Behrens, Major Meade, Sir John Kennedy, Mr R, Peters, Capt 
Bullock and Mr G, Storey. Iliffe started the meeting by stating that he understood that many 
members had decided that they would not seek re-election to the council or remain members 
of the League.
329
 Derby and Milne had decided to step down due to ill health and old age and 
Willingdon had died in 1941. Then Iliffe invited Amery to set out the League’s strategy 
toward the new Labour Government. Amery replied that there was no indication of the 
Government’s attitude toward compulsory military service; however, he stated that the 
regular army required ‘National support’ which he thought could be fostered by the League. 
He thought that any decision about the League’s future should be delayed until the 
Government announced its policy. Altrincham agreed with Amery but wanted the League to 
gain the endorsement of a ‘leading soldier of the war’ to give it gravitas; he suggested Field 
Marshals Montgomery and Alexander. Beddington-Behrens pointed out that since its 
inception the League’s policy had been to bring in ‘prominent soldiers’ to give advice and 
gravitas. Iliffe also wanted a re-organisation of the League so it would ‘function more 
efficiently’ in the future. However, Amery wanted no action taken until the Government 
policy had been ascertained. Altrincham also mentioned whether the League might consider 
in the future co-operating more closely with the Navy League and Air League or even 
amalgamation.
330
 Amery dismissed this, stating that he thought co-operation was acceptable 
but ‘not necessarily one League’. Beddington-Behrens said that the League could usefully 
function for the time being by sending questions to Members of Parliament on service pay 
and pensions. Amery said that any possibility of forming a inter service League should be 
considered and that Field Marshal Montgomery should be approached before another 
organisation similar to League was created which he might endorse. The League had £4, 775 
(£166, 475 amount today) in war bonds and assets but had liabilities of £1000 (34,860) which 
had been accrued in 1939 by the Citizen Service League. However, the League was not 
receiving subscriptions from members. If the League was wound up then its assets had to be 
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transferred to ‘any other organisation having similar objects’.331 Amery then broke the 
meeting up.  
 
At this time Amery was under intense personal pressure because his eldest son John Amery 
was in custody on a charge of high treason. John Amery had been interned in France in 1940 
but had willingly made propaganda broadcasts for the Vichy regime, the Germans and the 
Italians during the war.
332
 Over the coming months Amery attempted to get his son to plead 
guilty on the grounds of diminished responsibilities. On 28 November John Amery went on 
trial at the Old Bailey, however,  John Amery chose to plead guilty and was convicted of high 
treason sentenced to death within in eight minutes. On 19 December John Amery was 
executed  at Wandsworth Prison. Amery responded to his death by writing a pamphlet entitled 
John Amery an Explanation which he circulated to all his friends. After 1945 he devoted 
much of his time attacking the Anglo- American Loan and the imposition of the Bretton 
Woods agreements because he argued that these would sweep away imperial preference and 
the Ottawa agreements and allow American domination of international trade and the 
Commonwealth. In 1945 Amery was offered a peerage but turned it down so Julian Amery 
could pursue a career in politics. The League would remain dormant for eighteen months. 
During this period the Cold War would intensify and Britain would find itself dealing with 
financial ruin and increasing Soviet intransigence. The main problem facing the Army 
between 1945 and 1946 was dealing with demobilisation while ensuring that Britain’s many 
overseas commitments were fulfilled.   
 
On 6 November 1946 Clement Attlee, The Prime Minister, announced that the Government 
was going to introduce peacetime conscription to bridge the gap between war and peace 
establishments of the armed forces.
333
 Attlee took the unusual step of announcing the 
Government’s intention of introducing peacetime conscription the week before the King’s 
speech to Trade Union Leaders and Labour MPs and activists at a political conference to 
prepare the most ardent opponents of conscription in his own party and the Unions for the 
Government’s decision. Attlee was very keen to point out that the adoption of the scheme was 
not going to be a ‘permanent feature of our national life’.334 However, Ball states that Attlee 
had assured Field Marshal Sir Alanbrooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), in 
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February 1946 that conscription would be permanent.
335
 Between October 1945 and January 
1946 the Joint Planning Staff (JPS), on behalf of the Chiefs of Staff (COS), had undertaken an 
extensive review of possible commitments and preparations necessary for another large 
conflict.
336
 This was carried out in conjunction with the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) 
who provided an assessment of Soviet and American intentions and possible Soviet force 
dispositions in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. This first round of post-war planning 
emphasised the fact that in the first five years of the peace there would be large numbers of 
trained reservists left over from the war which would support the mobilisation phase of 
another major war, unlike in the last war when Britain had very few reservists. The JPS 
proposed that the Armed Forces should have a peacetime strength in 1947 of 1,440,000 in a 
state of heightened readiness, but they also stated that the probability of war was unlikely 
before 1951. Attlee replied that due to economic considerations and the fact that war was 
doubtful the COS should significantly reduce their estimates.
337
 This is how the revised figure 
of 1,100,000 appeared in Cmd 6743 in February 1946. If the COS plans had been accepted 
then the Government would have been forced to introduce a three year period of National 
Service to cover the manpower requirement for the projected force levels. The Government 
wanted the length of service to be restricted to eighteen months which is what it was 
introduced at. On 12 November 1946 Attlee stated publicly that conscription was necessary 
because of ‘rapid developments in modern warfare would rob this country of that breathing 
space - measured in years rather than in months - by virtue of which alone in the past two 
great wars it has been  able to build up its warlike strength and overcome its enemies’.338  
 
However, on 7 May 1947, after a backbench revolt during the passage of the Bill through 
Parliament, the Government reduced the length of service to one year.
339
  Michael Foot 
argued that the Government’s decision had been a ‘great victory for parliamentary 
democracy’.340 But the Labour left wingers would have a short- lived victory because 
international events would increasingly compel the Government to increase the length of 
service. On 17 June 1947 Amery wrote to Lord Iliffe setting out his fears for the post-war 
Army and the need to lobby for better organisation of, and welfare provisions for, the regular 
Army, now that the ‘issue of conscription’ had been settled.341 Amery also stated that the 
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present government had ‘not’ come to any kind of lasting conclusions regarding the Army. 
However, he had been in contact with Viscount Alanbrooke, who had recently handed over 
the post of Chief of the Imperial General Staff (C.I.G.S.) to Field Marshal Montgomery, 
whom Amery thought was not focussed on the problems facing the Army at this point, about 
using the Army League as a powerful public sounding board for serious issues confronting 
the Army. On 18 June Iliffe wrote to Amery saying that they should hold a meeting to decide 
whether continue the League and inform the council of their decision.
342
 On 19 June Amery 
wrote back to Iliffe stating that he considered the time was now right to disband the Citizen 
Service League.
343
 Amery thought that even though the Act was only binding for five years 
conscription would become permanent feature of post war society. Amery suggested to Iliffe 
that the League should look at organisational questions facing the whole of the military 
system and the welfare of the Regular Army. Amery also had concerns that the Regular Army 
would be ‘neglected’ by the Government. Amery’s decision was to continue the League but 
wait and see in which direction Government policy was going.  
 
The question of pay and conditions of service in the Regular Army had been a significant 
issue during the debates concerning introduction of conscription. On 12 November 1946, 
during the debate on the King’s Speech in which the peacetime National Service Bill was 
introduced, Lord Holden, a Labour peer, added that regular recruitment to the armed forces 
had been poor since the war because: ‘psychologically young people are less inclined after six 
years of total war to join the armed forces and that rising employment and social equality has 
dissipated traditional negative social inducements such as poverty, hunger and unemployment 
as a compelling factor in men joining the armed forces’.344 However, Bond states that in the 
1920s and in the 1930s, when there was high unemployment, the Army still struggled to 
recruit enough men to its ranks due to its negative reputation.
345
 Many commentators thought 
that the Welfare State would act as a break on recruitment to the armed forces. Conversely, 
the Minister of Defence, Emmanuel Shinwell, stated publicly in 1947 ‘the public does not 
seem to realise that the Army for the most part, from rank and file to the officers, are living in 
quarters which civilians would not be prepared to accept’.346 This comment is very revealing 
because one of the most powerful domestic issues of the early post-war era was the chronic 
shortage of housing and the generally dilapidated state of property. On 18 September 1948, 
Woodrow Wyatt, a Labour MP, set out in the popular magazine Picture Post what he thought 
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was wrong with the Army: ‘low pay and poor conditions of service’.347 Another problem was 
that there were high levels of employment in the late 1940s which made it difficult to attract 
recruits or retain personnel.
348
 The Government could not compete with the higher wages on 
offer in civilian life. This was compounded by the fact that providing national service 
manpower was expensive. However, the overriding problems were a lack of resources and 
persistent overseas commitments which required considerable manpower resources.  
 
On 3
 
July 1947 the League held a general meeting to decide its future. Amery announced that 
the Army League would absorb the Citizens Service League stating with some pragmatism 
‘that now that conscription is part of the law of the land, it is unnecessary to revive The 
Citizens Service League’.349 However, Amery was more circumspect when he argued that the 
government did not realise that a ‘considerable standing Army was necessary’ as well as a 
‘conscript Army which could not be used overseas’. Leo Amery perceived that national 
service was becoming a catalyst for a weakened two-tier Army, neither being sufficient for its 
allotted tasks. However, at this point the Army League had become little more than an 
informal discussion group with a greatly reduced membership, whose pre-war aims had 
clearly been achieved.  There were only four other members present including Iliffe at this 
meeting. Amery said he would try and get Alan Brooke interested in the League and 
suggested that be offered the post of President. Amery also decided the future direction of the 
League needed careful consideration. However, on 1 August Amery wrote to Iliffe stating that 
Alanbrooke had declined his offer to become involved in the League. Iliffe stated that it might 
be more practicable to give the remaining funds to Army Cadet Movement and start the Army 
League from scratch in a few years time.
350
 However, on 31 December the League held its 
Ordinary General Meeting which agreed that the League should continue.
351
  
 
On 7 January 1948 the League Council Committee held a meeting to discuss what form the 
League’s activities would take in the future.352 Amery thought there was enough ‘uncertainty 
of outlook’ that the League should adopt a watching brief. Iliffe offered to have his 
employees carryout all secretarial work which was accepted. Amery also decided to give 
£500 to the Army Cadets from the League. But, League activity subsided again. However, 
during 1948 the international situation began to deteriorate further. In March Britain formed 
                                                 
347
 Woodrow Wyatt ‘What’s Wrong with the Army’ in Picture Post Vol,40. No,12. September 1948,  
p26.  
348
 Addison, P. (1995) pp173-174.  
349
 AMEL 1/7/81, Minutes of the Army League Committee meeting, 3 July 1947.  
350
 AMEL 1/7/82, Letter from Iliffe to Amery, 1 August 1947. 
351
 AMEL 1/7/82, Annual General Meeting and Report of the Management Council, 31 December 
1947.  
352
 AMEL 1/7/82, League Council Meeting, 7 January 1948.  
 112 
the Brussels Pact with France and the Benelux countries. At the end of June the Soviets began 
blockading Berlin. In September 1948 at the height of Berlin air blockade Churchill, the 
leader of Opposition, received a paper from a COS Committee, written by Montgomery, on 
the state of the Army. This paper stated that Army morale in the UK was low due to 
inadequate allowances, particularly for married personnel, poor accommodation and scarcity 
of married quarters, constant movement of personnel due to short service conscripts and a 
shortage of regular personnel and the low quality of those who re-enlisted.
353
 It is interesting 
that Churchill received a ‘top secret’ report on the state of the army at a time when the Soviets 
were tightening their grip on Berlin and the regular army was stretched to the limit abroad, 
when  there was a growing consensus among the COS that more resources were needed to 
bolster the defence effort. In September 1948 the Government admitted that more resources 
were needed for defence and that much of the Armed Force’s equipment was becoming 
obsolete and that wartime stocks were nearly exhausted.
354
 Gorst contends that defence 
planning undertaken by the COS between 1946 and 1948 was flawed because it only paid ‘lip 
service’ to the realities of the economic situation.355 
 
Because of the Blockade, on 23 September 1948 demobilisation of National Servicemen was 
delayed by three months to provide extra manpower. On 1 December 1948 the Government 
was forced to increase the length of National Service from 12 months to 18 months as it 
became clear that the international situation would remain uncertain.
356
 At the end of 1948 
more British troops were being committed to Malaya to deal with communist insurgents. 
Recruitment to the Regular Army was also sluggish which was placing pressure on regular 
units which were increasingly being filled with conscripts. The increase in the length of 
service allowed conscripts to be deployed to units in the Middle East and Africa. On 3 
December 1948 Amery had lunch with General Slim the CIGS where he gave him a 
memorandum entitled ‘Army Requirements’.357 Army requirements set out what Amery 
considered to be the Army’s peacetime role and what its strategic dispositions should be at the 
start of the next war. Much of the document contained ideas that Amery had been arguing for 
since 1903; troops based at vital strategic points across the globe; the creation of a strategic 
reserve; a large static home defence army; a highly mobile small professional force for 
overseas operations; the creation of a long service overseas Army; greater technical training 
of service personnel. However, he believed that Britain should reduce the number of national 
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service men serving in Germany which should become a regular army commitment with 
weaker units. He also argued that the Government needed to raise a large foreign legion made 
up of Poles and Germans for service in the Middle East. He also argued that a large air 
transportable force be created which could be used for imperial emergencies. On 22 
December Slim wrote back stating that the WO had considered his proposals but pointed out 
that the cold commitments demanded a larger army than could be raised by voluntary 
recruitment which is why units in Germany contained large numbers of national 
servicemen.
358
 Slim agreed that a air transportable force was a good idea but noted that 
financial constraints made it difficult to realise this aspiration in peacetime. He said that the 
question of a foreign legion was always being considered but he observed that Gurkha units 
already constituted a foreign legion. However, Amery did not mention pay and living 
conditions of the regular Army. He had moved on familiar ground the promotion of an 
imperial strategic policy and the creation of an army able to meet Britain’s overseas 
commitments.   
 
Amery was perceptive enough to realise that conscription was a doubled-edged sword 
because it guaranteed a source of temporary manpower for the Armed Forces but would it 
attract enough men to make the regular forces viable once their period of compulsory 
enlistment had expired? The Government were well aware of this problem but they were 
constrained by the fact that they needed to maintain considerable overseas commitments 
which meant having large amounts of manpower. The introduction of conscription was a 
Pyrrhic victory for advocates of conscription like Amery because it was destabilising the 
Regular Army. In early December 1948 Leo Amery circulated ‘Army Requirements’ to 
League members.
359
 On 16 December 1948, Lord Iliffe wrote to Amery stating, ‘I am glad we 
did not entirely wind up the Army League’, because the ‘present mismanagement of Army 
affairs’ was a cause for concern.360 After this Amery began writing to potential new League 
members. Amery asked General Sir Giffard Martel, who had been commander of the Royal 
Armoured Corps from 1940-1942 and then head of the military mission to the Soviet Union 
from 1943-1944 before retiring from the Army in 1945, if he would consider joining the 
League. In August 1947 Martel stated in an address to the Royal United Services Institute 
(RUSI) that conscription would adversely affect voluntary recruitment to the regular Army 
and the Territorial Army.
361
 He also contended that Britain was unlikely to fight another 
‘protracted’ conflict in the nuclear age and therefore no longer required a large reserve. 
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Martel hypothesized that British forces would be involved in the immediate  post-war period 
in ‘policing duties’ more suited to a regular Army, and that many of the UK’s ‘imperial 
policing duties’ would be taken over by a ‘international body’ in the future. This latter 
consideration was the widely-held belief that the UN would eventually provide the frame-
work for a collective security force to enforce international law. In the 1920s and 1930s 
Martel had been advocate of armoured warfare and the tank and was an unsuccessful 
Conservative candidate at the 1945 general election. Much of his writing on defence issues 
contained considerable amounts of anti-communist rhetoric.  
 
In April 1949, Martel wrote a detailed briefing paper for Winston Churchill on the pros-and 
cons of peacetime conscription and the general direction of post-war defence. He stated ‘we 
need a highly efficient regular army of 200-250 thousand men, which would provide our 
overseas garrisons, four divisions with attached troops for use in Germany or elsewhere’.362 
Martel further argued ‘even with the present unattractive pay and conditions we already have 
174 thousand regulars. But these men, instead of being concentrated in effective units, are 
being used to train an army of 430 thousand men at annual cost of £304 million’. Martel’s 
solution was to abolish National Service and use the money then being spent on conscription 
to provide better pay and conditions for the regular army, which would attract more recruits 
and achieve his proposed force of 250,000. The figure of between 200,000 and 250,000 
equates to the size of the regular army before the war. Martel also alluded to Liddell Hart as 
being ‘like minded’ on the subject of conscription and noted that if conscription was not 
quickly dispensed with it would become increasingly difficult to dislodge. As Martel pointed 
out, the government had four million reservists with vast military experience who could be 
mobilized until the mid-1950s ‘when it would not be of much value’. Martel wanted a highly 
trained, well equipped and mobile Regular Army backed by a powerful air force. This echoed 
Amery’s advocacy in the mid-1930s of a strong air and sea defence capability backed by a 
mobile imperial field force.   
 
On 10 January 1949 Martell wrote to Amery, a lifelong advocate of conscription, stating that 
there was ‘very little difference between our views’.363 Martell thought that the Soviet Union 
would not be able to start a major war until the mid 1950s. He, also, noted that financial 
constraints made it difficult to provide for a ‘proper regular army plus all the immense 
training establishments for national service men’. Martel argued that the Soviet Union would 
not be able to launch a major attack on Western Europe without considerable period of 
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warning for at least next few years. Martel also thought that technological developments 
would make large static military forces vulnerable and obsolete.  On 13 January Amery wrote 
back stating that he thought it imperative that there were sufficient reserve forces to guard 
factories, air fields, docks, transport and communication infrastructure from air-borne forces, 
sabotage and commando raids.
364
 Amery also reflected that the wartime reservists experience 
was being superseded by new technology and their ‘lack of individual preparedness’. He 
argued that a compulsory system kept the reserve viable and made the Territorial Army a 
significant military force. However, Martel declined Amery’s offer to join the League on the 
grounds that he was too busy.  
 
However, Amery was also looking for new members in the House of Commons because most 
of the old council members who had been MPs were now in the House of Lords or had lost 
their seats. This meant finding recruits who could use the Commons chamber as a pulpit to 
publicize League’s views. On 7 February Amery wrote to the Conservative MP Brigadier 
Prior-Palmer, a former professional soldier, who had been attacking the Government policy 
on regular recruitment in the House of Commons.
365
 On 1 December 1948 during the National 
Service Amendment Bill Prior-Palmer had made a powerful speech which wanted the 
Government to concentrate more resources on making sure that the regular army retained its 
personnel by improving pay and conditions of service.
366
 He was also concerned that the 
identity and training of the regular was being eroded by national service. Amery sent Prior-
Palmer notes and a memorandum on army recruitment and information about League and told 
him he supported his stance on recruitment. On 9 February Prior-Palmer thanked Amery for 
his information and support and said he would attend meetings if he was able to find the 
time.
367
 On 7
 March 1949, Iliffe wrote to Amery stating ‘the mess which the government have 
made of recruiting for the regular Army inclines me to think that it might be really worth 
restarting the Army League, on original lines..’.368 At this point Amery wrote to Beddington-
Behrens telling him that he decided to formally re-launch the League because of the ‘regular 
recruiting mess’.369 Although, Amery had already began recruiting new members and was 
busy formulating a policy for the League. However, it is clear that, although the League was 
reconstituting in what amounted to a defence of the Regular Army, it was positioning itself to 
attack Labour’s ‘mismanagement’ of the Army. This had a clear party political bias which 
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was missing from the pre-war approach of the League which was careful not to attack the 
Government directly.  
The Conservative Party published a pamphlet in December 1948 which accused the 
Government of being divided on the issue of conscription and weak because they had reduced 
the length of service to a year and then back to eighteen months.
370
 If there was any consensus 
regarding defence issues it was skin deep. However, Bartlett argues that Attlee’s government 
‘emerges with much credit’ for its handling of defence matters between 1945 and 1948.371 By 
December 1950 Brigadier John Faviell defence adviser to the Conservative Party Central 
Office (CPCO) was a member of the League Council. Faviell served in First World War as a 
Gunnery officer; in Ireland during the troubles in the early 1920s and Palestine in the 1930s 
were he won the Military Cross. During the Second World War he served with the 51
st
 
Highland Division. After the war he served as secretary to the Army Board at the WO. He 
retired from the Army in 1950. Throughout the 1950s Faviell kept records of League 
meetings and discussion papers which were kept by the Conservative Research Department 
(CRD). Faviell was also involved in the production of League material. Among Faviell papers 
at the CRD is a briefing paper from the Army Council concerning the state of the Army in 
1949.
372
 The paper noted that the condition of the regular army gave cause for concern. There 
was a perception that national service would continue to deteriorate the regular army to point 
that it would cease to an effective force. The remedy was increased pay and conditions of 
service and a ‘drastic reduction of national service’ which would be necessary to fund the 
wealth increases. Faviell interest in the League probably stemmed from his desire to use it to 
push for increases in pay and conditions of service to improve recruitment to the regular 
army.   
 
On 14 March Amery wrote to the Labour MP Reginald Paget, later Baron Paget of 
Northampton, stating that he had for sometime followed his speeches on the problem of the 
Army.
373
 The Eton- and Cambridge- educated Paget was considered to be on the right of the 
Labour Party. He was a noted barrister and had entered Parliament in 1945. Amery broke the 
ice by saying ‘This is not a Party question, for whatever views we may hold either about 
foreign policy or national expenditure, we must all want to have the best defence that our 
economic situation will allow’. Amery told Paget that he wanted to create a ‘voluntary career 
army’; however, he also informed him that national service should provide enough men with 
a ‘minimum of elementary military knowledge. The length of that period of training is a 
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matter of much less consequence than the organisation as a whole’. He also thought that ‘such 
training should not be confused with military service’. This is illuminating, because Amery, 
who had been an advocate of national service in peacetime for nearly fifty years, was 
concerned that conscription was being misused. On 16 March Paget replied to Amery saying 
that he was ‘in entire agreement with your appreciation of the present situation’.374 Paget also 
agreed to attend a League meeting. This gave Amery the possibility of crossbench 
participation which had been missing from the pre-war League. But, Paget was hardly 
representative of the Labour Party given his background and negative assessment of 
Government policy.  
 
Amery also targeted the Conservative MP Brigadier Anthony Head. The Eton, and Royal 
Military College Sandhurst, educated Head joined the army in the 1920s and served in the 
cavalry. During the Second World War Head a distinguished career both as a field and staff 
officer. He was present at all of the major allied conferences of the war. He entered 
Parliament in 1945. Head soon gained a reputation as an expert on defence matters and was 
considered to be one of the rising stars of the Conservative Party. On 14 March Amery wrote 
to Head stating that he thought the Government policy on recruiting for the regular army was 
failure because ‘they cannot make up their minds regarding universal training as a permanent 
feature in our military scheme’.375 He also attacked the Cardwell system ‘with its seven years 
of service that has wreaked the Regular Army from a recruiting point of view, ever since I 
have known it’. Amery acknowledged the need for having a large reserve for home defence 
and ‘later for occupying enemy territory’ but thought that national service should not debase 
the regular army. Amery concluded that national service should be regarded as a ‘training 
school’. This idea was based on the NSL model of summer camp plus yearly refresher 
training. Amery, as usual, sent a memorandum and information on the League. Head also 
arranged to attend a League meeting. He also approached Brigadier Toby Low, the 
Conservative MP for Blackpool North. Low trained as a Barrister before the war and had also 
been a member of the Territorial Army. During the war he served in Greece, North Africa and 
Italy. By 1945 he was one of the youngest brigadiers in the Army. In 1945 he was serving as a 
staff officer with 5 Corps in Austria when he supervised the forcible repatriation of Cossack 
prisoners of war to Soviet forces; the Cossacks were summarily shot on their arrival in the 
Soviet Zone of occupation. This would later come back to haunt Low when he was accused of 
being war criminal by Count Nikolai Tolstoy and Nigel Watts in 1989.
376
 Low won the case 
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but his reputation was tarnished by the affair. After 1946 Low was the political correspondent 
for the Army Quarterly and compiled ‘The Army From Parliament’ column.377 Low attended 
several League meetings at the end of 1950 and in early 1951 before joining Churchill’s 
Government as a junior minister in October 1951.  
 
Another brief member was Major General Sir Ian Jacob. Jacob was commissioned into the 
Royal Engineers in 1918 and subsequently served in India and Egypt between the wars. In 
1938 he was appointed military assistant secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defence at 
the WO. In 1939 he was promoted and became assistant military secretary to the War 
Cabinet. During the war he worked closely with Churchill the Minister of Defence (and Prime 
Minister) as one of military secretaries. In 1946 he retired from the Army and joined the BBC 
as head of overseas broadcasting. Like Low he attended meetings of the League at the end of 
1950 and in early 1951 but he then joined Churchill’s new Government in October 1951 as 
chief staff officer and deputy military secretary to the Cabinet. Another part-time member 
was Professor Solly Zuckerman who attended several League meetings over the years. 
Zuckerman was a renowned scientist who specialised in anatomy. However, in 1939 
Zuckerman began researching the effects blast damage on human beings. Zuckerman quickly 
became the leading expert on blast damage to humans and buildings. Zuckerman was also 
employed by the Cabinet to assess the effectiveness of Bomber Commands strategic offensive 
against Germany. Zuckerman also worked as scientific advisor to the Combined Operations 
Executive; he was responsible for calculating the level of naval and air bombardment needed 
to knock out shore defences. After the war Zuckerman chaired or was a member of many 
eminent Whitehall scientific committees in the 1950s and 1960s.  
 
Lieutenant General Sir Fredrick Morgan also contributed to the League in 1950. Morgan was 
commissioned into Royal Field Artillery in 1913 and joined the Lahore divisional Artillery of 
the Indian Army. He served on the Western front during the Great War before returning to 
India in 1919. He would serve in India until 1935. Between 1935 and 1938 he was a staff 
officer at the WO. In 1940 Morgan commanded the support group of 1
st
 Armoured Division 
of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) during the fighting in Northern France. Between 
1940 and 1943 Morgan held a number of commands. However, in 1943 he was appointed 
chief of staff to the supreme allied commander (COSSAC). In this capacity he would be 
intimately involved in the planning for the invasion of North West Europe. In 1944 he was 
appointed deputy chief of staff at Eisenhower's headquarters (SHAEF). In 1945 Morgan 
became chief of operations in Germany to the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation 
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Administration (UNRRA). In 1946 Morgan was forced to resign after claiming that UNRRA 
operations were being manipulated by ‘sinister’ Soviet and Jewish organisations. In October 
1951 Morgan became controller of Atomic Energy and discontinued his association with the 
League.   
 
It is difficult to gauge the impact of these members on the League and activities, because 
Julian Amery, the League’s secretary, kept very selective records of the League’s meetings 
which often amounted to heavily annotated summations of events.
378
 In 1956 when Julian 
Amery handed over to brigadier Vernham as secretary of the League he told him not to record 
all discussions of League meetings for ‘political’ reasons but keep the records brief.379 
However, the papers of the study group are more extensive and contain discussions on the 
preparation of articles and reports. Another problem concerning post –war membership was 
that many members left to take up appointments in the Government or to run official bodies 
which precluded them from being members of an unofficial body. Between 1949 and 1950 
Leo Amery and other League members managed to rebuild the League but the 1951 general 
election decimated the League because nearly all the members of the League were associated 
with Conservative party which formed a new Government in October and many members left 
to join the new Government. However, during 1949 as Amery rebuilt the League the 
international situation began to dictate what the direction the League’s studies would take in 
coming years. On 4 April 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was created 
which did much to stabilise the military situation in Europe.
380
 However, on 29 August the 
Soviet Union detonated its first atomic bomb which shattered the American nuclear 
monopoly. This meant that the Western allies would have to reconsider their conventional 
forces levels. Then on 1 October Mao Zedong proclaimed the formation of the People’s 
Republic of China after defeating the Nationalists forces Chiang Kai-shek. It seemed to all 
intense purposes that the West was now facing a monolithic threat which was being directed 
from Moscow.       
 
In July 1949 Amery began writing to the Minister of War, Emmanuel Shinwell, on the Army 
recruitment situation.
381
 Amery told Shinwell that national service should separated from the 
Regular Army; this would greatly reduce the amount of time that the Regular Army was 
spending on training national servicemen. Amery thought that national service should be 
reduced to one year and undertaken within the Territorial Army at local drill halls or military 
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bases. On 28 July Shinwell replied that he wished that national service could be undertaken 
within the Territorial Army but the ‘difficulty is that our worldwide commitments at the 
present time call for a degree of full time national service’. 382 As Shinwell pointed out 
overseas commitments made it impossible for the government to introduce such a policy. 
Similarly, the Army had an establishment of 345,000 men in March 1949 who were hard 
pressed to carry out all the various commitments required of it. The pre-war Army had been 
hard pressed to recruit and maintain a army of 210,000. After 1946 the volatile international 
situation compounded the problem and became a constant drain on resources, manpower and 
planning. On 15 August Amery wrote to Shinwell suggesting that he look at Arnold Forster’s 
scheme two-tier Army system. Amery still believed that the Army should be divided between 
a long service Regular Army and a short service Home Army which could be supplemented 
by the Territorial Army fed by national service.
383
 However, Amery’s ideas were unrealistic 
because the international situation and British imperial commitments were too widespread to 
be fulfilled by voluntary recruitment alone. By the end of 1949 the League was slowly being 
reactivated and rebuilt by Amery. However, this gained momentum in 1950 when Amery 
asked his son Julian Amery to join the League as acting secretary.  
 
The New League  
 
 
Julian was born in 1919 and educated at Eton and Balliol College Oxford. Like his father he 
was small and studious. Whilst at Oxford he was a member of the Oxford Union and in 1939 
participated in a debate with Liddell Hart (against) over the issue of introducing peacetime 
conscription due to the international situation.
384
 Julian Amery was the younger son of Leo 
Amery. During the Second World War Julian had served in the Balkans as part of the military 
mission to the Royalist forces of General Mihailovic in Yugoslavia.  In 1945 he decided that 
he wanted to become a writer before embarking on a political career. In 1946 he was involved 
in a Secret Service operation to infiltrate agents into Albania; however, all the agents were 
captured on arrival because the mission had been compromised by Soviet intelligence. In 
1948 he published his wartime exploits in Sons of the Eagle. On 23 February 1950 Amery 
entered Parliament after winning the seat of Preston North (at the second attempt, after being 
unsuccessful in 1945) at the general election; also that year he married Catherine Macmillan, 
youngest daughter of Harold Macmillan. Julian Amery, like his father, was a committed 
imperialist and was instrumental in 1954 in the formation of the Suez Group of Conservative 
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MPs who were opposed to Eden’s intention of withdrawing from the Canal Zone; he was 
additionally secretary of the group.
385
 He also a dedicated supporter of the European 
Economic Community (EEC) and worked closely with Beddington-Behrens in the European 
Movement. When Harold Macmillan became Prime Minister in January 1957 he became 
Under Secretary of State for War and then in November 1958 he was made Under Secretary 
of State for the Colonies. In 1960 he was given the post of Secretary of State for Air and in 
1962 Minister for Aviation. He never served in the Cabinet. At the 1966 general election he 
lost his Preston seat but in 1969 he won a by election and was elected as the MP for Brighton 
Pavilion. After the 1970 general election Edward Heath, the Prime Minister, appointed him 
Minister of State for Public Buildings and Works after a few months he became Housing 
Minister. In 1972 he moved to the Foreign Office as Minister of State which was his last 
government post. In 1974 the Conservatives lost the general election.  In 1975 Heath was 
replaced by Margaret Thatcher as leader of the Conservatives. In 1979 when Thatcher became 
Prime Minister she overlooked Amery who remained a back bencher until 1992 when he 
retired from the Commons. In 1992 he created a life peer as Lord Amery of Lustleigh.  
Onslow described Julian Amery as a political operator ‘par excellence’, who sought all 
‘avenues to achieve his political agenda’.386 He died in September 1996 at 112 Eaton Square.  
 
In 1950 the Army League Council consisted of the following: Major Edward Beddington 
Behrens, Field Marshal Lord Chetwode, Lord Altrincham, Robert Peters, Sir Henry Price, 
Lord Iliffe and Leo Amery.
387
 However, Chetwode died on 6 July 1950.  Another notable 
recruit in 1950 was Basil Liddell Hart who would provide much of the League’s intellectual 
stimulus over the coming years. Although Liddell Hart been rejected in 1937 by the League 
Council, he was asked by Amery to become a member. Basil Liddell Hart was one of 
Britain’s foremost contemporary military thinkers and historians until his death in 1970. 
Liddell Hart was born in Paris in 1895. His father was the chaplain to the Methodist church in 
Paris. Liddell Hart was educated at number of schools and in May 1914 passed the entrance 
examination for Corpus Christi College Cambridge to read history. However, at the start of 
the First World War Liddell Hart was commissioned into the King’s Own Yorkshire 
Regiment and served in France in the trenches.
388
 He began writing his first military articles 
in 1918 and was given a regular commission in 1921. However, in 1923 he was invalided out 
due to poor health, although he was retained on half-pay until 1927. In the period immediately 
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after the war he produced several papers on tactical experience gained in the war, all of which 
enhanced his reputation as a military thinker within the Army. After 1923 he moved into 
journalism, initially as a sports correspondent. In 1925 he became the military correspondent 
for the Daily Telegraph. By the late 1920s his work as a military writer was being 
internationally recognised. At this time his theories concerning ‘indirect approach’ were 
formulated. During this period he was a devotee and friend of Major General JFC Fuller who 
was considered the foremost exponent on the theory of mechanized warfare.
389
 Fuller would 
be asked to contribute to the League and became a member of the study group in 1950.  
 
During the mid-1930s, Liddell Hart argued against the use of the mass conscripted army 
(nation in arms) in favour of highly-trained flexible mechanized armoured and infantry 
forces.
390
 There were two main reasons for this theory. First, Liddell Hart argued that the 
great loss of life in the First World War would have been avoided, at least for Britain, if the 
British government had not been drawn into the attritional nature of modern warfare by 
sending the bulk of its manpower strength to Europe. Liddell Hart based this assumption on a 
critical reappraisal of Clausewitz’s theory of absolute warfare and its corollary the ‘nation in 
arms’.391 Liddell Hart argued that the UK should remain aloof from large-scale continental 
commitments. But he did argue that the use of sea power to enforce a blockade and provide 
defence for the UK was still relevant in the 1930s. Additionally, he stated that naval power 
allowed the use of amphibious forces for strategic purposes to carry the fight to the enemy’s 
interior: indirect approach. Further Britain should utilise its Empire, industry and commerce 
in support of, or as Liddell Hart stated, ‘subsidizing’, Britain’s allies.392 In other words a 
return to the ‘classic’ British way of fighting a continental war with a ‘peripheral strategy’ 
utilising the mobility and surprise of naval power to project land forces and material support 
for allies. By the mid- 1930 he advocated a ‘limited liability’, consisting of air and naval 
forces with a land commitment of two modern armoured divisions for rapid deployment as 
required for operations on the continent in support of Britain’s European allies. This approach 
had been supported by Amery in the mid 1930s.  
 
Strachan argues that Liddell Hart’s perceptions in the 1920s and 1930s were ‘didactic’, 
designed to provoke discussion by utilising the irrefutable historical evidence of Britain’s 
maritime domination since the eighteenth century, as  a device to substantiate  his 
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‘prescriptive’ for the future.393 The championing of the conventional British strategic policy 
by traditionalists became intertwined with an increasing awareness, also a historical fact 
which Liddell Hart largely ignored, that Britain’s peripheral strategy was dominated by its 
reliance on an alliance with a European military power with considerable land-based forces. 
In 1935 Liddell Hart became the military correspondent for The Times and an unofficial 
advisor to Duff Cooper and then Hore-Belisha many of his modernising ideas on the WO 
were instigated by the latter.
394
 This relationship was ended in 1938 because Liddell Hart’s 
outspoken attitude and previous attacks on the military establishment created powerful 
enemies who conspired to remove his ‘unofficial’ influence on an elected official. During the 
period of appeasement Liddell Hart wrote two books, Europe in Arms (1937) and The 
Defence of Britain (1939), which advocated a policy of ‘limited liability’, constraining 
military commitments to air and naval forces, supported by two first-rate armoured divisions. 
In the late 1930s Liddell Hart undertook a series of speaking engagements warning of the 
dangers of National Socialism and Fascism.
395
 However, he opposed appeasement and the 
possibility of war in equal measure which somewhat diminished the perspicacity of his anti 
fascist rhetoric. Liddell Hart later stated that he had expressed considerable reservations about 
Chamberlain’s security policy and was an ardent opponent of appeasement.396 However, 
Mearsheimer refutes this, arguing that in 1939 Liddell Hart ‘downplayed’ the threat posed by 
Hitler and advocated more appeasement when it became apparent the Britain might go to war 
with Germany.
397
 Mearsheimer notes that Liddell hart was unable to articulate a integrated 
grand strategy which maintained a balance of power on the Continent without making a major 
military commitment.  
 
This period corresponded with major health problems (a heart attack in June 1939), which 
effectively ended his association with the pro-appeasement The Times although his 
relationship with the paper had been deteriorating since Liddell Hart had been publicly 
campaigning against the dangers of Fascism and appeasement. During the Second World War 
he was criticised for having a defeatist attitude, due to his advocacy of a defensive strategy 
based on an ‘armed truce’ and collective security. 398 Liddell Hart’s ideas were denounced for 
being ineffectual and misguided given the geo-political situation after 1940 in the West and 
after 1942 in the Far East. Liddell Hart stance was further weakened by the realisation of the 
true barbaric nature of National Socialist Germany and Japanese militarism. This and his 
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rather erroneous assumption made in 1943 that it was only a ‘possibility’ that the allies could 
defeat the Axis powers, effectively left him isolated and by 1945 without an outlet for his 
work.
399
 However, his doctrine of an armed truce and defensive collective security were more 
suited to the realities of the emergent Cold War. After 1946 his polemics about the use and 
threat of atomic weapons in future conflicts entered into his published articles and books 
along with assessments of Soviet military strength and operational doctrine. He was also a 
supporter of the 100 who campaigned against nuclear weapons and was sceptical about their 
value as a credible deterrent. In 1945 he began having a series of interviews with captured 
German generals who were imprisoned near his home in the Lake District. In 1948 he 
published The German Generals Talk which asserted that the generals had been merely 
professionals doing their duty for Germany; Liddell Hart argued that the megalomaniac Hitler 
had deceived and manipulated them and they had been ignorant of the true extent of  the Nazi 
states crimes. In 1951 he published The Other Side of the Hill which was an updated version 
of The German Generals Talk. In 1953 he published the Rommel Papers. During the early 
1950s Liddell hart campaigned on behalf of the German generals. Paget was Field Marshal 
Von Manstein’s British lawyer and published a book about his client in 1951.  In 1950 Liddell 
Hart wrote The Defence of the West which evaluated the impact of nuclear weapons on 
conventional defence and what resources the West required to defend itself against Soviet 
attack.  
 
By 1960 his reputation as a military thinker had been fully restored after fourteen years of 
rehabilitation. His political outlook has always been considered to be to the left in leaning and 
after 1945 he did support the Labour government of Clement Attlee, whom he advised on 
military matters. His relationship with the Conservative Party was cool, mainly due to his 
negative relationship with Churchill, whom he had criticised after 1940 for his management 
of the war effort and his repeated calls for a negotiated settlement.
400
 He did have links to 
Labour politicians in the 1950s, notably John Strachey
401
, former War Minister, and Denis 
Healey, a future Secretary of State for Defence and shadow spokesman on defence issues in 
the 1950s. Liddell Hart would annually holiday after Christmas at a Bournemouth hotel with 
Field Marshal Montgomery. He was a sole advocate of the rehabilitation of the reputation of 
the German General Staff in the late 1940s and early 1950s, and subsequently fostered links 
with many senior general officers in newly-emergent West Germany as a consequence. He 
argued publicly for NATO to adopt a policy of a flexible deterrent in the late 1950s and early 
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1960s.
402
 His ideas in the 1950s were wildly admired in Israel and by President Kennedy, who 
considered his book Deterrent or Defence as a major influence on the shaping of defence 
doctrine in Washington after 1960.
403
 Liddell Hart was knighted in 1966 by Harold Wilson’s 
government and died in 1970.  
 
Clearly, the Amery’s and Liddell Hart were at opposite ends of the spectrum in their views on 
conscription. But both were united in a belief that the Army by 1950
404
 was not suited to the 
task it was increasingly being called upon to carry out: namely counter-insurgency operations 
across the globe in defence of British interests and defending Western Europe from Soviet 
aggression. Liddell Hart argued in The Defence of the West, that conscription would be a 
drain on the regular armed forces and defence budgets because of the increased pay and 
resources needed to equip and maintain such a large force and that it would tie up 
considerable number of regulars in training these men, undermining their own efficiency and 
availability for operational use as a consequence. Mclnnes makes the observation that in 
1945, many sections of the Army were still governed by old concepts of small wars and 
imperial policing and as a consequence there was a desire to return to an all-regular force as 
soon as possible.
405
 There was more common ground concerning the size of Britain’s 
continental commitment, which was seen as being a limiting factor on the Army’s ability to 
carry out its traditional role as imperial policeman. Given that the two were in many respects 
poles apart, their collusion within the League can be construed as a clear indication of their 
perceptions regarding the gravity of the geo-political situation facing Britain and the 
perceived mess that the Army and overall direction of defence policy were in at the time.  In 
1949 and 1950 League initially began preparing to lobby on the subject of Regular Army 
recruitment and pay and conditions of service. After Julian Amery entered the Parliament he 
used the Commons as a platform to attack Government policy. However, the League was 
attempting to engage with WO and become its ‘unofficial’ appendage.  
 
On 28 March 1950 Julian Amery asked John Strachey, Minister of War, whether the 
Government had any plans to look again at ‘other sources’ of manpower, including the 
formation of a foreign legion, because of the ‘difficulties encountered’ in recruiting for the 
Regular Army.
406
 Clearly Julian Amery was aware that the WO had discussed the possibility 
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of using foreigners because Leo Amery had written to Slim in 1948 about recruiting Poles and 
other Eastern Europeans into a foreign legion and the latter had confirmed this. Julian Amery 
asked if the Government’s reticence was due to the fact that it did not wish to upset the 
‘susceptibilities’ of the Soviet Union; however, he pointed out that the international situation 
had deteriorated since  the Government had last looked at the situation which might 
necessitate a change of policy. Strachey replied that situation did not warrant a change in 
policy. Julian Amery’s appraisal of the size and organization of the Army was based on his 
perceptions of the geo-political realities of the Cold War and the military threat posed by the 
Soviet Union and Communism. Julian Amery became an uncompromising cold warrior and 
this remained his stance for many years to come.  In contrast Low used parliament to push the 
Government on improving housing, pay and conditions of service in Regular Army to 
increase recruitment.
407
 However, events in the Far East would further galvanise the League 
to increasingly study questions relating to strategic policy and not the welfare issues related to 
the Regular Army and the issue of recruitment.   
 
On June 25 1950 the Communist North Koreans crossed the 38
th
 parallel and attacked South 
Korea.
408
 In response Britain was quick to support the United Nations Security Council 
resolution tabled by the United States on June 27 to defend South Korea. The following day 
British naval forces were being deployed under American command in the Sea of Japan. At 
the start of the Korean War Slim, told the government it would be impractical to send national 
servicemen to Korea due to the current length of service.
409
 His solution was to call up 
reservists and offer national servicemen special engagements to cover the conflict to 
circumvent the length of service issue. This provided 500 officers and other ranks in addition 
to reservists to bring 29 Brigade (two infantry battalions) up to strength which was dispatched 
from the UK to the Far East in August 1950.
410
 There were British forces in Hong Kong 
(mainly regulars) and Malaya but the FO and CO both argued that these forces should not be 
weakened because of the threat posed by Chinese forces and Communist terrorists, although 
41 Royal Marine Commando was formed from personnel in Hong Kong and was attached to 
American forces in Korea. By November 1950 British forces included armoured and artillery 
units and 5 battalions of infantry.
411
 This force was later incorporated into the Commonwealth 
Division (including Canadian, Australian and an Indian Army medical unit which was the 
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second largest independent force deployed by the UN during the conflict after that of the 
United States.
412
 The Korean War was unlike most of Britain’s other post-war conflicts 
because it was a major limited war which placed considerable strain on the economy and saw 
the first wide-scale call up of reservists and a temporary moratorium on regular discharges 
from the Armed Forces. Darby argues that Korea effectively ended any debate that National 
Service was temporary or unnecessary, or that Britain could contemplate reductions in Cold 
War commitments and defence spending.
413
  
 
In response to the Korean War in August 1950 the Government announced that it was 
increasing conscription to 24 months. Both of these measures were supported by the 
Conservatives.
414
 This was not an unexpected move on the part of the Government because, 
since the invasion of South Korea in June, the newspapers had been stating that an increase in 
the length of national service was a foregone conclusion if national security was to be 
maintained in response to what The Times described as ‘wanton’ Communist intimidation. 
The increase in National Service, The Times argued, was ‘belated under the circumstances’.415 
The Conservative Research Office sent Churchill a briefing on the Government’s plan, 
asserting that the increase would in the short-term make no difference to military security in 
Europe, which relied heavily on the mobilization of reservists, but in the long-term would 
increase manpower available for training units releasing regular manpower for operational 
units abroad.
416
 In an attempt to appear magnanimous the government reduced part-time 
liability for conscripts in the reserve (which included annual two-week refresher training) 
from seven years to five and a half years. The government acknowledged that greater 
numbers of National Service men would now be able to serve in colonies and the Far East 
because transport difficulties such as passage time and disruption to the cohesion of units 
caused by the large turnover of transiting personnel would no longer be such an issue.
417
 The 
period of 24 months would remain until the last National Serviceman returned his kit to stores 
in 1963 and the armed forces reverted to being all regular. Also after August 1950 conscripts 
were more likely to serve in the colonies on active service. At the same time the Government 
increased the pay and conditions of service for regulars and re-enlistment and re-engagement 
bounties to boost recruitment and retention of conscripts. The increase in the length of 
national service netted an additional 55,000 men for the Army. On 1 April 1950 the regular 
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Army had strength of 184,000 men but recruitment to the regular army was falling again.
418
 
On 24 July Julian Amery wrote his first open letter to The Times stating that the Korean War 
had shown Communist world was at war with that the West and had been for some time and 
would be until they abandoned their bid for world domination.
419
 He also argued that all 
Western nations needed to act together against Soviet aggression in whatever form it took.   
 
On 12 September the Government announced that it was introducing a £3400 million 
rearmament programme over the following three years. The decision was made against the 
advice of the Treasury who were concerned about a balance of payments deficit of £600 
million and faltering economic recovery. The start of the Korean War increased commodity 
prices in world markets which adversely affected British trade and domestic consumption. 
The decision to introduce the rearmament programme increased defence spending to 10% of 
Gross National Product (GNP) from 6.5%. However, the rearmament programme required 
American economic assistance which was promised, but not guaranteed. The scale of the 
rearmament programme was unprecedented and reflected the growing sense that a major war 
with the Soviet Union was imminent. Over 327000 persons would be needed both in the 
services and industry to undertake the rearmament plan. The Labour Government had a 
parliamentary majority of six which made it particularly vulnerable to backbench dissent. 
Many Labour MPs were opposed to increases in defence spending, because it might 
jeopardise spending on welfare and social programmes. By the end of the 1950 defence policy 
was becoming a major problem for the Government.  
 
By the autumn of 1950 Leo Amery had managed to convince Lieutenant General Sir Wilfred 
Lindsell, who had served as successful staff officer in the Middle East and in India during the 
Second World War, to join the League as a military expert. Although, there are no papers 
relating to Lindsell’s involvement with the League within his archive at King’s College 
London Liddell Hart Centre for Military Studies. Another new recruit was Lieutenant General 
Sir Frances Tucker who served in the Indian Army for his entire career; Tucker had had a 
distinguished military record in the Second War leading the 4 Indian Division in the Middle 
East, North Africa, Italy and the 4 Indian Corps in Burma. Tucker’s papers at the Imperial 
War Museum do not extend into the post war period. Another addition was Hore-Belisha who 
joined the League’s council. However, Hore-Belisha archive at Churchill College Archive 
Centre contains no record of his activities in the Army League or his membership. Amery 
asked Tucker and Lindsell to join League to give it more military representation. Lindsell and 
Tucker quickly joined a nascent study group which included Leo and Julian Amery, Paget and 
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Basil Liddell Hart. On 27 October 1950, Leo Amery wrote to John Strachey, Minister of War, 
on behalf of the League setting out a long list of its observations on the shortcomings of the 
Army and its inability to deal with the deteriorating international situation.
420
 The League 
offered its services to the Government and a requested access to WO records to help them 
accomplish their task. Amery informed Strachey that one of the reasons the League had 
decided to contact the government was because of Defence in the Cold War.  
 
In 1950 the Chatham House Study Group led by Anthony Head published Defence in the 
Cold War an influential assessment of what the West needed to do to counter the Soviet threat 
in Europe.
421
 Essentially they argued that NATO needed to increase the number of divisions 
and tactical air-force units permanently in a state of readiness in Europe. It was widely 
accepted that NATO in its first year had been desultory in its efforts actually to provide forces 
and had been more content to stick to limited planning and liaison activities.
422
 Similarly, 
after the detonation of the Soviet atomic bomb in 1949 doubts about the value of the 
American nuclear deterrent began to surface and this focused attention on the ability of the 
existing ground forces to delay the Red Army whilst America mobilised its forces and 
deployed them to Europe.
423
 Julian Amery circulated a copy of Defence in the Cold War to 
the study group who then appraised and discussed it. On 5 November Lindsell considered the 
paper to be influential and constituted a starting point which the League could follow on 
from.
424
 Lindsell wanted the League to look at strategic questions and then use its analysis to 
educate the public and put pressure on the Government to make ‘suitable provisions to meet 
the requirements of the situation’. Tucker was concerned that the paper was too defensive and 
argued that the League should concentrate on showing how to beat the Communists.
425
 
However, like Lindsell he thought the League should use it as a starting point for further 
studies and discussions. Paget thought that the paper overplayed the unity and cohesion of the 
Soviet system. He wanted the League to look at what weaknesses the Communists had and 
how they could be exploited by the West. Paget also thought that the West should start 
building up resistance movements behind the Iron Curtain to undermine and overstretch 
Soviet forces and regimes. The paper became the starting point for the League to produce its 
own document.  
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Not surprisingly Government perceived the League’s offer of assistance with suspicion. 
Strachey responded that the League’s offer would be considered but access to official material 
would be declined because they were not an official body.
426
 On 7 November 1950, 
Emmanuel Shinwell, Minister of Defence, wrote to Leo Amery setting out ground rules which 
the WO and Ministry of Defence (MOD) would adopt in their dealings with the League; the 
only limitation being that the League would not be given access to official material.
427
 
However, the note also encourages Amery and offers assistance, as long as it does not 
contravene security considerations. On 30 November the League held a meeting at 112 Eaton 
Square which included Hore-Belisha, Zukerman, Lindsell, Paget, Jacob, Liddell Hart, 
Morgan, Low, Beddington-Behrens and Julian Amery. JFC Fuller also attended the meeting. 
Fuller like Liddell Hart is considered to one of the great military thinkers of the twentieth 
century. However, in the early 1950s Fuller was still tainted by his association with Fascism 
in the 1930s and even today is still a controversial figure.
428
 Fuller had been estranged from 
Liddell Hart because of ideological attraction to Fascism but by mid 1940s they had resumed 
their earlier friendship. It was probably Liddell Hart who invited Fuller to attend the League 
meeting. Amery informed the meeting that League needed influence public and official 
opinion on the ‘gravity of the defence situation, upon shortcomings in the present dispositions 
and plans for the scale, organisation, and use of our land forces’.429 Amery invited the 
members of the meeting to provide papers for discussion at their next meeting which was to 
be held on 14 December.  
 
On 14 December 1950 Liddell Hart produced a paper setting out his thoughts on the 
international situation and its impact on military policy. Liddell Hart thought the League 
needed to prioritise Britain’s commitments in order of relative importance.430 He was 
concerned that the term ‘commitments’ was too broad and was losing its meaning. Liddell 
Hart ranked the UK as the highest priority followed by Western Europe, Scandinavia, South 
Europe, South East Europe, Africa, Turkey, the Middle East, India and Pakistan, the Far East 
and Australasia. However, he noted that all of the commitments were interconnected and 
presented a strategic problem which could only be solved by the careful deployment of 
military forces at vital points. Liddell Hart thought the West needed to have 40 divisions to 
deal with a ‘sudden’ Soviet invasion of Western Europe. He noted that France had plans to 
create 20 divisions by 1952, Belgium 5 and Holland 4. This left a large gap which he thought 
should be filled by the Germans. However, he thought for ‘the time being’ that this was 
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politically impossible until French security fears were addressed; he also noted that the 
Germans themselves were concerned that rearmament might induce an attack by the Soviet 
Union. He concluded that the British needed to provide five or more divisions as would the 
Americans. Liddell Hart was also concerned about French morale which he stated needed 
‘stiffening from outside’.  
 
On the question of Africa he thought that the local forces would be sufficient to assure 
security because that area was not in immediate danger. Liddell Hart argued that Australia 
and New Zealand were the lowest priority and that security in this area could be provided by 
the United States which both countries had gravitated to during the War. He was convinced 
that because of the vast size of Chinese resources defence of the Far East was not possible. 
Pessimistically, he noted that ‘Malaya might be preserved for a while’ but only at the risk to 
other areas. Because India had strong natural barriers he thought that it might be able to hold 
out until its resources had been properly organised and co-ordinated. In his opinion the 
Middle East could not be defended. He noted that the chain of  British air bases in the area 
were ‘extremely insecure’ and had too few aircraft; the solitary division in the region was too 
far from the immediate danger points in Turkey and Iran. He conceded that the Middle East 
was vital to British interests and could be used to attack Soviet oil fields in Caucasus and 
armament factories in the Urals. However, he thought that the importance of the Suez canal 
was over exaggerated. Liddell Hart believed that Turkey was the most strategically important 
country in the region because it was easier to defend due to its strong  ‘natural barricades’ and 
was closer to targets in Russia and the Balkans; the Turkish Army was numerically strong and 
could be developed to make it resilient defensive force. Liddell Hart was concerned that a 
policy might develop which was based on trying to ‘hold everywhere, and thus risking 
collapse everywhere’. He advocated ‘reapplying the principle of concentration’ and making 
informed strategic decisions based on facts rather than ‘feelings’. On the question of national 
service Liddell Hart thought that it might be advisable to reduce the length of service and 
create a ‘post-mobilisation national army’. He wanted a ‘greater ready for action force’ by 
reverting to a purely regular ‘first line’ active force. In other words the importance of the 
active army would override that of that reserve forces.  
 
Amery countered with a paper on the importance of defending Middle East to ensure the 
security of the Commonwealth and the West.
431
 Amery argued that the Russians had the geo-
political capacity to strike West, South and South East. However, he thought that a Soviet 
strike into the Middle East was the most attractive because Iran and Turkey lacked the ability 
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to defend themselves and the region was highly volatile. He also believed that the Middle 
East should become the defensive responsibility of the Commonwealth because its loss would 
mean that the Commonwealth would be cut into two. Amery believed that utilising British 
influence in the region built up over the years was a ‘significant starting point’ from which to 
create a military alliance in the region. Amery supposed that the state of Israel ‘was now a 
permanent reality’ which meant that it was ‘vital to Western interests’ that the co-operation 
with Israel was achieved because its roads and ports would be invaluable in a war to defend 
Syria, Iraq and Persia from Soviet attack. However, he noted that Arab intransigence toward 
Israel made any military accommodation with Tel Aviv challenging but not impossible. 
Conversely, his attitude toward the Arabs can be construed from his remarks concerning the 
Suez Canal and the Arab League. Amery believed that Egypt should ‘be told quite plainly that 
there can be no question of our leaving the Canal Zone’. Amery portrayed the Egyptians as 
being xenophobic and that their ‘psychology is one that respects force more than 
appeasement’. He also thought that the Arab League should be broken up because it was an 
‘unnatural body’ which maintained discord in the region for its own benefit and worked 
against British interests. The Amerys would increasingly agitate against any withdraw from 
the Canal Zone. Amery’s advocacy of the importance of the Middle East is consistent with 
the ‘Three Pillars Strategy’ which was articulated by the COS in 1948.432 British policy was 
based on the assumption that the defence of the Middle East was vital to the security of the 
British Commonwealth and therefore should take precedence over a European commitment. 
Echoing defence policy of the mid 1930s, the COS argued that British air and naval power 
would be used to counter a Soviet threat in Europe.    
 
Fuller prepared a paper that argued the Soviet Union held the initiative because of their ‘aims 
and strategy’.433 Because the world had divided into ‘irreconcilable ideological camps’ one 
based on ‘freedom and the other slavery’ he believed that war was inevitable. Picking up on 
theme which he had been arguing since the mid 1940s he stated that Anglo-American policy 
in the last war had allowed Stalin to control central Europe which gave him a clear strategic 
advantage in the next. Fuller stated that Russia’s military power was immense and designed to 
create a ‘psychological terror’, and could ‘easily conquer Western Europe’. He assumed that 
the Soviets would first use propaganda, fifth columns, strikes, rebellions and civil wars across 
Europe, Africa and Asia as a prelude to invasion. He termed this ‘conspiratorial subversion’. 
Interestingly, he thought that the Iron Curtain was designed to keep Western culture out of the 
Soviet Union and its satellites so it would not infect their citizens with democracy. He argued 
                                                 
432
 Ovendale, R. (1996). British Defence Policy since 1945 Manchester: Manchester University Press 
p43.  
433
 LH 5/4/2, Our Defence Problem by Major General J.F.C Fuller.  
 133 
that ‘Russia is living under a greater terror of being corrupted by Western culture the Western 
Europe is of being subverted by Russian Marxism. This is a Key point to note’. His 
assessment of Soviet military strategy was based on what he described as ‘closely 
circumscribed towards winning the strategical centre of gravity at the least expense to 
herself’. This he argued was achieved through distracting her enemy’s fighting forces by 
drawing them away from their main avenue of advance; and by building satellite forces 
around the Soviet Union. Fuller noted that over the last five years British forces had been 
drawn into Malaya, the French in Indo-China, the Dutch into Indonesia and the Americans 
Korea; Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania were being rearmed and a 
Volksarmee was being created in East Germany. Fuller considered this to be a direct threat to 
Western Germany because as long as Western forces were being drawn away from Western 
Europe Soviet military strength grew in the East.     
 
Fuller also prepared a supplementary paper which argued that the maximum number of troops 
which the government could recruit using the ‘present system’ was 400,000 officers and 
men.
434
  Fuller calculated that Britain could only raise a maximum of ten divisions. He 
discounted the Territorial Army from his figures because he thought it was ‘inoperative’. 
However, the Government was planning for Territorial Army to rapidly expand from its 
strength of 82,500 on 1 January 1950 to a target of 150,000 within three years due to an influx 
of national servicemen.
435
 Fuller considered the defence of Western Europe as the primary 
operational task. To achieve this he thought that the Western powers needed to have 40 
divisions based in Germany with a further reserve of 20 in France, Holland and Belgium. He 
also wanted Spain and West Germany brought into the alliance system. On the question of the 
size of the West Germany forces he thought foolish not to completely rearm West Germany 
rather than a suggestion to create a few brigades. This was a reference to the Pleven plan of 
October 1950 which envisaged the creation of an integrated multi-national European army. 
This was subsequently known as the European Defence Community (EDC). Pleven’s plan 
was to integrate German manpower into NATO in a way which was acceptable to the French. 
His idea for Spanish troops was completely unacceptable because Franco’s Fascist 
Government was internationally isolated. However, by mid-1950s the American Government 
was negotiating with Franco about using air and naval facilities in Spain. Fuller wanted the 
League to concentrate on getting West Germany rearmed as quickly as possible. He also 
likened the alliance with France like being ‘wed to a corpse: it is strategical necrophilia’. This 
appears to be was Fuller’s last paper for the League and he is not recorded as attending  any 
further meetings.  
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On 21 December the study group held its next meeting at 112 Eaton Square. The meeting was 
attended Lord Balfour of Inchrye. Balfour had been Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State 
for Air during the War. After the war he was president of the Chambers of Commerce of the 
British Empire from 1946 to 1949. He was successful business man who later chairmen of 
British European Airways (BEA). Balfour read an ‘appreciation of the defence position of 
Western Europe, prepared by a leading Western military authority’.436 The minutes of the 
meeting state that the statement ‘underlined the utter inadequacy of that has been done so far 
in this field’. The group thought that a supreme global headquarters staff should be created to 
co-ordinate Western efforts. However, it was agreed that such a body would have to be a 
purely Anglo-American organ. The group also thought that there would be possible security 
objections to giving continental nations representation on a ‘supreme staff’. This statement is 
indicative of British ambivalence toward West European countries which were effectively 
treated with suspicion and distain. However, it also fails to understand the fundamental shift 
which had occurred in the relationship between the United States and the UK since 1945. 
Britain had gone from interdependence to junior partner status with five years. The group 
assessed Liddell Hart’s paper and agreed that the dangers that the country faced would 
‘require a national effort and sacrifice on a vastly greater scale than anything suggested by the 
responsible authorities’. Because of Liddell Hart’s paper it was decided that the League 
needed to ‘bring home to the public and official opinion the need to relate the effort required 
of this country more closely to the dangers which confront it’. It was also decided that the 
League would look at the question of manpower and how large an army Britain needed to 
undertake the defence of its world interests. 
 
Leo Amery was asked to write a letter to The Times to state publically that the country needed 
to be aware of the task facing it. On 1 January 1951 Leo Amery’s letter was published in The 
Times calling for ‘statesmanship backed by armed strength’.437 Amery stated that the UK 
should more or less place itself on a wartime footing by securing and stocking raw materials 
and food stuffs and reactivate the lend lease agreement with United States; increase the 
number of  ready divisions from 6 ‘weak’ to 10. He also wanted British Government to 
massively reinforce British garrisons in the Middle East which he described as an area of 
‘vital importance’ to the Western World. On 17 January the study group held a meeting to 
discuss manpower, equipment and organisation of the Army.
438
 Field Marshal Auchinleck 
attended the meeting as a guest of Leo Amery. Auchinleck had spent most of career in the 
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Indian Army. During the Second World War he commanded land forces in the disastrous 
Norway campaign in 1940. In November 1940 he was appointed Commander-in-Chief in 
India. In 1941 he was given command of Commonwealth forces in the North Africa. In 1942 
he was replaced by General Montgomery. In June 1943 he was reappointed Commander-in-
Chief in India and held the post until 1947 when he retired from the Army. Amery knew 
Auchinleck well and was considering asking him to become president of the League. Faviell, 
Low and Liddell Hart produced a paper on the type and number of forces required to defend 
the UK and the Commonwealth. Leo Amery thought that paper might make a possible 
opening section of a report which the League would publish. The paper argued that all 
assumptions concerning Western security were only possible with ‘sufficient air support’.439 
The paper also asserted that ‘danger is regarded as immediate and calling for an almost 
wartime sense of urgency’. Soviet active strength was estimated at 175 divisions of which 55 
were armoured. There were a further 125 divisions which could be mobilised within a month. 
They also had 1,000,000 men in the armies of their European satellites. The Soviets also had 
the advantage of interior lines of communication which meant they could concentrate rapidly 
against Western Europe or the Middle East. But he noted they were strong enough to operate 
in both theatres as once. The paper calculated that the West needed to mobilise 80 divisions 
by 30 days of a major conflict. The paper also stated that the British needed to have 10 active 
divisions in Germany to ensure that other Western nations were given a psychological boost. 
The British contribution to the Middle East should be 5 divisions of which 3 should be 
armoured.   
 
On 30 January the Government announced that it was increasing the rearmament programme 
and calling up Z reservists for fifteen days refresher training.
440
 Z reservists were all members 
of the reserve who had been called up before 1948 under the wartime national service 
legislation. The Government wanted to call up 235,000 men for refresher training by the end 
of 1951. The Government also announced an increase the rearmament programme to £4700 
million over four years. On 5 February Julian Amery wrote to Faviell asking for his 
comments on a draft paper which he would then circulate to the rest of the group which might 
form the basis of a report.
441
 Amery argued that the ‘defence of Western Europe is today an 
indispensable condition of our survival’. The study group began looking at ways of increasing 
the amount of manpower available to the Army and other European countries. Liddell Hart 
supplied a letter from General Student about the possibility of rearming Germany. Student 
was the former commander of German airborne forces during the Second World War. Student 
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thought that Germany was suffering from ‘psychological problems that would last a long 
time’ this he concluded would mean it would be some time before ‘German divisions are 
ranged which are willing to fight’.442 This was a major problem for Western defence planners 
because it was widely assumed that the Soviets were on the brink of launching a major 
offensive in Europe or the Middle East.  
 
However, Lindsell thought that Russia was not in fact on the verge of launching an ‘all out’ 
war.
443
 Lindsell argued that the Russians wanted the Western allies to rapidly increase the size 
of their standing forces, because this would strain manpower and manufacturing resources 
and severely interrupt the Western economic capacity and growth. This would allow the 
Soviets to use ‘their propaganda’ and subversion to undermine Western democracies. A 
central theme that the Soviet military effort was part of a co-ordinated ‘long term’ plan which 
incorporated a period economic, political and social disruption followed by subversion and 
then military operations is a reoccurring argument  made  by League’s members. Lindsell also 
considered assessments of Russia military strength to be exaggerated; this was because he 
thought they lacked the necessary stores, administration, and maintenance and movement 
capacity to maintain such a large force in the field. Lindsell considered it important that the 
study take into account the possibility that the Soviets would not be ready before the mid 
1950s.  
 
Liddell Hart said he had received figures by different military authorities which estimated the 
numbers of forces needed by the West to defend against a Soviet attack; 40 divisions were 
required in the first echelon; 20 divisions (15 armoured, 5 infantry) ready at moment’s notice; 
20 divisions (5 armoured, 15 infantry) ready at 2 to 3 days; 40 divisions in second echelon; 20 
(5 armoured, 15 infantry) ready in 10 days; 20 divisions at 30 days. Liddell Hart argued that 
the British needed to revive French, Dutch and Belgium morale. Persuade the Germans to 
rearm and gain American support. However, he argued that the price for American support 
would assume a disproportionate burden on British forces. Liddell Hart stated that once the 
‘Continental nations had recovered their strength and sprit, it might be possible for the British 
to withdraw forces from Europe’. This would allow them to be redeployed to the Middle East 
or South East Asia. Liddell Hart believed that the majority of British forces in Germany 
should be armoured. He also calculated that minimum strength required to defend the Middle 
East was five active divisions (3 armoured and 2 airborne).  These forces would be required to 
hold and contain any attack until the second echelon of 3 British divisions, 2 British colonial 
divisions (West and East African), 2 Arab divisions, 2 Israeli divisions and 1 Foreign Legion 
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division could be deployed. Liddell Hart decided not to calculate the force required to defend 
South East Asia because he had not made an assessment of the fighting qualities of 
Communist China. He thought that 3 divisions would be necessary to defend Malaya, Hong 
Kong and Singapore. The only threat to UK was from airborne attack which he thought could 
be contained by two active divisions. Liddell Hart argued that the Britain needed to create a 
force of 17 active divisions and 10 reserve; 10 of the active divisions should be armoured. In 
1950 the Army had strength of 375,000 (193,000 regulars); the active army had 7 and half 
divisions (1 armoured division which was forming). The Territorial Army (TA) had 105,000 
men (94,000 volunteers and 11,000 national servicemen and national service volunteers); the 
reserve army could field 9 divisions (6 infantry, 2 armoured and 1 airborne). The active army 
was deployed across the globe which meant that largest concentration of forces was in 
Germany where there were two divisions. However, both of these divisions contained the 
large number of national servicemen.    
 
On 27 February the study group met to discuss the problem of finding more manpower for 
active units.
444
 Lindsell thought that in peacetime the UK did not have the resources to 
maintain 17 active divisions. It was decided that the study group should investigate how the 
army could save manpower to increase its fighting formations. It was also proposed that the 
study group approach the Secretary of State for War to provide tables of establishment for 
infantry and armoured formations. In response Liddell Hart produced a paper on the 
divisional slice. Liddell Hart stated that the British Army had raised about 10 divisions from a 
total strength 450,000 (including the TA).
445
 Each division contained 18,000 men for every 
45,000 serving with colours. The other 27000 were employed on headquarters staffs, supply 
lines, anti-aircraft defences and administration. In comparison the Americans produced 1 
division for every 54,000 men and the French for every 37,000 men. However, the Soviets 
produced 1 division for every 16,000 men. Liddell Hart sated that soldiers in the British Army 
would never accept the ‘standard of economy’ which the Soviets imposed on their soldiers. 
He also noted that because Britain was a colonial power it would be more difficult to reduce 
supply and movement units because of the logistical complexities of having diverse imperial 
commitments. Liddell Hart produced a second paper on the subject entitled ‘cutting the 
tail’.446  The tail units consisted of headquarters staffs, supply, transport and administration 
formations. He thought all were ‘over loaded’ and could be reduced. Liddell Hart proposed 
increasing the number of ‘sub-units’ commanded by a single headquarters. Traditionally the 
British Army had based its organisation on ‘fours’-four sections in a platoon, four platoons in 
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a company, four companies in a battalion, four battalions in a brigade. In the war this was 
abandoned in favour of having three battalions in a brigade which was the continental 
method. 
 
However, each division contained three brigades but had divisional artillery attached which 
formed the fourth principal unit.  Liddell Hart wanted to increase the number of battalions in a 
brigade to five. He also envisaged continuing this ‘system of five’ up the organisation chain; a 
corps commander would command five divisions instead of three or four; an Army 
commander would command a larger number of corps. He also proposed creating a division 
which had two enlarged brigades of five battalions each. This would reduce the number of 
headquarter units and free up manpower from the tail for other units. The teeth or fighting 
units were usually deployed within divisions and brigades and constituted all arms 
formations. Each division at full establishment had 930 officers and 18,770 enlisted men. 
However, modern warfare required considerable number of administrative staff and logistical 
units at divisional level. An infantry division had detachments of the Royal Army Service 
Corps, Royal Army Medical Corps, Royal Army Ordnance Corps, Provost, Mobile Bath, 
Postal Unit and a Divisional Salvage Unit. It would also have independent armoured brigade 
support attached. An artillery regiment had 36 officers and 636 enlisted men and was 
comprised of three batteries. An armoured division had 869 officers and 17,337 enlisted men 
and about 277 tanks; an attached infantry brigade (including an anti-tank battery) and an 
artillery regiment with anti-aircraft battery. An armoured division had signal, engineer, Royal 
Army Service Corps, Royal Army Medical, Royal Army Ordnance and Provost units. By the 
end of the Second World War the division contained a considerable number of vehicles and 
required a large amount of technical and logistical support. Liddell Hart argued that the 
number of tail units could be considerably reduced without adversely affecting the operational 
performance of teeth formations. However, his primary target for reduction was headquarter 
and administration units which in his opinion were a hindrance on the army organisation.  
 
However, Lindsell was critical of Liddell Hart’s approach.447 Lindsell argued that comparing 
the British Army with other nations ‘unhelpful’, because ‘there were far too many differences 
of armament, tactics, environment, national characteristics, political views of control and 
general system of maintenance’. He pointed out that that the army had been forced by 
political pressure to create a ‘vast welfare organization’ during the Second World War which 
had restricted the number of teeth units. During the war the British created 11 armoured 
divisions, fourteen independent armoured or armoured tank brigades, thirty five infantry 
                                                 
447
 AMEL 1/7/83, Comments by General Lindsell.  
 139 
(including two airborne divisions) and nine county divisions for beach (home) defence. 
Additionally there were equivalent of 12 divisions employed on anti-aircraft defence. Men 
were also required for training, communication, repair and supply formations both at home 
and in overseas bases. This required huge amounts of manpower. Lindsell noted that the 
amount of petrol, food, ammunition and supplies required to keep each division in the field 
was prodigious; this required trucks which also needed men, spares and maintenance. 
Logistical support was further complicated by terrain and climatic conditions. Lindsell, who 
had been a staff officer in North Africa, noted that operations in the desert required the 
collection and movement of large amounts of water which impacted on the number men and 
vehicles required to keep a division moving. As he pointed out if the distance might be 400 
miles or 1200 miles then the number of men and lorries required would need to be adjusted 
which necessitated having adequate and flexible tail resources. He described this as the 
‘incremental factor’. He also used his knowledge gained in Burma directing jungle warfare to 
argue that control of forces in undeveloped and challenging territory required a greater 
number of headquarter organizations to maintain the cohesion of units in the field. Similarly, 
the movement of supplies through undeveloped terrain required considerable amounts of 
manpower or a substantial air resupply capacity.  However, he agreed that the reduction of the 
number of headquarter formations was possible, if Liddell Hart’s five brigade system was 
adopted.  
 
Leo Amery thought that the figures supplied by Liddell Hart raised questions about what 
contribution the UK could make to European defence without completely ‘disorganising our 
life’.448 Liddell Hart thought that it was ‘50/50’ that the present British contribution would be 
adequate. Leo Amery thought the study group ‘should plan for safety’ and revise it figures to 
reflect ‘minimum strategic’ need. Leo Amery thought that the study group needed to 
‘ruthlessly eliminate any weapons which are not going to be used to their fullest in any future 
war’ in an attempt to stretch manpower and save resources. Amery agreed with Lindsell that 
the study group needed to consider what was required in the Cold War and how that would be 
achievable without damaging the economic status of the country. This consideration 
increasingly became a central argument advanced by the COS for the adoption of a declared 
policy of atomic deterrence to offset smaller conventional forces levels compared to the 
Soviets. Amery pointed out that if Britain had been better prepared in time of peace then it 
was possible that ‘we could have avoided the last war’.  Amery also noted that it was better to 
avoid war by strength and risk financial problems rather than being unprepared and weak. The 
meeting agreed that redirecting manpower to form more divisions was the best policy for the 
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study group to promote. On 8 March Julian Amery used the Army estimate debate to argue 
for the Government to implement much of what was contained in the study group paper.
449
 
Amery argued for a major study to be carried out in the divisional slice and used Liddell 
Hart’s facts and figures to back his argument. He wanted the tail cut and the manpower used 
to create more tail units. He also called on the Government to consider using African 
manpower to create additional units for defence of the Middle East. On 31 March Lindsell 
wrote Julian Amery congratulating him on his speech during the debate which he stated ‘sets 
out admirably the Army League case’.450 However, Lindsell said that he thought that any 
major reduction in the size of the tail was a mistake.  
 
On 16 April the study group began discussing whether the Government should instigate new 
Esher Committee which should be independent of the WO.
451
 Liddell Hart told the meeting 
that he had heard that the Government was considering cutting down the tail. The meeting 
also decided that Lindsell (Lindsell was not present) argument about not drastically cutting 
the tail should be rejected by the League. Lindsell had argued that the French defeat in May 
1940 had been caused in part by them having inadequate tail. However, Liddell Hart stated 
that it caused by ‘red tape, lack of manoeuvrability, bad organisation, liner formation and 
Communist infiltration. At the meeting it was decided that Julian Amery and Liddell Hart 
should start working on a draft report for publication. Leo Amery also thought that the 
League was getting enough interest shown by the WO because it lacked official recognition. 
He argued that the League should utilise the present situation with rearmament to bring home 
to the public the gravity of the international situation and use it to promote a ‘long sighted 
policy in Army affairs’. This was the first tangible step toward producing a public report. 
Paget wanted ‘Julian Amery and his group in the house’ to push for the appointment of a 
wide-ranging committee to look at the organisation of the Army. This was to be backed up by 
the League ‘putting out a reasoned case’. Leo Amery also argued that contrary to public 
opinion the Government’s rearmament programme was not in fact taking place. He also said 
that Lord Lloyd, President of the Navy League, had spoken to him about whether the Navy 
League and Air League should work together with the Army League to campaign to promote 
a ‘more effective rearmament programme’. However, no joint campaign was launched and 
subject was not mentioned again. This may have been because Leo Amery wanted to retain 
the League’s independence from more established military pressure groups.  
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While the League was carrying out its study of the manpower problem the Army Council 
decided to convene a Committee to look into the General distribution of manpower in the 
Army.
452
  This Committee was to be headed by General Sir Gerald Templer. However, the 
Templer Committee was not given a wide remit and was restricted to UK based 
administrative units only. No overseas, Divisional, Corps or front line units were consulted by 
the members of the Committee. Leo Amery wrote to Strachey on 28 March and the 19 April 
setting out what the study was working on and whether the WO would allow it access to 
official material.
453
 On 11 May Strachey wrote to the Leo Amery offering to allow the League 
study group to consult Templer’s Committee’s.454 Strachey told Amery that study group was 
being invited to meet with the Committee in an unofficial capacity and because of security 
considerations would not be allowed access to official information prior to the meeting. He 
tried to placate Amery by stating ‘I realise, of course, that members of your group are all men 
on whose discretion we could rely; on the other hand, you would undoubtedly wish to quote 
in your report facts and figures from which it would be possible for an enemy to deduce much 
valuable information regarding our detailed organisation’. The study group began preparing 
information for a possible meeting with the committee. In the meantime they began a further 
examination   how it would be possible to cut the tail and create more teeth units using the 
existing manpower establishment. It was also decided that increasing the number of divisions 
from 10 to 15 was not feasible in peacetime.
455
 The study group began considering whether it 
would be possible to reduce manpower requirements in the tail by creating ‘tailor-made’ 
fighting formations which could be deployed for particular tasks. This would mean a 
departure from the ‘ready-made’ formations which configured for all purposes so far as 
organisation and equipment are concerned. The study group proposed the creation of task 
forces which would be matched to suit terrain, it would operate in, and the character of the 
enemy. This they claimed would allow a simplification in weapons which in turn would 
diminish the number of men engaged on supply and maintenance of different weapons and 
machinery.  
 
On 25 September the study group met the Templer Committee in a committee room at the 
WO. Leo Amery invited Field Marshal Auchinleck to attend with the study group but he 
declined because he stated that he was unprepared and not ‘up-to-date’ to cross-examined by 
the committee. Leo and Julian Amery, Hore-Belisha, Liddell Hart, Paget and Faviell attended 
on behalf of the League study group. Liddell Hart produced a set of notes for use by the study 
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group at the meeting.
456
 His main talking point was that headquarter units were too big and 
had too much transport. He noted that between 1949 and 1951 the manpower levels in 
armoured division had recently increased by 523 men but the number of tanks had not. He 
also stated that the WO had increased it staff. However, he gave no figures to back his 
assertion. He stated that a Russian infantry division was stronger in quantitative weapon-
strength than its British counterpart but had 70% less manpower. A British infantry division 
was 300% larger in transport as well. Liddell Hart stated that the committee had been ‘sunk 
into detail’ and was not looking at the whole question. After the meeting the League produced 
a memorandum on proceedings.
457
 Templer was not present at the meeting. The WO to 
officials to observe and the committee was represented by Major-General Evelegh and Major 
General Whitfield. Leo Amery opened the meeting and asked Evelegh and Whitfield to 
explain what their remit was and what progress they were making. Evelegh explained that the 
committee’s scope was limited to the administrative units of the Army at home and did not 
include the WO organisation. He further stated that the committee was not permitted to 
examine the structural organisation of the Army or wartime establishments. This confirmed 
what Liddell Hart had expected, that the committee’s scope was to narrow and not radical 
enough. Evelegh calculated that if the recommendations made by the committee to date were 
carried out then 721 officers and 10,000 other ranks could redeployed. The committee was 
also recommending that retired officers and civilians be used to replace regular soldiers where 
possible.  
 
Although, the committee was not permitted to look at corps, divisional or brigade 
establishments they thought that considerable savings could be made in manpower in teeth 
units by simply reducing their peacetime strengths through making structural changes within 
formations. However, the committee did not elaborate what from these changes would take or 
if they would get the opportunity to undertake a wider study. Leo Amery stated they were 
‘attempting to reduce the swollen girth of the army by massage without considering diet and 
general way of life’. Bastyan countered that the committee had to take into account the 
strength of tradition and habit in the Army which would inevitably make such a 
reorganisation very gradual. He also stated that attempting a major reorganisation at a time of 
crisis when the Army had to constantly ready was unwise. Liddell Hart asked whether any 
work had been started on cutting the number of links in the chain of command, such as corps 
and Brigade Headquarters which would save manpower and accelerate the speed of 
information and the execution of decisions. Liddell Hart also made himself a personal record 
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of the meeting. 
458
 He noted that the members of the committee had rather a shock when I 
expressed surprise at the limitations imposed on the committee given that their terms of 
reference seemed to include all the present distribution of manpower in the Army. Liddell 
Hart had been sceptical about the scope of the committee and his fears were confirmed at the 
meeting.  
 
The Committee’s final report which was submitted in November 1951; the report listed the 
unit commanders and specialist officers consulted whilst the report was being compiled but 
did not mention the League.
459
 Leo Amery reported to a meeting of the League’s council 
committee on 2 April 1952 that Field Slim, had told him that the remit of the Templer 
Committee had been widened as a result of its meeting with the League.
460
 This seems to be 
rather pushing the truth because the League met the Committee roughly one month before it 
finished its report and the scope remained limited to minor commands and units. The fact that 
the League was not mentioned is indicative of what the limitations of the League where: they 
had little, if any, influence over official bodies. However, the fact that the committee met with 
them is testimony of their collective expertise. The meeting with the committee would be last 
meeting with an official body by the study group. On 25 October 1951 Labour lost the general 
election and Churchill was returned to power. This had event wide ranging implications for 
the League because many of its members left to take up posts in the new Government. Also as 
a consequence of the meeting the study committee decided to prepare a report for publication 
on the task of the British Army. Another major change to the League in 1951 was the 
resignation of Lord Iliffe from the council. From this point on Leo Amery and Julian Amery 
controlled the League and its activities.  
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Chapter Four: From Study Group to Pressure Group  
 
 
The League had not taken any subscriptions since 1939 from its members. The membership 
had become exclusive and restricted to life members and friends and associates of the 
Amerys’. The League had essentially split into two. The study group revolved around Leo 
and Julian Amery, Liddell Hart, Faviell, Paget and Lindsell, while papers were circulated to 
Tucker, Auchinleck and Hore-Belisha, who occasionally attended meetings. The pre-war 
members like Iliffe and Beddington-Behrens were involved in the administration of the 
League and did not contribute to the creation of policy. However, Iliffe and Beddington-
Behrens controlled the finances of the League. The life members were free to attend annual 
meetings but the Amerys’ controlled the daily direction of policy. This is starkly illustrated by 
Leo Amery’s attempts to clarify Julian’s status within the League between 1951 and 1952.  In 
January 1951 Leo Amery decided that the League should begin preparing a report for 
publication, so he asked Iliffe and Beddington-Behrens for their support. On 10 January 1951 
Leo Amery wrote to Iliffe setting out his proposals for setting up a separate account in 
readiness for the production of a report.
461
 Leo Amery also wanted Julian Amery, who was 
acting secretary, to be paid for his work on the report. Amery also wrote to Beddington-
Behrens asking for his support in getting Julian Amery paid for his work.
462
 It was decided 
that the League should deposit £750 in a separate account for the purpose of creating a report 
and to help the work of the study group. Julian Amery was to be paid for ‘producing the 
report’ which would mean that he would not be paid a salary and thus avoid paying income 
tax.
463
  
 
In September 1951 the League’s council decided that it ‘might’ be possible to make a 
payment of £500 (£12,000) for Julian Amery’s work on the report. By the start of 1952 the 
League had funds of £5315 (£131, 549 at today’s price). However, only £1100 (£27,000) was 
in a deposit account; the rest was invested in bonds which netted a small annual income of 
£90 a year. However, on 6 June 1952 Iliffe wrote a revealing letter to Beddington Behrens, ‘I 
have no doubt that L S Amery’s work has been invaluable but in view of the fact that his 
father took such a leading part in the formation and running of the Empire Defence League, 
the Council will have to be careful to see that the sum voted is on the low side. The son, as so 
often is the case, has to suffer some little handicap on account of the activities of his 
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father’.464 On 10 June Beddington-Behrens wrote to Leo Amery enclosing what he described 
as this ‘astonishing’ letter and asking for Leo Amery’s advice on who he should contact on 
the League’s council to get support for Julian Amery’s payment. On 13 June Leo Amery 
wrote back stating that there was some force in Iliffe’s argument because no ‘concrete report 
has yet appeared’.465 He also noted that hardly any life members turned up to meetings and he 
was unsure which members were active. Amery told Beddington-Behrens that perhaps any 
payment to ‘Julian’ should be left until the report was completed. However, his ‘main concern 
and Julian’s’, was that the latter should not be subject to income tax on any payments made 
by the League for work carried out on the report. It was the production of report would be the 
focus of the Leo and Julian Amery and the study group for the next two years.  
 
In February 1952 the study group began working on a possible report about the ‘task’ which 
the Army would face in the next five years. The same month at the NATO summit in Lisbon 
it was agreed that by the 1954 Britain would provide 10 Regular and reserve divisions for the 
defence of Europe and further 8 reserve divisions by D-day plus 30. In 1952 the British Army 
of the Rhine (BAOR) had 3 active divisions. However, British global commitments required 
the presence of 4 active divisions with 2 divisions at home. The total NATO strength in 
Europe in 1952 was 25 divisions, the target was 96 divisions and 9000 combat aircraft by 
1954.
466
At best, and with some difficulty, the UK managed to keep 10 active divisions in the 
field during peacetime.
467
 It was also widely accepted that the reserve divisions needed at 
least three months training before they would be fit to join the line. Therefore Lisbon goals 
were unrealistic. By start of 1952 the Korean war had reached stalemate and the security 
situation in Malaya had stabilised. Negotiations for the EDC were ongoing and the strategic 
situation in Europe seemed to be improving. This was international situation when the study 
group began detailed work on a new report.  
 
On 1 February 1952, Faviell wrote to Julian Amery setting out his thoughts on the problems 
facing the Army in the future.
468
 Faviell predicted that the Soviets would ‘stir up trouble’ in 
colonies, citing Malaya, West Africa and Hong Kong as examples. Soviet covert action, he 
maintained, was increasing internal security problems for the UK and France ‘in colonies’. He 
also stated that our ‘European allies are comparatively far weaker than they have been in the 
past’. Faviell argued that Britain had no choice, even if went against the grain, but to provide 
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a continental commitment to ensure that other Western European states had time to rebuild 
their strength. Equally, the UK should redefine the roles of the Army between forces devoted 
to operations in the colonies and those for deployment to Europe. A reduction in overseas 
garrisons should be undertaken by quickly settling on the ‘minimum’ required for safety and 
the creation of a strategic reserve. This, he concluded, could be partially achieved by greater 
savings in manpower usage, the adoption of new technology and a better appreciation of 
financial constraints. This is precisely what occurred five years later in 1957 when Sandys 
presented his White Paper on Defence.  
 
However, on 2 April the study group held a meeting at which Faviell stated that the League 
should either concentrate on welfare issues or strategic ones, and should attempt to attract 
new members.
469
 Faviell argued that the League did not have enough ‘detailed’ knowledge on 
strategic issues to give its opinions credibility. He also felt that the League primary function 
was lobbying government to improve conditions of service for the Regular Army. Doing both, 
he concluded, would dilute the League’s ability to be an authority in either area. Whether this 
was an attempt to steer the League away from mounting attacks on the new Conservative 
Government’s Defence, Colonial and Foreign policies is not clear. Faviell’s files in the 
Conservative Party Archive have no reference to this meeting or his thoughts on the direction 
of the League. Faviell had been quite active in his support to Amery and the League by 
supplying information and his advice when Labour was in power. Although Faviell 
counselled caution, the League, and primarily its study group, began to widen its polemic to 
include more emphasis on strategic issues. Given that Leo Amery was Chairman and Julian 
was Secretary, and Liddell Hart’s association, the League’s direction was arguably 
predestined to be confrontational and focused more on the strategic issues which Faviell 
counselled against. It was agreed that the title of the report should be The Task of the British 
Army. At the same meeting it was agreed that the Labour MP Woodrow Wyatt would be 
asked to join the study group. Wyatt had been Under-Secretary and Financial Secretary at the 
War Office between April and October 1951. Wyatt agreed and joined the study group in 
May.  
 
On 22 April the Julian Amery circulated to the study group the NATO Standing Group report, 
written by General Eisenhower on 2 April 1952, which stated ‘the big task’ was ‘the 
recruiting, training and equipping of standing forces and reserves, and of providing their 
support in the war of airfields, signal communications and supply lines’.470 Tucker thought 
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that the paper showed that NATO was not making the best use of its trained manpower and its 
reserves and should create home guard units.
471
 The question of how viable NATO’s Lisbon 
forces levels and the reliance on reserve forces became a central theme in the study group’s 
analysis. In July after a tour of Western Europe Liddell Hart described the French 
mobilization scheme for its reservists and its general military organisation and ethos as being 
out of step with modern strategic problems and warfare, harking back to pre-1914 concepts 
and methods.
472
 The 1951 reserve training scheme had been described by the Manchester 
Guardian’s defence correspondent as more reminiscent of 1914 and 1939 and therefore rather 
‘anachronistic in the nuclear age’.473 Liddell Hart pointed out pessimistically that the forces in 
place in Europe were only viable if rapidly reinforced by reserve divisions which were under-
strength and not formed or prepared for their designated task of stemming a Soviet attack 
towards the Rhine. Liddell Hart argued that existing units would cease to exist as coherent 
forces after a week of combat operations with Soviet forces east of the Rhine. Another factor 
was that French reserve divisions made up the basis of the NATO strategic reserve forces and 
these were being weakened by the drain on officers and NCOs and regular troops being 
deployed for operations in Indo-China. Liddell Hart saw the only long-term practicable 
solution being a rapid decision on West German rearmament to alleviate the problem, and 
even then he stated that this would only create the minimum force needed to counter Soviet 
Forces. After 1952 much of NATO planning began to reflect the need to redress the 
conventional forces imbalance in Europe. The possible use of tactical nuclear weapons and 
size and disposition of holding forces now increasingly took precedence over creating larger 
conventional forces based on reservists.  
 
By the end of May the study group had prepared a ten page draft copy of The Task of the 
British Army.
474
 The paper set out what the principle commitments of the British Army would 
be the next five years. They considered the principle task providing an adequate organisation 
for the land defence of the UK ‘against such sea or airborne attack as may get through’. The 
paper postulated that the UK was susceptible to an airborne assault on a ‘vital area’. 
Unsurprisingly, they argued that Army had to provide enough garrisons to assure land 
defence and internal security of the ‘main bases’ on the Commonwealth lines of 
communications. The ‘growing range’ of aircraft was described as having a fundamental 
effect on the nature of war because ‘soon nothing will be out of range of anywhere’. It was 
envisaged that thermo-nuclear weapons had abolished the distinction between the battle field 
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and the home front. On the question of missile attack the paper argued that British and 
Commonwealth forces should be deployed to prevent Soviet forces from establishing 
launching sites in range of the UK or other key Commonwealth territories. It was also argued 
that establishing ‘situations of strength on the main approaches to our territories or essential 
interests’ was a primary policy consideration. The Middle East was designated as a key area 
because of its oil fields, the Suez Canal and its approaches to Africa, South East Asia, India, 
Malaya and Australasia. These were described as the ‘keys to the struggle for the world’. The 
paper asserted that the British had manifold overseas defence responsibilities which could not 
reduced.  
 
It was expected that British forces would be involved in Cold War operations which required 
the creation of a highly mobile strategic reserve.
475
 The study group argued that the threat to 
Imperial territories was ‘greater today than at any time in British history’. This was attributed 
to the spread of Communism and the rising tide of ‘Asian and African Nationalism’ which 
had ‘vastly increased the problems of internal security’. Similarly, it was noted that the Soviet 
Union maintained it forces virtually on a permanent war footing which meant that the UK’s 
armed forces had to be keep at a constant state of readiness that was unprecedented in 
peacetime. However, the size of the Army needed to carry out all these tasks was the subject 
of some debate within the study group. Liddell Hart’s briefing paper of 1951, which assumed 
that the UK needed to have 14 active divisions and 10 reserves, was still the basis of the 
League’s calculation for an effective security posture. However, the paper pointed out that the 
Army was hard pushed to provide 10 divisions which were spread thinly. The problem of 
what was feasible due to economic and manpower constraints was considered not to be 
insurmountable but would require a increase in the length of service of national service to 
achieve. However, Liddell Hart’s ideas concerning increasing the number of fighting 
formations from existing manpower resources was discussed as a possible alternative. The 
paper reiterated the importance of looking at the Army’s organisation in an attempt to ‘purge 
it of superfluous manpower’ and reduce supply lines. It used Liddell Hart’s comparison 
figures between different divisional slices as a exemplar of how the British were wasting 
manpower. In fact the paper was a reaffirmation of Liddell Hart’s pervious papers on 
combing the tail and his work on the divisional slice. However, Lindsell was concerned that 
the paper was asking for too many cuts to the tail which would affect the ability of the Army 
to carry out sustained operations in a hot war. He reiterated his earlier concern that making 
comparisons with other nations was erroneous. He pointed out that he had carried out a study 
in the last war for Churchill into the problem of the tail and had concluded that it was 
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impossible to make substantial cuts without adversely effecting the Army’s organisation. He 
was thought that the idea to shorten supply lines was ‘nonsense’. On the question of reducing 
the number of headquarter units he was also now expressing doubts about whether one 
commander and his staff could manage more units over a wider geographical area. It was 
obvious that Lindsell would not agree to Liddell Hart’s idea of cutting the tail to increase 
manpower. On 23 May Julian Amery sent a letter to the study group asking for more input 
because of Lindsell’s comments and to discuss how the League should progress with its 
‘inquiry’.476 However, a moratorium was placed on any further discussion on the paper until 
September when the next meeting of the study group would take place.  
 
The study group’s perceptions concerning how to maintain Britain’s international status were 
not out of step with those of the Government. On 18 June 1952 Eden, the Foreign Secretary, 
wrote a Cabinet memorandum entitled British Overseas Obligations which was an attempt to 
classify in order of importance overseas commitments and whether it would be possible to 
rationalize them.
477
 Eden argued that Britain could not reduce its overseas commitments 
without losing prestige. He noted that the UK gained considerable economic and financial 
benefits from its overseas obligations but the cost of maintaining them was increasingly 
beyond the economic capacity of the UK. Eden argued that the ‘essence of a sound foreign 
policy is to ensure that a country’s strength is equal to its obligations’. Eden believed that 
British foreign policy should seek to establish more collective security arrangements which 
would allow a reduction in British military obligations overseas yet retain the UK’s influence. 
He was concerned that the defence of the Middle East, which was the sole responsibility of 
the UK, should be ‘internationalised’ by drawing in the United States and through the creation 
of a regional defence pact. However, he thought that this would not cause an ‘immediate 
alleviation’ of the UK’s burden but in the long run would reduce military commitments. This 
was also applied to South East Asia which he noted was a key Cold War commitment. He 
believed that the Commonwealth should be induced to share in the defence responsibilities of 
both the Middle East and Far East. Either way Britain had to show leadership which would 
require the use of military and economic resources. However, Eden’s memorandum 
demonstrates that there many inherent tensions contained within British policy considerations 
because maintaining prestige while balancing economic constraints were not mutually 
compatible policies.   
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On 15 July the COS circulated its Defence Policy and Global Strategy Paper to Cabinet which 
signalled its support for a defence strategy based on atomic deterrence.
478
 The report shifted 
emphasis away from Cold War roles to Hot War preparations. There were significant 
questions raised about the length of any future Hot War because of the impact of nuclear 
weapons. The paper speculated that after a few weeks of fighting of ‘unparalleled intensity’ 
the UK and Russia ‘will have suffered terrible damage’ which may result in a ‘long-drawn-
out period of intermittent struggle’.479They argued that after this initial exchange there would 
be a period of ‘broken backed warfare’. The COS also stated because that the UK was 
geographically small and densely populated it could not be adequately defended against 
nuclear attack. What was driving these assumptions was the American Government’s decision 
to press on with their hydrogen bomb programme. At the time the British were carrying out 
nuclear tests at Monte Bello islands and would shortly become a nuclear power themselves. 
On entering office Churchill’s Government had decided to reduce the rearmament plan which 
it had inherited from the Labour Government on the grounds that it was to ambitious. On 3 
October  Lord Alexander, the Minister of Defence,  wrote a memorandum to the Cabinet 
stating that in view of the implications of the COS  Defence Policy and Global Strategy Paper 
it was now possible to reduce the rearmament programme to a more manageable level.
480
 The 
reduced programme was going to focus on improving air defence and strategic air forces and 
re-equipping the active divisions in the Army. The amount of war stocks, ships and the 
number of tanks on order would be reduced. The Government also acknowledged that the 
Lisbon forces goals were unrealistic and it was decided to only re-equip four of the reserve 
divisions. The Government had no plans to reduce the active Army which it pointed out was 
fully employed on Cold War duties.  
 
During the summer Leo Amery decided to recruit new members to the study group. On 8 July 
Leo Amery sent copy of The Task of the British Army to Sir Desmond Morton who was a 
senior civil servant at Ministry of Civil Aviation. Morton joined the Army in 1911 as an 
artillery officer. He was badly wounded at the battle of Arras and subsequently served as the 
aide-de-camp of Field Marshal Douglas Haig. After 1919 he became an intelligence officer at 
the FO. From 1929 until 1939 he was head of the imperial committee of defence’s industrial 
intelligence committee. He was the source of information to Churchill on German 
rearmament during the early 1930s. In 1939 he was made principal assistant secretary, 
Ministry of Economic Warfare. However, when Churchill became Prime Minister in 1940, he 
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became Churchill’s private assistant. In this capacity he administered the flow of intelligence 
information to the Prime Minister. In 1949 he served on the Middle Eastern Economic Survey 
Mission before joining the Ministry of Aviation. Amery asked Morton ‘as a old soldier who 
has not served the whole time you may possibly like to look at notes on the possibilities of a 
real simplification of our military system’.481 This statement is revealing because it shows that 
Amery was probably concerned that Lindsell was looking at the problem in a conventional 
way. Liddell Hart’s approach was radical but Lindsell had experience of running major 
military operations in wartime which Liddell Hart did not. Amery invited Morton to attend 
study group meetings where they could get the ‘benefit of your views’.  
 
On 10 July Julian Amery wrote to Liddell Hart asking whether he could recruit any high-
profile members to contribute to the report and replace departures to the Government.
482
 On 
11 July Julian Amery wrote to Beddington-Behrens asking him to join the study group.
483
 
Beddington-Behrens replied that his was happy to become a member but had little knowledge 
of recent military developments.
484
 The letter also discussed the impact of atomic weapons on 
military policy which Beddington-Behrens confessed to having little comprehension of 
beyond what the papers were printing. On 11 August Leo Amery wrote to Major General Sir 
Percy Hobart explaining the work of the League and whether he would like to join the study 
group. Hobart also accepted. Hobart had been mercurial exponent of armoured warfare of the 
1920s and 1930s. He also courted controversy during his career by clashing with his superiors 
and contemporaries. He also had a affair with one of his junior officer’s wife (whom he later 
married) which seen as a breach of his authority and strictly forbidden. This did not end his 
career but it did cause him and his wife to be socially excluded. In 1938 he was sent to Egypt 
to command the new mobile division being formed there; however, he quarrelled with the 
commander of British forces in Egypt and was removed in November 1939. He retired from 
the army in 1940 but was recalled in 1941 and given command of the 79
th
 armoured division 
for the remainder of the war. He retired in 1946. In 1948 he became from 1948 to 1953 his 
was Lieutenant-Governor of the Royal Hospital Chelsea. Hobart was a close friend of Liddell 
Hart.  
 
Leo Amery also contacted Lieutenant General Sir Brian Horrocks about joining the League. 
Horrocks joined the army in 1914 but spent virtually the whole of the First World as a 
prisoner war after being captured at the battle of Ypres in October 1914. Horrocks spent 
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fifteen years as a captain but remained in the Army and was rapidly promoted in 1939 when 
the war started. By 1942 he was given command of the 13
th
 Corps in the western desert 
campaign. After being wounded in 1943 he was side lined until July 1944 when he was given 
command of 30
th
 Corps during the battle of Normandy. Horrocks became general officer 
commanding western command in 1946 and then in 1948 he became commander of the 
BAOR. He retired from the Army in 1949 due to ill health. He was Gentlemen Black Rod of 
the House of Lords from 1949 until 1963. Horrocks also agreed to join the study group. On 17 
July the matter of Julian Amery’s ‘salary’ was resolved when it was decided that he would 
shortly receive £500.
485
 The League had £1100 in cash on account it was decided that £1000 
would be invested in bonds and the remaining £100 left for use by the study group. Julian 
Amery was spending £25 a year on secretarial material for the study group. No funds were 
released for the report in a separate account. This would mean that any publicity campaign 
would have to be paid for by releasing funds from the bonds which would incur tax. This was 
a potential problem because the League was not receiving any income from its members. Any 
sort of publicity campaign would require considerable amount of expenditure.  
 
At the end of August Leo Amery circulated a short paper on ‘modern warfare’. 486  He also 
wanted the study group to consider the most economic way of achieving British security 
objectives. The paper asked the study group to deliberate on whether the Government needed 
to construct fighter aircraft or bombers; if it was possible to employ airborne forces against 
Soviet cities or strategic sites rather than bombing; how important bombing had become 
because of atomic weapons. Amery posed the question whether the role of land forces would 
be radically altered by atomic weapons. He noted that the lineal defence line might have 
become obsolete because of airborne forces and the armoured break through. He envisaged 
the deployment of a quincunx formation which allow elastic defence in depth and reduce 
manpower requirements. On the question of weapons he postulated whether it was feasible to 
reduce the number of weapons in a division which would reduce training cadres and transport 
requirements. He wondered if the tank was ‘still worthwhile’ and if so what sort of tank 
needed to be produced. Amery queried the worth of AA artillery against modern high speed 
jet aircraft and what were the possibilities of ‘directed anti-aircraft projectiles’. On sea 
warfare Amery argued that the aircraft carrier had superseded all other forms of surface ships 
but he noted that the use of islands and overseas bases from which to launch air attacks on 
aircraft carriers was now a major policy consideration. He believed that the navy should no 
longer manpower and resources to attack submarines. This was because the Soviet Union was 
predominately a land power.    
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However, the study group did not meet again until the 2 December 1952. Hobart was invited 
to discuss his thoughts on modern warfare; however, there is no record of what he said.
487
 It 
also was decided that a new version of The Task of the British Army should be prepared in the 
new year. On 11 February 1953 the study group met for its first meeting of the New Year and 
discussed the report.
488
 Julian Amery circulated a copy of The Task of the British Army which 
contained new passages on the conduct of Cold War operations with references to recent 
operations in Kenya, the Canal Zone and Malaya. The colonial authorities had called a state 
of Emergency in Kenya in October 1952. The British had been negotiating with the Egyptian 
Government of King Farouck for several years about retaining use of the Canal Zone base 
after 1956 when the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty expired. However, the Egyptian 
Government wanted the British to unconditionally withdraw.  Between 1951 and 1952 the 
British garrison in the Canal Zone was under constant attack from insurgents. Canal Zone was 
also blockaded by the Egyptian Government. However, in July 1952 King Farouk was 
overthrown by military coup. This put a stop to the attacks for several months and the 
blockade was rescinded. However, in October 1952 after talks between the new Government 
and the British broke down the blockade and the attacks on the garrison resumed. The 
security situation in Malaya began improving in 1952 but the situation was still uncertain. 
Julian Amery described operations in Malaya and Kenya as ‘not strictly military operations at 
all. They are police operations’.489 He argued ‘that it was questionable whether the Army is 
suited by its structure to undertake such operations’. The answer, according to Amery, was to 
create an imperial gendarmerie for use in counter insurgency operations. The force would not 
be under military control but civil and would be used in conjunction with local forces and 
police.  
 
On 11 February the study group held a meeting which discussed a paper by Liddell Hart 
regarding the use of air borne troops behind Soviet Lines to disrupt their advance or to knock 
out or hold strategic points until relived by mobile armoured units.
490
 They also began 
considering the type of army needed in the future to meet different operational requirements. 
Hobart said that even regular troops took a long time to adapt themselves to different forms of 
warfare and mentioned British troops on the North West frontier and how useless they were 
compared with the Indian army. Leo Amery stated that individual troops ought to be trained 
in different forms of warfare, but Liddell Hart pointed out that there was very little time to 
teach a soldier a great deal in two years (the length of national service). They also discussed 
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the need for more air transport capability which could deliver two divisions from the UK at 
short notice to ‘any-where’. It was unanimously agreed that the present air transport situation 
was unacceptable. By now Julian Amery had become a member of the Conservative 
Parliamentary Committee for Defence Army sub-committee. This gave Julian Amery access 
to Anthony Head, Secretary of State for War, who briefed the committee before making 
announcements to the House of Commons.
491
  He also received information from the 
Conservative Party Research Department on military matters concerning the Army. However, 
much of this material was produced by Faviell. Julian Amery was rapidly becoming known as 
an expert on defence issues within the Conservative Party.  
 
On 9 March Julian Amery, Paget and Wyatt contributed to the annual Army estimate debate. 
Anthony Head confirmed that the maximum number of active divisions which could be 
formed in peacetime was 11 plus 2 brigades; however, he confirmed that with ‘present 
commitments’ this was ‘just too small for the job’.492 Julian Amery used the debate to attack 
the Labour Party’s advocacy of a negotiated settlement with the Egypt Government to end the 
deadlock on the future of the Canal Base. Labour believed that the blockade of the Canal 
Zone had shown that the British position in the Canal Zone was politically untenable.
493
 Julian 
Amery believed that the British military action in January 1952 when they had disarmed the 
Egyptian Police at Ismailia had shown that using pre-emptive force had improved the 
situation. However, after the battle there had been riot in Cairo which had resulted in the 
widespread looting and destruction of British homes and businesses and the death of British 
citizens.  It is true that attacks on the garrison subsided after the incident at Ismailia but the 
military coup and the removal of King Farouk in July had a far greater effect on the military 
situation than the action at Ismailia. However, by October 1952 the new military Government 
re-established the blockade and the attacks resumed. However, on 16 February 1953 Eden 
circulated a memorandum to the Cabinet arguing that Britain could not afford to keep 80,000 
troops in the Canal Zone ‘indefinitely’.494 Julian Amery’s position on the validity of the base 
was clearly at odds with Government’s. Wyatt raised questions about whether the 
Government was cutting the number of men from headquarter units.
495
 Paget was concerned 
that regulars on short service enlistments (three years) were being unfairly penalised because 
national servicemen (two year enlistment) served for less time with the reserve and were less 
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likely to be recalled in an emergency.
496
 It is interesting to note the Labour members of the 
study group used the debate to discuss matters which affected the army and its personnel, 
while Amery concentrated on strategic policy and attacks on Labour’s position on the Canal 
Zone.  
 
On 14 April 1953 the study group held a meeting to discuss colonial security issues. They 
agreed that the use of more special forces, such as the Special Air Service (SAS)
497
 and the 
creation of a fully mobile special gendarmerie force of about 10,000 men which could assist 
‘local forces’ in dealing with insurgents in the colonies should be formed as a matter of 
urgency.
498
 These forces would be ‘specially’ selected and have an aptitude for languages and 
an ability to adapt to local customs and would be able to work in small groups and live off the 
land, in other words using guerrilla tactics against the insurgents. They also argued that 
national servicemen as being ‘unsuitable’ for counterinsurgency operations. Paget stated that 
such operations should be carried out by regulars or foreigners who would be formed into a 
foreign legion. However, Liddell Hart countered that foreigners might not be ‘controllable’ in 
a ‘police action’. They also thought that ‘strong arm methods’ were in the long run counter -
productive and advocated a ‘British police approach’ to deal with insurgents. Pessimistically, 
Leo Amery argued that Britain faced ‘many years’ of counterinsurgency operations in Africa 
and ‘possibly in Middle East’. The study groups meeting was taking place three weeks after 
the Uplands massacre in Kenya when the Mau Mau murdered and mutilated 157 men, women 
and children. Paget and Julian Amery both spoke in the House of Commons about the 
massacre. Amery used the debate to state, ‘What I am going to suggest is rather outside the 
scope of this debate, but it has to do with the matter. We have a cold war developing and 
insurrectionary undertakings in different parts of the world. Should we not therefore 
contemplate the formation of some new corps, something between the Commandos and a 
gendarmerie that would be equipped and divided into the right size of squadrons and units to 
cope with this kind of activity?’499 Julian Amery had been developing the idea of specialist 
counter insurgency force for some time. The Uplands massacre caused a wave of revulsion 
and calls for tougher action by the police and military to deal with the insurgency.   
 
The study group placed considerable faith in the intervention of British troops either in a Cold 
War role or counter-insurgency operations; however, they echoed the complaints of the WO 
and senior officers that British troops should not be tied up on operations in the colonies. The 
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study group also recommended the creation of a Strategic Reserve in the UK. This had been 
discussed for some time as a solution to the problem of reinforcing local garrisons at short 
notice to snuff out any disturbance before it became a major emergency or for limited war 
operations. On 26 April, Julian Amery wrote to Tucker for his views on the League’s 
proposals for an imperial gendarmerie.
500
 Tucker argued that the cost of training an ‘imperial 
police’ would be as much or more than  the costs  involved in providing regulars and it was 
much better to train and pay local men to police specific areas. Tucker, a retired Indian Army 
officer, urged Amery to use the empirical experience of policing India, which had seen ‘the 
most successful experiment in administering a huge country by a few foreigners the world has 
yet seen’ as a template for dealing with the Mau Mau and the Malaya communists, whom he 
dismissed as inconsequential compared to the ‘terrible potentialities’ that had been present in 
India. Amery had also circulated a memorandum from Tucker in March which had stated, that 
it was ‘ridiculous’ that British troops were being used in Kenya ‘to settle internal unrest’ and 
questioned when more colonial troops would be raised to ‘save money’ and ‘replace our men 
overseas and save manpower’.501 A re-occurring theme within conservative and right wing 
writings on the strategic implications of the Empire at this time is the apparent lack of control 
and planning of utilising resources to retain the British sphere of influence and the power that 
flowed from it. Unlike in the past, when a short sharp campaign would inflict a lesson and 
ensure submissiveness by indigenous peoples, such a course of action would have brought 
international and domestic condemnation in the 1950s.  
 
Suez Canal Base  
 
 
On 27 March Julian Amery circulated a five page paper on the Suez Canal Base.
502
 Since the 
start of the crisis in the Canal Zone Julian Amery had become one of the most vocal 
opponents of coming to a compromise with the Egyptian Government within the 
Conservative Parliamentary Party. His position was that the base was vital to Commonwealth 
security and could not be abandoned at any cost.  The paper argued that the Suez Canal Base 
served several strategic purposes; it was the main base for the defence of the Middle East 
against Soviet attack; it was the strong point underpinning all other British bases and treaties 
in the Middle East.  The paper also noted that it protected East-West communications and the 
oil supplies. Amery believed that the base protected British possessions in Africa and was 
vital to defend India and Pakistan from Soviet attack. The paper argued the Indian and 
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Pakistani Governments attached great importance to the maintenance of the base. Amery 
dismissed other alternatives like Cyprus or the Gaza strip as being inadequate. He argued that 
the cost of replacing the bases facilities made the transfer to any other location impracticable 
and too costly. He was convinced that once British forces left the base the Canal would be 
subject to sabotage. Amery argued that ‘Egyptian hostility’ had not seriously disrupted the 
base’s operational status and that the ‘base can function at very little cost to British lives’. 
But, he did acknowledge that the withdrawal of Egyptian labour from the base zone had 
created problems.
503
 By 1952 the garrison numbered 80,000 troops. Amery argued that this 
was sustainable in the short-term but needed to be ‘addressed’. His solution was to achieve a 
negotiated agreement or if this was not possible, which increasingly looked the case, by 
‘imposing’ a settlement on the Egyptian Government. This ‘settlement’ would remove the 
Canal Zone from Egyptian sovereignty and into a ‘trustee territory’ run by the British. By 
1954 Julian Amery and his fellow members of the Suez Group were opposed to any sort of 
agreement with the Egyptian Government which did not include the continuing presence of 
British troops in the Canal Zone.  
 
On 16 June the study group met to discuss the Canal Zone and Julian Amery’s paper.504 
However, Julian Amery did not record the discussion or any remarks concerning his paper it 
just gives a brief summation of the agenda. This practice of heavily editing the  record of 
study group discussions appears to have been a deliberate ploy by Amery to protect the 
member’s thoughts and disagreements on contentious issues from being scrutinised by non 
members. We know that Lindsell was in favour of retaining the Canal Zone because he wrote 
article for the Brassey’s Defence Annual in 1954 calling on the British Government to retain 
the base.
505
 Liddell Hart’s copy of the paper has accompanying notes or annotations on the 
subject of the Canal Base.
506
 Predictably, Leo Amery supported Julian Amery’s position on 
the base. On 5 March Paget disagreed with Julian Amery in the House of Commons over the 
viability of the base if it was permanently under siege.
507
 On 29 July 1954 during the Suez 
Canal Zone Anglo-Egyptian agreement debate in the House of Commons Paget stated that the 
British should have evacuated the zone in 1952.
508
 Wyatt’s position on the Canal Zone was 
ambiguous. His attitude was that the base was vital to Western security and should be retained 
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but he favoured a negotiated settlement.
509
 Like Paget he poured scorn on Amery and the 
other members of the Suez Group for their obdurate position on the Canal Zone Base. The 
Government argued that the advent of the thermo-nuclear weapons had rendered a large static 
base area like the Canal Zone vulnerable to attack which had contributed to their decision to 
withdraw. Julian Amery used the debate to argue that the Government’s position was not 
plausible, because it assumed that all bases, including those in the UK, were now 
indefensible.
510
 The substance of Amery’s argument was that the base fulfilled a vital 
strategic role within the Cold War, was a symbol of British prestige in the Middle East and 
Africa and guaranteed the cohesion of the Commonwealth both in peace and war. However, 
the vast base was configured and intended for use in Hot War. On 9 February the COS 
calculated that there were 11,000 vehicles, 1,000 units of rolling stock (including 
locomotives) and half million tons of stores in Canal Zone which covered a vast area of 
several hundred square miles.
511
 Amery was quite right to state that the withdraw from the 
Canal Zone was a failure of British foreign policy to reach a rapprochement with Egyptian 
Government but his prescription for the problem was the use of force and covert agitation to 
deal with Egyptian intransigence which was a solution more applicable to the period of 
Splendid Isolation than the realities of a Cold War. The international system was dominated 
by the Soviet Union and the United States and without America support the British position 
was untenable. Although, Amery and other Conservative MPs were calling for the 
Government to adopt a realpolitik solution to the problem, any military action designed to 
remain in the Canal Zone after 1956 would breach international law.   
 
However, the implications of the blockade of the Canal Zone and fact that 80,000 British 
troops were needed to defend the base presented a major problem for those who were 
advocating its retention. Either a political settlement was needed or a large garrison in a state 
of permanent siege would be required for an indefinite period. On 8 April Lord Alexander, 
Minister of Defence, stated that it might be possible to retain a minimum garrison of 15,000 
in the Canal Zone but only if the size of the base area was drastically reduced.
512
 Defence of 
the Canal Zone was becoming a drain on already overstretched manpower resources. It was 
Government policy to gradually decrease the size of the Army by reducing overseas 
commitments.
513
 However, this only amounted to a reduction of 15,000 over two years. There 
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were also no plans to reduce national service which was providing much of the manpower 
needed to maintain overseas commitments. By 1954 the Army had 218,000 national 
servicemen serving for a period of two years. The Regular Army had strength of 234,000. 
With the Army’s overseas commitments requiring a manpower commitment of 454,000 it 
appeared that national service would become a permanent feature of post-war society. 
Although, conscription was widely accepted by the public as a necessary condition of the 
Cold War there were concerns among some politicians about the length of service and the fact 
that conscripts were being used in Egypt, Malaya, Korea and Kenya on active operations.
514
 A 
reduction in the length of service of six months would effectively stop conscripts from 
serving in the Far East and one of twelve months in the Middle East. However, utilising 
another source of manpower would allow a reduction in the length of service of national 
service or even see its abolition which politically was an attract proposition, because 
peacetime conscription was grudgingly tolerated by the public.  
 
An African Army 
 
 
On 3 July Julian Amery circulated a paper on using Africa manpower to create an ‘Imperial 
Africa Army’.515 As early as November 1951, Julian Amery had written  to Anthony Head, 
the new Secretary of State for War, setting out a proposal for an increase in East African 
forces.
516
 The Leo and Julian Amery proposed greater use of manpower from colonies 
arguing that the strategic needs of the Middle East, Far East and Africa could be met by 
utilising this great resource. There was nothing new in this idea, which had been a feature of 
the British manpower debate since the expansion of the Empire in the mid-nineteenth 
century.
517
 In 1949, the COS undertook a comprehensive review of colonial forces which 
formed the basis of a post-war policy.
518
 This review argued that the WO should retain control 
and administration of regular colonial forces and that they be organised for rapid expansion 
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during a major conflict. The primary function of the colonial forces was internal security and 
local defence. On this basis colonial Governments paid for forces equipped and trained for 
internal security whilst the WO from their estimate covered the costs of headquarters units or 
forces equipped for imperial defence. In 1950, COS argued that the further use of colonial 
forces to relieve British manpower was not possible or practicable.
519
 In 1951 Slim had 
argued that it was impossible to produce quickly African formations capable of holding their 
own in battle against a well-equipped enemy but they could possibly  be used in Cold War 
operations.
520
 Slim noted that this would be possible as a long-term project if schools and a 
programme of education for indigenous NCOs were developed which would mitigate the fact 
that nearly all African soldiers had no or very little education on entry to colonial forces. In 
the late 1940s and early 1950s there was a shortage of experienced British officers and NCOs 
on the establishments of colonial forces and this problem was often used as a reason why it 
was impossible to increase the number of colonial forces. Slim stated that it would be possible 
to create two divisions, one from West Africa and another from East Africa, but because of 
the problems associated with education and training the costs of such forces would mean that 
they would be more expensive than the equivalent British troops.  
 
On 21 May 1951 John Strachey, Secretary of State for War, noted that the WO thought that 
‘colonial recruits did not settle down well in the Army’.521 However, Strachey did make a 
prescient observation that direct recruiting for the British Army in the colonies ‘might 
interfere with recruitment to local colonial forces’. Considering the perceived weakness of 
colonial forces, and the fact that as early as 1949 COS had identified a requirement to 
strengthen the internal security capability of colonial forces, denuding them of their best 
personnel would have seriously undermined this policy. There was a perception in the press at 
that time that the Kings African Rifles (KAR) could be expanded and that West African 
forces would be available in the future, but as the Observer defence correspondent noted on 
18 February 1951 ‘strong resistance from African nationalist leaders’ was being generated to 
the operational deployment of African colonial forces to Malaya or the Middle East.
522
 This 
adverse political dimension was beginning to impact on British imperial policy 
considerations. Additionally, battalions of the KAR which were recruited in Tanganyika were 
also prohibited from service outside of East Africa by the UN utilising exclusion clauses 
imposed by the conditions of the Mandate and the Trust.
523
 A subsequent report produced by 
                                                 
519
 CO 537/5323, 14504/66/50, ‘Planning for the use of manpower in the colonies in a major war’, 
December 1950.  
520
 CO 573/6829, COS (51) 45, ‘Use of Colonial Manpower in Cold War’  
521
 CO 573/6829,’Recruitment of Colonials to the Armed Forces’, 21 May 1951.   
522
 The Observer ‘African Army Proposals’, 18 February 1951 p8.  
523
 Clayton, A. and Killingray, D. (1989) p256.   
 161 
the Standing Committee of Service Ministers in March 1951 rejected the direct recruitment of 
colonial subjects to UK forces on the grounds that those found to be medically unfit on arrival 
in the UK prior to training or on discharge, on completion of service, would present 
difficulties during resettlement because they might choose to ‘remain’ in the UK. They stated 
that this would add ‘to the problems presented by the colonial people already in Great 
Britain’.524 In 1952 another study had been undertaken in the MOD because of repeated calls 
in the Houses of Parliament that the Government make greater use of colonial manpower in 
the services.
525
 This report noted that ‘non-Europeans’ were not excluded from seeking direct 
entry but there were several conditions which had to be met before such an individual could 
be considered; that they attained the requisite standards; satisfy the authorities that they were 
likely to hold their own in the corporate life of the Services; and were resident in this country. 
Obviously the last condition presented a problem unless the recruit had already arrived in the 
UK. Additionally any large-scale recruitment in the colonies or overseas would require an 
overseas recruiting team which was rejected in 1951 as being financially and politically 
impracticable.
526
 
 
On 13 July Julian Amery presented his paper on a African Army to the study group. He 
stated, ‘the basis for the argument for forming an African Army is that we have at present no 
strategic reserve because our only strategic reserve is tied up in the Suez Canal. It’s the kind 
of use that an African Army could serve’.527 Leo Amery considered that Britain’s present 
manpower problem to be ‘permanent’ ‘resulting partly from the loss of the Indian Army and 
from the change in the world balance of power and the rise of nationalism in Asia and 
Africa’. Pessimistically, he stated that ‘nor is the situation likely to improve by a détente in 
international affairs since this might lead to pressure at home for a reduction in the term of 
National Service. The question, therefore, arises: are we tapping all available sources of 
manpower for the Army?’ Increasing the amount of manpower for the Army from what 
Amery called ‘other sources’ would make the Army immune from ‘pressure at home’. Julian 
Amery thought that ‘doubts’ were being raised by industry, the public and the press about the 
value of the national service scheme because a wider perception was being created about the 
validity of conventional forces in the nuclear age. However, Leo and Julian Amery considered 
Africa to be the principal source of British strategic power in the Cold War. During the 
Second World War the African colonies had provided 374000 men for service in the armed 
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forces.
528
 Julian Amery also thought that if the international situation improved calls to reduce 
the length of national service would be hard to ignore.
529
 Information for his paper had been 
gained on a recent parliamentary trip to East and Central Africa where he had spoken to 
officers in the KAR and General Headquarters Nairobi. Amery stated that he had spoken to 
General Tucker in command of British forces in East Africa and ‘leading European 
politicians’ in central and East Africa about increasing the size of the African Army. Amery 
stated that ‘after what Walter Monckton, Minister of Labour and National Service 1951-1955, 
had said about the shortage of man-power in this country, the arguments for enlarging the 
Colonial Army would seem stronger than ever’. He calculated that it would be possible to 
raise three divisions in East Africa and two in West Africa which represented a threefold 
increase.  
 
The group discussed the political consequences of using African troops outside Africa. 
However, the question of overseas deployment and acquiring political agreement from 
African territories was considered to be a ‘minor stumbling’ block in comparison to the 
situation with the Gurkhas; this was because Leo Amery argued that Nehru, the Indian Prime 
minister, had been forced by the Indian Government to make assurances that there was no 
active recruitment of Indian nationals by the British for Gurkha units on Indian soil or that 
there would be.
530
 The force envisaged would be an African Army that would not be based on 
regional affiliations and nationalist Government’s which would circumvent local hostility to 
units serving outside of their regions. This was the case with West African forces which had 
not been permitted to serve in Malaya by the newly-formed nationalist Government.
531
 This 
was in contrast to the KAR which deployed in Malaya between 1950-52 as part of the British 
response to the emergency.
532
 Clayton and Killingray argue that the decision by the Western 
African governments to refuse the participation of their troops in Malaya effectively killed 
any idea of an ‘Imperial African’ army after 1952. Julian Amery argued that the cost of an 
African Army would have to be borne by the British; however, this allowed greater control 
over the force because most colonial forces were either partially or entirely financed by 
colonial Government’s which gave them some political control over ‘their forces’. Even 
though the West African Government had refused the use of their troops in Malaya Julian 
Amery considered the plan viable.  
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Leo Amery saw African manpower as a logical replacement for loss of the Indian Army 
which he argued was the main reason why Britain was hard-pressed to fulfil its post-war 
obligations. An African Army was the cornerstone of the Amery’s plans for solving Britain’s 
manpower problems. It was envisaged that the new army would duplicate the Indian Army. 
During the discussion Leo Amery, Paget and Wyatt developed a paternalistic argument which 
stated that Africans entering the service would be given an education and that this would be 
the basis for a new upwardly-mobile group in African society which, as Wyatt pointed out, is 
precisely what had happened with the men of the Indian Army.
533
 George Wigg, a Labour 
Party defence expert, consistently argued in this period for an African Army which could be 
used as a source of education and social change among Africans as well as a source of 
military manpower.
534
 The study group was very conscious about the post- colonial period 
which can be best inferred from this quote by Paget ‘one can’t build nations only of states’. 
They considered that one of the core groups in future African civic society would be British-
trained ex-servicemen, which presumably meant that they would be pro-British. There is 
some debate among historians whether service in the Armed forces in the Second World War 
had radicalised ex-servicemen increasing their interest in politics or support for nationalism 
and anti-colonialism.
535
 However, the Army that Julian Amery wanted to create would only 
have British officers and NCO’s who would serve with the force for their entire career. 
However, he did state that officers of the KAR had told him that their men did make good 
NCO’s and some were capable of gaining a commission. Killingray states that the idea of an 
African Army was shelved by the Conservatives when they came to power in 1951 because it 
would cost too much money and there were insufficient British Officers and NCOs 
available.
536
  
 
Similarly the extent to which service made the soldiers more pro-British is difficult to judge. 
Clayton notes that discipline and loyalty among the men serving in the KAR was not a issue 
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for the military authorities.
537
 However, Jackson notes that there was ‘tension and unrest’ 
among men who served in the Southern African High Commission Territories (HCT) units as 
labourers in Europe and the Middle East; there was much resentment over the different pay 
rates which existed between African and British soldiers; a lack of promotion, especially the 
nearly nonexistent potential for commissioning; issues about seniority between African NCOs 
and their British counterparts.
 538
 The abolition of corporal punishment did not occur in the 
African colonial forces until 1946. It had been abolished in the British army in 1881, except 
for where it ceased in 1907. Killingray notes that kinds of field punishment carried out in 
West African forces during the Second World War would not have been tolerated in the 
British Army, which in 1939 took over judicial and administrative responsibility for the 
colonial forces from the CO.
539
 Leo Amery also stated that white politicians within the 
Central African Federation and East Africa could additionally be attracted to the project 
because it would attract potential new settlers in the form of white Regular Army officers and 
NCOs who would increase their communities by bringing their families with them. Paget 
argued that it was essential to have a counter-balance to the existing white settler population 
over the issue of ‘federation’. Leo Amery argued that ‘an element of ex-servicemen settled 
among the ordinary settlers and bringing wider responsibilities could be invaluable’. The 
secondment of serving British officers and NCOs within the control mechanisms of the 
security and defence organisations would have possibly allowed the British more control of 
this key political area and a source of white settler power. The other factor was that the 
British officers would have commanded African troops which could have constituted a 
powerful block on any unilateral nationalistic aspirations. The comments made by Amery and 
Paget could also be construed to mean that a fresh input of new British colonists would 
increase pro-British sentiment within Central and Eastern Africa and dilute increasingly South 
African white supremacism which was on the increase in Southern Rhodesia.   
 
It was also agreed in theory that an African Army might be raised alongside a British Regular 
Army,
540
 the implication of this statement being that the African forces would act as 
additional manpower for use in Africa for counter-insurgency operations and as a 
consequence conscription could be dispensed with. This they, considered, had merit in two 
ways: first it meant that equipment costs could be minimised as the African units would be 
lightly armed and therefore initial expenditure would be reduced. Secondly, the pay costs 
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involved for African troops would be greatly less than those for British personnel which 
meant that a division of African troops was potentially more cost-effective than British 
troops. Additionally, African troops would be restricted to operational areas outside Europe, 
where European troops needed time to acclimatise, such as in the Far East or Middle East. 
This would reduce movement costs which were considered to be excessive and mean that 
more troops were available in theatre. The study group estimated that at any one time at least 
30,000 British troops were in transit either by land, air or sea as a consequence of diverse 
overseas commitments. The League concluded that having large static African units based in 
close proximity to their operational areas would be advantageous in reducing the cost and 
waste of manpower in transit. The Julian Amery argued that the creation of a minimum of 
three African divisions would be of immense political, economic and military value both in 
the short and long-term for the British government. Nevertheless, Leo Amery would lament 
that ‘the formation of an African Army would not, of course take the place of the old Indian 
Army. For one thing, we should have to pay for it’.541 Clearly a committed imperialist like 
Amery would make a statement like this, especially as the Indians had been fiscally liable for 
‘their’ own defence until 1939. 
 
Whether Amery was advocating the creation of a system of paramountcy similar to that which 
had existed in India in the African colonies is uncertain, but this ‘new’ African Empire was to 
be used to raise manpower and raw materials for military use and retain British prestige and 
global power.  This arrangement would have necessitated the ‘co-operation’ of the indigenous 
population, and more importantly that of their elites and the suppression of anti-British 
nationalism. This latter consideration is troubling because the League were pragmatic enough 
to realise that constitutional development was a key political consideration but they appeared 
to be advocating the creation of a state within a state based on military hegemony. The KAR 
were recruited across East and Central Africa with the recruits being garrisoned in different 
territories from their enlistment areas after basic training.
542
 Traditionally tribal, religious and 
regional differences were exploited to ensure that local sympathies would not detract from the 
soldier’s loyalty to the British. An African Army would and could have asserted powerful 
political influence for the British. It was a logical step to advocate an African Army both for 
internal security duties in colonies and for deployment in the Middle East and Far East. 
Whether such an Army would have been able to maintain internal stability against widespread 
anti-colonialism or nationalism in Africa is doubtful.  The Julian Amery argued that the 
present nexus of strategic bases could be retained and garrisoned by regional Strategic 
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Reserves both of indigenous and British troops. Exponents of African manpower argued that 
they would make excellent light infantry. The primary role envisaged for light infantry in this 
period was for use in Cold War operations in a counter-insurgency role; elements of the KAR 
did serve in Malaya during the emergency and in Kenya against the Mau Mau as light 
infantry where they gained a very good reputation as practitioners of jungle warfare.
543
 A 
large-scale building programme would have been necessary to construct training facilities in 
Africa or alternatively large numbers of recruits would have to be moved to the UK for 
training. Both these options were expensive and there were issues regarding the health of 
African recruits in a Northern European climate because of empirical experience gained in the 
First and Second World Wars showing that they were susceptible to influenza and other 
related viral diseases associated with the winter months.  
 
The use of African troops appeared to be the panacea which would solve the manpower 
problem and reduce conscription. Julian Amery considered the creation of an Imperial 
African Army a vital policy which would have eased many of the UK’s strategic problems in 
the Middle East, Far East and Africa. It was decided that the idea of an imperial African 
Army should be included in any final report the League published. There is no record of 
another study group meeting taking place in 1953. By March 1954 Julian Amery had prepared 
a draft copy of the What Kind Of An Army do we Need? It was decided that the report should 
be published the following year. By November Liddell Hart had prepared additional material 
on nuclear war and its effect on defence policy which was passed on to the study group.
544
 
Liddell Hart’s questioned the logic of British defence planning which was overwhelmingly 
dominated by ‘atomic and thermo-nuclear weapons’ use. He argued that the ‘super 
revolutionary’ effects of the ‘H-bomb’ had created a gap between planning for conventional 
defence and massive retaliation. Liddell Hart argued that once the H-bomb had been used all 
forms of warfare would probably cease. He concluded that the concept of broken backed 
warfare was essentially redundant. As he pointed out five H-bombs would be sufficient to 
totally destroy all the centres of industry while killing or injuring half the population in the 
UK. He calculated that the effect of such a strike on the UK might be sufficient to cause 
‘paralysis and collapse’ across the rest of Western Europe without the Soviets having to use 
atomic weapons on our allies. NATO policy in 1954 was based on the concept of massive 
retaliation. It was envisaged that tactical nuclear weapons could be deployed to counter the 
larger Soviet conventional forces. Liddell Hart was concerned that this nuclear exchange 
would not be limited to the battlefield but would be used against civilian and industrial targets 
and would spiral out of control to the point where thermo-nuclear weapons would be 
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deployed. At this point he argued mutual suicide had occurred.  He went as far as to suggest 
that NATO remove all its tactical nuclear weapons because the temptation to use a ‘new toy’ 
would risk increasing all out nuclear exchange.   
 
However, he thought that both sides could now use this situation to induce a ‘rational 
reluctance to launch a suicide retort’. In his opinion this would allow increased scope for 
aggression that ‘shrewdly limits it aims and actions’. Under such circumstances NATO’s 
conventional forces needed to large enough and technically strong enough to be able to deal 
with a Soviet assault with depending on tactical nuclear weapons. In his opinion NATO 
conventional forces had become a ‘supplement’ to the deterrent and were seen as an 
economic burden. However, Liddell Hart argued that the most likely form of aggression was 
‘political subversion with guerrilla action’. He wanted highly mobile and efficient ‘fire 
brigade’ units and an ‘extensive gendarmerie’ to deal with this problem. In his opinion short 
service conscripts were not suited to this type of war. This reflected Liddell Hart’s aversion 
for conscription and his advocacy of highly trained and equipped mobile armoured forces. He 
argued that a European Home Guard should be created which could supply manpower for 
local defence and be a more practicable reinforcement to active forces than reserve units 
whose mobilization and transportation would be subject to ‘bomb-disruption’. This was the 
last paper circulated to the study group before Julian Amery began writing the League’s first 
report of the Cold War.  
 
On 8 December 1954 the League Council met to discuss the possible publication of the draft 
report. Hore-Belisha stated that he thought that the League had not been supporting the Army 
and should include information about nuclear weapons and the EDC within the report.
545
 He 
also stated that he had read the draft report which he thought was a valuable document but he 
was concerned that it would be out of date by the time it was published. In his opinion the 
League needed to state the case of the Army which he obviously thought it was not doing. 
Leo Amery countered that the League needed publish its report and then ‘recreate itself’ as a 
larger movement. Julian Amery pointed out that he was talking to Head about gaining support 
for the League from the WO but had not received a ‘satisfactory reply’. It was agreed that 
Julian Amery should attempt to ‘whip up support’ for the League in the Commons and find 
‘active supporters’ of the Army who might be prepared to ‘throw their weight behind’ it.546 It 
was at this point that Julian Amery said that he would speak to Harold Macmillan, Minister of 
Defence, on the ‘whole question of the recreation of the army League’. On 16 December 1954 
Julian Amery wrote to his father in law Harold Macmillan about the League study group and 
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enclosed Liddell Hart’s paper on nuclear weapons and it effect on conventional defence 
policy.
547
 The letter merely stated that Amery was secretary of the League which was thinking 
about publishing a paper on the Army. However, he was more concerned to get Macmillan to 
look at Liddell Hart’s paper on need to retain conventional forces rather than concentrate on 
the nuclear deterrent. On 20 December Macmillan wrote back stating that Liddell Hart’s 
paper over simplified the problem but he thought that it raised interesting questions 
concerning a future ‘stalemate situation’ when both sides had nuclear parity.548 There was no 
reference in letter to the League or its activities. It is possible that they spoke privately about 
the League over the Christmas period but there is no record in Julian Amery’s diary of a 
conversation about the League or any more letters on the subject within their respective 
archives. In fact, this is the only correspondence on military matters in the Macmillan’s 
papers between Julian Amery and Macmillan.  
 
Members of the study group began scrutinising the report and making recommendations.  Sir 
Desmond Morton had joined the League at the beginning of 1954 and prepared a brief 
analysis of the draft report.
549
 Morton was concerned that the report made far too many 
assumptions about the number of Western superiority nuclear weapons that might ‘not be 
true’. He considered this to be inadvisable and he wanted references to bacteriological 
weapons removed for ‘reasons of prudence’. However, the most important contribution was 
received from Liddell Hart. Liddell Hart considered Morton’s belief that the West had fewer 
nuclear weapons was an import point which needed emphasising.
550
 Liddell Hart wanted all 
suggestion of the possibility of winning a war in the H-bomb era removed.
551
 He was 
concerned that much of the information on Soviet force numbers was out of date and needed 
revising upwards. Julian Amery had linked the loss of the Middle East in the same order of 
importance as the loss of Central Europe. Liddell Hart disagreed with this because the loss of 
Central Europe was in his opinion decisive, while the loss of the Middle East was serious. He 
did not want conventional and tactical nuclear weapons linked in any way because tactical 
nuclear weapons should not be considered a normal weapon ‘on any definition’. The report 
advocated the concept of broken backed warfare; however, Liddell Hart argued that it was 
now completely redundant since the advent of the H-bomb. He was also concerned that the 
Suez Canal Zone Base and Singapore were described as ‘vital land bases’. Liddell Hart’s 
ideas concerning the revolutionary aspect of nuclear weapons on conventional defence were 
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significant enough for the title of the report to be renamed The Army in the Nuclear Age a 
Report by the Army League Study Group. On 30 November Tucker wrote a letter to Julian 
Amery about the draft report.
552
 Tucker focused on the need of the report to reiterate the 
necessity for a permanent continental commitment. He also argued that by the time NATO 
had examined the whole problem of nuclear warfare it then would be appropriate for the 
Government to decide on the type of formations an army needs for the future. On the question 
of imperial security he wanted the report to emphasise the need for SAS type units and armed 
imperial police organization skilled in guerrilla work. He also thought that a better imperial 
police intelligence network should be developed to identify and contain security threats 
before the army was needed to deal with it.  
 
On 21 December Julian Amery circulated a letter stating that he would revise the report 
adding the different points raised by members.
553
  However, Julian Amery went away on 
business to Rhodesia for the whole of January 1955 which meant that no work was done on 
revising the report. On 6 January Major General the Viscount  Bridgeman, the former 
Conservative Defence spokesman in the House of Lords  wrote to Faviell stating that he had 
attended a League meeting in November ‘as requested’.554 Bridgeman stated that he written to 
the secretary of the League regarding its future activity after the meeting, but had heard 
nothing back. He also told Faviell that he thought the League was not being resurrected as he 
had been led to believe. This of course coincided with  Julian Amery’s business trip to Africa 
which might account for his lack of response. It also reflects the fact that the League was still 
closely associated with the Amerys’ and Liddell Hart. Over the next few months Julian 
Amery began writing the final draft of the report. On 23 March 1955 the League’s Council 
released £1000 toward the publication costs of the final report.
555
 However, in April Churchill 
resigned and the new Prime Minister, Eden, called a general election. This of course put back 
all work on completion of the report because Julian Amery was campaigning for his seat in 
Preston. The most contentious defence issues in the campaign were whether the length of 
national service should be drastically reduced or even abolished and the effect of the H-bomb 
on the international situation.
556
 The Conservative position on national service was that should 
not be reduced until after disarmament talks at Geneva took place in July. Reducing the 
length of service became a central election pledge of the Labour Party during the election. On 
26 May the Conservatives won the election securing a majority of 61.  
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In May Julian Amery sent a draft copy of the report to the WO for their opinion. On 14 June 
Fitzroy Maclean, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for War, wrote back to confirm that 
Harold Macmillan had read the report and it had been studied by officials at the Ministry of 
Defence (MOD) and ‘was being considered’. 557 However, there is no record of there being an 
official study in the WO or MOD files or a record of their appraisal being received by Julian 
Amery. On 28 May Harold Macmillan became Foreign Secretary which closed one direct 
avenue of approach for Julian Amery and the study group to the MOD and WO. The new 
Minister of Defence was Selwyn Lloyd, and Head remained as Minister of War. On 19 July 
the League Council held a meeting to discuss who should publish the report.
558
 It was decided 
that J H Leach a retired businessman with connections in printing industry should be 
approached about managing the project. Leach agreed and was placed in charge of publishing 
the report. 
 
On 20 July Julian Amery and Liddell Hart, who had been invited by Amery, had lunch with 
Selwyn Lloyd.
559
 Lloyd did not record what was said but he noted that they had a ‘long talk’. 
Clearly Amery’s decision to bring along Liddell Hart must have meant that the subject of 
defence was discussed. We can construe that Amery was using the lunch to lobby Selwyn 
Lloyd about something. This kind of personal lobbying was accepted part of political culture 
in the 1950s. At this point the League had not found a public relations company to advise 
them on their publicity campaign for the reports launch. However, it was decided to use the 
public relations firm Voice and Vision Ltd. Voice and Vision Ltd which was a subsidiary of 
Colman, Prentis and Varley. Colman, Prentis and Varley had advised the Conservative Party 
and Army for many years on advertising and public relations.
560
 On 28 July John Metcalf 
from Voice and Vision wrote to Beddington-Behrens stating that he had read the report but 
wanted the League to make some changes.
561
 He stated, ‘with an opposition attack on the 
length of National Service already brewing up I should like to see a closer analysis of reasons 
for the present period of National Service, its value to the country and so on. Need it remain 
at two years? Could it be brought down?’ This was a problem for the study group because its 
stance on conscription was ambiguous and divided. Liddell Hart was opposed to conscription 
by wanted the Army to have at least 11 divisions which required 400,000 men. The Amerys’ 
supported  national service  but thought it should be reduced and used for home defence. This 
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is why the League argued for the creation of an imperial Africa Army because it appeared to 
guarantee a source of plentiful manpower during the Cold War. On 2 August Leach wrote to 
Julian Amery telling him that the study group needed to incorporate Metcalf’s ideas into the 
report before publication.
562
 However, on 9 August Julian Amery wrote to Metcalf stating 
‘National Service is of course political dynamite just now and I rather doubt whether we can 
get the study group to make any great pronouncement on it. I am inclined, therefore, to add 
nothing to the report on that score’.563 On 25 August John Metcalf wrote to Amery stating that 
he thought that the report would either make no money or a loss.
564
  
 
It was decided that the report should be published in November to coincide with the new 
legislative year. Over the winter Leo Amery had been making suggestions about the final 
shape of the report to Julian Amery.
565
 Leo Amery thought that NATO would hesitate to use 
nuclear weapons against Western European cities which had been overrun by Soviets forces. 
He thought that it was essential that the report emphasised this uncertainty about using 
nuclear to explain why it was important to have large conventional force levels. On the wider 
strategic questions he argued that once NATO forces had been fully reconstituted it would be 
possible to turn the British commitment in Germany into a purely training component and 
allow the regular army to concentrate on the Middle East and Africa in the future. However, 
on 16 September Leo Amery died peacefully in his sleep at112 Eaton square aged 81. The 
report was published on 11 November 1955.  
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Chapter Five: Army League Report 1955 
 
 
The League’s Report had taken four years to prepare. It set out a vision for the Army which 
reflected the strategic problems and technological advances that had occurred in that period. 
The report was divided into nine sections and was forty pages long.
566
 It also contained three 
annex’s one by Liddell Hart on the divisional slice and reducing the tail; another by General 
Westphal on the same subject and third by Colonel Slone of the US Army on the American 
division. All of these papers had been circulated in 1951 when the study group were 
discussing the divisional slice. The first section posed the question is an army really 
necessary; the second looked at the tasks of the British army; the third the world distribution 
of military power; the fourth the British contribution; the fifth and sixth argued ‘can’ the army 
be strengthened; the seventh what kind of army do we need; the eighth the pattern of 
commonwealth defence; the ninth was a summary and conclusions.   
 
The first section discussed the advent of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons which the 
report stated had transformed the pattern of warfare. It pessimistically noted that the USA and 
the USSR would in due course have enough H-bombs to destroy civilisation. It warned that a 
saturation point would soon be passed which would confer no advantage to either side. It 
noted that the Soviet union need not have as many thermo-nuclear weapons as the West 
because the US Air Defence Command calculated that just 50 was enough to paralyse the 
United States. The study group calculated that as little as 12 thermo-nuclear bombs would 
destroy all organised resistance in the UK. It also noted that there was no real defence against 
this type of attack and that one out of four bombers might be intercepted. They argued that the 
supremacy of the offensive over the defensive might last for a considerable time.
567
 Under 
such circumstance they thought that total war ‘would offer the probability of almost total 
destruction for all participants’. If this was the case they posed the question are ground forces 
any longer any use. In the opinion of the study group the answer was yes, because there 
would be an inevitable increase limited wars and ‘local acts of aggression’. Although, nuclear 
weapons acted as deterrent against a general war they expected the Soviets and Chinese to 
overrun ‘undefended territory’ and present the West with a ‘fait accompli’. Under such 
circumstances it would be highly unlikely that the West would risk total war to regain 
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occupied territory. Under such circumstances the Communists might attempt the ‘piecemeal 
destruction of the Free World by local and limited acts of aggression’.568  
 
The report argued that the Soviets might gamble that if Western conventional forces in 
Europe were weak it might be possible to overrun the continent and break down the 
‘American will to go on fighting’. They also argued that Western forces might not use nuclear 
weapons against occupied territory. Under such circumstances the h-bomb was not an 
effective deterrent without adequate conventional forces. However, they noted that if Western 
forces could hold Soviet aggression it might be possible to use the threat of thermo-nuclear 
attack as a means to end the fighting. The report also argued that it might be possible to ‘win’ 
a thermo-nuclear exchange if your state had the ‘superior survival value’. However, this was 
based on the assumption that the scale of destruction would be crippling and require many 
years of reconstruction. But, if the West was to prepare its population, infrastructure and 
resources to limit the extent of damage it might be possible to emerge from a nuclear as an 
‘effective fighting force’. Under such circumstances the report argued that ground forces, 
civil defence and internal security had an essential role to play in a thermo-nuclear war. They 
considered the likelihood of a major war as slight but noted that the natural ‘extension of 
politics’ will be the promotion of subversion, revolutionary movements and civil war in 
opponent’s territory during the Cold War. However, the report argued that the scale of these 
‘insurrections’ might develop on an ‘unprecedented scale’ which would require large numbers 
of ground troops to maintain internal security. The report wanted a specialist reserve created 
which could be used as fire brigade to rapidly deal with ‘emergencies’ before they developed 
in to major counter-insurgency operations.      
 
In the next section ‘on the tasks of the British Army’ the report noted that most of the 
countries of the British Commonwealth have no land frontiers with the exception of Canada 
which was closely allied to the United States. It concluded that the Africa colonies ‘are so 
remote as to be scarcely in danger of overland attack’. Malaya could be securely held if the 
isthmus of Kra was secured against land attack. However, it noted that many of the countries 
in the Middle East which Britain was responsible for protecting had long land frontiers. But 
Middle Eastern terrain presents a formidable obstacle to a potential attacker. It concluded that 
British Commonwealth can only be successfully attacked by a power or group of powers 
strong enough at sea or in the air to invade them. They argued that the British and 
Commonwealth defence effort should focus on a combination of sea and air power which was 
calculated to prevent invasion and the bombing of vital centres of population and 
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production.
569
 The report reiterated the historical first task of the British army to provide an 
‘adequate organisation’ for the land defence of the UK. The next task was to ‘provide similar 
garrisons to assure the land defence and the internal security of the main bases on the 
Commonwealth lines of communications’. Because of improvements in aircraft range the 
report argued that everywhere was becoming the front line. The report noted that future 
development in rockets and guided missiles made it essential that Soviets were denied 
launching sites which would threaten the British Isles and Commonwealth countries from 
attack. They argued that it was essential to create ‘situations of strength on the main 
approaches to our territories or essential interests’. These included Central and Western 
Europe which the report described as the ‘glacis to our island defence’; the Middle Eastern 
approaches to the oilfields, the Suez Canal and Africa; and the South East Asian approaches 
to India, Malaya and Australasia. These were depicted as ‘the keys to the struggle for the 
world’.  
 
However, these situations of strength required ‘alliances’ and the ‘creation of collective 
military organisations’. The report argued that if Britain wished to retain influence within 
these collective organisations ‘she must be prepared to make an adequate contribution to 
them’. Because of this the British needed to provide in peacetime a requisite number of 
ground forces to maintain regional defence systems. However, the report pointed out that 
manpower and economic constraints and the need to maintain strong naval and air forces 
placed a limitation on the size of the Army. The Army also had to train the population for 
Home and Civil defence which was an additional pressure. The size of the British army was 
placed in context against the distribution of military power across the world. The principle 
threat was the Soviet Union, China and the Eastern European satellites. The report admitted 
that it was impossible ‘to establish accurate statistical standards of comparison between the 
armies of the different powers’.570 Also they noted that differences of organisation, 
equipment, morale, training and ‘natural fighting quality’ make it extremely difficult to 
compare armies. The report estimated Soviet land forces strength at 3,200,000 or 175 active 
divisions and 40 artillery and anti air-craft and 125 reserve divisions; the Soviet satellites 
1,210,000 or 60-80 active divisions and 20 reserve; China 2,500,000 or 80 active divisions. 
The total Communist forces were 6,910,000 and 480 divisions. The report calculated the 
strength of the ‘free world’ at 3,660,000 and 214 divisions. The largest Western power was 
the United States which had 1,500,000 and 20 active divisions and 27 reserve divisions. In 
total Western Europe strength was 1,676,500 which included 436,500 British troops. In the 
Far East the League calculated that there were 900,000 South Korean and Formosan troops. 
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The West could also rely on 500,000 ‘Balkan’ troops.  The report calculated that the 
Commonwealth could provide 250,000 troops.  
 
The report argued it was important that Japan and West Germany rearmed as rapidly as 
possible. It also wanted the ‘uncommitted’ nations such as India and Pakistan to be integrated 
into the Western security system. Pragmatically the report argued that although Communist 
forces were numerically superior it was important to note that there were manifest differences 
in equipment, training and morale which could distort the military situation. The ability to 
bring available strength to bear in particular area was considered to be essential to ensure that 
British interests were defended. The report argued that there were three main areas of 
strategic importance that warranted particular attention: Central Europe, Middle East and 
South East Asia. The report noted that there was a disparity of 92 divisions in Western and 
Central Europe in favour of Communist forces over those of the ‘free nations’. This disparity 
could only be reduced by NATO adopting the use the tactical nuclear weapon during the 
opening stages of a major war. The report noted that most ‘military authorities’ in the 
Western Europe argued that the minimum number of divisions required after three weeks of 
fighting would be 80. However, Lisbon had set a target of 50 by 1954 which had been ‘raised 
though no specific figure’ announced.571 The disparity would not be redressed after West 
German rearmament, because, as the report noted, there would be a shortfall of 20 divisions 
from the revised target.  The report concluded that NATO would no choice but to 
‘contemplate’ using tactical nuclear weapons to stop a Soviet attack.  
 
Defence of the Middle East presented many strategic problems. The report stated that there 
were no ‘estimates of the strength which the Soviets could deploy south of the Turco-Iranian 
mountain barrier’. It was assumed that geographical, climatic and supply difficulties would 
restrict Soviet forces to 15 divisions. West would have to disrupt ‘communications’ from the 
Transcaucasia which would further restrict Soviet deployment and resupply. The main forces 
in the region were the Turkish Army; however, the report argued that Pakistan ‘could’ send 
troops to assist the Persia Army and Iraqi forces. The report argued that South Africa and the 
Central African and East African colonies could provide forces for Middle Eastern defence in 
the event of a major war. In South East Asia the report again stated that it was difficult to 
assess the number of Chinese which would be deployed against allied forces. However, it 
argued that unlike in 1941 when Japanese forces had overrun Malaya and Burma the Chinese 
do not have local air and naval superiority. This would make the defence of Malaya easier. 
Because of the ongoing emergency in Malaya the British had 23 battalions which included 
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Gurkha and locally raised troops in the region. However, the report stated that without 
American and Indian military support it would not be possible to hold any territory north of 
the Kra Isthmus which included Burma and Thailand. Although, the report thought that the 
South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) was a move in the right direction, it argued 
without American support of ground forces it was ineffectual.  
 
The British contribution to the ‘strength of Free Nations’ was 11 active divisions and 11 
reserve divisions. The report argued that this ‘appeared substantial’, however, it then stated ‘a 
survey of their dispositions gives ground for anxiety rather than complacency’.572 The 
problem was that six active divisions were ‘absorbed on the maintenance of internal security 
in the Colonies, and guarding the main bases defending Commonwealth communications’. 
While 4 active divisions were based in Germany, plus one in reserve (in the UK) and two 
brigades were in Korea which were described as being available to oppose a ‘Soviet attack’. 
This meant that half of the active army was committed to fighting the Cold War or in 
‘essential garrison duties’. Optimistically the report argued that in ‘it may be possible in the 
next few months to overcome the insurrections in Malaya and Kenya altogether’. However, 
during a ‘major crisis’ it was expected that the internal security problem in the colonies would 
be ‘greater than today’. This meant that the question of apportioning manpower for internal 
security had to be carefully considered both in terms of the Cold War but also in a Hot War as 
well.  The report concluded that during a period of ‘dangerous international’ tension British 
forces would be tied down suppressing local insurrections rather than being available to 
defend against external attack. The reinforcement of the Middle East and South East Asia was 
assumed to be now more difficult because of the development of nuclear and thermo-nuclear 
weapons which would disrupt communication and transportation routes. Therefore, the report 
argued, traditional mobilisation schemes needed to be reconsidered. The solution to this 
problem was that Britain must in peacetime have two strategic reserves each of 2 divisions 
permanently  based  in the Middle East and South East Asia or ‘near these areas’. However, 
the report observed ‘at present such formations are not available. Our military power, as now 
organised, is, in fact, insufficient in the circumstances of modern warfare to underwrite our 
worldwide commitments’.573  
 
The report then provided the Government two choices; ‘either we could effect such changes 
in our Army as will make it an adequate instrument for the fulfilment of existing 
commitments’; or ‘we can reduce our commitments and conform to existing military 
limitations’.  Conversely, it stated that in latter case ‘Britain would cease to act as a world 
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power and would concentrate her strength in Europe and Africa. The political and economic 
consequences of such a course, however, would be momentous and incalculable.’ The 
economic benefits of remaining a world power were accessed as being more beneficial than 
reductions in ‘defence estimates’. The report concluded ‘our group has accordingly preferred 
to concentrate on the other alternative and consider the possibilities of increasing the strength 
of the Army without adding to its numbers. In this way, and this way alone, we can match our 
Army to our policy’. The report then discussed way in which the Army could be strengthened. 
However, the report pragmatically noted that it was impossible for the UK with its limited 
manpower resources to increase the size of the Army. Therefore, it stated, that the ‘central 
problem’ was increasing the number of fighting formations from available manpower 
recourses. However, the report revealed that their discussions had not reached a ‘final 
conclusion’ on how best to achieve this. This highlighted the disagreements which had arisen 
over Liddell Hart’s plan to reduce tail units. The report noted that since 1950 the divisional 
slice had been reduced from 42,000 to 38,500. However, the report stated that a special 
committee should be convened to look at war establishments and advise on structural 
reorganisation of the Army. The report also argued that entirely new approach to the 
‘problems of transport and equipment’ was needed. 
 
The structural reorganisation would be based on creating ‘economies in manpower’ within the 
framework of the ‘existing organisational structure’ of the Army. The report posed the 
question of whether brigades and Corps were still necessary. The report argued that Liddell 
Hart’s system of five would achieve considerable savings of manpower and increase the 
number of fighting formations. The better employment of available manpower resources was 
a central theme running through the report. The report estimated that there were 20-30,000 
men in transit at any given time. This they described as being in the ‘pipeline’. The solution to 
this problem was the ‘large scale development of air transport’. The report argued that all 
troops and their equipment, except tanks, should be flown from the UK to their main bases 
overseas. The use of air-transport was considered to be ‘swifter and thus more economical in 
manpower, as well as far less vulnerable either to infiltration and guerrilla techniques or to 
nuclear and thermo-nuclear bombing’. The report argued that the development of air transport 
would thus seem an essential element in any solution of the problem presented by the 
combination of our shortage of manpower and long lines of communication’. 574 The 
envisaged air transport fleet was to be strong enough to air lift a division at a time. The report 
wanted there to be additional air lift capacity developed in the commercial air transport sector 
by the Government, so the military air transport fleet could be rapidly expanded at the 
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beginning of a major war. The report recommended that the design of civil transport aircraft 
be supervised by the state to ensure that it could be quickly adapted for use by the military. 
On the question of whether the RAF or the Army should take over operational control of air 
transport, the report noted that the RAF was inclined to attribute more importance to strategic 
bombing and fighter interception requirements than transport.  
 
The need for simplification of equipment was also considered to be an import means of 
reducing manpower. The report argued that fighting formations were ‘overloaded’ with 
equipment which might be used in any ‘foreseeable circumstance’. However, this, they 
argued, increased difficulties associated with supply, maintenance and the provision of spare 
parts which in turn required additional manpower resources. The report recognised that the 
‘multiplicity of weapons has advantages’ but thought that to ‘cover everything tends to lead to 
the fatal mistake of not being strong enough anywhere’. This was Liddell Hart’s argument. 
The solution was to prepare ‘tailor-made’ units which were equipped and trained for 
operation in specific areas. This would allow a rationalization of weapons, tactics and 
organization to suit local conditions. The report noted that in the past there had been 
considerable resistance to the idea of specialisation because orthodox thinking argued that all 
formations needed to be trained and equipped for operations anywhere. However, the report 
argued that the validity of this argument had been greatly reduced by the advent of the h-
bomb which had made ‘it very doubtful whether it would ever be possible to move troops 
stationed in the Middle East or S.E. Asia to other theatres of operations’.575 The report 
recommended that all overseas strategic reserves should only be equipped and trained for 
warfare their respective regions.  
 
The next section looked at the question of finding additional manpower resources external to 
the UK to improve the ‘task of Commonwealth defence’. The report argued that the loss of 
the Indian Army had created many of the difficulties which the UK had meeting its overseas 
obligations. The report stated the only ‘major’ source of additional manpower were the 
African colonies. They noted that East and West Africa had produced 474,000 troops 
(including labour units) during the Second World War but in 1955 there were only 26,000 
men serving ‘under British command’. The report estimated that it was possible to expand 
this force and create four divisions (80,000 men). The report argued that this could only be 
achieved by increasing the amount of finance which came from the UK, because the African 
colonies would be unable to afford additional contributions. The construction of 
accommodation was also a problem due to the fact that there was a shortage of building 
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materials in Africa. However, the report argued that equipment was less of an issue, because 
African troops ‘did not require the most modern equipment’.576 The report argued that service 
in African forces for European officers and NCOs should be for life which was not the case at 
that time when officers and NCOs were on temporary secondment (usually three years or nine 
months for national servicemen). They argued that if a ‘lifetime’ career structure was adopted 
it would produce officers and NCOs who would be experts in ‘African conditions and 
languages’ which would ‘win the personal loyalty of their men’. However, European officers 
and NCOs would continue to receive additional training in the UK or with British Army units 
abroad. The report argued that incentives like tax free employment, higher standards of living 
and opportunities for sporting and outdoor pursuits would make service in an African Army 
an attractive proposition for respective recruits.  
 
On the question of the value of an African Army the report argued that it was ‘confidence in 
their officers’ which would increase efficiency and improve standards. The report admitted 
that officers of the KAR had stated that their men struggled with coming to terms with using 
the most modern equipment. On the question of making Africans officers it was noted that in 
West Africa were educational standards were higher this would be a more rapid process but in 
East Africa the numbers were ‘smaller’. It was also noted that Africans made good NCOs. 
This process was described as ‘dilution’ which would allow a reduction in the number 
European officers and NCOs within each unit. The report argued that if formations contained 
a fixed component of British troops, like the Indian Army, it might be possible to field 
African formations against any enemy. If was not the case African troops could be employed 
as garrison troops in the Middle East or in counter insurgency operations in Kenya and 
Malaya. On the question of political control the report argued that forces raised in East Africa 
could be directly controlled by the WO. However, West African forces could not, because the 
Gold Coast and Nigeria were ‘so far advanced towards self-government’ that defence issues 
could not remain ‘a reserved matter’. The report concluded that this would appear to make the 
formation of forces from West Africa doubtful. However the report argued that it would be 
many years before Africanization would be complete meaning that West African forces 
would require British assistance. This could be used to conclude agreements which might 
allow the deployment of West African forces outside their territories. The report cited the 
example of Nepal and India were an agreement was reached for the recruitment of manpower. 
Similarly, they argued that the nascent Central African Federation might also be ‘convinced’ 
to employ their forces outside their territories.
577
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The report argued that ‘European leaders’ in East and Central Africa ‘seemed ready to 
support an expansion of an African Army’, and ‘they show little anxiety about placing rifles 
in African hands’. The report thought that service in an African Army would be seen in a 
positive light by Africans, because it would mean access to education and training which 
would improve their long-term employment prospects. Another idea to induce recruitment 
was the allocation of a land grant on completion of service which would raise the social status 
of ex-servicemen. The report also thought it was time to consider the possibility of creating a 
foreign legion. However, the report noted that at the end of the Second World War there had 
been an opportunity to create a foreign legion out of the exiled Polish, Czech and Yugoslav 
soldiers who had remained in the UK and large numbers of displaced persons. As the report 
pointed out the majority of these men were experienced soldiers with extensive military 
training. Additionally, there was a cadre of British officers and NCOs who had served in 
foreign units during the war.  
 
However, the report noted that the situation after the war contrasted with the present 
circumstances because there were fewer displaced persons and ‘unplaceable’ people which 
would mean less ‘dramatic’ opportunities for recruitment. But, the report thought it might be 
possible over a period of years to create a division from foreign sources of manpower. The 
use of civilians to release military manpower was also considered to be an area which the WO 
should be investigating. The report argued that jobs like mechanics, drivers, fitters and other 
skilled and semi-skilled jobs could quite easily be civilianised. The report stated that it was 
wasteful to train National Servicemen for such jobs. However, they recognised that 
employing civilians would mean competing against industry in the labour market which was 
very competitive. To counter act this they proposed the creation of an auxiliary service corps 
which would be open to ‘colonial subjects and foreigners as well as to UK subjects’. This 
would be a uniformed service which would encompass the RAF and Army. Recruits would be 
engaged on a long term basis. The report pointed out that a similar unit had existed in the 
BAOR comprised of German nationals. The report argued that it might be possible to increase 
the ‘fighting power of the Army’ by six divisions if African and foreign manpower resources 
were used.
578
  
 
The report argued that operations in Kenya and Malaya were not military operations, but 
police operations. The report proposed creating a special service force or an imperial 
gendarmerie to deal with counter insurgency operations. These units would be specifically 
trained in riots, guerrilla operations, terrorism and the ‘scientific guarding of key 
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installations’. The report described these units as a cross between the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police and the SAS. They would operate as the ‘hard core’ around which local 
police and ‘levies’ would work and would be under civil control. The nucleus of the 
gendarmerie would be formed of long term regulars. Because this force would be configured 
for a ‘single role’ the report argued that it would allow its organisation to be more economical 
with manpower than Army units employed on the same duties. The report argued that it might 
be possible that some of this force might be comprised of national servicemen. The unit 
would also be given a hot war role of maintaining security behind the lines or within colonial 
territories. Also it could be employed to carryout sabotage and guerrilla war behind enemy 
lines. The report noted that having such a force in existence in peacetime would be 
advantageous at the outset of a war. The report argued that Commonwealth participation in 
collective security schemes would also allow a better distribution of British manpower. 
Although, historically Commonwealth countries had been reluctant to accept overseas 
peacetime commitments, the report commented that British recognition of the ‘equality of 
status of different members of the Commonwealth’ had changed this perception. The report 
argued that it was now possible that Commonwealth forces may become involved the 
garrisoning different bases on the ‘main lines of inter-Commonwealth communications’. They 
also expected Commonwealth countries to contribute to regional strategic reserve forces.  
 
The final section of the report looked at how the Army needed to develop in the coming years 
to fulfil its obligations. The report stated that the Army had to perform four major functions at 
the same time.
579
 These included Cold War operations such as those in Kenya and Malaya; 
limited war in Korea; preparing for immediate and general war; adapting to the conditions of 
the new industrial revolution which was transforming contemporary strategic and tactical 
conceptions. The report argued that the limited war in Korea had resembled the pattern of 
operations from the Second World War. However, the report noted that if a major war broke 
out in Europe this pattern would not be repeated; allied forces would be on the defensive and 
they would not have complete air superiority which was the case in Korea. Atomic weapons 
would be used against ports, bases and industrial centres. The report argued that more work 
needed to be carried out on the effects of atomic weapons on the organisation of the Army. As 
the report noted the blast radius of an atomic bomb was 3 to 10 miles, while the blast radius 
of an h-bomb was up to 50 miles. Similarly, the effects of radiation and blast damage needed 
careful consideration. The report argued that it might be necessary to construct deep 
underground shelters to house military forces, essential industries, aircraft and other key 
installations. The development of missiles and longer ranged bombers was seen as giving a 
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decisive edge to the attacker. This was compounded by the fact that the blast radius of the h-
bomb meant that a near miss would be sufficient to destroy a target.  
 
The report argued that strategic nuclear and thermo-nuclear bombing was likely to interfere 
with all communications; this would probably destroy harbours, airfields, railway junctions 
and roads. This would mean dispersing aircraft, lighters and vehicles to protect them from the 
initial attack. The report argued that a network of secondary airfields should be created. 
Because of the expected massive disruption to transport and communication networks, the 
report argued military units should become more self-supporting. This would mean having 
men who could carry out numerous tasks and greater reliance on conserving fuel and 
munitions by units in the field. This would also alleviate the vulnerability of large formations 
to attacks by tactical nuclear weapons. The report predicted that troop movements would have 
to conducted across country and that supply and administrative units would have to be 
dispersed. More resupply would have to be carried out by air and greater use of helicopters 
made. The report argued that it was too soon to state whether tactical nuclear weapons ‘had 
spelt the end of the heavy tank’. However, the report thought that lighter tanks might be more 
survivable on a nuclear battlefield. Another, effect of greater dispersal might be a reduction in 
the ‘number of rifled barrel artillery’ which additionally would reduce supply and manpower 
requirements. The report noted that guided missiles had rapidly made the anti-aircraft gun 
‘virtually obsolete’.580   
 
The report thought that the ‘loosening of the front’ would encourage deep raids into enemy 
territory against military, industrial and political targets. This would require SAS type units, 
armoured and airborne formations. These formations would have to live off the land and be 
resupplied by air.  The report concluded that modern warfare would by necessity become 
dispersed. According to the report the present structure of corps, divisions and brigades would 
not be suited to this kind of warfare. The report assumed that smaller task force formations 
would emerge based on the battalion. These forces would become ‘highly equipped, highly 
trained and highly mobile elite troops’. Troops of this elite active army would form armoured 
units, paratroops, commandos, and jungle and mountain task forces. To defend rear areas and 
strategic points and provide garrisons units of second line troops and home guard would be 
recruited and trained for this specific role. The report argued that this kind of work was better 
suited to the Territorial Army. The report stated that the elite army should ‘probably’ be 
composed entirely of Regulars. National service would be designed solely to train civilians 
for static defence. This would allow national service to be reduced. However, the report noted 
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that it may be sometime before it might be possible to recruit enough regulars which would 
mean that national service might have to be retained to fill commitments in Europe and the 
Middle East for ‘many years to come’. The report pointed out that if more colonial resources 
were utilised it might be possible to reduce national service quicker. On the question of 
recruitment of regulars the report argued for better pay, food and living conditions. The report 
also argued that a three tier army should be created which allow a recruit the possibility of 
joining at 18 and retiring at 55. The first tier being the elite army; the second the static 
defence army or service in the Territorial Army; and the third the home guard. The report also 
believed that it would be possible to attract more recruits if service in the elite army was 
publicised as being an ‘adventure’.    
 
The conclusion stated that the recommendations and proposals in the report ‘must be of a 
tentative nature’. This was because the study group had no access to official material. 
However, they believed that a revolution in military thinking caused by the advent of the 
hydrogen bomb required a ‘searching re-examination of the organisation of the Army. To 
achieve this, the report thought that a new Esher Committee should be convened. The study 
group were also concerned that the Army (WO) was producing too few active fighting 
formations. The creation of strategic reserves in the UK, Middle East and Far East was also 
considered to be a top priority. The final comments of the report were designed to provoke a 
reaction from the WO. However, the general tone of the report was not overtly political. The 
report was generally well received by the press. The Times reported that the League’s most 
striking proposals were those regarding the creation of an African Army, a Foreign Service 
corps and a foreign legion to deal with the ‘manpower problem’.581 Similarly the Manchester 
Guardian
582
 and the New York Times
583
 focused on the League’s manpower solutions based 
on colonial and foreign manpower sources in their evaluation of the Report. Army Quarterly 
described the League’s Report as ‘comprehensive’, which bore the ‘stamp of authority’ and 
was based on the knowledge and research of a distinguished group who had an ‘unusually 
wide range of experience’ in military and political matters.584 The Times Defence 
Correspondent and the Army Quarterly editorial picked out the creation of an African Army 
and an Imperial Gendarmerie to deal with ‘police operations’ as ‘certainly worth considering’.  
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The Daily Telegraph’s military correspondent was Lieutenant General Martin who had 
contributed to the study group by looking at its study group papers and suggestions. He 
thought that the creation of a foreign legion, African Army, a three tier army and the imperial 
gendarmerie were the most striking proposals.
585
 But, he thought that a new Esher committee 
should be convened to investigate the effects of nuclear war on the Army’s organisation 
before changes were made to its structure. The Daily Mail stated that ‘Britain might get a 
French style foreign legion’, and that an African Army could be raised in Africa to ease the 
manpower problem.
586
 The Daily Mirror also ran with the headline about the foreign legion, 
but considered proposals for reducing manpower problems as welcome.
587
 The Daily Express 
also highlighted the foreign legion idea and the creation of an African Army.
588
 All of the 
newspapers described the report as the ‘return’ of the Army League to the defence debate. 
The study group were described as being renowned experts on defence matters. Julian Amery 
told the press that he hoped that the report would be studied in the ‘right quarters’. However, 
the WO refused to comment on the report.  
 
On 10 November Beddington-Behrens wrote to General Templer, CIGS, enclosing a copy of 
the report.
589
 Beddington-Behrens also offered the services of the League to Templer. The 
government had been given advanced warning of the contents of the final report from Faviell. 
On 23 November Julian Amery briefed the Conservative Parliamentary Committee for 
Defence Army Sub-Committee on the contents of the report.
590
 The notes of this meeting 
were sent to Head by Faviell. The meeting agreed that cuts should, and could, be made to the 
tail and headquarters staff’s. However, many on the committee thought that the plans to 
increase African manpower resources were ‘overoptimistic’. The formation of an Auxiliary 
Service unit was considered to be a good idea and worthy of further investigation. The plan 
for a foreign legion was dismissed as still being too provocative and the committee thought 
that maintaining a steady flow of recruits to be a major problem. The committee thought that 
a three tier army was unworkable because most elements in the elite army would be serving 
overseas for extended periods. The committee argued that it would be better for the WO to 
focus on improving the ratio between home and overseas service. This problem was often 
cited as a reason for the poor retention of regulars. The committee endorsed the report’s 
proposals for the creation of strategic reserves in the Middle East and the Far East, because 
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they would augment the ‘general deterrent policy’; however, they argued that these forces 
should not be used for garrison duties or for internal security. On the question of internal 
security the committee endorsed the creation of a gendarmerie but wanted it to be an integral 
part of the existing colonial forces and recruited locally. British officers and NCOs would be 
used as a cadre.   
 
The committee considered the simplification of equipment a ‘subject well worthy of further 
examination’. They also thought that equipping units for a single task would be more efficient 
and save manpower. The increasing the use of air transport was described as an ‘important 
subject’. However, the committee thought that the report had given the impression that at the 
start of a nuclear war there would be no ‘movement of any sort’; the committee argued that 
after an initial period of time transport would have to continue because it was ‘essential for 
continuing war-like operations of any sort, or indeed continuing the life of these islands’.591  
The committee stated that the only alternative was the construction of ‘dumps of materials’ 
which was ‘impracticable in peacetime’. The committee concluded that the report ‘formed a 
valuable basis for study’. On 7 December the committee met again to discuss the paper. The 
committee looked at a gendarmerie as alternative to using the Army in counterinsurgency 
operations and whether it should be controlled by the WO.
592
 The committee agreed that the 
Army was being used to deal with ‘police duties’ which were of limited value to prepare 
troops for normal military operations. They also stated that in the future ‘the probable 
developments of the ‘cold war’ techniques were so diverse that they were beyond the military 
sphere and a ‘gendarmerie’ might be better controlled from a special organisation outside the 
War Office’. The committee stated that soldiers were ‘basically unsuitable’ for 
counterinsurgency operations. However, the committee thought that it would be difficult to 
find sufficient numbers of recruits. In the past higher pay and other inducements had been 
used to attract volunteers to the Palestine Police and the Black and Tans. The Black and Tans 
and the Palestine Police were both para-military police units formed after the First World 
War. When in 1921 the Black and Tans were disbanded many members transferred to the 
Palestine Police which was then being formed.  The notorious Black and Tans gained a 
reputation for indiscriminate brutality because of their reprisal attacks on the civilian 
population in Ireland during the war of independence 1920-21.  
 
The League’s proposals for the creation of specialist units which could perform ‘fire brigade 
duties’ was dismissed as being a waste of manpower. The committee argued that it was better 
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to have two divisions based in the UK which could be rapidly transported by air to deal with 
emergencies. This force would also be more flexible and able to deal with a variety 
operational requirements. The committee also considered the three tier army system to be 
flawed because service up to the age of 55 was excessive and unattractive to potential 
recruits. On the question of national service the committee noted that the study group had 
avoided making any ‘concrete proposals’ because they had not been ‘unanimous’ on the 
issue. The committee debated the issue and concluded that it was possible that another ‘major 
operation’ might arise which required the maintenance of considerable reserves. The 
Committee thought that it might be better to rely on a volunteer TA for such a reserve and 
dispense with national service. However, like the study group the committee was divided on 
the issue because there were concerns that regular recruitment would not be sufficient enough 
to meet commitments. The committee argued that the abolition of conscription could only be 
considered after a increase in regular recruitment or a reduction in commitments. They also 
thought that once it was abolished ‘it would never be possible’ to bring it back again, unless a 
third world war was about to start. The study groups proposals for recruiting and training of 
colonial troops in substitution of British personnel was thought practicable on a small scale 
but would not be possible to the extent that the report claimed because it would not be 
possible to recruit adequate numbers of qualified men. The committee also thought that the 
training of a large force of colonial troops would tie up as many, if not more, regulars as were 
presently deployed on training national servicemen. However, the committee thought that it 
might be advisable for the WO to make a study of the problem because it might produce more 
manpower.  
 
On 14 December Brigadier Prior-Palmer, Chairman Conservative Parliamentary Committee 
for Defence Army Sub-Committee, wrote to Head enclosing the minutes of both meetings and 
his observations on the report.
593
 Prior-Palmer told Head that the creation of a gendarmerie 
was based on experience of the situation which had existed in Malaya and Kenya; he then 
stated, ‘I want to make quite clear that as you know this is largely my idea’. He also stated 
that the he believed that the Army should not be used in counter-insurgency operation’s 
which is why he thought important that the gendarmerie idea be considered by the WO. 
However, he deviated from the study group proposals by arguing that the formation be 
‘recruited for the period of the emergency only’. He did think that the force should be trained 
in the ‘art of jungle and guerrilla warfare’. Leo Amery had approached Prior-Palmer in 1950 
about joining the study group but had declined. However Julian Amery had been a member of 
the Conservative Parliamentary Committee for Defence Army Sub-Committee since 1951, 
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and therefore was in close contact with Prior-Palmer. Faviell supplied a considerable amount 
of information to the committee and was active in the study group. It is conceivable that 
Julian Amery asked for Prior-Palmer’s opinions on the draft report and his views on the 
Army. However, Prior-Palmer comments about this being my idea, and you knowing about, 
indicate how the activity of the study group was being discussed and monitored by the 
Conservative Party and Head. On 21 December Head wrote to Prior-Palmer thanking him for 
his letter and offered to brief the committee on the findings of the WO into the report when it 
was completed.
594
  
 
However, Head was not the only minister interested in the report.  On 24
 
November Selwyn 
Lloyd, Minister of Defence, wrote to Head stating that he had read the report which he 
thought could not be entirely ‘disregarded’ because the study group contained some 
influential figures.
595
 He thought that the plan for an African Army was attractive but noted 
that it had been rejected on numerous occasions by the COS and was therefore impracticable. 
Similarly, he argued that the plan for the gendarmerie was already being met within the Army 
by the organisation and training of a brigade group in the UK. However, he was interested in 
the proposal for an Auxiliary Service Corps because it might reduce the demand for national 
servicemen. Lloyd stated that creating a Auxiliary Service Corps ‘would be an important step 
towards our ultimate objective all regular armed forces and the abolition of national service’. 
The WO completed it analysis of League’s report on 31 January 1956. The report was 
examined by various departments in the WO who were asked to comment on a proposal 
which was their responsibility. A memorandum on the report was passed along to the Army 
Council to make a decision on any further action which might be required. The proposals 
concerning the creation of a Auxiliary Service Corps were given the most attention by the 
WO which was undertaken in a separate and more comprehensive study.  
 
Auxiliary Service Corps  
 
 
On 9 December 1955 the Army Council Committee discussed the Army League Report and 
the Adjutant-General, General Sir Cameron Nicholson, noted that they considered the 
Auxiliary Service Corps numbering 32,000 could be a ‘consideration as a step toward an all 
regular army’.596 Nicholson also stated that a feasibility study of the possibility of forming an 
Auxiliary Service Corps should be undertaken in tandem with the deliberations of the Hull 
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Committee, which had been tasked with examining the ‘future size and shape of a wholly 
Regular Army’. The Army Council set up a committee, headed by the Director of Manpower 
Planning, Major -General G. R Dalton, to investigate the possibility of creating an  Auxiliary 
Service Corps, and another to consider the rest of the Army League Report based on 
representatives from departments within the WO. On 20 December the MOD widened the 
Auxiliary Service Corps Committee to become an inter-service examination. Before the 
Committee met, Dalton broadened the possible recruitment field to include British nationals. 
The Committee was invited to consider especially the problems of ‘Trade Unions, racial 
differences and status’ within an embryonic Auxiliary Service Corps. The Committee invited 
representatives from other Whitehall departments such as the CO, FO, Home Office (HO) and 
the Ministry of Labour and National Service to contribute to this investigation. The FO 
observed that the Auxiliary Service Corps equated to a British version of the ‘French Foreign 
Legion’.597 The CO was asked to provide assistance and advice, because it was envisaged that 
the recruitment of such a unit would be carried out predominantly in the colonies. The HO 
was involved because of issues regarding the legal aspects of having foreign or colonial 
subjects living in the UK but enlisted in the UK’s armed forces.    
 
Dalton’s Committee argued that the armed forces already used, or had employed, 
considerable numbers of locally- raised manpower for unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled 
labour in overseas establishments for many years in peacetime and in prodigious numbers 
during the Great War and the Second World War.
598
 The League proposed to take this a step 
further by increasing the technical expertise and ability of entrants and ensuring that they had 
a ‘worldwide liability’ to nullify the parochial limitations of employing local labour. There 
were considerable numbers of civilians employed by the Services in overseas stations. For 
instance in  1956, the BAOR employed 21,000 German and 7,000 ‘stateless’ persons as 
drivers, watchmen and labourers in the German Service Organisation; in Korea 100 Koreans 
had been employed per infantry battalion on a variety of jobs. The envisaged new Corps 
would cut across the responsibilities of the Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers 
(REME), Royal Engineers, Royal Army Service Corps, Mixed Service Organisation, Royal 
Army Medical Corps, German Service Organisation and the Royal Pioneer Corps. Some of 
jobs being discussed included Cooks, Storemen, Clerks, Drivers, General Duty Men, Vehicle 
Mechanic and Fitter. According to the FO, the WO’s main reasons for wanting to form the 
Corps were to release British manpower and have a force which was uniformed and  subject 
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to military law and able to be posted to areas where it would be ‘desirable’ to replace local 
civilian employment or where it was in short supply.
599
  
 
However, the scheme ran into difficulties straight away because it was too ambitious. The 
Army wanted 10,000 English-speaking ‘skilled men’ at once, 12,000 ‘semiskilled men’ who 
could be easily trained and 10,000 ‘unskilled men’ from the colonies for general duties or 
labouring. The Admiralty representative, Captain McMullen, stated that the Royal Navy was 
not interested in the scheme because it already employed and recruited members of the 
Commonwealth and people from the Colonies directly; for many years, overseas 
establishments, dockyards and ships had contained locally-recruited ratings with a limited 
service liability or locally-employed civilians.
600
 The Royal Navy did not want to alter this 
arrangement, which they pointed out supplied ample amounts of manpower for the evolving 
‘small-ship navy’ and they were concerned that the introduction of a new Corps would create 
‘administrative difficulties’. The Air Ministry Official, Mr Roberts, agreed with the 
Admiralty stating that the RAF preferred to maintain the status quo but they did have 
concerns that the 2
nd 
Tactical Air Force was reliant on the German Service Organisation 
(GSO) and therefore any alteration to this understanding would mean a re-examination of the 
RAF’s position on the issue. Clearly the Army and Navy did not want to disrupt their existing 
overseas manpower arrangements which meant that the Army had no support for the 
formation of an Auxiliary Service Corps. The RAF and Navy were not the only Whitehall 
departments that had objections to the Corps.   
 
The FO legal department argued that it was not illegal under international law to recruit 
manpower in other countries for military purposes but in such circumstances it was governed 
by local judicial conditions and the goodwill of particular foreign governments; however, 
there was a concern that British Embassies or consulates   should not be used as recruiting 
offices or that recruitment practices affect ‘international comity’ or the sovereignty of other 
states. The use of the Embassy or consulate in these circumstances was construed as 
constituting a possible ‘abuse’ of trust and status.601  It was also assumed that the only place 
where recruitment could realistically take place was either in the UK or in British territories 
overseas; the FO noted that it was unlikely that any country other than Nepal would allow 
recruitment of manpower within its territory. The Western Department of the FO did argue 
that there were some advantages in the scheme; mainly because the cost of the GSO was 
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rising and the Government at the time were looking to reduce overseas foreign exchange 
expenditure and defence costs associated with the BAOR and the 2
nd
 Tactical Air Force. 
Overseas exchange losses generated by defence expenditure, especially those associated with 
NATO, were a constant source of annoyance both to Eden and Macmillan during their 
Premierships.
602
    
 
There was also anxiety about the effect of full employment in West Germany undermining 
future recruitment of manpower. It was noted that under such circumstances pay and 
conditions of service would have to be drastically improved ‘at a cost we cannot afford’. It 
was thought that the stationing of an Auxiliary Service Corps in Germany would be more 
economical in terms of foreign exchange and would ‘protect us against the demands of the 
German labour market’. However, Western Department warned that the West German 
Government should be warned in advance and would be amenable if economic conditions 
were conducive and local communities and German workers were not unduly disadvantaged 
by the British dispensing with their services. Another concern was that the German 
government should be consulted about the use of ‘colonial subjects’, because French colonial 
troops were ‘very unpopular’ in Germany.603 It was also noted that ‘German opinion was very 
touchy’ on the subject of recruitment of its citizens for foreign armies because of ‘excessive 
French recruitment’ in their occupation zone since 1945 for their Foreign Legion.  
 
Another possible source of manpower was the considerable numbers of UN refugees from 
Eastern and Central Europe living in Displaced Persons Camps in Austria and Germany. The 
General Department was concerned that UN refugees might be not be suitable because they 
would technically still be under the protection of the UN and therefore the UN ‘would be 
entitled to have a voice in their welfare’.  This situation, they argued, could be rectified by 
giving them British citizenship. However, it was maintained that the Communists would 
‘seize on this’, arguing that the West was ‘forcing refugees from behind the Iron Curtain into 
the role of tame followers of NATO by denying them any other prospects of resettlement’.604 
They also considered that many of the men involved might have a ‘grudge’, because of the 
length of time they had spent in the refugee camp, leaving them with a ‘propensity for 
carrying on émigré political intrigues’ that ‘might prove embarrassing to the military 
authorities’. The African Department pessimistically noted that ‘none of the nations who have 
recently achieved independence are likely to permit recruitment in their territories’; this 
perception was prevalent throughout Whitehall departments. They additionally argued that the 
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Russians and Egyptians would exploit the formation of an Auxiliary Service Corps for 
propaganda purposes. But they did think that the ‘Paperless Palestinians’ who had recently 
been employed in the Canal Zone could be used or might be willing to serve in the Corps.
605
  
It was noted that there would be ‘difficulties with language’ if Africans were recruited. The 
FO argued that all these sources of manpower posed an infiltration threat to the Armed 
Services by Communists; they especially singled out ‘colonial nationals’ as being a ‘hazard’.    
 
These arguments formed the basis for the rejection of the League’s idea of an Auxiliary 
Service Corps. On 26 October 1956 the Principal Personnel Officers Committee (PPOC), 
which was a joint service committee composed of senior officers, rejected the scheme based 
on the working committee’s observations.606 The principle reasons given were fears over 
security issues concerning the employment of ‘foreigners’ in HM forces; political difficulties 
with other Governments (including Commonwealth and colonial territories) over recruiting 
their citizens for a ‘regular enlistment’ in the British Army; the poor education standards of 
potential recruits from the colonies; and objections from European or other Governments to 
the employment  of ‘coloured’ troops in British military formations  in their countries.607 
Dalton remarked that the Army had approached the whole exercise with an ‘open mind’ but 
found the idea of an Auxiliary Service Corps ‘distasteful’.  The PPO Committee concluded 
that a more in-depth study in the future could be undertaken into the use of colonial 
manpower if their ‘recommendation was not politically acceptable’. Dalton’s volte-face of the 
Army’s position on the possibility of using overseas manpower to that of aggrieved party is 
odd, given that previously he and the WO had identified a requirement to find additional 
manpower for the expected ‘smaller’ Army of the future. From July 1956 Dalton was also 
involved in the Cabinet Committee on National Service as a principle official representative 
of the WO on an inter-departmental working party which had been tasked with looking at 
manpower requirements for reduced Armed Forces of 450,000.
608
 Dalton and the Army 
needed to find manpower, especially, as Dalton recommended to the National Service 
Committee, technical personnel, if conscription was to end. However, the PPOC and Dalton’s 
comments are revealing because they can be construed as showing that there was resentment 
about being required by politicians to meddle with ‘their’ existing structures and practices for 
the employment and use of overseas manpower. This remark about political acceptability 
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derives, in part, from the fact that at that time the COS were being subjected to more political 
control from politicians.
609
   
 
African Army  
 
 
The memorandum next looked at the proposal to form a African Army. The WO noted that 
General Templer’s Colonial Security Report had recently reviewed the role of African 
colonial forces and had decided that in future their role would be restricted to internal 
security.
610
 Templer had completed his report on 23 April 1955.
611
  It was a wide ranging and 
comprehensive appraisal of colonial police and military forces and their ability to carry out 
Hot War and Cold War operations. The Templer’s report was discussed by a Cabinet 
committee through the summer of 1955. On 4 August 1955 the Committee stated that 
Ministers had ‘accepted’ that the role of colonial forces was to provide for ‘their’ internal 
security and local defence.
612
 The wider ‘Cold War’ role of colonial states was to provide 
installations for ‘Commonwealth strategic employment’ and ‘reserves of manpower’ to ‘draw 
on after a first phase’ of a nuclear war.613  To this end they had agreed that responsibility for 
colonial forces should be transferred to the colonial Governments which would then have to 
provide finances for their own forces. However, this would be applied on an ‘individual’ basis 
as colonies approached independence and after consultation with the existing colonial 
governments. This meant that colonial forces would in effect have a limited Hot War role in 
future. Rather than being able to provide manpower for operations in the Middle East and the 
Far East as the study group were arguing the Government were in fact planning to reduce the 
capabilities of colonial forces in Africa. Also transferring financial control of colonial forces 
to local administrations would probably mean reductions in manpower, training and 
equipment.  
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The WO stated that West and East Africa colonies would at best provide a brigade in future 
operations in the Middle East. The study group were arguing that it would be possible to 
provide two divisions. The WO agreed with the study group that the creation of an African 
Army had many advantages. However, it stated that there were political and racial objections 
to the use of African manpower in some European and Asiatic countries. The constitutional 
progress in some African countries made it difficult to guarantee that in the future newly 
independent states would allow African troops to be deployed outside of their territories. This 
they concluded meant that African troops could not be used in a emergency which made them 
a poor substitute for equivalent British forces. It was also noted that in other parts of the 
world British forces preferred recruit locally enlisted manpower to augment their strength. 
The study group proposed using African troops in the Middle East but the WO argued that the 
in the future British forces would be comprised of small armoured force which African troops 
were ‘not suited’ to.  
 
Foreign Legion  
 
 
Similar arguments were used to disregard the idea of a foreign legion. The idea of forming a 
foreign legion was not a new and had been discussed several times since 1939. On 7 
September 1939 it was anticipated by the CIGS War Committee that ‘ex-enemy volunteers’ 
might be enlisted in a Foreign Legion but the scheme was deemed too impracticable and 
dropped before it got off the ground. In January 1946 Attlee had asked the Service Ministers 
to carry out a feasibility study regarding the employment of foreign nationals while he 
decided whether to continue conscription into peacetime to cope with overseas 
commitments.
614
 The WO dismissed the idea as being politically and administratively difficult 
and argued that there was a shortage of officers and NCOs if the units were raised and it 
would be too expensive.
615
 The WO noted that the League’s report had stated that a Foreign 
Legion could have been ‘easily’ formed in 1946 and seemed to point the finger at 
Government inactivity rather than the objections of  WO (Army Council) which had 
dismissed the idea.  However, the idea was again considered in 1948 after it was raised in the 
House of Commons by a number of MPs and was rejected by the WO on the grounds of cost.  
 
In 1949, the question was again posed and this time rejected because there was a concern that 
the nationality status of the personnel and their dependents after service in a Foreign Legion 
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made the idea unworkable; the FO used the same argument to denigrate the possibility of an 
Auxiliary Service Corps in 1956. The WO thought that the UK would have a ‘moral 
responsibility for offering a home to such individuals and their dependents’ which they 
argued posed too many questions to make the scheme workable. As with the Auxiliary 
Service Corps they considered such a force to be a security risk. In 1950 it was decided by 
Service Ministers that it might be possible to recruit more ‘aliens’ into the services 
particularly in the technical Corps (where there were manpower shortages) or in a Foreign 
Legion  but again a WO working party stated that the present arrangement of allowing a 
maximum of  2% of aliens into the services should be continued and no extra effort be made 
because of ‘administrative difficulties’ involved in creating a Foreign Legion or increasing 
the number of aliens in the armed forces.
616
 In 1952 another study was undertaken about 
admitting ‘aliens’ into the Army and was rejected by the Army Council on administrative and  
security grounds. During the Second World War large numbers of Poles and other Europeans 
and colonial peoples of all races and creeds had served in the British Armed forces. However, 
in the Cold War security risks regarding Eastern or Central Europeans and Aliens and the 
reaction of the Soviets to a Corps comprised of manpower from their sphere of influence were 
all considered to be insurmountable; fears that foreign troops would not be loyal if deployed 
in the colonies or as the Army Council put it ‘take sectional interests before that of the British 
Commonwealth’ and ‘cease to be impartial’ effectively ended the prospect of a foreign 
legion.
617
 And of course the perennial problem of financial cost and a lack of British officers 
and NCOs were also limiting factors.  
 
Structural Reorganization of the Army  
 
 
The study groups plans for a structural reorganization of the Army based on Liddell Hart’s 
five battalion scheme was dismissed because it would not save manpower. The WO conceded 
that a five battalion division would be more mobile but would not have the same ‘organic 
firepower’ of an existing infantry division.618 They also argued that  existing division 
contained self-contained task forces which were better suited to fighting in dispersed on a 
nuclear battlefield. WO officials also argued that one headquarter staff  would have to deal 
with an  increased number of  formations which would slow down the direction and control of 
scattered units not improve it. The WO expected that the nuclear battlefield would have loose 
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fronts requiring more localised control of formations; fighting would also take place in a 
small area. The WO argued that it would be preferable for divisional commanders to have 
more ‘intimate’ control of brigade commanders which would be more dispersed under a five 
battalion system. The WO also pointed out recent training exercises had shown that it was 
more preferable to have a reserve headquarters which was situated well back from divisional 
headquarters in case they were destroyed by nuclear attack.  
 
The study group plan would have meant that the reserve headquarters would have been 
removed. The same arguments were deployed against increasing the number of divisions 
commanded by a corps commander. The WO thought that increasing the number of divisions 
in a corps would mean that larger formations would have to be deployed for a task which 
would increase overheads rather than reduce them. However, the WO recognised that during 
the last war higher headquarter staffs were to large but at the time it was deemed ‘desirable 
for reasons of national sentiment’. The WO argued that it might be possible from an 
administrative point to remodel supply organisation and remove corps links and save 
manpower. This would mean that Army headquarters would deal directly with divisions. 
However, the WO was opposed to any reduction of tactical control of formations from corps 
headquarters. In fact they suggested that corps commanders have all administrative 
responsibilities removed which would increase their tactical control. The WO pointed out that 
during the Second World War there were many examples of corps commanders who had 
sized opportunities presented by rapid turn of events in mobile operations. However, they 
were concerned that a corps commander having to control six or seven widely dispersed 
divisions which were involved in simultaneous actions might find impossible to have much 
personal control of a battle. The WO officials recommended not further action is taken over 
the five of five scheme.  
 
However, the study group’s ideas concerning the future structure of the Army were not 
entirely out of step with the WO. In February 1956 the Committee on the Organisation of the 
Army under the chairmanship of Lieutenant -General Sir Richard Hull was created and given 
the task of rationalizing the Army. The committee argued that there was considerable scope 
for reductions in the administrative tail of the Army. The Committee stated that greater use of 
civilians would allow a reduction in the uniformed manpower requirements in the UK base 
and in some overseas bases.
619
 Hull had been told to plan for a all regular army of 200,000 
men which was considerably lower than the study groups plans. The committee also argued 
that it wished to improve the balance between home and overseas service which the study 
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groups plans would not have achieved. However, the committee also advocated the creation 
of ‘tailor made units’ which could be based overseas and used as strategic reserves. It was 
expected that the proportion of teeth to tail would be 54% to 46% which was in line with what 
the study group projected. This would be achieved by reducing headquarter units and 
transport, again a study group suggestion.   
 
Air Transport  
 
 
The next section of the memorandum looked at the study group proposal for air transport. The 
study group noted that a considerable number of service personnel were in transit and that to 
ease this problem greater use could be made of transport aircraft and charter flights for air-
trooping. The League also argued that a ‘fleet of transport aircraft’ should be constructed to 
increase the tactical mobility of the Army and Armed Forces. In fact the WO calculated that 
there were 16,470 men in transit in November 1955; 9,000 on embarkation or disembarkation 
leave or being prepared for movement; 1,830 in transit by sea to the BAOR; 5,640 in transit 
by sea to overseas units of whom 260 were being transported by air. The WO stated that 
movement times could be decreased by utilising more charter flights if the money was made 
available and there was an ‘increased capacity’ to cope with demand. Limiting factors 
included a lack of air-freight capacity to carry units with their equipment and the problem of 
over-flight restrictions on certain routes.
620
 The WO calculated that at the start of a global war 
all civilian transport and freight aircraft would be utilised enabling the Army to move 125,000 
troops or 17,500 tons of stores a week to the Northern European theatre of operations. The 
WO disconsolately noted that the present air fleet of 87 aircraft (38 Hastings, 35 Shackletons 
and 14 Valettas) was ‘inadequate’ to move the newly-formed strategic reserve in one lift 
which the League and the WO stated was vital to support overseas garrisons in an emergency. 
The WO calculated that if all the RAF’s transport aircraft were used and the civilian charter 
capacity (18 aircraft) then the UK would be able to lift 4,000 troops or 2,500, with 50x5 cwt 
vehicles and trailers and 65 tons of stores in one lift.
621
 However, they pointed out that there 
was at that time a ‘serious’ shortage of heavy-lift aircraft capable of moving vehicles and 
stores both over long and short distances.  
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Given the problems associated with production of new aircraft and a declining amount of 
expenditure and resources available for new or existing defence projects the Army could only 
expect the minimum number of aircraft required to do the job. There was simply no room for 
manoeuvre either in the allocation of budget resources or in the management of equipment 
usage. Indeed it was noted by the WO that to ‘justify the cost’ of an air-transport fleet in 
‘peacetime conditions’ the majority of the aircraft would have to be employed on ‘air 
trooping and other tasks’. In July 1956 as part of the Defence Review an inter-service 
committee, the Bingley Committee, was convened by the COS to study the problem of air-
transport. However, Transport Command had been neglected in the early 1950s and the COS 
had only made a half-hearted attempt to sort out its deficiencies between 1954 and 1956.
622
 
Darby, among others, argued that the V-bomber programme had swallowed up a considerable 
amount of resources and production facilities and was therefore the main focus of the Air 
Staff who neglected air transport as a consequence.
623
 This was confirmed publicly in 1964 by 
Hugh Fraser, the Secretary of State for Air, who stated that between 1959 and 1964 Transport 
Command, had received 13% of RAF expenditure on new aircraft, engines and weapons, 
whilst Bomber Command had 43% and Fighter Command 28% respectively.
624
  
 
The traditional method to move troops and their families was the troopship, which was 
operated by civilian charter companies and the Ministry of Transport.
625
 Ironically, in 1956 a 
large new troopship was commissioned into service, the Nevasa followed in 1957 by a second 
the Oxfordshire, although both were withdrawn in 1962. In 1961 a Parliamentary Committee 
on trooping concluded that ‘trooping by air is cheaper’ and ‘that on every route sea transport 
costs more than air transport’.626 In 1951-1952 423,000 military personnel, their families and 
civilians working for the services were moved by sea and 18,500 by air; in 1962 148,000 
were moved by sea and 284,000 by air.
627
 In 1951 there were 18 troopships; in 1960 there 
were three. In 1960 all the overseas bases from Gibraltar to Singapore  could be reached by 
air in one day, by contrast it took  four  days by sea to reach Gibraltar and twenty three to 
reach Singapore. During the mid-1950s the Government began encouraging civilian 
companies to undertake air-trooping to stimulate the aircraft industry and create an airfreight 
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and transport fleet comparable with the RAF’s.628 As early as 1952 it was recognised by the 
Government that Air-trooping was cheaper and quicker but a combination of a lack of money, 
transport planes and unwillingness to completely replace a tried and tested method of 
movement among the various service departments protracted the process of change. The 
Treasury argued that since 1952 the greater use of aircraft for air-trooping had been achieved 
by the reductions in the overall size of the armed forces and a corresponding increase in 
available air- transport capacity both civil and military.
629
  
 
The backbone of the early post-war Transport Command were the Handley Page Hastings, 
Shackleton and the short-range Valetta; the Valetta and Hastings were used at Suez where 
their short comings as modern tactical drop aircraft were very evident. However, the Hastings 
continued in service until 1969 as a long range air-freighter. Although used in an air-transport 
role, the Shackleton was primarily a maritime patrol aircraft, and in consequence was really 
unsuited to moving men and equipment great distances. There were new aircraft on order in 
1955 or coming into service: the Beverley, Comet, Pioneer and the Britannia. The Britannia 
was the only transport aircraft coming into service with substantial range but it was hampered 
by not being able to carry heavy loads and was essentially a long-range passenger aircraft but 
its introduction into service was delayed by teething problems with the turbo-prop engines.
630
 
The Comet was designed as a revolutionary civil jet airliner and was used by the RAF as a 
passenger plane; after numerous fatal crashes involving Mark 1 Comets between 1953 and 
1954 it had to be radically redesigned and all the early planes were grounded and then 
scrapped; the RAF began to receive modified mark 2 Comets during 1955 but the Comet did 
not go back into civil service until 1958.  
 
The Beverley was designed at the outset as a military freighter which could carry heavy loads 
with a short take-off and combat drop capability but was hampered by being slow and 
medium-ranged. The Beverley replaced the Valetta as an in-theatre tactical aircraft after 1956. 
The Valetta could carry 20 paratroopers or thirty passengers but had no short take off ability 
and had limited cargo space. The Beverley could carry 94 troops or 70 paratroopers and drop 
vehicles or cargo on special pallets which was an innovation.  The first Beverleys were 
delivered to the RAF on 11 March 1956 and overnight enhanced the heavy lift and tactical 
ability of British forces. In 1955 the over ambitious Vickers-1000 transport plane project was 
                                                 
628
 Ibid p6.  
629
 Ibid p76.  
630
 The Britannia had been conceived in 1942 as a long range passenger aircraft capable of flying the 
long haul routes of the Empire. Its introduction into service with British Overseas Airways Corporation 
was delayed by design problems with the revolutionary turbo prop engines. Its importance to the 
British civil passenger aircraft industry was increased by the crash of the Comet Mark I in April 1953.   
 199 
cancelled by the government, meaning that the Beverley was the only true military transport 
aircraft being placed in production in the mid-1950s but it was limited by its medium range 
and slow speed. The 1956 Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Air to accompany the 
Air Estimate devoted a considerable amount of space to the V-bombers, Hunter, Javelin, the 
English Electric P1, air to air guided weapons and the F.86 Sabre but the Britannia and 
Beverley were given negligible attention.
631
 Obviously the RAF wanted to promote its cutting 
edge technology and the V-bombers and new fighter aircraft grabbed headlines and the public 
imagination but the less glamorous transport aircraft did not. There was also another reason 
why transport aircraft were low priority. The 1957 Air Estimate noted that the amount made 
available for new aircraft and equipment would decrease by £16 million and American aid 
would be cut by £28.5 million in 1957 and 1958.
632
 The Air Force wanted new fighters and 
missiles and the V-bombers needed upgrading as soon as they became operational due to the 
fact that they had been designed in the late 1940s as high altitude bombers and were now 
rapidly becoming obsolete in that role because of advances in missile defence technology.   
 
Also the new transport aircraft would need modern air-portable equipment. This meant 
replacing the large amounts of the existing equipment much of it dating from the Second 
World War. This modernisation programme was again hampered by a lack of money, 
resources and production facilities; many of the Army’s heavy air-portable equipment 
requirements made in 1958 did not become available until after 1965. There is no doubt that 
Britain’s tactical lift capacity increased after 1955 as more modern and capable aircraft 
entered service but like so many of the changes being  undertaken at that time the problem of 
sustaining the expenditure needed to keep the forces and their equipment current and 
operational was increasingly beyond the economic capacity of the state. The study group 
wanted large numbers of transport aircraft to enhance the strategic mobility of British forces. 
However, inter-service rivalry hung over policy considerations and initially stunted the 
application of a unified policy. The study group argued that a unified inter-service and 
civilian board should be created to control and administer Air Transport Command.  This idea 
was discussed by COS in 1957 but never put into practice. However, in 1960 38 Group was 
formed to control tactical operations.
633
 Although 38 Group was commanded by a senior RAF 
officer, its planning and operational staff contained Army personnel. In 1956 there had been 
three airborne transport exercises involving the Army; in 1959 there were fifty. Wynn notes 
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that between 1956 and 1957 Air Transport Command was poorly equipped and essentially in 
transition as more modern aircraft with greater lift capacity and range came into service.
634
 
 
In February 1957, COS had argued in their report on Air Transport for the Defence Review 
that to offset any reductions in overseas garrisons increased mobility and air-freight capacity 
would be required.
635
 The memorandum stated that ‘the greater the reductions in the size of 
overseas forces, the greater the need for air transport, which for a relatively small expenditure 
would make it practicable for fewer men to carry out more tasks’. Therefore the importance 
of the Strategic Reserve for use in ‘emergencies’ increased as it became apparent that 
overseas garrisons would be reduced. COS noted that the use of transport aircraft and the 
Strategic Reserve was in ‘keeping with future strategic policy and the current financial 
climate’.636 The concept of increased mobility in the mid- and late 1950s was seen as the 
panacea for the manpower problem.
637
 The COS report also stated that the use of transport 
aircraft would allow the ‘greater concentration of our overseas garrisons and enable the 
maximum use of reinforcements from the United Kingdom’; this, they argued, would also 
‘represent a major contribution to the economical and efficient use of our forces’. The 
Bingley Committee argued in regard to internal security operations that the ‘timely arrival of 
a small force at an early stage of a potential danger may be sufficient to stabilise the situation, 
but if this force does not arrive in time, then a larger force will ultimately be needed’. The 
Committee also sent a shot across the bows of the Government when it stated ‘we cannot 
express too strongly the fact that, if we are to rely on the strategic mobility of our forces as a 
deliberate and economic act of political policy, it becomes essential that our forces should be 
provided with the means to exercise this mobility’.638  
 
A Cabinet appraisal of the 1957 defence policy noted that capacity of Air Transport 
Command had to be increased if the new defence policy was going to be feasible.
639
 The 
politicians and COS were both in agreement on the issue but the problem of providing the 
new aircraft and the money for the project were constant sources of friction. On 26 July 1957, 
as it became apparent that Macmillan and the Treasury were considering the possibility of 
more defence cuts, Sandys circulated a memorandum to the Cabinet Defence Committee on 
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the implications of further reductions in defence spending which emphasised the importance 
of keeping the air transport capacity large enough to ensure that the defence policy outlined in 
April was still viable and that reductions in manpower ‘were still applicable’.640 The principle 
tasks envisaged by COS for Air Transport Command and the Strategic Reserve after Suez 
were for an internal security emergency or a limited war in the Far East.
641
 Even as late as 
1959, RAF Transport Command was being referred to in the aviation press as the ‘Cinderella’ 
of the RAF.
642
  
 
Simplification of Equipment 
 
 
The WO noted that the simplification of equipment was under ‘constant consideration’.643  At 
that time a study was being carried out to increase the mobility of British formations by 
reducing the number of weapons carried by soldiers. The WO argued that the equipment that 
units carried was designed to meet the requirements of global war. However, the WO study 
was considering what the requirements would be for limited war. The League wanted a to 
reduce equipment levels to improve manpower establishments. The WO argued that this was 
already taking place; the number and type of vehicles in units was being reduced. This would 
reduce the range of spares required. Similarly, the WO was attempting to reduce the number 
of different types of ammunition used. There were also ‘continuous discussions with America 
and Canada on standardization of equipment’ which the WO argued would reduce logistic 
problems.  However, the WO stated that all plans regarding standardization, rationalization 
and simplification were influenced by financial and production factors. The problem of 
standardization was compounded by the different needs of the Army which was deployed 
diverse theatres of operations. In South East Asia unit’s required tropical equipment and 
lighter units for limited and global warfare which had different organisation requirements.. In 
the Middle East large numbers of vehicles and armour was required which again meant a 
different organisation from units in South East Asia. However, forces in the Middle East also 
had a limited war role but this closely associated with its hot war role. This diversity had an 
effect on supply and logistical arrangements. The WO argued that this made simplification 
very difficult to achieve.  
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Commonwealth Cooperation  
 
 
The WO assessment of the study group’s ideas on Commonwealth cooperation was equivocal 
because the League’s report was ambiguous on the subject.644 The WO noted that Australia 
and New Zealand were contributing to the creation of Strategic Reserve in Malaya. Canada 
provided a infantry brigade on the continent for NATO. Australia and New Zealand were 
members of SEATO, the Australia, New Zealand and United States Pact (ANZUS) and were 
committed to the Australia, New Zealand and Malaya Pact (ANZAM). The only major 
Commonwealth state which was not contributing to a collective security pact was South 
Africa. The WO argued that this would not likely occur in the future because ‘she is obsessed 
with the idea of defending her territory from the Equator’. However, where the League and 
WO differed was on the status of India. The study group argued that India could be drawn 
into a security pact with the West or at the outbreak of a global war would provide military 
assistance. The WO argued that this was highly unlikely. Pakistan had joined SEATO and 
was also a member of the Baghdad Pact which had been formed in 1955. However, the WO 
noted that Pakistan was ‘absorbed by internal problems and disagreements with her 
neighbours’ and it was ‘hoped she would’ provide forces for the defence of the Middle East. 
The new formed Central African Federation was providing one battalion for operations in 
Malaya and would be expected to send one medium battery to the Middle East during a major 
war. The British position in Ceylon was tenuous because Ceylon was ‘uncommitted in peace 
and war’. The WO noted that the British had ‘succeeded in interesting Australia and New 
Zealand in defence to an extent never previously achieved in peace. It will be important to 
maintain this interest, particularly in view of the problems likely to be raised by the granting 
of independence to Singapore and Malaya’.645 The WO argued that it was important to 
strengthen the defence of the Middle East which depended on the development of the 
Baghdad Pact. If the Baghdad Pact was seen to be stable, efficient and confident the WO 
stated, that it might be possible to entice South Africa and Central African Federation to join. 
However, the WO argued the League’s proposal for the creation of a strategic reserve in the 
Middle East was not a ‘practicable proposition within the next few years’.   
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The kind of Army we need  
 
 
The League’s proposals for a major re-organisation of the Army based on their conception of 
future global war were not well received by the WO.
646
 The study group’s  concept of a 
widespread dispersal of economic and industrial capacity and a loosely manned front was  
driven by their conceptual analysis of the effects of nuclear weapons on war. The study group 
argued that the army should be divided into three tiers (elite, Territorial Army and home 
guard) which would reflect the realities of nuclear war. However, the WO thought that the 
study group’s concept of global war was ‘debatable’. Conversely, they do not state why they 
think it is debatable. The WO thought that a formation of an elite army would create 
‘jealousies, envies, frustration and bitterness from those excluded from the elite. The WO 
stated that a corollary of the elite army was that the Territorial Army (TA) was ‘low quality 
organisation’. If that was the case then it would be difficult to get recruits to join the TA or 
induce regular officers to serve in it. The study group stated that it would use national service 
men in both the elite and TA. However, the WO thought it wrong to plan on the assumption 
that conscription would be a permanent feature. The WO argued that having younger men in 
the elite army would create ‘a lack of experience and mature judgement’.  
 
The problem of experience was also applied to the technical issues. The WO argued that 
because of the growing complexities of modern weapons, trades man in the elite army would 
be inefficient through lack of experience. Also because the League envisaged the elite army 
spending most of time overseas the WO thought that highly skilled personnel would not join 
the army, because of the constant disruption.. The WO argued that this would also lead to 
exodus among married personnel as well. Another problem would be that the elite army 
would be predominantly armoured and contain specialised units. When a soldier moved from 
the elite army to the TA he would have undergo conversion to other arms which would mean 
a loss of efficiency and cohesion in the TA. The WO also noted that the study group had 
argued that reserve army would no longer reinforce the elite or TA armies in war. This, the 
WO argued, would mean that that was a shortage of essential specialised units which were 
provided by the reserve army. The WO stated that they did not believe that it would not be 
possible to mobilise reserve forces at the outbreak of a nuclear war. The study group argued 
that the TA would be employed on static defence. The WO argued that this would mean they 
would be subject to the full weight of the enemy attack which would include nuclear 
weapons. However, the WO believed that morale would be low in the TA comprised of 
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relegated soldiers which would affect their ability to withstand a major offensive against 
them. The only proposal the WO agreed with was that soldiers serving their last years in the 
home guard which was described as a ‘sound’ suggestion. However, it was deemed 
unworkable in peacetime because it would be unaffordable to keep a large number of officers 
and men of an ‘older age’ on full pay that had no operational function apart from in wartime.   
 
Imperial Gendarmerie 
 
 
The study group’s idea of forming an imperial gendarmerie to deal with counter-insurgency 
operations was already being considered by the WO. However, the WO was not proposing 
creating a dedicated security force. The Templer security report had recently recommended 
that an independent infantry brigade be created to deal with internal security problems in the 
colonies and to act as a strategic reserve. However, this idea had been periodically discussed 
since the end of the war. Churchill had minuted the Cabinet Defence Committee on 3 
November 1954 stating that two and half divisions should in the future be based in the UK to 
act as a strategic reserve because doing so would be cheaper than stationing them abroad.
647
 
The WO noted that since 1948 forty three fighting units had been moved from the UK under 
‘emergency conditions’ to deal with Cold War and internal security commitments.648 The WO 
argued that the strategic reserve which was in the process of being formed would be given 
specialist training and equipment conducive to carrying out counter insurgency operations. 
The WO thought that it would be advantageous to have a specialised force solely trained and 
equipped for internal security operations. Another benefit would be that the force would be 
directly controlled by the CO which would reduce ‘inherent delays’ that existed in the present 
system where requests for the intervention of troops had to referred to the COS and then to 
the WO. Also, the strategic reserve would not be constantly used for internal security 
operations and could be equipped and trained for limited and hot war operations.  
 
However, the WO was concerned that it would be difficult to recruit sufficient manpower for 
the gendarmerie. The WO also noted that the report had not specified how large the force 
should be; they estimated that it would require a minimum operational strength of 2500. 
However, they thought that even this may be too small because of the number of operations 
which were ongoing at the time or might begin in the future. The WO thought that a specialist 
counter insurgency unit would be in competition with the regular army for recruits and would 
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be limited operationally by its training, equipment and cost.
649
 The gendarmerie would also 
require considerable facilities and an administrative organisation both in the UK and in the 
colonies. WO argued that even if the gendarmerie utilised existing Army facilities these 
overheads would initially be expensive. WO stated that if was forced meet the cost of the 
gendarmerie there would have to be a corresponding cut in the active army.  This they 
concluded would mean creating a force which could only be used for special operations and 
replacing forces which could be used in any emergency. The WO also thought that it would 
be politically difficult to create a para-military force for use in the colonies which operated 
under civilian control. The Army Council concurred, and noted that it was ‘not desirable to 
form a military or para-military force to operate under civil authority in colonial territories’. 
The WO stated that colonial police forces should form their own specialist units. This marked 
the end of the WO appraisal of the report.   
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Chapter Six: The 1956 Defence Review and the Sandys White 
Paper 
 
 
After the publication of the report Beddington-Behrens wrote several letters to Head stating 
that the League was willing to assist the WO in its efforts to publicise the work of the Army. 
On 5 February 1956 Head wrote back to Beddington-Behrens stating that he, the Army 
Council and Templer welcomed the return of an active Army League but would not give it 
official support or information.
650
 Head stated that he thought the report was most interesting 
and would be useful to the WO. The WO had drawn up a memorandum on the benefits of 
being associated with the League for the Army Council.
651
 WO officials stated that the 
League should not be a propaganda organization like the Navy League or Air League. 
However, they wanted the League to act as a kind of ‘Brains trust’ which could produce 
papers on defence matters. The primary function of the League was to inform the public of 
the role of Army and it continuing importance in the nuclear age. On 7
 
March  Faviell wrote 
to the new secretary of the League Council Brigadier J.R. Vernham stating that the League 
needed to focus more on ‘matters of the more personal aspect of the service’ rather than 
strategic questions.
652
 On 3 July 1956 the League Council held a meeting to discuss the 
impact of the report and the future direction of the League.
653
 It was decided to make Hore-
Belisha President of the League and Julian Amery became Chairman of the Council. The final 
cost of printing the report and distributing it was £661. The Council decided that because of 
the wide publicity which the report had received it would begin recruiting new members. It 
was also decided that the study group would start work on new report which would be 
completed in 1958.  
 
The Council assumed that because America and Russia both possessed the H-bomb the 
likelihood of a world war was greatly reduced. They also noted that because the British H-
bomb test was imminent. They considered that the strategic implications of this would be far 
reaching and would bring about ‘large scale cuts in manpower and expenditure of the 
services’. The Council stated that the study group should examine whether ‘trip wire’ or the 
‘graduated deterrent’ posture was the best strategic policy for the UK to adopt. The ‘trip wire’ 
policy advocated a conventional NATO force in Europe which if attacked would trigger 
American massive response with its strategic nuclear weapons. The graduated deterrent was 
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based on the use of tactical nuclear weapons primarily against military targets but in portion 
to scale of the enemy attack. This was based on the concept of economy of force and the 
possibility of limited nuclear war. The study group also decided to debate the merits of 
national service and whether it could be abolished. The study group were also considering the 
possibility of using African manpower, the expansion of colonial forces and a foreign legion. 
The League had no intention of focusing on the terms and conditions of soldiers. Any future 
study would focus on strategic issues. However, the Government was beginning a far 
reaching a comprehensive review of British defence and security policy.     
 
On 4 June 1956 the Secretary of the Cabinet, Sir Norman Brook, circulated a Cabinet Paper 
which set-out to re-assess British defence policy in light of changes to Soviet objectives and 
aims.
654
 Eden’s often quoted contribution to this paper was to state, ‘that we must now cut our 
coat according to our cloth. There is not much cloth’. Therefore, international and domestic 
economic pressures and the rapid enervation of British trade are key elements within all 
policy considerations in the late 1950s. This is undeniable and is a persuasive argument to 
explain both the decline of British prestige and her status as a global power after 1945. 
Darwin maintains that successive British governments in the 1950s were obsessed with 
restoring Britain’s pre-war position as a centre of international finance, commerce and with 
the validity of Sterling and convertibility.
655
 The subsequent Suez crisis destroyed any 
pretence (both within the government and internationally) that Britain could sustain Sterling 
as a viable international currency and secure oil supplies vital to British industry without the 
support of the United States.
656
 Eden argued in June 1956 that the main threats to British 
interests and influence were ‘political and economic and not military’ and that ‘our policies 
should be adapted to meet the changed situation’.657 Eden and the government maintained that 
the risk of a major conventional war had diminished and that planning and allocation of 
resources for a significant confrontation constituted an unnecessary drain on the UK 
diminished resources and its future ability to counter threats to British influence across the 
globe. The seismic shifts in strategic policy and defence planning attributed to the immediate 
aftermath of the Suez Crisis, which the 1957 Defence White paper is often cited as being a 
prime example of, were in fact the product of the preceding two years of debate on defence, 
conscription and economic policies within the Cabinet and government departments. 
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Eden stated in a minute to the Defence Policy Review Committee that it was ‘vital’ to protect 
overseas interests and prestige, and in particular access to oil.
658
 This perception would 
subsequently lead to Britain and France protecting its ‘national interests’ by attacking Egypt 
in November 1956 and attempting to reassert their regional hegemony and humiliate Nasser’s 
brand of Arab nationalism viewed as a threat both to British prestige and access to oil.  Eden 
had also instructed officials from the three Service Departments, MOD, the Ministry of 
Supply and the Ministry of Labour and National Service to carry out an examination on the 
future of National Service.
659
 The ‘rationale’ for the Government’s study on Conscription was 
the perennial problem of finding manpower for the military and industry, or, as the 
Committee contended,  ‘the present paper examines various methods of reducing the demand 
made upon the manpower of this country by National Service’.660 However, Selwyn Lloyd 
effectively limited the scope of the Committee’s deliberations by stating that the envisaged 
size of the Armed Forces in 1958 (the year Conscription Act was due to expire) would be 
700,000; armed forces of this scale could only be met by using conscription. Conversely, in 
1954 the Government stated that it could only provide production and resources for new 
equipment for 8 regular divisions, instead of 10, and two TA divisions, rather than 4.
661
 This 
rearmament programme was due to be completed between 1961-63. In 1955 the Army had 
440,000 men, women and boys serving with the colours: the regular component of the army 
totalled 216,000 men and 8000 women, 5000 boys and there were 200,000 conscripts.
662
 In 
other words, using the Government’s 1954 figures, Britain could only afford or had the 
industrial capacity to re-equip 72% of the present army with modern weapons and equipment 
by 1963. In 1956 Major General BT Wilson (retired) argued in Brassey’s Annual that Britain 
was only able to equip and maintain a regular Army of five or six divisions or 200,000 men 
based on available economic resources and production facilities.   
 
In June 1955 a paper produced by the WO for The Long Term Defence Programme (LTDP) 
stated that a re-examination of the organisation and tactics of the Army because of the impact 
of tactical nuclear weapons was in progress.
663
 The aim was to reduce the ‘variety of weapons 
and transport’ in the battle-zone and increase firepower. But it was anticipated that new 
equipment would be needed for both the Hot War and the Cold War roles, which the report 
                                                 
658
 CAB 134/1315, PR (56) 11, Policy Review Committee of Cabinet on assumptions for future 
planning, 15 June 1956. 
659
 DEFE 7/979, MISC/P(55)33, ‘Future of National Service Scheme’, 25 August 1955.  
660
 DEFE 7/979, MISC/P(55)33, ‘Future of National Service Scheme’, 25 August 1955. 
661
 CAB 129/69, C, (54) 250, ‘Report by the Committee on Defence Policy’, 24 July 1954. 
662
 Cmd 9391, Statement on Defence 1955 Annex 1 Analysis of Active Strength, February 1955   
London: HMSO p27.  
663
 DEFE 7/979, COS (55) 59, ‘The Long Term Defence Programme Paper by the War Office Part I’, 
18 June 1955.  
 209 
stated would take time to produce and deploy. It was noted that this new equipment would be 
more expensive than existing equipment, and would require a ‘bigger not a smaller re-
equipment programme’. The scope of the rearmament programme included not only 
technologically advanced systems like missiles, armoured vehicles, Very High Frequency 
(VHF) radios, and radar firing systems but also small arms and ammunition. However, it did 
state ‘that present day financial stringency’ would govern the progress of the re-armament 
plan. This paper did not envisage drastic cuts in manpower over the next five years for the 
Army (from 400,000 to 380,000) or the termination of conscription, unless existing 
commitments were cut and new equipment became available after 1960. But at this point the 
Army was projecting a negligible change to its future manpower requirements, based on the 
fact that it had only just begun examining the impact of new weapons and tactics on the 
existing army organisational structure; and because they were envisaging a slow rearmament 
process because of economic constraints and production difficulties. This would mean that the 
army would be tied to its present logistical and administrative arrangements until new 
technology or cuts in commitments freed up manpower and equipment resources.  
 
The Hull Committee recommended that reductions in manpower were achievable by 
civilianisation of base units both in the UK and, to a limited extent, in overseas bases and 
would result in a 1 to 1 ratio of teeth to tail units.
664
 The study group argued along similar 
lines as the WO paper maintaining that there was still a case for having a viable reserve and 
that considerable numbers of troops should be retained overseas in strategic locations to 
mitigate the inevitable disruption to communication and transport routes by nuclear weapons 
at the outset of a major war. Essentially, the League was advocating a continuation of the 
policy of broken- backed warfare. Inadvertently, the 1955 WO LTDP paper presented a 
strong case as to why manpower and the overall size of the Army would have to be reduced if 
the scale and scope of the next phase of post-war rearmament and modernisation programme 
was going to be realised: because of the reduced amount of resources available for new 
equipment. Navias states that throughout 1955 and 1956, the services placed considerable 
emphasis on retaining multiple capabilities which would have required retaining conscription 
in some form.
665
 In November 1955 the Middle East and Africa were still considered of prime 
strategic importance by the COS and the League both in the Cold War and a potential Hot 
War. However, the WO argued that between 1955 and 1963 the likelihood of a global war 
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was slight: like the study groups, they thought that limited wars and Cold War operations 
would increase.
666
  
 
On 8 June Sir Richard Powell, the Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Defence, sent a 
memorandum to Monckton, Defence Minister, setting out what problems he perceived would 
impinge on defence planning in light of Eden’s present review. Powell argued, ‘it was 
accepted’ that Britain was ‘over committed’, and must therefore reduce it commitments ‘of all 
kinds’, he qualified this by statement by adding, ‘including defence commitments’.667 Clearly 
there was a perception that overseas commitments, presumably including colonial territories, 
must be dispensed with and that this had in theory been ‘accepted’. However, Powell also 
argued, ‘there is little prospect of any significant reduction in the near future of our defence 
commitments in the Middle or Far East’ which alludes to a lack of timetable or coherent 
political direction at this stage other than a desire for wider reductions at some point when 
conditions were favourable. The only two areas that Powell thought could allow significant 
reductions in the defence programme were ‘the forces maintained in Continental Europe in 
peace’ and ‘preparations for global war, including the defence of the UK and the 
accumulation of war reserves’.668 However, Powell was adroit enough to recognise that any 
reduction in Britain’s contribution to Europe could have adverse effects on the NATO 
alliance and it members, particularly the Americans. Powell also pointed out that any 
reductions would have to made in light of the governments perceptions regarding the 
likelihood of the ‘risk of war’, which presumably meant a global conflict with the Soviet 
Union, these decisions he concluded were ‘primarily a  political  matter’. Future direction of 
defence policy was increasingly linked to the government’s assessment of the possible type of 
major conflict the UK would become involved in and whether that war would involve a 
nuclear exchange negating existing preparations.  
 
The situation regarding NATO conventional forces, however was possibly subject to 
alteration, due to the creation of the West German Armed Forces, which Powell argued could 
facilitate a reduction in Britain’s present overall force levels. Powell did place a caveat on this 
by stating, that the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and the NATO Military 
Committee would not allow any ‘re-examination’ until the German forces were fully trained 
and  brought to full operational efficiency which would take several years to achieve.
669
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Powell also added, that SACEUR would probably argue that there were insufficient 
conventional forces to completely defend the whole of the NATO area and as consequence 
would naturally block attempts at reductions. Powell was quick to point out that even a token 
show of resistance would be enough to ‘warn of a situation’ for the use of ‘nuclear 
retaliation’, although he qualified this statement by arguing, that SACEUR and the Americans 
would have to be consulted on this point before a policy based on the concept of trip wire 
could be formulated. Regarding the risk of war Powell was unequivocal, ‘we believe’ that the 
Soviet Union ‘had concluded that the risk of nuclear retaliation is not worth running’ and 
‘they have put aside any intention of realising by force their objective of making the world 
safe for Communism’.670 The ‘new’ threat from the Soviet Union was perceived to be an 
economic and political one. Powell even described the recent outbreak of détente and moves 
toward unilateral disarmament as ‘superficial’ and trade agreements and cultural relations, as 
‘economic and political penetration’. Powell argued that NATO should not reduce its active 
military capacity in light of recent Soviet pronouncements but should remain vigilant. This 
perception was echoed by the study group report because they were concerned that public 
opinion might being swayed by Soviet gestures of peace and would undermine British 
defence policy considerations or decisions which appeared to be out of step with détente.  
 
Powell argued that NATO policy had wider implications for British defence and economic 
policies, ‘any reduction would make a significant reduction on military overheads, which is 
where the bulk of the money goes, would have to be large: two or three divisions at least’. 
Smaller reductions would in the long run actually increase the overall proportion spent on 
overheads due to inflation and the fact that running costs for over-sea garrisons were 
constantly on the increase and would in a short space of time amount to the same as  the 
original costs. Therefore, it would have to be a rapid substantial reduction to constitute a real 
saving in economic terms which was conversely more politically difficult to achieve. Britain 
was entering a period of economic and political realignment which coincided with 
corresponding shifts in international systems (United Nations and bi-polarity) and perceptions 
regarding Cold War security and colonialism. Powell went on to state that Britain’s forces 
should realigned to make them suitable to undertake operations for limited wars and Cold 
War operations, and that the ‘principle fields of investigation’ for the defence review were 
reducing bomber and fighter squadrons, stock piles of material for global war, the size and 
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composition of the peacetime navy, in particular aircraft carrier battle groups, and its role in 
limited war and the size of anti-submarine forces. The notable exception in this list is the size 
of the Army and its future manpower requirements for future operations.  
 
On 13 June Sir Norman Brook, Secretary to the Cabinet, circulated a memorandum, entitled, 
The Future of the United Kingdom in World Affairs: The Problem, for consultation among 
the departments involved in the policy review. This memorandum contained outline proposals 
with how to deal with present and expected problems in the economic, foreign and military 
fields.
671
 The paper stressed that there were two main factors why the government had 
undertaken this review, ‘the external situation confronting us had changed’ and ‘it is clear 
since the end of the war we have tried to do too much- with the result that we have only rarely 
been free from danger of economic crisis’.672 This could also apply to every government 
defence review since the war. The Cabinet considered that the external situation had been 
most recently been effected by the advent of hydrogen weapons which they argued had 
‘transformed the military’ position. This assessment was correct and mirrored the strategic 
thinking of other governments and military commentators. This perception was qualified by 
stating that the Russians had recognised this as well and were ‘adapting their actions to it’. 
But to emphasize that this was not a genuine act of détente by the Soviets they speculated that 
‘while objectives may remain unaltered, their methods of attaining them are changing’. This 
they concluded would diminish the importance of conventional forces, however, there was a 
recognition that they were of some value in ‘certain situations’. 
 
The economic vagaries, which had beset Britain since 1945, were blamed ‘on attempting to 
do too much’, which is a clear conformation of the overstretch theories that have dominated 
post-war studies of British foreign policy. However, this statement is only partially true and 
must be viewed as such, because there is a condition attached to their declaration, ‘we must 
now concentrate on essentials’. The shedding of unimportant or redundant commitments was 
wholly expected occurrence derived from the normalisation of the post-war international 
situation after Korea and the re-emergence of West Germany, Italy and Austria as nation 
states again. The preceding decade had radically altered the international order and had seen 
the economic, strategic and political emergence and domination of the Soviet Union and the 
United States on the international stage. Although, Britain had been forced to attempt too 
much its options had been dictated by her status as a major victorious power  in the Second 
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World War and by the fact Britain was still responsible for governing and protecting the 
millions of people who lived in the Empire and giving leadership to the emerging 
Commonwealth. In fact the memorandum stated that the impetus for this review was not 
painful reassessment of a decade of overstretch, but a confirmation that the Soviet Union had 
changed its tactics, and that the hydrogen bomb had radically altered the international 
situation. The threat now poised by the Soviet Union was economic and ideological and 
Britain needed to stabilise its economy to meet this new threat, whilst maintaining a defensive 
posture based on ‘massive retaliation’ and flexible forces for operations outside of Europe. 
 
On 6 June Sir Richard Powell wrote to the Minister of Defence, Walter Monckton, stating, 
‘we are overcommitted everywhere and must reduce our commitments of all kinds, including 
defence commitments’.673 However, Powell was more cautious in his appraisal of the 
possibilities for reductions in overseas commitments in the Middle East and Far East which 
he considered to be long-term and would require considerable amounts of manpower and 
material. Although the Canal Zone had been evacuated Britain still had troops in Libya and a 
military presence in Jordan, Iraq and was building up the garrison on Cyprus and in Aden. 
The Suez Crisis would change many of the assumptions made in the memorandum, but the 
process of change had been instigated before the invasion. Hennessy contends ‘that by 
October 1956 nothing could deflect Eden from his determination to topple Nasser. Whitehall 
had never experienced anything quite so bizarre’.674  Eden and the Cabinet had been informed 
by the Foreign Office and the JIC and that hostile action against Egypt would result in an 
Anglo-American schism. The COS of Staff had argued that if a military operation was 
successfully mounted then Britain would have to leave an extensive garrison in the Canal 
Zone (at least 80,000) and carry-out major counter-insurgency operations in an attempt to 
govern the country.
675
 The COS of Staff argued that the permanent retention of conscription 
would be the logical consequence of any successful military operation at Suez. This would 
provide the additional four divisions plus administration units required to control the Canal 
Zone and install a new regime in Cairo and then keep it power; even with the retention of 
conscription a division would have been indefinitely withdrawn from Germany as well as the 
permanent deployment of the UK strategic reserve.
676
 The memorandum had argued that the 
retention of conventional forces for global garrisons and dealing with ‘emergencies’ was 
expensive and should be avoided at all costs.  
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The COS argued that the Canal Zone garrison would be subject to constant guerrilla attack by 
pro Nasser forces and therefore the occupation would be bloody and costly in human terms 
for both sides. This would have been politically disastrous for British prestige in the region 
and in the international community and would have left a bitter legacy in the region and 
would have been equally as divisive as the invasion had been both at home and abroad. 
Another factor was that there was potentially no time limit of extrication of the garrison.  
Although the Canal Zone Company lease ended in 1968, which meant that any tenuous legal 
claim of protecting British assets would in theory expire then, Britain possibly could have 
been committed for decades trying to maintain internal security within Egypt. A new puppet 
regime may have been persuaded to renew the Canal lease, but in the eyes of the world, and 
more importantly the United Nations, it would have been seen as a sham and the dictate of an 
aggressor. Success at Suez would have been in the long run more detrimental to Britain 
because it would have been economically and militarily profligate and destroyed British 
credibility on the international stage at a time when colonialism was at odds with United 
Nations and the aspirations of nationalists clamouring for constitutional change and 
independence.   
 
Unlike the situation in June, when the process had begun, the events of the preceding months 
had radically altered the economic, political and military situation for the UK. On 26 July 
1956 the Egyptian Government nationalised the Suez Canal Company. On 30 July the British 
announced that it was making precautionary measures of a military kind. However, the crisis 
quickly showed how inefficient military planning and forces were in respect of limited war. 
British planning and conventional forces were directed toward Europe and a Soviet attack. 
Another problem was that British forces were deployed on counter insurgency operations in 
Cyprus, Malaya and Kenya meaning that they were ill-equipped and trained for a limited war. 
This meant that period of training and re-equipping would be required before a task force of 
sufficient strength could be concentrated and dispatched. It would also take time to assemble 
landing craft and the naval power in the Mediterranean necessary to launch an amphibious 
assault. It would therefore take time to take military action against Egypt. The Government 
was forced to mobilize the Army reserve to find enough manpower for the operation. 
Deficiencies were found in the mobilization scheme. Much of the equipment used by British 
forces was dated and or a poor state of repair from constant use. A lack of heavy lift capacity 
reduced the mobility of British forces. The small number of available tank landing ships 
severely reduced the size of the armour units deployed.  
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On 29 October Israel attacked Egyptian forces. The next day the British and French delivered 
an ultimatum to Israel and Egypt to withdraw from the area around the Suez Canal. On 31 
October British and French air forces launched attacked Egyptian air fields by the 2 
November the Egyptian air force ceased to exist as a fighting force. On 5 November British 
and French air borne troops landed around Port Said. The following morning British and 
French forces mounted an amphibious assault on Port Said. Militarily the operation had been 
a successful but there were many questioned raised about the state of equipment and the 
capabilities of the armed forces to rapidly mount large scale amphibious operations. What 
defeated the British was a run on the pound and the refusal of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) to give Britain an emergency loan. Twenty four hours after the first landings 
Eden was forced to announce that he would accept a cease-fire brokered by the UN. The war 
had made it apparent that Britain could no longer act independently of the United States. 
Similarly, a considerable amount of military equipment needed modernising. Airborne 
operations had shown that greater emphasis should be placed on air portable systems. The 
navy needed new assault ships and specialist helicopters and aircraft carriers capable of 
handling assault forces would be needed. The war had shown how the air transport system 
was totally inadequate and that there was a complete lack of tactical transport aircraft capable 
of using primitive and small airfields. However, this modernisation required a realistic 
appraisal of British strategic and defence policy.  
 
Ironically the Suez crisis allowed radical alteration to strategic policy without domestic 
recrimination or loss of international prestige because both had already occurred. Head 
replaced Monckton in October as Minister of Defence, mainly because Monckton had been 
the most vociferous opponent of military action to solve the Nasser question within the 
Cabinet, and John Hare
677
 took over as Minster of War. On 24 November Head was placed in 
a difficult position by Macmillan, after the latter had sent a letter stating that major cuts in 
defence expenditure was needed due to the dire economic situation which was unfolding due 
to Suez and because of the need to finalise planning for the defence estimates in December. 
On the 30 November Head sent a terse reply and argued, that a ‘clear cut agreement’ had not 
been reached regarding the long-term defence plan, this he thought was the ‘fact that really 
mattered’ and that he was ‘only to aware of the difficulties of our financial situation  and of 
the circumstances which have prompted your letter’.678 Given the dire economic position at 
that time Macmillan was clearly searching for instant public spending savings which could in 
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the short term bring some relief, whilst Head was only too aware of Macmillan present 
economic concerns he sought to limit the damage which a snap decision could have on the 
Services. Macmillan had increasingly wanted to push through major defence cuts to save 
money since he had become Chancellor.
679
 When Macmillan had been Minister of Defence 
felt that the post lacked real authority and was diluted by the other three service-ministers and 
service COS this in turn created inertia which he argued made change difficult to implement. 
Macmillan likened the post of Minister of Defence to that of a ‘medieval king or emperor’ 
whose authority was constantly being challenged by ‘powerful feudatories’.680 Head however, 
argued that the Minister of Defence if backed fully by the Prime Minister and the Defence 
Policy Review Committee could wield effect control of the Service Departments and 
Ministers. He did concede that the defence policy considerations were presently being 
discussed at ‘great length’ which had the effect of leading to compromise at Cabinet level. 
This was dissipating clear direction at Cabinet level and in the long run costing more money 
on defence procurement, due to delay and constant discussion delaying policy decisions. 
Head felt that unpalatable decisions should be imposed on the COS of Staff and Service 
Departments and backed by the Prime Minister and thrashed out at  Policy Review Level and 
the objections of the Service Chief’s should be ignored, even if they were vociferous.681 In 
other words, greater political direction at Cabinet level and a stronger Minister of Defence 
responsible directly to the Prime Minister. . 
 
Head further stated that the absence of the Prime Minister had left him impotent when dealing 
with the Service COS and departments until after Christmas when Eden was due to return. 
Clearly Head was attempting to resist Macmillan’s pressure to impose wider ranging cuts on 
the armed forces to help dissipate the growing economic problem. Head did concede that 
adopting nuclear weapons would help reduce defence spending, but was adamant that Britain 
should rely on its own nuclear technology and not that of the American’s to maintain 
independence in defence matters and the retain leadership of the Commonwealth. The area 
where the most savings in defence expenditure could, in Heads opinion, be made was in the 
reduction of manpower. Head argued that conscription was ‘wasteful and inefficient’ and that 
it tied up to many men in training and achieved high experience levels and involved 
considerable numbers of men in transit.
682
 Head is clearly echoing what most military 
commentators at the time were saying including the League. He further argued ‘that a 
reduction in manpower would not be as drastic as it might appear numerically, because in the 
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Air Force and the Army the reduction would fall in the first instance on the National Service 
element’. This could be achieved by reducing commitments and after ‘recent events’ the 
Army’s possible limited war commitments could be reduced as well. Head acknowledged that 
carrying out this kind of reduction would not allow ‘massive’ reinforcement in a limited war 
in the Far East or ‘even’ in the Middle East. Head described colonial operations as Cold War 
commitments and argued, ‘I am inclined to think that they are apt, within certain limits, to be 
of the size and number of the Army Units available. If they are somewhat fewer, then the 
Colonial Governor will see to it that his intelligence and police arrangements are improved 
because he will realise that he cannot count on being able to call up  rapidly  two or three 
battalions of British infantry’.683 This perception is important because it states that 
improvements in local security measures would be forced on Governors if they could not 
expect any substantial British military assistance. This would possibly negate wide scale 
security operations from occurring, which the Defence Policy Review argued were expensive 
and politically counterproductive.  
 
In December Eden circulated a minute in which he stated that he had ‘authorised’ the Minister 
of Defence to work out a long-term defence plan based on the following assumptions; ‘Our 
defence policy should be based on the principle of smaller Forces equipped with fully up to 
date weapons, Our commitments and overheads should be adjusted to match these smaller 
forces, the armed forces should be reduced to 450,000 (Army 200,000) by April 1961 or 
earlier.
684
 Eden further stated that the Armed Forces should make greater use of civilians and 
the UK should not be ‘entirely’ dependent on the United States for supply’s of atomic 
weapons and equipment. The other net looser was to be the Royal Air Force which would 
have to brace itself for heavy cuts in day fighter air-craft and other air-craft. On 3 January 
1957 Salisbury’s Committee on National Service held its last meeting before Macmillan made 
his decision to terminate conscription on 27 January 1957. The Committee which now 
included Head and Ian Macleod, Minister of Labour and National Service and Viscount 
Hailsham, First Lord of the Admiralty. This meeting was dominated by the findings of a 
report submitted by the Central Statistical Office which confirmed what had been discussed 
on numerous occasions and what was common knowledge that regular recruitment would not 
sustain a force level of 200,000 for the Army.
685
 The number of servicemen which regular 
recruitment would provide by 1960 was estimated at 320,000 or a short fall of a 130,000 of 
the government’s proposed figure of 450,000. Although Macleod recognised that the short 
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fall was a problem, he argued that a ballot system be adopted to find the 130,000.
686
 This 
would have meant finding an annual draft of 75,500 men on a two year national service 
enlistment, at least in the short-term until regular recruitment reached projected force levels. 
However, Macleod argued that the ending of National Service should be ‘seriously 
considered’. Macleod felt that the projected regular recruitment figure was ‘conservative’, and 
pointed out if the government did attempt to retain conscription for such a small number of 
men it would have to contemplate the abolition of the whole system because it would be 
‘inherently difficult’ to convince the public and therefore politically problematic. Another 
factor which was going to be a problem, was that by the mid 1960s there would be 450,000 
men eligible for National Service that the ratio of men called up for service which Macleod 
argued, ‘would be  too small to make national service either acceptable or workable’.687  
 
On 11 January 1957 the COS of Staff acknowledged that a change in operational and overseas 
commitments had occurred in light of ‘recent events in the Middle East’.688 Smaller garrisons 
based in Cyprus, Aden, Kenya and Libya which would allow three battalions for internal 
security across the Middle East would be the norm from now on. The COS argued that most 
of the Middle East and North Africa and Sub Saharan Africa would now not allow over 
flights or staging rights for British aircraft. The importance of West Africa for British air 
movement therefore became critical post-Suez and the possible use of Turkish airspace as 
considered being vital. The various operational requirements of the Army and the Armed 
Forces such as operation HORTIAN, CAPITAL, JACKSON and LANDSEER which covered 
deployment of troops to Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and Trucial Oman respectively were still seen 
as essential. Each of these deployments would have involved the deployment of one battalion 
and were still pertinent post Suez because they would have been in support of indigenous 
regimes, whether from exogenous aggression or internal revolutionary activity in both cases 
British forces were obligated to intervene if requested. Although Suez had had a marked 
effect on unilateral action, however, as the COS quite rightly pointed out Britain still had 
considerable possible commitments and would require access to air movement and bases to 
project military forces for rapid deployment.  
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On 5 February 1957 the COS Committee published their own appraisal of the Long Term 
Defence Review.
689
 The COS argued that the proposed drop in service strength from 737,000 
to 450,000 as being one of ‘considerable magnitude’ which ‘represented a heavy loss of 
operational units’. They further argued, that ‘there are no military or strategic grounds which 
justify considerable reductions from the resources at present devoted to United Kingdom 
defence’. The reason they felt that the government was undertaking this review and changing 
policy was driven by economic motives which they ‘accepted’ as a ‘justifiable risk’ made by 
the government.
690
 The COS of Staff argued that the projected force levels would be the 
‘minimum’ for Britain’s defence requirements and commitments until 1961. They also added 
a proviso that these revised forces should be fully equipped with modern weapons to achieve 
their projected operational requirements. The Chief’s stated that ‘the Cold War pervades 
almost all aspects of our defence policy’. When describing Britain’s colonial defence 
requirements the Chief’s appraisal is revealing because it has anachronistic tone, ‘the United 
Kingdom has colonies, dependencies and other interests throughout the world. Nearly all 
these interests are coveted by other states and many by neighbouring states’. This perception 
seems at odds with the realities of the Cold War because the only states realistically who 
could covert British interests were the Soviet Union or the United States and additionally 
there is no real understanding of Britain’s future colonial role or its relationship with the 
United Nations. The colonies still appear to be prestige assets which have significant strategic 
importance rather than being potential political and economic liabilities which was the 
conclusion that the government and more importantly the Cabinet was beginning make.  
 
The COS also argued that British interests in East Africa could only be safe guarded by 
utilising forces from the Middle East in an emergency and conversely argued that the same 
was true for Africa. In all probabilities it was felt that in a major conflict the Suez Canal 
would be blocked to British warships and troop ships and that air routes would denied as well. 
They considered that this problem ‘dominated’ British strategic planning. To close the 
expected gap in Britain’s strategic communications the Chief’s envisaged deploying a strong 
naval carrier group in the Indian Ocean which would have a the new innovation of a 
commando carrier which could deploy a Royal Marine Commando by ‘beach or 
helicopter’.691 The COS also advocated the building up the British military presence in Kenya 
to Brigade level with additional equipment. This they stated would allow ‘stability and help to 
ensure the tranquil development of British and protected territories in East and Central 
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Africa’. The use of mobile sea borne forces was a pragmatic and historical way of imposing 
British interests and when combined with the strategic bases was a logical policy to adopt. 
The COS were primary concerned to ‘bring power to bear’ by ‘demonstrating’ air and sea 
power. However, they argued that the ability of Britain to maintain ‘a relatively independent 
line’ would as a consequence of reducing conventional forces would  be ‘inevitably’ be 
restricted.  
 
This was the position regarding National Service and the wider issue of defence commitments 
when Macmillan became Prime Minister on 10 January 1957. On the 13 January Macmillan 
appointed Duncan Sandys, Minister of Defence. Heads removal was inevitable given his 
intransigent over the issue of reductions in manpower and his support for continuing some 
form of National Service until regular recruitment could maintain the Army and as Macmillan 
stated ‘I felt doubtful whether he would agree to the level of defence expenditure for the 
following year’.692 Macmillan in his memoirs stated that when he was Minister of Defence he 
had been frustrated by the apparent lack of control which could be exerted over the Service 
COS due to the fact that the Minister of Defence had no real authority over the three services 
and his first act as Prime Minister was to strengthen the authority of Sandys.
693
  
 
Sandys like Head had been a member of the Army League and had a reputation for being 
difficult to work with; he liked to run his department by divide and rule pitting each of the 
Services Departments and Service COS against each other.
694
 However, Sandys was greatly 
assisted by the fact that inter-service rivalry had been prevalent for years which made his task 
easier and suited his style of management. Strachan argues that Sandy’s tenure at the Ministry 
of Defence was successful because he had the complete backing of Macmillan and when this 
waned Sandys position with the Service COS and his authority was dissipated. Heads letter to 
Macmillan on the 30 November 1956 had set out his prescription for an effective Minister of 
Defence who could dictate defence policy which had a central tenant the full support of the 
Prime Minister. Macmillan clearly understood this and Sandys was given his full support over 
the coming months. Macmillan was in full control of what was occurring at the MOD, this we 
can concur from comment made by Julian Amery in his diary, who became Under Secretary 
for War on 18 January 1957, on 10 September 1957 Amery attended a Defence Committee 
meeting to discuss nuclear weapons were he described the Prime Ministers demeanour, 
‘Harold [Macmillan] is quiet but fully in control analysing the problem and guiding the 
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discussion till he gets his way’.695 Macmillan and Sandy’s began preparing to abolish 
conscription and signal wide ranging cuts in conventional defence capacity, however, many 
of their subsequent decisions had been set in motion during 1956. Suez also allowed 
Macmillan to achieve many of the political and strategic considerations which were set out in 
the 1956 defence review.  
 
Sandy’s spent the coming months preparing his seminal white paper on defence. On 22 
February 1957 Sandys minuted the Cabinet setting out his review of defence plans.
696
 Sandys 
informed the Cabinet that the Government would abolish conscription as soon as it was 
‘practicable’ and would not be extending the call up beyond 1960. Sandys believed that it 
would be possible find adequate numbers of recruits to maintain regular armed forces in the 
region of 380,000. However, he stated ‘I must, however, emphasise that this plan, which is 
tailored to the possibilities of voluntary recruitment rather than to an independent assessment 
of defence needs, would appreciably affect our ability to exert military power in distant parts 
of the world and would inevitably reduce our influence in NATO, SEATO and the Baghdad 
alliance’. On 27 February Macmillan minuted that he agreed with the figure of 380,000.  The 
implication of this decision was that the Army would have strength of 165,000. The COS 
proposed that the Army have a minimum strength of 180,000.
697
 In March Julian Amery 
wrote to John Hare, Minister of War, stating that the White Paper should not include precise 
figures for the size of the armed forces.
698
  Amery argued that the figure of 165,000 was 
‘uncertain’ and might constitute a political ‘millstone around our necks’ if the Government 
published precise figures for the future size of the armed forces. However, this statement is 
disingenuous because not publishing precise manpower projections would have been 
unprecedented and roundly attacked by the press and the other political parties. On 14 March 
Amery sent Hare a memorandum which in his own words ‘I venture from a purely party as 
distinct from departmental point of view to put forward certain suggestions regarding the draft 
White Paper on Defence’.699  Amery stated that certain sections of the ‘Party’ would consider 
the paper was abrogating freedom of action to the United States which would cause ‘anxiety’. 
He also wanted the White Paper to state that some form of national service would be retained 
until sufficient regulars had come forward. Clearly Amery was attempting to limit the extent 
of the cut to the manpower level of the Army and he was supporting the COS.  
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On 25 March the COS complained that if they endorsed the Government’s proposals it would 
appear that they approved the strategic rationale behind the decision.
700
 On 1 April 1957 the 
Government published Defence: Outline of Future Policy.
701
 The paper had been redrafted a 
considerable number of times before being published. The paper stated that British defence 
would be based on nuclear deterrence and that conscription would be terminated in 1960.
702
 
However, the paper noted that if regular recruitment did not produce sufficient recruits then 
the Government would be forced to reintroduce a form of conscription.  
 
Conventional forces would be ‘reshaped and redistributed’ and British defence would rely on 
collective security. The paper noted that ‘growth in the power of weapons of mass destruction 
has emphasised the fact that no country can any longer protect itself in isolation’. Sandys 
decided that there was no longer a requirement for ‘self sufficient and balanced’ forces. The 
paper stated that a central reserve would create in the UK which would allow reductions in 
overseas garrisons. The central reserve would backed by a ‘substantial fleet of transport 
planes’ which would allow rapid mobility.703 The fleet would be supplemented by civil 
aircraft in an emergency. The paper noted that if a larger force was needed for an emergency 
then British forces from Germany would be dispatched as well. However, the paper argued 
that there would be a large reduction in day fighter strength of the 2 Tactical Air Force in 
Germany. Liddell Hart had always based his conventional forces levels in Germany on the 
assumption that there would air parity with Soviet forces. Although, the League’s report had 
argued for an increase in transport capability of the Army and the creation of a strategic 
reserve based in the UK the scale of the cuts to conventional forces was unprecedented.  On 9 
May Amery wrote to Hare stating that we are ‘agreed’ that an army of 165,000 will not be 
large enough to meet our requirements in 1962.
704
  Amery suggested that the Government 
increase the number of Gurkha and KAR units which would provide additional manpower 
and allow the Army to increase its manpower target to 180,000 without relying on national 
service. He also suggested an expansion of colonial forces on the grounds that they were 
cheaper than equivalent British forces. He described this as an insurance policy against poor 
regular recruitment. However, Sandys was constrained by Macmillan’s desire to reduce 
defence spending. The day Amery wrote to Hare Britain successfully detonated its first 
thermo-nuclear weapon. Julian Amery later remarked that having the h-bomb made Britain a 
major power again.  
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Having Julian Amery inside the WO made it difficult for him to openly criticise Government 
policy. He was longer involved with the directly involved with the League. His acceptance of 
the reductions in conventional force levels was inevitable given his position within the 
Government and his remark concerning the detonation of the h-bomb. Amery was tipped be a 
potential Cabinet minister and his personal relationship with Macmillan gave him 
considerable political kudos. In 1958 the League published a second Report entitled The 
British Army in the Nuclear Age which stated that ‘we endorse the view that a return to a 
regular Army is now the best policy’.705 But Darby stated that the League’s members had 
been divided over the issue.
706
 By 1958 the Chairman of the League was John Strachey MP 
and Colonel Tufton Beamish MP. Tufton Beamish was briefly Conservative defence 
spokesman in the 1960s. In 1960 the League held a luncheon in honour of Secretary of State 
for War, Christopher Soames. The luncheon was designed to launch a donation drive to raise 
£50,000 which would assist the League to continue its work.
707
 In February 1961 Liddell Hart 
resigned from the League to concentrate on his writing.
708
  
 
In early 1962 the League published report on obtaining the right kind officers for the Regular 
Army called a Challenge to Leadership. However, Liddell Hart wrote to Brain Bond that he 
had read the report and thought that it would make little impact on the press or the public.
709
 
By this point the chairman of the League was General Sir Richard Gale. Gale had recently 
been deputy to the NATO supreme allied commander in Europe. However, Gale had out 
spoken views on retaining a form of national service. In 1964 the Army League issued a 
pamphlet called The Army Britain Needs which argued that Britain needed either to reduce 
commitments or introduce selective compulsory military service of 30,000 men a year. Paget 
wrote a letter to the Times stating that his name had been used a co-author because he was a 
member of the study group but he said he had not been consulted on the contents of the 
pamphlet and was publically dissociating himself from its contents. In 1966 the League 
published a report on the British Defence Policy in South East Asia. This was the last report 
of the Army League which disbanded in 1967.  
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Conclusion  
 
 
The Army League under the leadership of Leo and Julian Amery had no influence over 
Government policy. It did not affect any change in Government policy during its many years 
of lobbying. It existence was a mild annoyance to the WO but it ideas did warrant two 
detailed examination. Also its activities were monitored by the Conservative Party Research 
Department. Because of its well connected and influential members the League could not 
ignored but it wielded limited political influence. Leo and Julian Amery used the League and 
its distinguished membership and their reports to court public and press attention and further 
their political aims. The League was created to assist the WO in its efforts to increase regular 
recruitment to the Army. However, Leo Amery soon used the assembled group of 
distinguished retired officers and noted businessmen to lobby the Government about its 
defence policy. After Munich Leo Amery argued that the League should concentrate on 
persuading the Government to introduce conscription. Although the League did not influence 
policy direction, the Government was clearly concerned enough ask Leo Amery to 
discontinue its publicity programme. This period was the high point of the League’s public 
activities. However, it was still small in comparison to other defence movements such as the 
Navy League and the Air League. The Army League was never embraced by the WO which 
probably stymied its growth into a larger more inclusive organisation. The League evolved 
into a small elitist group which saw its role as guardians of the Army. However, from its 
inception the League was beset by internal division over the direction of activities and the 
content of its reports. Many of the League council members wanted the League to concentrate 
on promoting the welfare and conditions of service of Army and away from strategic and 
policy matters.  
 
However, under the leadership of Leo Amery the League was destined to become a political 
pressure group. Leo Amery was in many respects incapable of not using the League as a 
political mouth piece. His many years working as a journalist and his outspoken views on 
Army reform, imperialism, tariff reform and protectionism made this inevitable. Leo Army 
understood the value of publicity as a means of increasing the political profile of an individual 
or an organisation. The 1937 report was small and inconsequential but it did provide publicity 
which Amery used to give the League a platform from which to build a case for a change in 
defence policy. The blend of retired senior officers, politicians and businessmen increased the 
creditability of the League and widened its appeal. It appeared to be an authoritative 
alternative voice regarding the Army to that of Government. The aims of the per-war League 
were met by the rapid collapse of the international system after Munich. The Leagues shift of 
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emphasis away from the Army recruitment to the promotion of conscription and air defence 
was indicative of the rapidly changing political climate which was shifting toward a policy of 
military intervention against Germany. Leo Amery was one the principle detractors of 
Chamberlain’s appeasement policy. His involvement in the League added legitimacy to his 
arguments and gave him another public platform to air his views on defence policy. However, 
the League did not shape or change Government policy in the 1930s.  
 
The League which emerged after the Second World War was smaller and became an elite 
group. During the first years of the Cold War the League existed on paper only. Leo Amery 
decision to reform the League was again based on the assumption that the League would 
campaign on welfare issues for the Army. However, once again Leo Amery decided that 
League should increasingly focus on strategic issues. The study group which was formed in 
1950 was now the core of the League. The inclusion of Liddell Hart increased the quality and 
breath of research and analysis within the League. Also the arrival of Julian Amery breathed 
new life into the League and gave it a presence within the House of Commons. Leo Amery 
with the help of Liddell Hart created new study group which included members of both the 
main parties. Leo Amery again sought official recognition and was rejected. However, the 
League did contribute to Templer Committee which appeared to bode well for future 
endorsement from the WO for their activities. However, the committee did not record their 
contribution in their final report. This is more evidence of the study group failure to elicit 
official recognition.  The WO wished to consult because they were concerned that the League 
could be a potential source of trouble. The Labour administration was keen to keep the study 
group at arm’s length but was astute enough to indulge the study group by giving them access 
to the committee.  
 
By the end of 1951 the study group was beginning to work on a major report which would be 
its first published material since the 1930s. However, Leo Amery decided that the report 
should be focus on strategic policy as well developments in the sphere of nuclear weapons 
and conventional forces. This again led to Conservative party officials questioning the 
direction of the League and its motives. The involvement of Julian Amery who had assumed 
Leo Amery’s mantel of arch-imperialist within the Conservative Party further complicated the 
real motives of the study groups report. The study group was becoming a vehicle for the 
conceptual ideas of Liddell Hart and the political and strategic vision of Julian and Leo 
Amery. Because of Julian Amery participation in the Suez Group and his outspoken views on 
foreign and defence policy the study group report developed a greater importance. Liddell 
Hart gave the 1955 report substance while the involvement of Julian Amery made it 
politically significant. The report also was the last significant political and strategic work 
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which Leo Amery participated in before his death. The death of Leo Amery signified the 
handing over of the imperialist flame to Julian Amery.  
 
The report was the subject of WO scrutiny but was dismissed on the grounds that it was 
impracticable and unworkable. Many of Liddell Hart’s ideas on reducing the tail and 
increasing teeth units were radical and would have necessitated a major re-organisation of the 
Army. The study group stance on a contentious issue such as national service was ambiguous. 
There was a strong strand of imperial continuity in the report which did not reflect the 
realities of the Cold War or the reduced economic and strategic position of the UK. The use 
of colonial manpower to supplement British manpower was at odds with the perceptions of 
the Templer Security Report which was advocating more local control of indigenous forces. 
Many of the study group’s proposals were beyond the economic capacity of the UK. The 
report considered British economic and strategic problems to be temporary. However, the 
reality was that the Britain was living beyond it means and military spending was spiralling 
out of control. The report reiterated the importance of imperial bases and the retention of the 
African colonies as a crucial strategic consideration within the dynamics of the Cold War. 
This again did not reflect the realities of the political situation in West Africa or developments 
in Kenya. However, the report carefully considered the effect of nuclear weapons on the 
Army organisation and presented ideas which could be developed.  
 
However, the WO rejected nearly all of the report’s recommendations. The most significant 
study was carried out into the Auxiliary Service Corps, but the political uncertainty 
surrounding the use of overseas manpower meant that even this suggestion was dismissed. 
The Army League attempted to offer its services to the WO but this was rejected on the 
grounds that official recognition would not be appropriate. There was some debate within the 
WO that the League might be used for ‘propaganda’ but the in the final analysis the League 
would have been hard to control and could have quickly become a liability. This diminished 
the usefulness of the League as a potential outlet for the WO to promote policy outside the 
usual channels of Government. However, it can be construed that the personal reputation of 
the members of the League increased as a consequence of their involvement with the group, 
because they received favourable press for the report from the media which made them 
appear to be ‘defence experts’ working analogously of the Government. However, this 
appears to be the limit of the League’s influence. It is apparent that the WO listened to what 
the League had to say because the League had the ability to make life uncomfortable for 
Government. However, respectful indulgence is not the same as having influence. Clearly the 
League was not a pressure group which achieved any meaningful change on the Government 
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policy. The 1955 report represents a strategic vision which was too wedded to the past, yet 
was also too radical in its approach too effect army reorganisation.   
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